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Foreword 
 
 
 
 
The Phenomenology of Economics is part of a larger project. While the target here is one particular 
economic discourse, economic science, a full-blown phenomenological economic criticism had 
to include a (genetic) phenomenology of economic life, in particular of today and the last 
centuries of capitalism. It had to include traditional texts of phenomenology, read them as 
economic writings and ask which interest they serve therein. It also had to include other 
economic writings, ancient as well as early modern, more of the socialist and Marxian tradition 
than could be considered here, present popular economic writings, and, not to forget, those 
diagnoses of present-day capitalism that are based on a critique of the phenomenological 
tradition as in much contemporary philosophy – yet economic science seems endlessly remote 
from being even able to recognize these writings as a challenge. Worlds of concepts, methods, 
styles and interests, of histories and cultures separate the scientific from other economic 
discourses. For the reason of this remoteness of economic science from any conception of 
economic life, and from the concerns of other economic discourses the phenomenological 
critique at hand is confined to economic science.  
The Phenomenology of Economics can thus be read as a prolegomena to a renewed sensibility in 
economic life which is undermined as long as there is one economic discourse that claims 
authority in the name of science. At its bottom-line it contributes to the tradition of pamphlets 
against scientism in economic writings with an historical argument. The history of the 
scientification of economics that I describe along the endeavor for a generic object of “the 
economy” (the invisible hand), a tendency to formalism, and the ideological suspicion 
economic science evoked, so this historical argument, was the history of the oblivion of 
economic life and the world in which it is lived. 
For who then is The Phenomenology of Economics written? It is addressed first of all to 
academic economists, in particular to those who seek alternative ways of practicing economics, 
who worry about the discipline and the scholarship it allows for. Moreover, it also addresses all 
who have to deal with academic economists, such as other social scientists, politicians, and 
whoever concerns about the state of present economic life in 21st century capitalism. When 
addressing such audience, I had to keep the inner problems of the phenomenological tradition 
to a minimum, be they exegetic problems between Hua I and XXXIX, or between Heideggers 
GA1 and GA90 – debates I share and even belief to be discussed in economic terms (see e.g. 
Düppe 2008).  
8Although the critique of science is vital for the phenomenological tradition in that it allows 
for the phenomenological reduction, this critique too often does not address more than its 
own preconceptions of science, let alone the actual scientist. My experience within the 
institutions of economics was that the phenomenologists trying to enable a reflection (Besinnung) 
by recalling the oblivion of the life-world is closest (not without disclaimers) to what the 
historian does. Phenomenology of science amounts to the same as an intimidating historical 
style, with which I attempt to remain true to a genetic rather than hermeneutic type of 
phenomenology. I mobilize Husserl’s insight that every notion of science needs to include the 
fact that science is a product of historical life. Only in history we can pose the question that 
defines, according to Husserl, a “responsive critique” – namely, a “self-reflection aimed at a 
self-understanding in terms of what we are truly seeking as the historical beings we are” (Hua 
VI: 73, E.: 72). 
Rather than an exercise in phenomenological exegesis, I thus attempt to let the historical 
horizon show (zeigen lassen) from which and into which the practices of economic science take 
place. The material I present stems largely from the social history of economic ideas. There I 
show that precisely such a responsive reflection on the motives of science is impossible as long 
as one claims scientific authority. As soon as one does, one too easily ends up not claiming 
anything. This gives voice to much of the uneasiness, disorientation, irony, and sometimes 
even cynicism that has been felt by many economists and observed by their commentators 
during the last decades. Yet I expect many to agree: There is no longer anything to be gained 
by continued lamenting about economics. We should take a step ahead and acknowledge that 
economic science came to be – too late to hurrah or boo; too late to celebrate or complain. 
The question now is no longer, ‘Which economic science?’ but ‘When does it disappear?’  
 
Many thanks for inspiration and support go to Altug Yalcintas, Andreas Manz, Arjo Klamer, 
Christian Kraft, Deirdre McCloskey, Fabienne Peter, Gorgios Papadopoulos, Jos de Mul, Josef 
Giefing, Markus Schlosser, Massimo Pizzingrilli, Nils Goldschmidt, Piotrek Swiatkowski, Rolf 
Hetzel, Rolf Kühn, Sophie Loidolt, Tobias Ullersperger, and Steve McLaughlin. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In her poignant memorial speech before the collegiums of the University of Berkeley, Chantal 
Debreu de Soto revealed the following about her father, Gerard Debreu (1921-2005), a rather 
inconspicuous but nevertheless Nobel Prize-crowned mathematical economist.  
 
He (my father) seemed either to not have the needs other humans had or he managed never to show 
that he had those needs. Other people, other fathers got tired, got hungry, got thirsty, had a sweet 
tooth, sweat when it was hot, shivered when it was cold, got distracted when they worked on a difficult 
task. Other father’s clothes got wrinkled or got food stains on them. Other fathers got sad, discouraged 
or angry. For the longest time I believed that my father never did any of these things. I believed he slept 
fully clothed in his dress shirt and the bow tie that was his trademark for so long, with his dress slacks, 
his leather belt, his watch and his dress socks (Debreu de Soto 2005).  
 
Chantal Debreu speaks about the human reality of her father, about which his colleagues were 
only partially aware of, and his readers may not even have thought about, but which she herself 
was exposed to daily. What is surprising about these lines is not what commentators of science 
– who are sensitive to this reality – are usually interested in: the exposing of concrete 
contingencies of what appears to be sheer epistemic authority. Debreu’s daughter was able to 
reveal nothing of these hidden, thereby thrilling, and yet so human aspects of the scientist’s 
world. There was simply nothing to disclose. Debreu’s person was as formal as his work.  
Debreu seemed to have incorporated in not only his professional life but even in his most 
intimate social life what could be called the imperative of modern science: to be discreet about 
one’s own particular reality. The distance that scientists take from their own reality pervaded 
Debreu’s entire life, right down to his dress socks. Does not his daughter’s portrayal suggest 
that Gerard Debreu not only behaved discreetly with his closest fellows, but was even wary of 
himself? Debreu appears to have felt uncomfortable with the distraction of being hungry, of a 
wrinkle in his garment; he was cautious of being vulnerable and afraid of being humble. 
Perhaps he really did sleep fully clothed in his dress shirt and bow tie. 
If I consider such distancing from one’s own reality as the imperative of modern science, 
my critique moves away from questions of the legitimacy of science – be it in light of well- or 
badly-founded epistemological principles (as in the philosophy of science) or in light of 
revealing particular interests of scientists (as in the sociology of science). It directs my attention 
to the difficulties of incorporating the imperative of modern science for the scientist. For does 
this imperative not work against the intellectual sensibility of the scientist? If it is true, as 
phenomenologists insist, that all the motives that keep science going stem from the reality of 
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the scientist’s life, then the problem of modern science is that its practice is the oblivion of the motives 
that give rise to it. This, in a nutshell, is the phenomenological diagnosis of modern science. It has 
come to be headed under the title “oblivion of the life-world”. This is the case I shall make for 
economic science.  
 
 
The Reality “of” and of  Science – 
The Continuing Crisis of Economics between its Authority and its Significance 
 
The reality “of” science. The ambiguity of this expression describes the full difficulty modern 
science represents for the scientist. The reality “of” science as the reality to which science 
claims authority and the reality of science as the reality of this claim itself do not match. The 
epistemic imperative of modern science, since the 17th century, has been to present knowledge 
as though it were independent of the reality in which and through which it comes about. This 
reality includes above all its history, its institutions, its subjects and their biographies – that is, 
all that through which one acquires an intellectual ethos. In the words of one of the few 
outspoken economists: “When we are told that we must understand a man’s life to understand 
what he really meant, we are being invited to abandon science” (Stigler, in Popkin 2008: 30). 
Within the claimed reality of science, the reality of the claim itself is not supposed to appear. In 
other words, the commitment of science to the transparency of the world has its drawback in a 
more fundamental in-transparency – namely, of the world the scientist lives and which allows 
him to commit himself to science. Such is the phenomenological concern of the commentary 
of science. It points to the difficult relation between science and its experiential reality.  
More than 70 years ago, Edmund Husserl evoked this ambivalence with regard to the 
reality “of” science when in 1936, in the last years of his life, he spoke about the Crisis of 
European Science (Hua. VI) – European because science came from Greece and then took root 
in modern times first in Italy, then in France and England. In this late work, Husserl moved 
away from his lifelong belief in science and initiated perhaps the first move beyond that 
modern philosophy, which has aimed at a foundation of science. “Is there, in view of their 
constant successes, really a crisis of the sciences? ” (§1), he opened this last publication. 
Although in its own terms (in terms of the reality it claims) science was successful in a way it 
had never been before, Husserl announced a crisis. It “concerns not the scientific character of 
the sciences (Wissenschaftlichkeit), but rather what they, or what science in general, had meant 
and could mean for human existence” (Hua VI: 3, E.: 5). The crisis consists of the manner in 
which science has set its terms of success, in the “the whole manner in which it has set its task” 
(Hua VI: 1, E.: 3). For this reason, Husserl spoke of the “loss of its meaning for life” (Verlust 
ihrer Lebensbedeutsamkeit §2), which became the archetype of continental critique of modern 
science in the 20th century. “The oblivion of the life-world” became its catch phrase.  
Considering the decades following Husserl’s announcement, he remained right. The last 
century of the history of academic institutions, at face value, can only be called a success of 
science. Academic life became dominated by and even identified with the character of the 
scientist at the cost of, say, the savant, scholar, or literate. The scientist represents academia in 
society, and, having increasingly fewer opponents within academia, can rely on a ready-made 
2 
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social identity – or better: a ready-made ethos as a scientist. The distance between the 
practitioners of science and their critics seems greater than ever before. For this reason science 
occupies an ambiguous position in society. Although the promises, the grants, and perhaps also 
the belief in science are greater than ever before, we pause when speaking of its achievements. 
As firm as is the character of the scientist, so great is the doubt that there is nobody who takes 
responsibility for the “progress” of science. How else could it enter its devastating alliances 
with 20th century politics, technology, and culture in general if not by virtue of its social 
irresponsibility, and by means of those who knew how to exploit science for their own 
purposes? What else could lead from the moment when Galileo cast the first stone to the two 
drops of August 1945? Believing in the authority of science on the one hand, how could we 
possibly trust the ethos of the scientist on the other? 
Such social responsibility of science was what Husserl meant when he spoke of the crisis 
of science that “concerns not the scientific character of the sciences (Wissenschaftlichkeit), but 
rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence” 
(Hua VI: 3, E.: 5). While the difficulty of incorporating the imperative of modern science is the 
concern of the following exercise, social responsibility is its normative horizon.  
After 1945, the crisis of science deepened – and in particular in economic science. 
Economics played a decisive role in the success of the institutions of 20th century science, 
regarding, in particular, its socio-political consequences. Economic science came into its own 
after WWII, transforming from a discipline struggling for a suitable identity into a powerful, 
rapidly growing institution of Big Science. We should not forget that economists – at least 
some celebrated members of the field – have contributed to the open violence that has been 
done in the post-war decades in order to secure Western freedom. Economists have 
considered the two bombs as an “allocation of resources”. And neither should we forget how 
economists contributed to the silent violence that, since the 1970s, neoliberalism has exerted 
on the political discourse by restricting its terms of critique. Economists have thought of 
political life as the “maximization of votes”.  
Inside academia, economics came to dominate the scientific standards of social theory. 
Even if the size of the institutions of economics today decreases in terms of students moving 
to neighboring sciences, and even if these sciences exert a strong influence on economics, 
economic theories have already made their way into these neighboring disciplines. Think of 
statistics (which is econometrics), but also of political sciences, sociology, and even 
anthropology. I have just read a call for the application of formal methods such as game theory 
to the epistemology of religion – modeling “miracles” and the like. Economics sets standards 
of scientific authority. It is the attempt to cultivate scientific authority in all discourses that aim 
to understand the social world in which we live. In this attempt economics had unsurpassed 
success, in that the figure of the social scientist – a novelty in the 19th century – became an 
established character within the academia. In the second half of the 20th century, the ethos of 
the social scientists lost a great degree of contestability. Gone are the days in which they 
evoked the suspicion with which clergy once regarded natural scientists. The lion’s share of the 
credit of this success goes to economists. 
Despite the success of economics in the last five or six decades, it remains in a crisis. It is 
in a crisis precisely regarding “the whole manner in which it has set its task” (Hua VI: 1, E.: 3). 
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Since the 1970s at the latest, there is on all levels of practitioners and commentators a sense of, 
say, uneasiness about the discipline. Is there not a secret agreement among economists that 
economic science does not deserve and cannot take responsibility for its institutional 
pervasiveness? Is there not a secret uneasiness that other modes of economic reflections, even 
if their relevance is implicitly acknowledged in their importance, are pushed into the 
background of the discursive stages of the Western world? After the formalist revolution of the 
1950s and ’60s – a “coma” of modern economics since most economists were excluded from 
the core – is the re-awakened profession not plagued by a desperate search for novelty, for a 
new beginning, for new roots? Is not the intense search for theoretical innovation since the 
1970s, rather than a sign of proficient productivity, a sign of disorientation? I think of the many 
“neoisms” in economics, the New Classical, the neo-Ricardians, the neo-Keynesians, the neo-
Austrians, etc. I think of the adaptation of new methods from other sciences, such as the 
renaissance of cognitive sciences, the boom of computer sciences, and the rise of laboratories. 
I think of the search for new paradigms beyond equilibrium and rationality, such as bounded 
rationality, principal agent, asymmetric information, mechanism design, etc. Is the tirelessness 
of these innovations not an expression of the insecurity to which a theoretical innovation really 
amounts? Does it not give an odd unity to economics that all these innovations are made for 
the sake of overcoming the omnipresent spectre of so-called “neoclassical economics” – in 
particular because all attempts end up re-enforcing economists’ incontestable authority as a 
science, and with it the empire of their institutions? 
Skepticism regarding the state of economics as a science is no novelty. Perhaps arguments 
of this sort have by now already managed to represent the common sense of the profession. 
Most economists today may not even consider themselves as scientists. Yet there is no 
alternative with whom else one could identify, as the following statement of an economist 
shows that I consider to be representative: “People ask me if I’m a scientist, I’d say ‘No, I’m an 
economist.’ However, that doesn’t mean I don’t think it’s rigorous, and I think it’s as rigorous 
as science” (in Reay 2008: 146). Economists are in an ambiguous relationship with science – 
attracted yet unwilling to embrace it. One of the early economists who has shown skepticism 
about economics as a science, and formulated a conflict that will figure prominently in my 
account of economics, is Frank Graham:  
 
Economics has always been under suspicion as a ‘science,’ and the consequent defensive attempts on 
the part of its exponents to force their theory into rigid scientific forms has frustrated its application to 
the facts of life (1999 [1942]: 28). 
 
This frustration was shared later by economists such as Robert Gordon, who spoke of a trade-
off between rigor and relevance (1976). He set the tone of much of the critical commentary in 
the 1980s and 1990s, from Klamer’s interviews onwards (1984). The common motif of this 
critical commentary is the affirmation of the urge to do more relevant work, yet, 
simultaneously, the acknowledgement of one’s own powerlessness. In the last decades, the 
pressure for economics to be relevant is higher than ever, yet has never been as difficult to 
achieve as today. As an economist who was trained in the mid-1980s said after 20 years at 
academia:  
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If I knew how to make academic economics more directly relevant to what non-academics are 
interested in I would push for some changes. But I don’t know how to do that. Indeed, there may not 
be any way of doing that (in Colander 2007: 89). 
 
The clearest symptom of the crisis of economics is the existence of leading economists who 
themselves do not believe in the worth of their work. In economics we find a unique attitude 
unparalleled in other social sciences that economists do not necessarily believe in economics. It 
is possible to be a successful economist while maintaining a skeptical or even ironic stance 
toward one’s own discipline. Here for example Robert Clower, a former editor of the American 
Economic Review:  
 
Much of economics is so far removed from anything that remotely resembles the real world that it’s 
often difficult for economists to take their own subject seriously. Publishers have sometimes asked why 
we economists don’t write as if we were intellectually engaged; why don’t we produce books about the 
marvels of our science? The answer is simple. Economics doesn’t have much to marvel at (Clower 
1989: 23).  
 
The repelling attraction of economic theory is more frankly expressed in the following, more 
recent statement by a leading game-theorist: “my greatest dilemma is between my attraction to 
economic theory, on the one hand, and my doubts about its relevance, on the other” 
(Rubinstein 2006: 866). Showing such an attitude can be said to be normalized in economics, 
perhaps even fashionable. The crisis in economics consists of this conflict of being an 
economist on the one hand, and scientist on the other: the conflict between making an 
economic claim and making it in the context of science. 
An apt example of this conflict is the following reply by Sir John Hicks (1904-1989), one 
such economist whose belief in science backfired. In his younger years he contributed to a 
development, about which he later showed a sense of remorse. Perhaps for this reason the 
person of Hicks, like Debreu, is rendered discreet. Although he received the Nobel Prize, and 
although each student of economics knows his name for the “Hicksean demand function” – 
the inversion of the Marshallian demand function, remember? – in the small village Blockley 
where he passed away, nobody knew of him. Asked about economics after 1945, he seemed to 
have lost touch with his intellectual means.  
  
(He hesitates). I do feel that most of this stuff that I pick up and see in the journals seems to have very 
little relevance to the sort of practical problems that really bother people.  
Such as? 
I mean…what have these mathematical theories got to say about whether Britain should go into the 
EMS (European Monetary System)? Nothing! That is the sort of question about which economists 
should have something to say. 
Do you want to say something about that?  
I’d like to if I could. But I think it is beyond what is left to my capacities (in Klamer 1989: 180). 
 
Such can be called the phenomenological symptom of modern economic science: that its 
practice is the unlearning of the ability to express what one actually or at least initially was up to. 
In the words of one of the formulas of the coming exercise: The practice of economics is the 
oblivion of the motives that give rise to this practice.  
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To be sure, economists always knew, at least in secret, that the ethos of a scientist is not 
sufficient for becoming a fully-fledged economist. Adam Smith certainly knew it. How else 
could there be a Smith problem? John Stuart Mill knew it perhaps even better than Karl Marx. 
“Political Economy, in truth, has never pretended to give advice to mankind with no lights but 
its own.” (Mill 2000 [1873]: 263) From Alfred Marshall to John Maynard Keynes, economists 
thought of themselves as the long arm rather than the analyst of practical man, producing not 
more than elaborated common sense. “The common sense of a person who has had a large 
experience of life will give him more guidance in such a matter than he can gain from subtle 
economic analysis” (Marshall 1938 [1890]: 84). And, also the curious Chicago economist 
George Stigler knew it when asking “Do Economists Matter”.  
 
A curious tension emerges from the simultaneous workings of two influences upon us. We wish to be 
scientists, with sound logic in our theories, reliable procedures in our empirical applications or those 
theories, and objective and fair-minded statements of the limitations of our knowledge. We wish also to 
be important – or in the language of this day, we wish to do good – much good, and generally 
recognized as such (Stigler 1982: 66).  
 
But the former comes at the cost of the latter. From Smith to Stigler, economists knew that 
one needs more than a sense for science in order to make an economic claim.  
Most economists may still agree today. However, this insight no longer echoes in the halls 
of the institutions of economics. To point to the insufficiency of the practices of science for 
being a full-fledged economist bears the mark of anachronism. Although most economists are 
aware of this insufficiency, the reality of their ethos has become ossified. The conditions that a 
reflection on the ethos of economists make a difference and take root in the profession are no 
longer met. It is difficult to come up with an alternative ethos without actually moving to 
another department.  
 
 
The Clarion Call of the Phenomenology of Economics:  
Economists of the World – Disperse! 
 
Since the 1970s at the latest, the perception of this crisis in economics has clearly been in the 
air. It is part of the consciousness of all economists, and has been stated in this or that way by 
many people from both inside and outside, and both left and right wings of the profession. 
There is something of a postwar tradition of lamenting about economics after the formalist 
revolution took hold with a new theoretical core: the conditions under which a general 
equilibrium holds. Let me recall some of the main actors, since it is their laments to which The 
Phenomenology of Economics responds. 
Fierce critique began in the 1970s in some of the presidential addresses of the American 
Economic Association. Popular economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith have expressively 
pointed to the costs of gaining scientific authority (1973). Economists who favour empirical 
work may still remember Wassily Leontief’s critique on the mathematical overweight of 
economics (1971, 1982). Another unforgettable one has been the ethnographic satire of “life 
among the econs”-tribe of Leijonhufvud, who just rescued Keynes from IS-LM (1973). Those 
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who held on to positivist beliefs about science, as the tradition from Hutchison (1938) to Blaug 
(1980), contributed to the sense of a crisis, too. Even philosophers of science who typically 
have goodwill in defending theoretical aloofness, showed skepticism about the “vanity of 
rigour” in economics, such as Cartwright (2007). Part of this tradition is certainly the anti-
economic activism that ranges from the “anti-Samuelson” of Lindner (1977) to the “post-
autistic economics” movement of 2000 (Fullbrook 2003). It also includes those who seek new 
forms of commentary between McCloskey’s Rhetoric of Economics (1985) and Ruccio and 
Amariglio’s Postmodern Moments of Economics (2003). In the last decades such skepticism has been 
normalized.  
One study needs to be noted especially for it came closest to the phenomenological locus 
of criticism – namely The Crisis of Vision by the historians Heilbroner and Milberg (1995). 
Having made a life-long argument for a more “worldly” ethos of economists, they announce:  
 
A deep and widespread crisis affects modern economic theory, a crisis that derives from the absence of 
a “vision” – a set of widely shared political and social preconceptions on which all economics ultimately 
depends (1995: Announcement). 
 
Most of the aforementioned commentators and practitioners have put their skepticism in 
terms of economics having lost touch with something to which it should refer. Heilbroner and 
Milberg put it in terms of a “rule” that they may have heard in their youth in the 1950s when 
Alfred Schütz lectured at New School – namely, that “regnant ideas must be relevant to lived 
economic experience” (Ibid.: 2).  
Am I going to repeat this sort of argument? Is it this old song to rescue economic science 
by means of either bringing it back to its proper realm or leading it to the relevant questions 
that came to be excluded? In light of this standard critique of economics, the reader may 
expect from The Phenomenology of Economics, with the subtitle at hand, an argument such 
as this: Economics does not relate sufficiently to the “life-world” – the world as ordinary 
people experience the economy – because economic theory is “too formal” – too much 
mathematics, too abstract, too much model building for its own sake – in particular in the 
theoretical tradition associated with the “invisible hand”, namely general equilibrium theory 
that culminated in the formalist revolution of the 1950s. Have we not heard this song too 
many times already? Is there a single economist left who does not agree? Does the all-
pervasiveness of this critique not make us wonder if it is perhaps the last unifying element of 
economics today? Is it not time to go beyond lamenting the state of economic science?  
The Phenomenology of Economics does not repeat the dominant demand of most 
standard critiques. I do not suppose there is a proper realm or authentic questions of 
economics. If this were all there were to understand about present-day economics, I would not 
speak of a crisis at all. There is thus not a crisis in the sense Kuhn coined the term: a 
transitional phase between one and the other paradigm. There is a crisis only in the sense that 
there is a common awareness of the eminent risk of working for nothing but the garbage bin; 
however, simultaneously, the insight that one lacks the means to do something about it. 
Economists are ensnared. In one of her columns for the Eastern Economic Journal Deirdre 
McCloskey gave a “brief list of devastating internal criticism of modern economics that have 
 
____________________________________
      Economists of the World - Disperse! 
_______________________
                                                      7 
________________________
22
not been answered” (2000: 244). Among the four dozen attacks, her charge of the misuse of 
statistical significance ranks high. It has not been answered. 
There is no reason to enlarge this list of unanswered challenges and contribute once more 
to the tradition of lamenting the narrow limits of economics. Perhaps we should come to the 
point of acknowledging that economists cannot do better than that without loosing their 
discursive identity. Perhaps there is no better economic science. Perhaps the history of the 
scientification of economics is somewhat complete. Perhaps there is no renewal to come. 
Perhaps we should give up the belief in a new wave towards a more “reasonable” economic 
science. Perhaps the times in which economists had to say something as scientists have already 
passed. Perhaps there is no longer any need to claim scientific authority. Perhaps economists 
could even do better without.  
The task today is to move beyond mourning in ever more severe tones. Instead, in order 
to come to appreciate the liberation from science, I invite the reader to a reconsideration of the 
horizon from which economics could make sense. What were the motives that led into this 
crisis and what does it tell us about economics as such? What made some believe in economic 
science in the first place? What has necessitated the present crisis of economics? Such 
questions were hardly posed in the postwar critique of economic science, because hardly 
anyone was willing to give up the belief in a brighter future or a noble past. Hence I aim not at 
stating, but at making intelligible the genesis of the crisis in economics.  
Instead of thinking about this genesis, is it not much more urgent to advance a new, better 
foundation of economics? I am far from taking the wind out of the sails of the standard 
critique and depriving it from the intellectual forces that keep it going – namely the conviction 
that economics does matter. Instead I want to channel these intellectual forces away from 
science. I do indeed share much sympathy with those who reply to the nerve-crumbling 
mourning with “Can we please move on?” – as Galbraith recently (2002) reacted to another 
wave of complaints about the lack of ‘worth of standard microeconomics’ (Guerrien 2002). 
“Aren’t you tired of embedding your originalities in critical restatements, however elegant, of 
what is already clear to thousands of bright undergraduates on the second day of class?”, 
Galbraith asked (Ibid.). He presents a list of ten points by which to arrive at a new curriculum, 
including, not surprisingly, more empirical work, more consideration of industrial power, and 
teaching of the classics.  
Yes, we should indeed move on. I do address those economists who got tired of their 
critique. “Zu den Sachen selbst” was the (today already somewhat dusty) clarion call of Husserl’s 
philosophy. I do, however, neither provide a new phenomenological methodology, nor new 
material for a renewal of economic science. I am not immediately concerned with what 
economics should be about – let alone how to form theories about it. I am afraid that these 
attempts at a better economic science could deepen the crisis. Perhaps pursuing “good 
economic science” made sense for some time, but today is running in neutral. Perhaps the 
commitment to science works against the very sensibility regarding what matters in economics? 
Instead of bringing economics back on track, I want to renew a sensibility for economic life 
that is concealed in the moment one claims epistemic authority. I thus rely on a certain 
skepticism regarding economic science, but aim to advance, rather than exploit, it. 
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Here, thus, is the case to be made: Claiming scientific authority in economic talk is 
phenomenologically unbearable. It represents a conflict for the economist. The understanding of 
this locus of criticism is vital. I do not argue that there is anything wrong with the being of “the 
economy”, that is much too complex for science and not capable of truth (I believe the notion 
of “the economy” is a misunderstanding of science). I do not argue that economic science 
excludes the truly human aspects of “the economy”, or that economics does not meet any 
other standards I impose (I believe the question of scientific standards is from yesterday). I do 
not argue that economic science requires thinking in a narrow way about the world (which 
world could that be?). Neither do I argue that economics makes economists like the people in 
their models: selfish (“autistic” I find more accurate), marketers (willy-nilly perhaps yes), brute 
calculators (at most as an effect of being bored), or whatever has been said about the character 
of economists.  
Rather, I argue that whatever the economist wants to be, seeking scientific authority is of no 
help for his or her expressive life. The very experience of practicing economics is the locus of 
criticism of The Phenomenology of Economics. For this and no other reason does it deserve 
this name (and furthermore deserves to be called, yes, transcendental). Practicing economic 
science, as it is the bottom line of the conflict I explicate, is only possible as the oblivion of the 
motives that give rise to it. In the commentary of economics, Heilbroner and Milberg came closest 
to this locus of criticism:  
 
By vision we mean the political hopes and fears, social stereotypes, and value judgments – all 
unarticulated, as we have said – that infuse social thought, not through their illegal entry into an 
otherwise pristine real, but as psychological, perhaps existential necessities (1995: 4) 
 
It is precisely this necessity that the following exercise will confront with the concrete historical 
conditions of claiming scientific authority. Is a responsive intellectual life in economic science 
possible? I do not aim at drawing once more the line between real and sloppy scientific practice 
in economics. But I show, plain and simple, that economic – pause – science is impossible: 
Economists cannot be scientists.  
Economists can have many kinds of characters. They can have the ethos of counting 
engineers, of painstaking bookkeepers, of preaching moralists, of critical gadflies, of brave 
revolutionists, of honest statesmen, moderate reformers, partisan scholars, and pretentious 
saviors. But they cannot be scientists. Claiming scientific authority is not good for the 
economist, and, in a broader sense, nor is it good for other economic discourses. As long as 
there is a socially widespread belief in science, other economic characters have difficulty 
avoiding losing face and being undermined by the regime of economic science.  
To make such a case is not only a matter of a new image of economics, but it is intended 
to have concrete political implications. Economic science, being phenomenologically 
unbearable, is not worth keeping up a discursive identity, and thus neither is it worth an 
institutional place within separate departments in academia. I mean it, politically – close them! 
This is not to say that all economists should find new jobs. Economists could be scattered to 
the winds of economic talk. They could go to other departments: to sociology (which once 
came as an alternative to economics), to law (this is where power belongs, doesn’t it?), to 
politics (from which economics actually comes from), to history (where I believe it really 
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belongs). Some at the religion department, too, welcome economists with open arms (at least 
the soft-hearted socialists). They have certainly good chances at the psychology department 
(recently, even in brain research!). Sure, business school – how could I forget? And those 
economists who really want should go serious and try to make a career at the physics 
department (although today there may be no economist left who did not hear of the end of 
this liaison), go straight to the mathematics department (though one may be disappointed how 
non-rigorous they have become), or set renewed hopes in a new technocratic empiricism at the 
IT department. Please. Go for it! 
Those economists who struggle to say more than Xx∈ , to talk about more than constant 
elasticity utility functions, or co-integrated structural VAR’s, and already gave up caring heavily 
about the institutions of economics in the triad of Chicago-Harvard-MIT, those economists, 
who share a basic skepticism about economic science, I would like to give a light shove. More, 
if I am right in my criticism, is not needed. No, it is not worth it to stay in the institutions of 
economic science. Leave them! 
 
 
Why? Because the Social History of the Scientification of Economics  
was a History of a Misunderstanding: Gaining Authority by Saying Less 
 
Enough of the pamphletic tone for now! The question, of course, is, how could I possibly 
argue for this case? Obviously, it is not a trivial task; the reality of economic science is pervasive 
and sits deep under many skins. But it is not an impossible task, since economic science is 
finite. It is an event in modern European history. This is its historical condition. 
Why does it seem so radical to envision an “end” of economic science? Because 
economists are used to thinking about their profession, if at all, philosophically – that is, in light 
of better economic science. Every philosophical critique must implicitly assume some sort of 
standard and thus a vision of an alternative that meets the respective critique. Do I not merely 
assume a different understanding of what science is all about, a particular philosophy of 
science, that is, a particular idea of scientificaty (Wissenschaftlichkeit)? Do economists not simply 
have to adopt the standards that I implicitly apply? Could I not envision a new 
phenomenologically enlightened economic science? Should I not simply draw the line between 
economic doxa and episteme at its real joint, and then announce again: this, dear economists, is 
the meaning of economic science!  
I repeat, the crisis of economics “concerns not the scientific character of the sciences, but 
rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence“ 
(Hua VI: 3, E.: 5). The Phenomenology of Economics thus does not aim or suppose an 
epistemic essence of economics. It is in this sense not philosophical. Criticism in the philosophy 
of science assumes that science is as infinitely flexible as reality demands, so that science can 
always claim epistemic authority, whatever reality there is. What is forgotten in such image of 
an infinitely flexible science is the finitude of science itself. What is forgotten is the concrete 
past that led to the theoretical interest in epistemic authority, its historical finitude. The 
Phenomenology of Economics shows the tensions for economists that are caused by claiming 
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scientific authority, not whatever that claim may be and on whatever grounds it is made, but as it 
happened to be as this concrete claim in the last two or three centuries of European history.  
The Phenomenology of Economics does not ask or suppose what economics really is. I 
neither scrutinize the specific modes, grounds, principles of claiming scientific authority, nor 
their historical change. Claiming science is not a matter of an abstract belief in particular 
principles that was somewhat shared by all economists of the last two or three centuries. It is a 
concrete practice with concrete material conditions. For this reason I do not have to say much 
about the definition, scope, or method proper to economics. Today, I will argue, it is even 
futile to pose these questions. If there were anyone to pose and to answer it, it would be the 
economist, not those who apply philosophy of science to economics. The adversary to 
normative epistemology I share with one of the great historians of science, Michel Serres, here 
in conversation with Bruno Latour:  
 
Either science must develop its own intrinsic epistemology, in which case it is a question of science and 
not of epistemology, or else it’s a matter of external annotation – and best redundant and useless, at 
worst a commentary or even publicity (Serres and Latour 1995: 14). 
 
As long as the economist does no longer pose the question of the difference of economic doxa 
and episteme – as it is the case – the philosopher worsens the situation when taking over and 
substituting the task of articulating the foundations of economic science (Düppe 2009).  
Philosophical beliefs of economists, moreover, hardly played a role in the social history of 
the scientification of economics. For the most part of this history, economists did not make up 
scientific authority on their own. They simply appealed to what was elsewhere acknowledged 
as scientific authority, saying economics is “like science” – like Bacon, Newton, or Descartes, 
like mathematics, biology, physics, psychology, engineering, etc. Economic science for the 
most part was coasting on the success of other sciences. If I am right in my appraisal, 
economics could indeed never genuinely claim scientific authority in its own right. Interesting 
are thus not the grounds on which scientific authority was claimed, but, as the 
phenomenologist asks, how it was claimed. This does not concern the principles of science but 
the reality of claiming scientific authority. And this reality is a finite, a modern, and a European 
history. The social history of the scientification of economics began at some point in 17th- and 
18th-century England with the first believers such as William Petty (1623-1687), and ends today 
everywhere in economics departments that became dominated by some U.S.-based institutions 
in the Stanford-MIT-Harvard triad. Within this historical scope, I will show, the “end” of 
economic science is conceivable. 
The Phenomenology of Economics is about economic science, as it happened to be. This 
historical reality encompasses the intellectual becoming and aging of economists, the traditions 
in which they have been trained, believe, and in which they reconsider their interests, motives, 
and problems. Phenomenology reads as a particular historiographical style within the social 
history of the scientification of economics. A social history of scientification concerns the 
concrete, and continuous attempts to renew scientific authority in the context of other 
economic discourses. This history is not a philosophical history in that I drew a line at one 
point when economics once came to be truly science, went off track, and now waits to be 
informed where to go next – not once when there was pluralism before the war, when there 
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was institutional sensibility before the marginal revolution, when there were “classical” 
economists who still had a sense for the meaning of the “production of wealth”, nor at any 
other point in history when there were still genuine epistemic concerns shared by economists. I 
thus do not apply the standard SMMS (Smith-Mill-Marshal-Samuelson) narrative of either 
progress or decay. Perhaps economic science was based on a misunderstanding all along that 
was productive for a while but ultimately had to show its destructive force. 
This productive misunderstanding of economic (pause) science was that there is 
something to say, a difference to be made with scientific authority. The misunderstanding, in a 
nutshell, is that economic science could be instituted and institutionally entrenched just 
because it was a way to avoid making an economic claim. The formalist revolution did not come 
out of the blue, but was the manifestation of this latent degeneration of the economic claims 
that are possible in science. Since then, the need for scientific authority in economic talk has 
been in decline. In other words, my critique points to the anachronism of the attempts in 
economics, let alone the appreciation of the attempts, to make a difference in economic talk. 
Did the attempts to be on “the good side” of economic talk, for example, not become 
redundant? If economics does not allow for such expressive activities, then, I suggest, 
economists could do better without the institutions of science.  
Saying that scientific authority is phenomenologically unbearable thus translates to the 
historical case that the social history of scientification of economics came to an end. Since the 
1950s, after the “formalist revolution”, I will argue, the development of economics no longer 
affects the ethos of economic scientists. The formalist revolution was the peak and the end of 
the social history of the scientification of economics, and was in this sense the end of modern 
economic science. Further developments will not reinforce the institutions of economics. To 
the contrary, they contribute to their dissolution. Economic science came to be – too late to 
hurrah or to boo, too late to celebrate or to complain. The question now is no longer ‘Which 
economic science?’ but ‘When does it disappear?’ 
The main ingredients of my argument, as listed in the subtitle, are thus not as mentioned 
above: With the notion of the “life-world” I do not suppose an ordinary or natural way of 
experiencing economic life that should serve in one way or another as the foundation of 
economic science. There is no such genuine world as the idyll of spurious experience in which 
we all understand each other without words. The notion of the life-world rather directs our 
attention to the intellectual life of economists in that they are responsive to something; it directs us 
to the intellectual sensibility of economists. “Formalism” neither refers to a particular more or 
less desirable feature of economic theory next to other more or less desirable features, but it 
refers to the lowering of one’s tone when raising one’s voice as an economist. By means of 
formalism the economist withdraws from the heat of other economic talk. The “invisible 
hand” describes similarly the lack of tangibility and materiality of the generic object of 
economic science: “the economy”. The “invisibility” stands for the lack of an actual economic 
claim. It stands for saying less. The three terms together thus say: the phenomenological 
condition of economic science is that it can realize scientific authority only within a tendency to 
formalism, that is, a tendency to claim less. The history of the scientification of economics is 
the history of the degeneration of economic claims. Economic science “has nothing to say”, 
and is in this specific sense insignificant.  
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*** 
 
This text is organized in three parts: Discourse, History, and Biography. In the Preliminaries, I 
present the conceptual prolegomena, that is, the philosophy of The Phenomenology of 
Economics. I familiarize the reader with the basic intuition of the notion of life-world as it 
describes the responsivity of intellectual life, with the critical impetus of the ‘oblivion of the 
life-world’ as a historiographic device, as well as with the meaning of formalism and the 
invisible hand. These three parts, which constitute the body of the text, progress with a rising 
awareness of the phenomenological problem of economic science. The first part (Discourse – 
The Public, Professional, and Pedagogical Ethos of Economists) begins with the naïve attempt at a 
simple determination of the social relevance of economists in an informal and descriptive 
fashion, as though there were no phenomenological problem at all. It has a largely heuristic 
function, and is also written for non-economists. The remaining two parts are historical in 
nature. The second part (History – Economic Science from the Oikonomia to “the Economy”) presents a 
grand narrative of economists’ intervention in modern history. The critical question I pose here 
is this: What was the motive of the scientification of economic writings? And what happened 
to this motive over the course of this scientification? The answer circles around a tendency 
toward formalism that set off in the political discourse of 17th century England and culminated 
in the formalist revolution of the 1950s. Finally, the third part (Biography – Gerard Debreu from 
Nicolas Bourbaki to Adam Smith) exhibits the actual experiential problematic of economic science 
following the biography of a suitable case, Gerard Debreu. It reads as a transcendental parable 
for the moral end of the ethos of the economic scientist. 
 As is already apparent in this short sketch, the text cannot be reduced to one particular 
point of view, but is rather a variation of views. It encompasses, in the words of Husserl, the 
inner- and outer horizons of economics. It is Big History that encompasses the before of 
economic science and envisions a time after. But it is also Small History that includes the most 
incidental and fleeting but nevertheless constitutive moments of science. I skip through that in 
which others invest most effort, while I remain patient at points others skim through. The text 
leaps and pauses, and in general favours the non-specialist.  
If one keeps in mind the increasing virulence of the problem of economics that 
accompanies the three parts, they can be read in the order most appealing to the reader. The 
Preliminaries stand apart, and can be read at any point. In particular if phenomenology is new 
to the reader, one may prefer to postpone them. The text is designed in such a way that all 
readers will find passages addressing issues with which he or she will be better versed than I. I 
am far from being an expert on all issues I address. But the text is also designed in such a way 
that all readers will find links to other passages that they have not yet considered. It is the task 
of reading to find the middle ground on which a discussion can take place.  
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Preliminaries 
The Phenomenology of the Life-World – 
Hermeneutics, History, and 
Transcendentality 
 
 
 
 
When bringing together two traditions so far removed from each other as phenomenology 
and economics, I do good to remind one of the main gestures of phenomenology as a 
philosophy of 20th century: the priority of possibility over actuality. Heidegger, at the occasion 
of explaining the dedication of Sein und Zeit to Husserl, and apologizing that his notion of 
phenomenology went beyond what Husserl would identify as his philosophy, referred to this 
priority:  
 
The following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by 
Edmund Husserl, with whose Logische Untersuchungen phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on 
the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its 
actuality as a philosophical ‘movement’. Higher than actuality stand possibility. We can understand 
phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility (Heidegger 1962: 62 f.).  
 
The same can be said about The Phenomenology of Economics in a twofold sense. For one, 
phenomenology is not a “program” applied to economics. As seen from the history of 
economics there are hardly any interfaces that could motivate such an “application” (apart 
from rather marginal economists such as Walter Eucken, Edgar Salin, Othmar Spann, or the 
students of Alfred Schütz). The actual tradition of phenomenology and its conceptual jargon 
thus stands back for what economics shows from itself. 
 This is not an excuse to avoid the sophisticated heights of phenomenological 
conceptualizations. Instead, the priority of possibility over actuality gives us a hint what 
economics can show of itself, namely the possibilities the tradition of economics seizes upon in 
order to become an actuality in our world. The Phenomenology of Economics, in other words, 
is the attempt to let the tradition of economics show in such a way that it testifies the 
experiences from which its thought gains force. With this interleaving of, say, the pathos of 
thought and the ethos of experience, I associate the notion of the life-world.  
30
 In the following I will present a preliminary conception of phenomenology as it is going to 
inform my account of economics. What phenomenology can mean for the reader at the end, 
he or she has to find out by going through. Here, I repeat, instead of presenting a conceptual 
apparatus, I can bring the reader closer to the sort of reflection that will be required to 
appreciate my account of economics. Phenomenology in the title refers thus to a free 
adaptation, or better, as Husserl would have said, a renewal of the reflection associated with the 
notion of the life-world.  
In the last years of his life Husserl’s efforts circled around the themes of modern science 
and the life-world. For him, it meant yet another attempt to “introduce” phenomenology in a 
renewed fashion. Although he used the term of the life-world already before occasionally, it 
found one of its most insisting expressions at a talk in May 1935 in the Wiener Kulturbund. At 
that time he was no longer allowed to speak in the Reich. The title was weighty: The Crisis of 
European Mankind and Philosophy. From this talk sprung his last publication before his death in 
1938, The Crisis of the European Science and The Way into Transcendental Phenomenology, or short, The 
Crisis (Hua. VI with additions in Hua. XXIX). These texts serve the backdrop of the following 
exposition of phenomenology.  
Husserl’s discussion of the life-world can be organized along three interrelated concerns. 
First, the explicatory question, in which sense is the life-world pre-given, and what does it mean 
that science presupposes the life-world? Second, the critical question, what does it mean that 
modern science forgot the life-world? For Husserl as a late modernist believer of science the 
horizon of the entire exercise was, third, his vision of a phenomenological science that overcomes 
the crisis of modern science.  
Within these concerns my text reads as a supplement for the open case of economic 
science. This case is based on the following adaptation of the three questions that will occupy 
us in the five preliminary chapters. I explicate the basic meaning of the pre-given life-world for 
all intellectual life and science along the transcendental notion of intellectual responsivity (1). I 
oppose the concern for the concrete theoretical experience that is implied in this notion to 
what I call the hermeneutic notion of the life-world. This distinction also helps the 
understanding of the relation of a phenomenology of science with the two prevailing 
approaches in the commentary of science, the philosophy of science and science studies (2). I 
take up the critical theme of the oblivion of the life-world as a historiographic guide for re-
writing the history of economics as the oblivion of the motives that give rise to it (3). Decisive 
point of my adaptation of this critical aspect is that the oblivion of the life-world in economic 
science does not refer to its objectivism, but rather to its formalism (4). Regarding Husserl’s 
third concern for a phenomenological science, that is, regarding the question whether I can 
envision an economic science that meets my critique, I am skeptical because the condition of a 
scientific claim roots in the theoretical perception of the “invisible hand”, which excludes the 
reflection on economic life (5). 
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(1) Life-World and  
Intellectual Responsivity 
 
 
 
 
Phenomenology, just as most other philosophies from Descartes to Deleuze, is a philosophy 
of sense and sensible life. In its post-Kantian (and also post-Hegelian) impetus, it is, more 
specifically, a philosophy of immanence, saying, that the constitution of sense lies in itself 
rather than being determined by a philosopheme of another kind such as a category, a concept, 
or any form of determination or even justification. Sense is not a matter of being constituted 
by something beyond itself, but a matter of being concrete and actual. Sensible life is the sense-
achieving life (sinnleistendes Leben), which is one of the weighty expressions of Husserl’s writings.  
The emphasis on experience in phenomenology comes from this concern for the 
immanence of sensible life. What is a hammer we know by hammering, what is sense we know 
by sensing, what is perception we know by perceiving, what are affects we know by being 
affected, what is a landscape we know by viewing, passing and wandering through. The critical 
impetus of such a principle was, in a nutshell, that in sense-achieving life there is no space for a 
philosophical split between what constitutes and what is constituted, between the 
transcendental and the empirical, between sensibility and spontaneity (Kant), between concept 
and reality (Hegel), between intellectual and sensible life. Instead, there is a correlation, that is, a 
being assigned to and implied in each other. Just as a feeling cannot be separated from the 
feeling of it, the world cannot be separated from the living of it. The life-world as the 
encompassing motif of the entire phenomenological tradition refers to the being enmeshed of 
the sense of the world in our sensible life. It is this commitment to immanence that makes 
phenomenology (next to the philosophies of difference) a philosophy of the 20th century. 
Within such a general commitment to immanence, I want to place Husserl’s notion of the 
pre-giveness of the life-world. I read it as a notion with which the immanence of intellectual 
life can be reflected upon. The life-world is the pre-given world for all intellectual life in that it 
informs, or better: motivates intellectual life. By means of being motivated intellectual life can 
be an achieving life (Hua IV: 220 ff.). The life word is the locus from which an intellectual life 
is motivated. Regarding science – clearly a prominent manifestation of intellectual life in 
modernity – the life-world is that instance through which science can give a response, the 
world that allows for intellectual responsivity. Intellectual responsivity is the corner stone of my 
adaptation of the life-world as a notion that discloses the concrete experience of science. I 
employ this notion mainly in order to disclose scientific experience as the locus of critique. I 
will thus hardly address questions concerning the genesis of the life-world explicitly (Hua. 
32
XXXIX, Lee 1993, Steinbock 1995). They do, however, represent the horizon of the critique 
how economic science deals with economic life. For after all, economic life is a primordial way 
of world-becoming (Weltwerdung).  
Here the conceptual outlook: Intellectual responsivity has two connotations, that of 
sensibility and responsibility. Intellectual sensibility may seem an odd expression for any reader of 
Kant and the rest of those who believe in the analytical-empirical divide. It will yet guide us 
through the description and the critique of the experience of scientific practices in economics. 
Intellectual responsivity not only describes but also represents the possibility of being guided 
by an intellectual value. It is the possibility of intellectual responsibility. The life-world warrants 
here the possibility of “justification” in that it constitutes the need of justification (rather than a 
philosophical principle of it). In this “aesthetical” (the Kantian word) and “ethical” aspect of 
responsivity, the life-world can be said to be the locus of the significance of science. The 
Phenomenology of Economics is thus not more or less than an enquiry into the constitution 
of the significance of economic science. It is in this conceptual horizon that my critique of 
economic science will move, and it is on this conceptual horizon that I will conclude. In this 
chapter I cannot present more than a preliminary exposition of this horizon.  
 
 
The Basic Notion of the Life-World: The Lateness of Science  
and the “Huge Piece of Method” of a Phenomenology of Science 
 
What then does it say that the life-world is pre-given? What kind of priority or precedence does 
it address? Husserl’s thesis of science presupposing the life-world means that science is 
phenomenologically late. Before there is an interest to adopt a scientific attitude, before a 
scientific practice can be instituted and carried out, already a lot of sense-labor (Sinnarbeit) had 
to take place. Science is not “self-made”. Before we are able to claim scientific authority, we 
already acquired a great deal of the world by means of such acts as reminding, associating, 
apprehending, anticipating, expecting, being attracted, driven, repulsed or appealed, and other 
“primordial” forms of motivations that make experiences “lived” (Hua. XI). An epistemic 
interest is something that has to become. It has to grow. The practice of science is 
phenomenologically old. Science has a past.  
Husserl and his followers often describe intellectual activity as a reflection (Besinnung) - 
another weighty word of the phenomenological tradition. In one of the core paragraphs of The 
Crisis, §15 (Reflection on Method of our Historical Manner of Investigation) Husserl describes reflection 
as a responsible critique.  
 
Only in this way [of a responsible critique] can we, who not only have a spiritual heritage, but have 
become what we are thoroughly and exclusively in a historical-spiritual manner, have a task which is 
truly our own (...). This manner of inquiring back into the ways in which surviving goals, whose 
unsatisfactory character again and again necessitates their clarification, their improvement, their more or 
less radical reshaping – this, I say, is nothing other than the philosopher’s genuine self-reflection on 
what he is truly seeking (worauf er eigentlich hinaus will) (Hua VI: 72 f., E.: 71).  
 
The past of science, therefore, is not of an epistemic kind that one needs to consider in 
addition to one’s present issue for the sake of rigor or completeness. The past of science is 
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Phenomenology of the life-world: exegesis or renewal? 
 
The notion of the life-world was for Husserl a working title rather than a program, and was thus
coined by ambiguities that gave Husserl scholars material for years to come. It encompassed, apart
from the cited work, other posthumously published works. Important to mention are the Ideas II
(Hua IV), from which I take the concept of motivation as a tenet of transcendental life; his Analyses of
Passive and Active Synthesis (Hua. XI), where the Kantian distinction of transcendental aesthetics
(sensibility) and analysis (spontaneity) is dissolved in the idea of a stream of consciousness that is
genetically spelled out along the acts of association, retention, apperception, etc. The work edited by
Ludwig Landgrebe Erfahrung und Urteil (1975), the third volume on Intersubjectivity (Hua XV), as well as
the most recent volume Hua. XXXIX gather vital notes on the constitution of the life-world. For the
development of Husserl’s notion of the life-world, see Kerckhoven (1985), and for a clarification of
its basic ambiguity between a foundation of science and a concept of phenomenon, see Claesges
(1972) and Kern (1979). 
Husserl presented the notion of the life-world as an alternative way into the phenomenological
reduction next to the Cartesian, egological way (Luft 2004). Yet it never found a fully elaborated
shape. The notion thus also represents the line between static and genetic phenomenology (Hua XI:
339 ff., Lee 1993). Concerning science, in static phenomenology, Husserl still aimed at a foundation of
a strict and eidetic science, while in genetic phenomenology he aimed at a genealogy of science and
judgments in general. This half-taken turn of the late Husserl is contested among Husserl scholars.
Some stress the continuity of his early and late work and emphasize that the notion of the life-world
is meant to account for science without affecting his notion of transcendental subjectivity as such –
that is, it remains within the constitutional paradigm of intentional consciousness (see for this
interpretation Held 1991, Mittelstraß 1991). In our context it is important that only in departure from
such a foundational notion of the life-world can one view the life-world as a pragmatically founded
structure as it was popularized by Schütz and Luckmann’s Structures of the Life-world (1980). This
structural notion results in a normative epistemology of “common sense”, which was also utilized by
Habermas when speaking of discursive communities (1985). For reasons that will become clear later,
I call this notion of the life-world “hermeneutic”. I also trace this notion in the works of Kuhn,
Hacking, and Foucault, in that they refer to a historical apriori (paradigm, style, episteme). This
hermeneutic notion functions only as a heuristic step in order to introduce the problematic of science
(see the next chapter).  
Other Husserl scholars have taken the turn of the late Husserl further and elaborated its genetic,
non-foundational character. Life-world here is not a matter of intentional constitution, but replaces
intentionality. Intentionality is “historicized” and itself made object of a transcendental genesis.
Transcendental subjectivity is thus constituted from its own achievements, which results in a
transcendental materialism. This road of interpretation was taken by first-generation Husserl
scholars, who did not share Husserl’s foundational concerns, such as Ludwig Landgrebe (1982,
1977), Eugen Fink (1927), and, of course, Heidegger (1962). Life-world triggered a reconsideration of
the transcendental notion of the world as a horizon as such, and thus the “being” of intentionality.
From this point of view, Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (1962), Merleau-Ponty’s being-to-the-world (2002),
or Lévinas’ interior world (1979) are all renewals of Husserl’s late turn (see further Steinbock (1995),
who advanced the idea of historicity to a generative phenomenology). 
The hermeneutic notion functions for the present endeavor as a heuristic starting point, with the
genetic notion as its horizon. The latter will only now and then come to the fore (such as in the
discussion of the mathematical experience of Bourbaki). As an introduction to the phenomenology
of the life-world, the English reader may consult the monograph of the translator of The Crisis, David
Carr’s Phenomenology and History (1974), and, more recently, a likewise profound study by James Dodd,
Crisis and Reflection (2004). Considering this background, a phenomenology of the life-world, though
seemingly an anachronistic project, can serve still today as an innovative input into the commentary
of science. 
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where the motivation of science comes from: One can only have a intellectual task as long as 
the provenance of one’s interest is still present, informs, and necessitates one’s intellectual 
effort. Indeed, intellectual efforts are nothing but the presentiation of a past (Vergegenwärtigung). 
Hence thought has always the character of remembering. Thought is not a faculty of synthesis 
(Kant) that supplements the rest of life, but is a task to be accomplished. Being responsive 
means that at each point of our intellectual projects we “remember”, are still-in-the-grip-of, 
still-hold-in-grasp, ‘presentiate’ in the broadest sense what once has informed this engagement.  
As a result, to have a grip on something, as it were, cannot be separated from being in the 
grip of something. Only a responsive science can be responsible and produce actual claims that 
the scientist is willing to explicate in light of the past that gave rise to it. Science only achieves 
something insofar as its practices correlate with a ‘necessitation’ of clarification, improvement, 
reformulation, etc. Science having a past is to be pulled along, to follow while remembering, 
that is, to have a horizon. In other words, life-world is the title of the bond of intellectual life 
with the motives that give rise to it. More trivially, the basic reflection is to be able to ask at 
each point of intellectual life: How did this or that become interesting? How did I get there? 
What brought me to it? What am I (truly) up to? Which reduces to the question: What does 
this mean?  
Decisive for this image of intellectual life is that the tardiness of science is not of an 
epistemic kind. It is misleading to say that science presupposes the life-world. The pregivenness 
of the life-world is not that of a presupposition or assumption. The life-world does not 
describe an epistemic limit like a set of basic beliefs that science never can critically inquire – as 
in Kant the supposition of the “thing in itself”. One cannot by any means or in any sense 
“derive” science from the life-world. The past of science is not a stock of belief that grants 
closure to intellectual life. It is not a ‘historical apriori’. In this fashion the life-world is often 
equated in the hermeneutic tradition with a pre-interpreted world, a discursive structure 
(Habermas), a discursive formation (Foucault), a historical paradigm (Kuhn), an 
anthropological field, or even a cognitive “mental map”. I cannot say, for example, that science 
abstracts from the life-world as it abstracts from the quality of a thing in order to consider 
another aspect of it. The life-world cannot be abstracted from; as the past of science it only can 
be forgotten. Science and life-world are not two separate contexts existing next to each other 
and related by means of a hermeneutic play of meaning (the dialectic of pre-understanding and 
projection). Life-world is neither a title of different systems of meaning, and does therefore not 
reduce to a (positive or normative) conception of ideology. The consequences of this 
demarcation will haunt us down to the conclusions.  
As opposed to its presentation in the hermeneutic tradition, the life-world is opposed to 
any form of closure of science. Husserl’s idea of the life-world was not to draw a line between 
science and the rest of life: between doxa and episteme. The life-world is, as Husserl’s often-
quoted phrase goes, the ‘seat of science in life’. With the life-world Husserl aimed at undoing 
epistemic hierarchies and showing how the doxa is indeed necessary for any episteme to be 
established. Science can never know more than what the doxa can believe. Only within this continuum 
science can be conceived as a truly human practice. Husserl even believed that only as long as 
there is a continuity between doxa and episteme can science truly be what it originally was 
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supposed to be: a telos of European (read, Greek) mankind - as he expressed his modernist 
belief in science in 1937!  
Is there, then, any conceivable difference between science and the rest of life? Episteme is a 
particular doxa to the extent that science manifests what is latently present in all human 
practices, in all acts of consciousness: being responsive to the demand of meaning. In every 
moment, in each act, even while asleep, to live amounts to the same as to sense, to be sensitive 
to what has been and will come, to the various sides and “shadows” of the things we perceive, 
that is, to sense the demand of carrying through our lived experience. We cannot open our eyes 
without being already enmeshed in the play of meaning that puts us into charge. And the same 
is true for science. What distinguishes intellectual from the rest of life is a higher degree of self-
articulation, self-understanding, and thus self-responsibility. Only a responsive science, 
according to Husserl, can be responsible for what it claims since it knows, or better: 
remembers its own conditions. Only then science can account of itself. 
This demanding character of experience (the “call” in Heidegger) is meant with one of the 
tenets of Husserl’s philosophy that the being of consciousness is intentionality. Intentional life 
remains always preliminary, pending, and patient. Science is then that intentional practice, 
which endures the demand of sensible life patiently, which is not easily distracted, but follows 
unwearyingly moment for moment the play of meaning. Justification requires thus to 
remember and to narrate the passage that led to a claim; it is to account for the “history of 
sense” that motivated a particular claim. Reason, in this view, is the capacity to be in the grip of 
and to be guided by experience. And so science is for Husserl of highest dignity, and has not 
only a seat in life, but a throne (see Dodd 2004: 27ff).  
 The life-world, in other words, is never “in itself” (an sich). It is “horizon”. It refers to the 
ambiguities of the world after which comprehension, understanding, (re)cognition, certainty, 
clarity, truth, and whatever epistemic values haunt intellectual life, can be considered as a task 
in the first place. The life-world as a transcendental notion proper is the world through which 
there can be an epistemic interest. Such notion informed Husserl’s perception of the ‘huge 
piece of method’ of a phenomenological critique of science, of the “tremendous task of a true 
and genuine philosophy of science” (Hua VI: 398*). In the context of the mathematization of 
the natural sciences, he elaborates:  
 
The researcher of nature does not make clear to himself that the constant fundament of his – after all 
subjective – work of thought is the surrounding life-world (Lebensumwelt); it is always presupposed as the 
ground, as the field of work upon which alone, his questions, his methods of thought, make sense. 
Where is that huge piece of method to critique and clarification [-that method] that leads from the 
intuitively given surrounding world to the idealization of mathematics and to the interpretation of these 
idealizations as objective being? (...) [H]ow formulae in general, how mathematical objectification in 
general, receive meaning on the foundation of life and the intuitively given surrounding world – of this 
we learn nothing (Hua. VI: 343, E.: 296). 
 
To understand the meaning of economic science, accordingly, I have to embrace a long way 
between those experiences that give rise to economic theorizing and the act of bothering about 
existence proofs and robustness tests. A phenomenology of science proceeds, in Husserl’s 
words, as a “retrogression to the life-world” (1975: 41 ff.). It is a regressive analysis (not to be 
mixed up with Foucault’s “archeology”), an analysis along the question: ‘What must have been 
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already accomplished in our sensible life so that an interest in science can be motivated?’ 
Husserl spoke of this “regressive analysis” as the ‘digging out of buried sense-
accomplishments’ (Ausgraben verschütteter Sinnesleitungen). The answer does not result in a 
criterion that tells doxa from episteme. But it exhibits and makes intelligible the possible 
meaningfulness of epistemic life. The phenomenological meaning of science does not lie in the 
features that describe its results, but in the attitude one has to adopt in order to find interest in 
these results. 
As Husserl asked what had to be accomplished in terms of the perception of the world 
that such a scientific thing as “nature” could appear, I will ask respectively: What had to 
happen that such a scientific thing as “the economy” appears? While Husserl explicated his 
answer in the history of science along the mathematization of nature in Galileo, I will explicate 
my answer along the history of claiming scientific authority in economics that culminates in the 
mathematization of “the economy” by Gerard Debreu. At the heart of this critique of 
economic science is the question: is a responsive economic science possible?  
As introduced in nuce, the notion of intellectual responsivity remains abstract. Since 
responsivity is the operational concept of the following exercise, we will fully grasp it only by 
means of the narrative it sets free, that is, by means of the problem it informs in economics. 
For a first intuitive understanding, let me list some of the questions that I will deal with:  
How do economist have to be motivated? Which attitude do they have to adopt in order 
to be affected by economic science? How can economists be “with” their theory as a subject of 
their practice? What is the locus from which and the ethos with which an economist speaks? 
What is the scientific attitude of economists? What is the integrity and sustainability of this 
attitude? In which way are intellectual values manifest in economists’ practice? Do they inform 
their work, or do they remain unexpressed? Or, as recently also Klamer (2008) attempted to 
answer, how do you get to see yourself as an economist? In the words closer to Husserl, what 
is the “act of meaning formative for the experience of scientific thinking” (Dodd 2004: 7). Or, 
as historians of science such as Lorraine Daston came to ask in the last decades, what are the 
concrete historical conditions for a commitment to abstract intellectual values such as rigor and 
objectivity to evolve (2000)? Or, in terms of Heilbroner and Milberg, how can economics 
“generate the resonance necessary for a fruitful vision?” (1995: 113) What moves the 
economist? What keeps the economist doing science? How could one possibly care about 
economics? How can economics be significant?  
 
 
Reflecting on the Significance of Science 
 
The Phenomenology of Economics is a critique of the significance of economic science. 
Husserl used this term at the occasion of stating the crisis of science in the opening of The 
Crisis. The crisis “concerns not the scientific character of the sciences (Wissenschaftlichkeit), but 
rather what they, or what science in general, had meant and could mean for human existence“ 
(Hua VI: 3, E.: 5). 
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In our vital needs – so we are told – this science has nothing to say to us. It excludes in principle 
precisely the question which man, given in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds 
the most burning: questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence 
(Ibid.: 5, E.: 7). 
 
Modern science is insignificant because it “has nothing to say”. Because of such lines, the 
notion of the life-world became associated with the significance of science. In Husserl’s text 
the notion of significance set the tone, but as a concept remained operational and not explicitly 
discussed. What then does it mean to reflect on the significance of science?  
Clearly, the predicaments of such a reflection in science are against me. For a scientist, to 
speak of the significance of science cannot be more than blurry talk. Is significance not beyond 
the possibility of all reasoning? Is it not one of the basic assumptions of science – of its 
autonomy, as it were – that everything could possibly be made an object of enquiry regardless 
of the sources of the interest that gave rise to the recognition of the issue? Is not everything 
virtually significant, even if in an unknown future? Particularly economists may deter from such 
a reflection. An odd form of pragmatism too often functions as an excuse to engage in matters 
of importance. Is it not a surprising fact that the limits within economic theory (rationality) as 
well as the limits of economic theory (modeling) are excused with the same truncated 
pragmatism: it depends on what you want?  
Economists may have another association with the word “significance”. It is used in the 
context of statistical testing of theoretical hypotheses. Since statistically speaking, everything is 
connected with everything one needs to cut the edge between considerable (read, reportable, 
publishable), and negligible results. In order to do so, one speaks of “statistical significance” on 
the basis of a specific “t-value”. McCloskey charged economists since more than two decades 
to reduce economic significance to these statistical standards (1985b, McCloskey and Ziliak 
2008). What is statistically insignificant can be economically significant and vice versa. 
Statistically small can be economically big. The risk of equating them is the automation of 
intellectual activity. Statistical significance is an excuse for putting intellectual effort in assessing 
the significance of a correlation in concrete. As soon as intellectual activity is standardized, in 
Husserl’s terms, science looses touch with its task. McCloskey’s critique thus points into the 
right direction: The question of economic significance cannot be answered once and for all, 
just as something can be significant only as long as it is in question.  
The exclusion of a reflection on significance describes the gulf that separates the scientific 
attitude from a phenomenological reflection on science. In modern science a claim gains 
validity only if one does not present it in dependence on an act of theorizing – other scientists 
could have made this claim too, others should agree when following the evidence too, etc. 
“Someone who is raised on natural science takes it for granted that everything merely 
subjective must be excluded” (Hua. VI., 343, E.: 296). Having a grip on something, as the 
dictum of modern science goes, is precisely not to be in the grip of something. Science has to 
hide its own particularities behind its claims in order to claim generality. Science has to be aloof 
from its own reality in order to claim authority over reality. The significance of science is thus 
operational in science. The phenomenological problem of modern science is then that it 
excludes to reflect upon the motives that give rise to it. But only through that which gave rise to 
scientific practices, science can understand itself in its claim to knowledge. Modern science thus  
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lacks precisely the knowledge of what is most fundamental, namely, the knowledge of what could 
procure meaning and validity for the theoretical constructs of objective knowledge and [which] thus 
first gives them the dignity of a knowledge (Hua XI.: 121, E.: 119).  
 
Modern science comes down to an “idolization of a logic that does not understand itself” (Hua 
VI.: 193, E.: 189). Or, in the words of a commentator of Husserl’s Crisis: 
 
The apparent meaninglessness of science is not due to a lack of content as such (…) Science has a great 
deal to say, but it is unable to speak in such a way that the importance of what it says, the significance of 
its truth is sufficiently clear, even to those who are open to it. The result is that the world has itself 
become unclear, precisely in the form it has taken as something which has been articulated, or 
understood, by science. Its very evidence, secured by science, fails to compel (…) This leads to a 
paradoxical situation – the successful understanding of the world, of its articulation in concepts, strikes 
most as empty, as not addressing what an understanding of things needs to address. This means that the 
very way that we comprehend things has become “incomprehensible” (Dodd 2004: 209 ff.).  
 
By means of dwelling upon and deepening this tension between modern science and its 
possible significance my account of economics will be critical instead of descriptive of the 
practices of economists. Like other critiques of modern science, phenomenology points to a 
blind spot in the constitution of science. There is a constitutive instance that has to remain 
hidden for science to be able to claim authority. This blind spot is nothing but the scientist.  
What then is it to reflect on “significance”? Apart from Husserl’s loose use, it was 
conceptualized by Heidegger (as Dasein’s mode of relatedness). But more telling may be Dilthey’s 
use of the term. In a Neo-Kantian fashion of a tripartite of reason, practice, and feeling, he 
describes significance as “what is coercive or determining within self-consciousness, which is 
evidence for cognition, that is, ‘ground’ of knowledge, the ‘ground’ of motivation for practice 
(Beweggrund), and the ‘ground’ of gratification for emotions” (GS 19: 57*). Significance, in my 
terms, is the concretization of the meaningfulness of meaning. What makes meaning 
meaningful is not its particular function within statements (as in Kant), but it lies in the 
achievement of sense (Sinnvollzug), that is, in the act of carrying out – with which Husserl 
anticipated one great gesture of 20th century philosophy to think beyond identity and structure. 
Significance can then be characterized as the affective weight of an act. Any act, whether practical 
or intellectual, correlates with an effort to be made. By means of these efforts, acts carry out 
what precedes them as well as what they disclose. Significance is thus what makes us remember 
and what lets us question further. It is the title of that, which gives something to say. 
Saying that science is significant is to say that science has something to bear. Science 
presupposing the life-world has to bear the weight of meaning. It is not free in choosing what could 
be said and what not. There are things to say. If what possibly is significant is left to the freedom 
of research, science easily ends up having nothing to say. Then science forgets the life-world 
since it is enmeshed in the world that it pretends to apprehend from a distance. The life-world 
puts the scientist into question instead of providing safe ground. It describes the need for 
orienting and locating ourselves at each moment of experience - the world that, as it were, 
never ceases to appear behind the horizon. And only as such the life-world gives us something 
to say since not everything has already been said. The life-world is associated with the realm of 
intelligibility not because it represents basic truths, but because it commits us to intelligibility. 
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The life-world is epistemologically prior only in the sense of constituting an epistemic problem, 
not an epistemic hierarchy.  
The life-world as just described is a transcendental notion. Rather than an object of 
intellectual life, the life-world “constitutes” intellectual life. Husserl put the entrance door to all 
transcendental phenomenology in the short words: “The world (…) does not exist as an entity, 
as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to it” 
(Hua VI: 146, E.: 144). The life-world is not like the encompassing container of contexts that 
enable us to understand each other as long as we are in it. The life word, if I take Husserl’s 
phrase serious, is not even a correlate of a consciousness, but, as one commentator said, the 
“correlate of the general life-care” (Lee 1993: 148*). As the correlate of life-care, the life-world 
is the locus of our sense of significance, and the carrier of the weight of meaning. The life-
world is then not constituted by the interest we have in the world, but the life-world is 
constitutive for any interest in the world. As opposed to any forms of hermeneutic and 
structuralist critiques of science, I do not consider science as a particular way of viewing the 
world. Rather, I am interested in the world that institutes the necessity to view the world 
scientifically. We have a world in the sense of a “passive having of a world” (Hua XI.: 110, E.: 
109) before there are objects in which we can have an interest. And this world is the life-world. 
Here the supporting lines of Husserl.  
 
It is clear what makes for the radical distinction here. The life-world is the world that is constantly 
pregiven, valid constantly and in advance as existing, but not valid because of some purpose of 
investigation, according to some universal end. Every end presupposes it; even the universal end of 
knowing it in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance; and in the course of [scientific] work it 
presupposes it ever anew (VI: 462, E.: 382). 
 
This step from the life-world as constituted-by to being constitutive-for our interests can be 
understood as a consequence of a basic phenomenological thought that sense is prior to reality. 
The life-world is not the correlate of a particular interest, but the world in, within, and from which 
we can have an interest. Science presupposing the life-world means that it is the condition of the 
possibility of being significant. And so the main question of The Phenomenology of Economics is 
not what is the significance of economics, but could it possibly be significant? Without this 
transcendental notion we will not be able to appreciate the conclusion I have announced.  
The peculiar character of this transcendental notion of the life-world is that it does not 
exclude an actual engagement with the materiality of science. It does not exclude the empirical, 
as opposed for example to Kant. In Kant the “transcendental deduction” of categories like 
“causality” and “necessity” were supposed to be free of “empirical terms”. For this reason 
Husserl charged Kant for his unintelligibility and formalist tendency (Hua VI: §§ 30 ff.). The 
life-world, instead, is both condition and the concrete materialization of science. This 
represents the post-Kantian impetus of my phenomenology of science. The simultaneity of the 
empirical and transcendental gives phenomenology its peculiar taste that may appear like an 
irritation on the first glance, but has it potential in the disclosure of a renewed sensibility. 
Such transcendental materialism Emmanuel Lévinas acknowledged in a rather untypical 
moment of his writings:  
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The method practiced here does indeed consist in seeking the condition of empirical situations, but it 
leaves to the developments called empirical, in which the conditioning possibility is accomplished – it 
leaves to the concretization – an ontological role that specifies the meaning of the fundamental possibility, 
a meaning invisible in that condition. (1979: 173)  
 
Transcendental discourse, as it is so fascinating and challenging of phenomenology, does not 
have to be carried out as an abstract philosophical discussion of categories, but can be carried 
out within the concrete history of acts of consciousness.  
Summing up the preliminary exposition of my philosophical intuition, the reader may 
remember the following. As long as we live the world, we are taken into charge: the life-world 
is not the world that “makes” sense, but is the locus of the need of making sense. The life-
world refers to the “twilight of comprehension” (Dodd 2004; 175), which keeps epistemic 
claims ambiguous, commits us to further questioning, and in this sense describes the finite 
reality of science. The life-world is what keeps us from judging the world and thus allows us to 
“have something to say”. To fully understand “is to grasp what is problematic about it, what is 
being risked and for what, thus what conflicts and decisions have defined it as a concrete life 
experience” (Ibid.: 55). All discourse, according to Husserl’s idea of the multi-layered 
intentional life, is a response to the lived character of experience, that is, to the affective weight 
of experience. This is the phenomenological ground of the possibility of intellectual 
responsivity. The life-world, if I had to provide a definition, is the phenomenological locus 
from where the problems come from. The hold that the life-world has on the scientist, which 
makes science bound by something, is the problem. 
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(2) Scientific Practice and the  
Hermeneutics of the Life-World 
 
 
 
 
While the basic intuition of the notion of the life-world is intellectual responsivity, the object 
of concern of my phenomenological critique is the concrete practices of claiming scientific authority in 
economic talk and writings. Bringing these practices to the foreground directs our attention 
away from the principles by which the scientist draws authority – as in the philosophy of 
science. It neither directs our attention to the explanation of scientific practices – as in science 
studies. It aims, instead, at the concrete conditions of the significance of economic science. In 
this chapter, I explicate this status of scientific practices in comparison with the role they 
occupy in these two prevailing approaches to science. In association with science studies, I 
then introduce the hermeneutic, as opposed to the transcendental, notion of the life-world. 
 
 
The Subjective Accomplishment of Scientific Authority  
as the Establishment of an Ethos: The Seat of Science in Life 
 
In the phenomenology of science, science is understood from the point of view of science-
conducting life, that is, from the “subjectivity which accomplishes science” (Hua VI: 343, E.: 
295). Such approach follows from the basic concept of Husserl’s phenomenology: 
intentionality – not to be confused with the use of this notion outside phenomenology, where 
it has mostly voluntaristic connotations (see Husserl 1975: 85 ff.). Science, rather than a body 
of representations of something beyond itself, is, as Husserl would say, the intentional correlate 
of an act of theorizing that constitutes scientific theories. In a phenomenology of science, 
science is “exhibited” (ausgewiesen) as the intentional sense constituted by theoretical practices. 
The idea of the pre-given life-world of science can be understood as a concretization of the 
meaning of this intentional constitution of science. 
Science is a subjective accomplishment. What motivates this insight is surely not the 
recognition of a limit of science – such as the theory-ladenness of observation. It says that even 
the most general or abstract theory can only be understood through the unique course of 
efforts that accomplish it. To speak of the subjective accomplishment of science is to focus on 
the necessity of someone to stand and carry out science: someone needs to keep track of, has 
to be with, and has to go through the possible claims. To be a subject of science is “to give 
one’s voice” to science. Science thus cannot be viewed from its result – a body of knowledge, 
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in which the history of sense that brought a claim about etiolates in the archive. What 
motivates this insight, though, is not a romantic desire for soft edges in hard science. 
Subjectivity of science is constitutive for the possibility of such “hardness”. If science is a 
subjective accomplishment, then what it claims does not deposit in anonymous truth that may 
or may not turn out to be the case. The truth of a claim is a “claim on me”, as a recent 
commentator of Husserl elaborates:  
 
Thus to reflect on the possibility of making the claim myself, in my own voice, not only brings the truth 
of a proposition into question, but it also brings my self into question as well – for the question here 
takes the form: what would it mean, to be the one who would make such a claim (Dodd 2004: 9). 
 
The question to be posed to the economist when speaking about the subjectivity of science is 
thus: How is it to speak on behalf of economics? How is it to speak as an economist? I will 
discuss this demand for a responsible subject of science with a more resonant notion, the ethos 
of the scientist. What economists accomplish with their concrete subjective engagement in 
science is not a set of anonymous prepositions, but an ethos through which they can claim truth.  
There is indeed a close match between the meaning I gave until now to the notion of the 
life-world and the notion of an ethos. In ancient Greek thought, most generally speaking, ethos 
designates a place: the places of habits, customs, and dispositions. Ethos also includes the 
customary objects of that place – cultural objects. Having an ethos is to have an appropriated 
world we can rely on, and in return the world through which we can be reliable beings. By 
acquiring an ethos we become articulated beings, and thus also addressable beings. Specifying 
the subjective accomplishment of science as an ethos, I thus account for the social and 
discursive dimension of intellectual life that Husserl too often and too easily ignored (Derrida 
1989). The ethos of the scientist describes the “seat of science in life”. Occupying such a seat is 
an “ethical” question of taking intellectual responsibility for claiming epistemic authority. 
In Aristotelian rhetoric, ethos has a more narrow meaning (1926: 17). It refers to one of 
the three modes of persuasion, along with logic and pathos. One persuades by the cogency of 
reason, by appeal to emotions, and by personal identity. Missing one of them, according to 
Aristotle, gnaws on one’s credibility. Ethos refers, for Aristotle, to the discursive identity of the 
speaker that grants reliability and credibility. Ethos is what allows one to raise one’s voice with 
weight and thus to demand that others listen. It refers to the attitude, the tone, and the posture 
with which one speaks to others. In other words, an ethos describes the social relation of the 
speaker to an audience. It originates equally in the self-understanding of the speaker, and the 
image the audience holds of the speaker – which may be very different. An ethos can be 
viewed as a discursive manifestation of a speaker’s past insofar as it grants authority, status, 
integrity, morale, and also expertise. The ethos of the economic scientist, respectively, refers, in 
a catchier expression, to the social, historical and discursive incorporation of the claim to 
scientific authority. What someone says, who says it, and who listens are inextricably related, as 
Shapin too took as a precept of his Social History of Truth: 
 
What we know of comets, icebergs, and neutrons irreducibly contains what we know of those people 
who speak for and about these things, just as what we know about the virtues of people is informed by 
their speech about things (1994: xxvi). 
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Considering the subjective accomplishment of claiming scientific authority, I thus ask: What is 
the ethos of economists, and how do they acquire it? What is their integrity? How are 
economists “with their claims”? What kind of person do economists have to be in order to 
give voice to an economic claim and defend it? Which past grants them expertise, credibility, 
authority, and morale? How does one come to see oneself as an economist, and how do others 
come to support this self-perception?  
In order to give a first glimpse as to why these questions could become virulent for the 
economist, consider that just for the reason of not being assigned a place, of not having an 
address, of not being reliable, of not sharing a past with others, merchants in the premodern 
world have been denied any “ethos”, be it professional or political. How then could the 
economic scientist gain professional or political ethos?  
 
 
How the Practice of Science is Forgotten in the Philosophy of Science  
and Naturalized in Science Studies 
 
Before elaborating further on this notion of the subjective accomplishment of science and the 
ethos of scientists, let me first gain some common ground by comparing this 
phenomenological approach with two prominent genres in the commentary of science: 
philosophy of science and science studies. What status does the practice of economics have in these 
approaches? Is it of concern? If yes, how? If not, why?  
The tradition of philosophy of science, as commonly referred to, goes back to the 
positivist program of the Vienna circle. Its initial hope was that referential truth could be 
reduced to a matter of logic – whatever is the pathos and ethos of truth. The tradition continued 
in postwar figures such as Karl Popper (1902-1994), who softened the Vienna program with 
his falsificationism, then found a further critique in philosophers like Willard Quine (1908-
2000), who undermined the analytic-empirical distinction altogether, and Imre Lakatos (1922-
1974) who built on Quine’s holism with his idea of ‘research programs’ as the units that come 
to be refuted. This continuous thinning out of the referential relation of theories to reality finds 
its present-day benchmark in scientific realism (e.g. Kitcher 2001, and Psillos 1999). There 
referential truth boils down to a basic belief of scientists that only halfheartedly maintains the 
metaphysical verve of the Vienna program.  
I do not need to enter deeply into this tradition for the simple reason that there are hardly 
any direct interactions with the history of economic science in the 20th century. Until roughly 
1975, the history of economic methodology can be written without ever mentioning 
philosophers of science (except, for example, Otto Neurath). Hardly any philosopher showed 
great concern for economics. And if they did, it was in different terms than commonly 
discussed by economic methodologists. Popper’s remarks on “situational analysis”, for 
example, figured less prominent for those who discussed Popper in the context of economic 
methodology (Blaug 1980: 231). However, this tradition is nevertheless the reference point for 
much of what came to be known in the 1990s as the methodology of economics, as 
represented, for example, in the textbook by Hands (2001, see also Düppe 2009).  
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The tradition of science studies also has its origin before the war in such scholars as Karl 
Mannheim (1893-1947) and his sociology of knowledge, or Robert Merton (1910-2003) and his 
sociology of science. After the war it was popularized and also historicized by Thomas Kuhn 
(1922-1996) with his notion of paradigms, Ian Hacking with a historicist approach to scientific 
objectivity, Bruno Latour who begun his career with an account of how “facts” in laboratories 
are socially determined (1979), developed by Karin Knorr Cetina (1981). Also Steven Shapin’s 
work could be mentioned (1994). These “constructivist” works share the notion that science is 
a human practice like any other human project: “Just as we have social histories of eating, 
dying, breeding, and getting and spending, so too we can have a social history of truth making” 
(Shapin 1994: xxiii). More theoretically than historically oriented is the Edinburgh school of the 
sociology of scientific knowledge centered on the work of David Bloor and Barry Barnes 
(Barnes et al. 1996). This school aims at social theories explaining the formation of (both true 
and false) beliefs of scientists. Most interactions with the tradition of the philosophy of science 
take place on their arguments. The works in the commentary of economics that could be 
linked with the tradition of science studies, from Klamer (1984) to Mirowski (2006), however, 
are carried out largely independently of these theoretical debates.  
The role of both the philosophy of science and science studies for the rise of a separate 
commentary of economics since the 1970s cannot be discussed in general terms. It needs to be 
spelled out historically (see Düppe 2009, more informed Mirowski 2004: 3ff., 97 ff.). Also, how 
phenomenology initially was designed as an alternative to the philosophy of science, and 
inspired parts of the tradition of science studies needs to be discussed separately. For the sake 
of brevity, let me leave these historical questions aside and consider here a rather stylized 
relationship between these two established approaches and the phenomenology of science. 
Roughly stated, the philosophy of science represents the official image of science. Praising 
big titles such as reality, truth, fact, etc., philosophers of science conceptualize issues of 
scientific justification, explanation, evidence, causality, and also more concrete issues of 
modeling and testing, such as measurement, probability, stability, robustness, etc. In science 
studies, instead, one exposes, defaces, and debunks precisely that image as a proper 
representation of what scientists actually do in their everyday lives. Scientists, as pictured in 
science studies, have much more mundane interests than to pluck entities from the epistemic 
sky. They have interests in the institutional power of their universities and associations, in the 
monetary benefits of their grants, in keeping up discourse barriers, in gaining majorities by 
discriminating against minorities – just as the rest of mankind does. Decisive factors for 
achieving these goals, science studies tend to show, are not the hard skills philosophers suggest, 
but rather soft skills as they count everywhere else in society. While in the philosophy of 
science scientific authority is justified by means of epistemic principles, in science studies the 
same authority is explained by the peculiarities of the scientists’ social world. 
There is undeniably a conflict between the philosophy of science and science studies. Since 
the big titles of the philosophy of science appear as mere strategies in a play defined in socio-
historical terms, science studies were branded relativist and constructivist. If truth-claims are 
means to pursue special interests or the effects of a social structure, they do not deserve their 
name, as many philosophers reacted to the strong program of the Edinburgh school, and 
battled more recently in the Science Wars. Truth needs to be indifferent to the means by which 
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it is claimed; otherwise it is the truth of the means, nothing more. To claim referential truth 
describes, as it were, the natural attitude of modern science and it excludes the perception of its 
social conditions. The standard reaction of philosophers to the social conditioning of science is 
a gesture symptomatic of their way of thinking: separating the truth from the means by which 
it is claimed, or, in terms of Popper’s famous distinction that has been endlessly repeated and 
contested: keeping apart the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification” – that is, 
in its result, keeping apart the reality “of” and of science.  
So how does The Phenomenology of Economics relate to these two approaches? My 
approach is philosophical in the sense that it aims at economic science as such instead of 
economic science at a particular moment in time, in a particular school of thought, in a 
particular cultural milieu, etc. Phenomenology, however, does not presuppose a particular 
philosophy of science in that it would impose standards of truth, reality, evidence, etc., and 
judge whether economics meets these standards – as, for example, in the case of those who 
complain that ‘economic agents are human beings, therefore not completely predictable, 
therefore economics is not a real science’. The Phenomenology of Economics follows science 
studies in that it shares the basic intuition of economics not being a representation of 
something beyond itself, but a practice within a concrete moment of time, a concrete school of 
thought, a concrete cultural milieu, etc. However, it does not suppose that this has nothing to 
do with the object of concern of economists – as, for example, in the case of those who 
complain that ‘economists are human beings, therefore merely self-interested, and thus not 
interested in real science’. 
I thus do not understand the claim to scientific authority as a vested interest in something 
else. I suppose that scientists do aim at epistemic claims of referential truth. It is their intention 
and interest to do so. A “social” notion of science that neglects this intention is not a notion of 
science, but a critique of it. The crucial question that combines the two approaches 
phenomenologically is, rather, whether a scientific claim is possible given its concrete socio-historical reality. I 
am thus neither concerned with economic theory referring to the world (as in: ‘what is the 
ontological status of the invisible hand?’); nor am I concerned with the possible properties of 
this reference, that is, what is discussed in theories of models. Theories, phenomenologically 
speaking, are re-presentations of the world not in that they depict it, but by means of being 
presentiations, that is, expressions of the lived world that gives rise to an epistemic problem in the 
first place. Theories “tell” from the world in which they are made.  
Pivotal contention of my approach to economic science is thus that its “product” – 
economic theory as the object of the philosophy of science – reflects and is reflected upon the 
practices of the economist as the object of science studies. Such follows immediately from the 
notion of intentionality mentioned above. In phenomenology as a post-Kantian philosophy, 
what describes the practice of science and what justifies its claims are two sides of the same 
coin. The separation of theory and theoretical practices is inconceivable. A claim does not 
point or refer to something beyond itself, but what is claimed is the “intentional correlate” of 
the claim itself. What is claimed and the claiming of it cannot be separate, just as a feeling 
cannot be separate from the feeling of it. The reality “of” and of science cannot be assessed in 
different terms. 
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Only if I think of theoretical re-presentation in such expressive terms beyond the 
separation that is so critical for the present commentary of science can I conceive of a genuine 
theoretical interest and practice without immediately bumping against an oxymoron. In order to 
save science as a subjective accomplishment, I need to avoid at any cost either reducing 
scientific practices to their resulting theories, or reducing them to their preceding interests. The 
meaning of economic theory is the correlate of an interest of the economist into something. I 
cannot speak of this interest in terms of theories representing the world, but in terms of 
concrete practices of theorizing. And I cannot speak of scientific practices as occurrences in 
the world, but in terms of that which accomplishes theories. In other words, the scientific 
interest in both received approaches is an empty spot. In the philosophy of science it is 
abstracted from in order to gain an object of justification (theory), and in science studies it is 
objectified in order to gain something to be explained. The theoretical interest itself is never 
addressed! 
Phenomenologically speaking, it is impossible to think of a division of labor between the 
philosophy of science and science studies. “To speak of a scientific life, of a life of the scientist, 
is thus no metaphor for, or an allusion to something that were merely an empirical 
concomitant of science – a sort of supplement to its actual being” (Henry 1994: 195*). Instead, 
the intellectual life of the scientist is the transcendental condition of a theory. The object of 
science cannot be separated from the sense-accomplishing life of the scientist.  
The risk of separating them is high. Focusing solely on the referential value and epistemic 
principles of economic theory, one considers its legitimacy independent of its actual practice. 
Then it is possible to legitimize economic theory even though there is no scientist who actually 
believes in science – as though the practice of and the belief in science could be subjected to 
division of labor. Matters of ethos would be undermined at their very root. Regarding the 
critical interest of philosophers of science, separating issues of justification supplements rather 
than challenges the philosophical naiveté of scientists since the need for justification is nowhere 
addressed. In this sense the philosophy of science seems to me hardly able to be critical of the 
culture of science (Düppe 2009). Does the philosophy of science reinforce Husserl’s Crisis – 
not knowing the task of science, and nevertheless having success in claiming authority with it? 
As soon as the philosophy of science ignores scientific practices, does it not too easily function 
as the ideology of science, so that scientists can happily continue pursuing special interests 
under the guise of scientific authority? 
Similarly, the risk of science studies is to not address the scientist. As long as one tends to 
take scientific practices as an empirical fact to be explained, science studies often has a 
defacing, if not alienating effect on the scientist. If all images scientists hold about their activity 
degenerate to a false consciousness that is reinforced by the philosophers of science, how 
could the scientist feel addressed? Rather, the scientist would feel reified and naturalized when 
considered as an “object of discovery”. Scientific practices are only considered in their social 
effects, and regarding the anonymous social structure they are subjected to. For this reason 
science studies have contributed to the decline of the writing of intellectual biographies (Forget 
2002: 232). In their concern for social structures, science studies is blind to the accomplishing 
subjectivity of scientists, as is the philosophy of science. This applies equally to the structural 
aprioris of historicists such as Kuhn (paradigm), Hacking (style of reasoning), and Foucault 
32 
____________________________________
                      Preliminaries 
______________________
 
______________________
47
(discursive formation). These anonymous structural notions are operational for stabilizing a 
closed discourse of commentary of science, but do not address the scientist (see for a 
phenomenologically sensitive critique of Foucault’s structuralism Derrida 1980: 31ff). Science 
studies thus tend to reproduce the difference between the contexts of justification and 
discovery as the difference between the ideology/structure of science and its empirical reality. 
In both commentaries the same dichotomy is operational: the reality “of” and of science. I thus 
need to free the intuition of science studies entirely from its tendency to degrade into a science 
of science that determines the allocation of beliefs. 
What I find lacking in both received approaches in the commentary of science is, 
therefore, that they fail to address the scientist in his or her concern for science. A clear sign of 
this failure is that both tend to be closed disciplines, and sub-fields in the philosophy, history, 
or sociology departments. To be sure, to address this concern is not to tell scientists with what 
they should be concerned. To address this concern is to show the necessity of the 
accomplishing life of the scientist that cannot be abstracted from or naturalized without losing 
its inherent urge that it exerts on scientists themselves – the urge to be the person who stands 
for scientific authority. 
For the sake of mitigation, let me add credits to some phenomenological sensibility in 
present-day commentary of science. I recognize it in some recent works in the history of 
science where one tries to write a material history of science, which bridges the 
philosophy/history divide. The classic edition is that of Lorraine Daston, Biographies of Scientific 
Objects. If her aim was to write a “history that would pose transcendental questions in a highly 
particularist mode” (2000: ix), it matches with the transcendental materialism that I associate 
with phenomenology. Another warmly recommended example is the philosophical history of 
Jonathan Rée, I See a Voice (1999). In this history of deafness, Rée meets neatly the tone of the 
transcendental notion of the life-world.  
 
With luck then, a philosophical history will allow us to catch hold of the idea of scientific objectivity 
before it has broken away from subjective experience, and observe it in a pristine state, at the moment 
when abstraction enters our lives, and sense begins to separate itself from sound (Rée, in Hacking 
2004:6). 
 
Characteristically, Hacking was quoting these lines in order to object to the phenomenological 
idea that “objectivity” can be claimed only as long as it is continuously renewed (2004: 6). He 
instead believes that “objectivity” is stabilized only by means of an historical a priori. Hacking, 
to grant him credit too, has nevertheless an equal right to claim precedents in the continental 
tradition. However, what he and others I mentioned apply is not my and Rée’s notion of the 
life-world. It is one I like to call “hermeneutic”, to which I turn now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let me give at least two examples of an implicit phenomenological sensibility in the commentary of
economics. The phenomenological motif strongly informs the tone of Colander’s work when he says to
be “descriptive of how economists feel about their profession” (2003: 157). Also the imperative he
associates with science studies (“understanding economists is necessary to understanding economics”
(Colander 1989: 145), has phenomenological potential in that it ignores the division between science
studies and philosophy of science. Furthermore feminist economists have partially taken over the move of
intimidating economics and economists when pleading for the recognition of “social embeddedness and
material embodiment, values, emotions (…), language, lived experience” (Nelson 2001: 93). 
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Determining the Significance of Economics by Delineating its Special World:  
The Hermeneutic Notion of the Life-World 
 
For now, these preliminarily remarks about the relationship of phenomenology of science with 
other commentaries of science will suffice. It will remain an implicit and now and then explicit 
issue for the following text. Let me come back to what it means to put scientific practices in 
the center of a criticism of science. Forgotten or naturalized, how can we do justice to scientific 
practices and address the economist as the accomplishing subject of science? What describes 
the phenomenological concreteness of this practice?  
Although I do share the basic intuition with science studies that science is a particular 
human practice in principle not different from any other human practices, I do not naturalize 
these practices. They are not like an incidence in the world which can be described like a fact. 
Scientific practices are the object of concern, not the object of dissection. When Husserl spoke 
a century ago about “purposeful action” of science – as many others have – he was far away 
from naturalizing scientific practices.  
 
First let us recall that what we call science is, within the constantly valid world, as life-world, a particular 
type of purposeful activities and purposeful accomplishments like all human vocations (Berufe) in the 
usual sense of the word; to this sphere also belong those practical intentions of a higher level which do 
not involve types of vocation or goal oriented interrelations and accomplishments, the more or less 
isolated, incidental, more or less fleeting interests. All these are, from the human point of view, 
peculiarities of human life and of human habitualities, and they all lie within the universal framework of 
the life-world into which all accomplishments flow and to which all human beings and all 
accomplishing activities and capacities always belong (Hua. VI: 141, E.: 138). 
 
In these lines Husserl does not speak of the life-world as a transcendental condition, but as that 
which indeed describes the locus within which scientific practices in all their contingent 
‘fleeting interests’ take place. The life-world exerts a hold on science by means of embedding 
its practices into this world. Just as other practices, projects, and their realizations belong to the 
life-world, so it is with science, too, as a human project and praxis. Science, as it were, has its 
own “life-world”. With this use of the term, Husserl did provide a framework to describe 
scientific practices. But for this use of the “life-world” Husserl reserved different terms, namely 
“special worlds” (Sonderwelten), or also “environment” and “surrounding world” (Umwelt):  
  
[S]cience is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure, both 
historically and for each new student, the intuitive surrounding world of life, pregiven as existing for all 
in common. Furthermore, it is an accomplishment which, in being practiced and carried forward, 
continues to presuppose this surrounding world as it is given in its particularity to the scientist (Hua VI: 
123, E.: 121).  
 
With the notion of the “surrounding world”, Husserl addressed what commonly came to be 
understood as life-world: the cultural specificity of human practices. Cultural worlds, at least 
since the 18th century, are manifold, or, as Husserl had said, “subjective-relative”. This plurality 
Husserl often illustrated along different professions, to which the profession of the scientist 
and the philosopher also belong (Hua XXIX: 362 ff.). Husserl speaks only of these special 
worlds as displaying a relative closure. Only here can one speak of life-worlds in plural.  
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Each of these ‘worlds’ [of special interests] has its particular universality determined by the end of the 
vocation (Berufszweck); each has the infinite horizon of a certain ‘totality’ (Allheit). But all these totalities 
take their place within the world, which encompasses all that exists and all existing totalities, as well as 
their ends and all purposeful men and civilization (Hua. VI: 460, E.: 380). 
 
Husserl discussed the most encompassing special world that provides the closure of “a certain 
totality” as the “world-for-everyone” (see e.g. Hua XXIX: 86). Since also this world needs to 
be continuously renewed by the negotiations between the special worlds, Husserl never 
conceived of an absolute closure of the life-world as one all-encompassing special world. For 
Husserl, there is neither an anthropological totality of the life world, nor an absolute separation 
of life-worlds. Instead, beneath each silence of incommensurability, to use Kuhn’s term for 
closure, there is always a swishing of continuity. 
In The Crisis Husserl also called such special worlds the regions of the life-world, the order 
of which can found a “regional ontology of the life-world” (§51). Apart from professions, this 
order can be constituted by various kinds of purposes, kinds of people, aspects of life, styles of 
discourses, etc. In all cases, the order can be described by means of particular types or styles of 
meaning – the so-called “modes of givenness” (Gegebenheitsweise). These modes predetermine all 
that could possibly be meaningful in them, and in this way represent the relative closure of a 
special world. Only then can the special world amount to an epistemic apriori in the sense 
hermeneutists cultivated it. In human practices, so goes one of the hermeneutists’ tenets, things 
are not given as such but in a particular mode: they are given as something. It is precisely this 
“as” that constitutes the hermeneutic order of meaning: the so-called nexus of meaning 
(Bedeutungszusammenhang). Characteristic for the hermeneutic notion of the life-world is a basic 
structure described in terms of regions that are constituted by different types of meaning.  
What would be the result of such a regional ontology regarding economic science? I could 
determine the special world of economists within the world they share with the rest of human 
beings. I could determine and delineate the type of meaning associated with the academic 
profession of economists. I could describe a special world in terms of typical motivations 
(social engineering, praising economic freedom), styles of expression (literate, axiomatic), kinds 
of writings (pamphlets, treatises, articles), types of social relations (schools, fields), kinds of 
attitudes (calculating brutally, aloof of moral inhibitions), and types of ends (public esteem, 
academic success) – that is, all what describes the kind of posture the economist adopts when 
speaking to colleagues and to others who perceive him or her as an economist. Economists’ 
practices (like teaching students, publishing their research, advising governments, reporting to 
the media, and debating with other scientists, etc.) occupy, then, a particular region of the life-
world, somewhere in and around Western economics departments. I could describe the 
economist as seen from the point of view of you-and-me-and-our-fellows. To say that economists 
have their own life-world here comes down to the fact that economists have their own culture. 
The Phenomenology of Economics came close to an anthropology of economics.  
Husserl expected from such a description also a foundation of the sciences on the idea of 
the regions of the life-world. The regions consisted of layers of constitution. The reference 
back to the life-world happens as a “founding of validity” (Geltungsfundierung) of regions in a 
many-layered scheme (Hua VI: 143, E.: 140). What is a constituted type on one layer is a 
constitutive type on another; what functions “anonymously” on one layer is “patent” on 
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another. These layers are genetically ordered and reach from passive, pre-egological acts like 
affects and associations to practical and intellectual life – that is, for Husserl, ultimately, reason.  
If we think for example about the economic region of the life-world, the triviality of this 
“regional ontology” becomes clear. We could first think of its typical affective type (such as 
‘the soberness of evaluations’ or ‘the rage of rivalry’), the type of practical goals (such as ‘life 
sustainment’ or ‘profit maximization’), typical cultural objects (such as ‘goods’ and ‘money’), 
typical mode of questions that arise (such as ‘What if the harvest will be too little?’ or ‘What to 
do with this profit?’), typical doxic positions (such as ‘The rich become richer, the poor poorer’ 
or ‘Free-trade makes us good beings’), epistemic interests (such as ‘How was it possible that we 
got into that misery?’ or ‘How can we take the next step on the ladder of growth?’) as well as 
the types of theories and kinds of abstractions made valid for this specific economic region 
(such as ‘accumulation of capital’ or the ‘homo oeconomicus’).  
To carry out the “huge piece of method” between science and the rest of life is here simply 
a matter of dividing up and spelling out the regions of the life-world. Of such a continuum, 
Husserl thought that it could provide a normative epistemology (see Hua VI.: 143, E.:140). 
The result would be to determine the significance of economic science in dependence on its 
position within the structure of the life-world. We could determine what kind of interests one 
has to share in order to conceive of the importance of economic scientists. Phenomenology 
would result in the elaboration of statements like this: from the point of view of the cobbler’s 
interest, economics seems incomprehensible, but from the point of view of the politician’s 
interest, important.  
The Phenomenology of Economics would thus be trivial. The notion of the life-world here 
boils down to the point that science is nothing but a particular way of “viewing the world”. 
The issue of the significance of economics is here simply a matter of naming it. Such could be 
called the task of static phenomenology, which employs the hermeneutic notion of the life-world. It 
relies on the life-world as a given order. Such a notion would be sufficient if there indeed was 
nothing problematic about economic science – that is, if economics were a profession as 
unproblematic as that of the cobbler. 
A down-to-earth version of this epistemology has been popularized by the Husserl scholar 
who most advanced the notion of the “structures of the life-world”, Alfred Schütz. He even 
formulated phenomenological postulates for research, such as the following “postulate of 
adequacy”:  
 
Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act 
performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct 
would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellowmen in terms of common-sense 
interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with this postulate warrants the consistency of the 
constructs of the social scientists with the constructs of common-sense experience of the social reality 
(Schütz 1953: 34). 
 
Note that such “common-sense” epistemology is possible only as long as the life-world is 
already of an epistemic kind, and grants a stock of “primordial knowledge” that is in principle 
not different from any other knowledge of science. The life-world grants us a doxic stock from 
which all episteme is nourished. For this reason, Alfred Schütz emphasized in Husserl the 
character of the obviousness of the life-world (1980: ch. 1, 1959).  
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This hermeneutic notion of the life-world is the closest to the philosophy that informs 
science studies (for an thorough discussion of the influence of hermeneutics on the sociology 
of knowledge see Hekman 1986). One finds a similar normative use of the notion of the life-
world, for example, in Habermas, when speaking of the life-world in the context of discursive 
communities. The basic intuition is that science “has” a life-world (cultural specificity) within a 
pre-given structure of a common world (cultural embeddedness). This intuition is present in 
various concepts such as situations, milieus, discourses, contexts, paradigms, etc. – notions that 
have achieved some popularity with the work of English speaking hermeneutists of the 1980s 
such as George Wright, Clifford Geertz, and Charles Taylor.  
Many economists between Marshall and Keynes and beyond would have signed Schütz’ 
normative principle without hesitation. They thought of economics as elaborated common 
sense. Later on, the hermeneutic notion of the life-world had a short prime in the commentary 
of economics, in particular in Austrian economics – all the more after they came to see 
themselves outside the mainstream (Lachman 1991, Lavoie 1991). Inspired by Habermas, Don 
Lavoie speaks of the life-world as a “linguistically constituted world” (1994: 58). Lavoie 
translated Schütz’s normative epistemology into the main Austrian tenet of purposeful action: 
“for any economic explanation to be acceptable it must relate the observed phenomena to 
their underlying meaning in terms of the individual purposes” (1986: 196). The Austrian 
economist Fritz Machlup did the same some decades before Lavoie. He quoted Schütz’s 
postulate of adequacy in the context of the quarrel he had with Lester on the meaning of 
marginalism (1969: 292). He did so, however, in order to defend the abstractions of marginalism 
against the objection that it does not describe what people do. Machlup thus used the relative 
closure of types of meaning as an excuse for what gave rise to the greatest mathematical 
sophistication.  
Is this all there is to the life-world that it provides a set of basic beliefs as a reference point 
by which all abstractions in science are bestowed with meaning? Sure, Cobb-Douglas functions 
too could be spelled out in terms of common sense with some imaginary acrobatics. Economic 
instructors have to do so every day. But what if there is nothing inherent in a Cobb-Douglas 
function that requires being spelled out in commonsensical terms? Can the life-world really be 
critical for whether or not a science is founded in it? Can it serve as a normative epistemology for 
the significance of science?  
 
 
The Hermeneutic Analysis of Economists’ Ethos –  
a First Heuristic Step Introducing the Problem of Economics 
 
The hermeneutic notion of the life-world will function as a first heuristic step in The 
Phenomenology of Economics, which will do no more than introducing the problem of 
economic science. In the first part (Discourse), I am going to introduce economic science 
informally by means of such an attempt to simply describe the significance of economics by 
delineating its place within the life-world. How does economic science appear to you-and-me-
and-our-fellows?  
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Which terms, then, are suitable to describe the special world of economists? Which layer 
of the life-world can economists settle as their region? In the phenomenological tradition, one 
spontaneously associates sensual experiences of the scientist as the terms of critique. Scientists 
have experiences in the lab, in the library, in conferences, etc., and need to attune their bodies 
again and again in a posture that allows for the assertion of objectivity. The reproduction of 
objectivity certainly needs time and effort, from morning to evening, and haunts some even on 
their weekends. However, such sensual experiences are phenomenologically virulent only 
insofar they are excluded from science. This is only the case in the natural sciences, which have 
always served as the descriptive folio for the phenomenological critique of science. Only in the 
natural sciences is talk about nature constituted by a permanent reduction of one’s own 
continuing sensual experience of nature.  
What is excluded and nevertheless necessary for a claim in economic science is not of a 
sensual kind, but of a discursive kind. Being enmeshed in the world one attempts to 
apprehend, in economics, means to participate in one economic discourse among others. The 
experiences from which a possible interest can arise in economics are of a discursive as well as 
historical nature. Intellectual sensibility in economics is a matter of discursive responsivity, as I 
take the hermeneutic lesson of the works between McCloskey (1985) and Klamer (2007) (see 
Düppe 2008b). Scientific authority is claimed by particular persons to particular persons. 
Economic science is one economic discourse next to others – such as the political, the public, 
the popular, the moral, the bureaucratic, the technocratic, etc. Economists participate in that 
economic discourse which gains ethos by means of stressing authority in the name of science. With 
this specification, I describe in the first part the discourse of economists.  
Audience, as hermeneutists and rhetoricians know, is not audience. There are different 
degrees of discursive vicinity between economists and economic talk. Economists can speak to 
everybody, and only for their own shrine. Accordingly, I will consider the economist first in 
relation to the indirect and occasional audience who never get in touch with economists 
themselves: laymen. What is the public ethos of economists? How does the economist appear in 
the media? What is their most general public identity? What kind of interest lets us listen to the 
economist? (1) Then, according to a very old economic idea that Husserl shared when speaking 
of the divisions of special worlds, I ask for the professional ethos of economists. What are 
economists as a particular profession and what kind of institutions do they inhabit? What do 
economists contribute to society? How do they make their living? (2) Last, I turn to the most 
intimate audience, to those who guarantee the generation of a tradition of economics: the 
students. How do economists teach? What happens to students when entering the academic 
world? What kinds of interests lead students to economics, what kinds of interests keep them 
going, and, at the end, graduating and finding a job? (3)  
The lesson of this heuristic exercise into determining the significance of economics will be 
that the economists’ world is elusive of such a hermeneutic notion of the life-world. Economics 
is, in other words, elusive of its own culture. Why this is so should be obvious to most 
skeptical commentators of the last decades, though not to you-and-me-and-our-fellows. In 
spite of the expectations that the general public holds of economists’ services in the political 
realm, it became common sense among the official commentary since the 1970s that 
economists are evasive of any sensible notion of relevance. The determination of the relevance 
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of economics is not as trivial as that of the cobbler. I cannot simply say ‘Given this or that 
interest, economists provide us with this or that knowledge’. The first part will result in the 
affirmation of these complaints. The problem is that economists do not seem to occupy a 
particular seat in life. Not one particular meaning, but the indifference to the very concern of 
meaning seems to guarantee the economists’ discursive identity.  
This problem, I will show, circles around “formalism” and the “invisible hand”. My 
description in the first part allows me to introduce both as titles of the hermeneutic poorness 
of economists’ discursive identity rather than as theoretical features. The invisible hand 
undermines the hermeneutic integrity of the economic profession exactly to the extent that it 
demands a formal attitude to economic life with which the rest of economic talk keeps itself 
busy. Formalism undermines the expressiveness of economic theory and thus the possibility of 
taking a distinct posture toward an audience.  
Summing up these preliminary remarks on the hermeneutic notion of the life-world – 
which I take to be the commonsensical notion of the life-world – let us remember that it will 
only serve as a heuristic benchmark in order to enter the genetic problem of the relationship 
between economists’ intellectual life and the rest of life. When Husserl spoke of science as a 
concrete historical practice, he did not appeal to a commonality that unifies all human 
practices, like a basic discourse through which all accomplishments can be articulated 
(comparable to a meaning “pole” as Husserl called the ego in his earlier work). The life-world 
is not the world through which we have at our disposal a perspective that makes all practices 
intelligible. The life-world does not provide us with a primordial discourse of spurious 
experience where we all understand each other even without words. It is not the safe ground 
on which all human matter makes sense. Phenomenology does not have the privilege of 
assigning suitable places to each practice of life.  
The problem of “the seat of economic science in life” is not simply to find out its row and 
number, where it can sit comfortably next to others with its peculiar perspective on the same 
hermeneutic play of meaning. The seat of economic science in life is inherently unstable. It 
cannot stand on its own without being pulled this way and that by the demands of relevance 
and the demands of those who know that it could not stand at all if it were too relevant. The 
ambivalence of the discursive ethos of economists makes us forefeel a phenomenologically 
older underground than hermeneutic grounds can be. For the life-world is not the original 
world, but the originating world. 
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(3) The Historiography of  
the Oblivion of the Life-World 
 
 
 
 
If the economist’s ethos cannot be determined trivially, The Phenomenology of Economics 
must become critical. The critical question is not what is the particular significance of economic 
science, but has it ever been (Part 2) and, moreover, could it possibly be significant (Part 3). These 
questions are critical for rather than of economic science in that I do not judge economics by 
the standards of a given order, but consider its own genesis – the possibilities it seizes upon.  
With these questions, I thus tackle the critical second concern of Husserl, that modern 
science forgot the life-world. I read this notion as a historiographical guide through the history of the 
scientification of modern economics. As such a guide, the notion of the life-world does not 
denote an order, but is a genetic title of the provenance of science. Which history triggered 
some to believe in economics and others to refuse it? What have been the motives that gave 
rise to the scientification of economic writings? And what happened to these motives in the 
course of their passing over to succeeding generations of economists? How did economics 
acquire its history? 
 
 
Husserl’s Historicist Epistemology and the Oblivion of the Life-World as  
Self-Oblivion: The Phenomenological Traces of the Scientification of Economics 
 
Since the life-world is the title of the past that gives rise to an intellectual life, the oblivion of 
the life-world directs us to the conflict between history and science, or better, between the claim 
to scientific authority and the historical world from and in which this claim takes place. In 
modern science, history as well as the history of science is not supposed to contribute to its 
body. History is like a residue of science. “A science that hesitates to forget its founders”, as 
Kuhn quoted the mathematician Alfred N. Whitehead, “is lost” (1970 [1962]: 138). Kuhn 
considered this weak point of science central for his image of science. “The depreciation of 
historical fact is deeply, and probably functionally, ingrained in the ideology of the scientific 
profession, the same profession that places the highest of all values upon factual details of 
other sorts”, he wrote in Structures (Ibid.). Later on his judgment reads as more severe:  
 
The sciences are unique among the creative disciplines in the extent to which they cut themselves off 
from their past, substituting for it a systematic reconstruction. Few scientists read past scientific work; 
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science libraries ordinarily displace the books and journals in which such work is recorded; scientific life 
knows no institutional equivalent for the art museum (…). When reconceptualization occurs in a 
scientific field, displayed concepts rapidly vanish from professional view. Such reconstruction is a 
precondition for the cumulative image of scientific development familiar from science textbooks (Kuhn 
2003: 87) 
 
To cut off its own past is constitutive for modern science, constitutive of its perception of 
epistemic life. As soon as something is known it is immaterial what led to it. More than that, to 
get rid of the ballast of its past is the very appeal of modern knowledge.  
If science forgets its past, it does not merely forget something particular, such as a possible 
source of errors. Rather, it forgets itself as a concrete practice in a concrete historical situation. 
“A historical reflection”, for Husserl was nothing but a “self-reflection aimed at a self-
understanding in terms of what we are truly seeking as the historical beings we are” (Hua VI: 
73, E.: 72). For Husserl, knowledge can only be meaningful by virtue of a historical reflection, 
since only then is it informed by its epistemic task. As long as the past of science is the 
condition of having a task, to forget the life-world amounts to the same as being incapable of 
asking the basic questions of history: What was this project supposed to be? How did it 
become interesting? How did we get there? What brought us to it? And how come it ended up 
like that?  
In this sense, Husserl called the “greatest historical phenomenon“, “humanity struggling to 
understand itself” (das um sein Selbstverständnis ringende Menschentum) (Hua. VI: 12, E: 14). Such 
was the point that drove the intellectual interest of second-generation phenomenologists such 
as Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. In recent decades, historical criticism 
of science found a philosophical revival in the works between Thomas Kuhn (1962) and 
Lorraine Daston (2000). I consider the phenomenological notion of historical reflection as an 
informative corrective for these writings. In this chapter, I present a preliminary image of what 
can be seen as the historicist epistemology of Husserl.  
Since, for Husserl, historical reflection and self-reflection are one and the same, “to 
remember” one’s past – in the broadest sense possible of “retaining-still-in-grasp” (Husserl 
1975: 106) – is not one mode of cognition next to others. It is the only possible mode. All 
intellectual accomplishments (theories, models, concepts, hypotheses, etc.), are intelligible only 
regarding the concrete history of sense that has led to them. In this respect, one could think of 
Husserl’s epistemology as a (transcendental) historicist epistemology. It is most present in his 
supplement to The Crisis on “the origin of geometry”.  
 
The ruling dogma of the separation in principle between epistemological elucidation, and historical, 
even humanistic-psychological explanation, between epistemological and genetic origin, is 
fundamentally mistaken (…). Or rather, what is fundamentally mistaken is the limitation through which 
precisely the deepest and most genuine problems of history are concealed (...) Every explication and 
every transition from making explicit to making self-evident (even perhaps in cases where one stops 
much too soon) is nothing other than historical disclosure (Hua VI: 379, E.: 370).  
 
Intellectual life is the experience of being impressed by, and the continuous renewal of, a past. 
While in sensual life – to contrast for the sake of clarity – being impressed means to sense the 
world as though for the first time, and while in practical life we can take on our tasks day by 
day as though we had never done them before, in intellectual life we must remember. In this 
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sense, Husserl continues speaking pompously of a “universal a priori of history with all its 
highly abundant component elements” (Ibid.: 380, E.: 371). I read this notion of a “universal 
apriori” in opposition to hermeneutic-structuralist notions of a historical apriori (such as 
paradigms). History itself is the apriori of meaning. Or more technically, history is the manner 
of transcendental constitution (see for example Lembeck 1987). The meaningfulness of 
meaning in intellectual life lies in its historicity. “We can also say now that history is from the 
start nothing other than the vital movement of the coexistence and the interweaving of original 
formations and sedimentations of meaning” (Hua. VI: 380, E.: 371). In other words, only 
someone who has gone through something can know.  
The separation of history and knowledge, of time and cognition in modern science, leads 
to two transcendental illusions. Once history and science are separate, history can only be 
“history of facts” (Tatsachengeschichte). The history of facts is that history which has lost its 
capacity for bearing a problem. Knowledge, in turn, loses its capacity for being a response to a 
problem. Knowledge degrades to referential truth – the truth for which no one has ever asked. 
As long as the life-world is the locus where problems come from, to forget is to be incapable 
of remembering what made problems problematic – that is, why matter matters. The historical 
consciousness is the discursive sense of the problem. The lack of it, respectively, is the 
insensibility to the problem. Regarding its impressional intensity, moreover, to forget a 
problem can be easily associated with a state of having solved it. Since problem-forgetting and 
problem-solving are two sides of the same act, forgetting can be constitutive of the perception 
of “progress” in science. The less well science knows its task, the easier it is to present its 
results as progress. It is in this sense that the separation of history and science is constitutive of 
the image of progress in modern science.  
 If there was an epistemological imperative of Husserl, it is this call not to forget,  
 
keeping always immediately in mind the original bestowal of meaning (Sinngebung) upon the method, 
through which it has the sense of achieving knowledge about the world. Even more, it must be freed of 
the character of an unquestioned tradition which, from the first invention of the new idea and method, 
allowed elements of obscurity to flow into its meaning (Hua VI. 46, E.: 47).  
 
This original bestowal of meaning upon method Husserl called Urstiftung (primal institution or 
establishment, Hua VI: 72, E.: 72). The effort of intellectual life, as Merleau-Ponty later 
commented in his lectures on Husserl, is to “[t]o take up contact with what in us understands 
the Urstiftung.” (2002: 32). The institution of science is, as I characterize it, the moment of a 
rising perception of an opportunity and need for epistemic concerns. It is the rising recognition 
that something demands patience in being followed in its sense-history. 
What happens if one does not “retain-in-grasp” the Urstiftung of science and loses track of 
it? Science, then, is not passed over as the formation and sedimentation of sense, but it comes 
to “dangerous shifts of meaning” (Sinnverschiebung), or to a “covering-over of meaning” 
(Sinnüberdeckung) (Hua VI: 46/47, E.: 47/48). Then the practice of science is not the mani-
festation, but the covering of past sense-achievements. Some readers may object that a covering 
of sense-achievements still amounts to a formation of sense. In its effect, yes, it does. But the 
‘covering-over’ of meaning cannot count as a subjective accomplishment. Sense-coverings are 
not harmless sense-modifications. Sense modifications occur only by means of exerting a 
42 
____________________________________
                      Preliminaries 
______________________
 
______________________
57
demand on the subject of science that constitutes itself as a responsive subject in seizing upon 
this demand. Only then does a subject accomplish sense-modifications. But this demand is 
interrupted by the oblivion of the life world. The sense-covering and shifts happen to the 
scientist, so that intellectual life turns against its own motives. The silent, creeping shifts and 
coverings of meaning represent the forgetting of the Urstiftung of modern science, its past, its 
task, in short, its provenance from the life-world. The oblivion of the life world is a history not 
of formations and sedimentations of sense, but a history of a self-infestation of sense.  
The oblivion of the life-world, to put it more simply, refers to a history of a rising conflict 
between epistemic life and the rest of life. It is a history of the degeneration of the epistemic 
task of science, and thus a degeneration of the sources that could bestow scientific practices 
with meaning. As a consequence, problems loose the grip they exert on the scientist. This 
history cannot be called an accomplishment of the scientist. It happens “to” him, but 
nonetheless “through” himself. The history of sense degrades to a trace, a supplement of what 
appear to be the “achievements” of science. The oblivion of the life-world as a historiographic 
guide makes us sensible to the history of the affective traces, existential echoes, and personal 
side-effects of a ‘science that has forgotten its founders’. It is the history of the traces in 
sensible life that are left by an epistemic life that is cut off from its past.  
When writing the history of the oblivion of the life-world in economics, I am thus obliged 
to organize my narrative of its scientification around the exclusion of history. To forget the life-
world, as I translate Husserl’s notion, means that scientific practices are nothing but the 
forgetting of what instituted them. The history of modern economic science has to be written 
as the history of the how it detached from its own sense-achievements, which is its history. To 
put it more paradoxically, the history of economic science is the history of the separation of 
that science from its history. The social history of economics, within which scientific authority 
could be instituted, ends up being the residue of its legitimacy. More concretely, it is the history 
of the increasing difficulty of making sense of oneself as an economist, of an increasing conflict 
between the social history of economics and the theoretical practices therein: an increasing gap 
between the reality “of” science and of science.  
This notion of the oblivion of the life-world will guide my historical narrative in the 
second part. What, then, could be the historical material of the history of the oblivion of the 
life-world? First, considering the history from which the motives of scientification stem, I 
certainly must include the social history of science as its general “environment”. It provides the 
social backdrop before which scientific authority plays out. I consider, furthermore, the history 
of economic thought as the means by which this authority is exerted, and insofar as it is responsive 
to preceding economic thought and its time. Phenomenologically more challenging is to 
positively account for the tension that develops between the social history and the history of 
ideas. How can one write a history of the traces and symptoms of the oblivion of the life-
world? Here I need to include the actual theoretical experience of economists themselves, with 
which the transcendental character of the life-world comes to the fore. I will write on the 
becoming and aging of an economist. I focus on a case in which the affective and experiential 
tension between the motives and the reality of economic science appeared in a clearest way, 
namely Gerard Debreu (see more below). To write the oblivion of the life-world, in sum, 
amounts to the writing of the traces of the scientification of economics. 
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How a Phenomenological Historiography Helps with the Dilemma  
between Social History and the History of Ideas 
 
Economic science is a textbook study in the exclusion of its history. History was excluded in 
all respects – regarding “the economy” as a historical phenomenon, regarding its own tradition, 
and regarding the intellectual biographies of economists. What other than such profound 
forgetfulness could have led from the epistemic concern of the ‘beneficiary consequences of 
mercenary motives’ to that of the ‘topology of existence proofs’? What else than horrendous 
“shifts” and “coverings” of meaning had to take place in order to arrive at a judgment that 
‘Debreu proofed Smith’, as the Nobel committee said in 1983? What else could lead from the 
17th-century British King to the 20th-century Swedish King? Let me give a first taste of the 
problematic relationship of economics and its history.  
Needless to say, the low reputation of the history of economics within the profession has 
long been a complaint (Boulding 1971). It applies to most western countries (see the 
testimonies in Weintraub 2002). History of economics is not an essential part of an academic 
training. While some undergraduates do take a course in history, it disappears from graduate 
programs altogether (Gayer 2002). Most students graduate without ever having read any of the 
past economists in their original forms. “In the United States, the subdiscipline [of history of 
economics], as represented in PhD program, is in near free fall, with little on the horizon to 
provide a safe landing” (Weintraub 2002: 9). “Have you ever heard of the Cambridge Capital 
controversy?”, Colander asked a graduate student. “Was that a JEP article? If it was, I didn’t 
read the article. There was a survey of it earlier in some other journal” (2007: 158). 
The intellectual practices of economists are far from historical reflections. Economists do 
not acquire their knowledge by the appropriation of a tradition. One can become a successful 
economist without knowledge in the history of economic thought, let alone economic history 
(which, anyway, is located in another department). We know the Stigler et al.’s who argue in 
one voice about the use of the past of economics that it is past and thus irrelevant: “The 
economics of 1800, like the weather forecast of 1800, is mostly out of date” (Stigler 1982: 108).  
 
One need not read in the history of economics – that is, past economics – to master present economics. 
This will not be news to the present generation of economists. (…) He [the young economist] will 
assume, just as mathematicians or chemists assume, that all that is useful and valid in earlier work is 
present – in purer or more elegant form – in the modern theory. The young economist will increasingly 
share the view of the more advanced formal sciences that the history of the discipline is best left to 
those under endowed for fully professional work at the modern level (Ibid.: 107).  
 
Despite the official rank as second-rate scholars, historians are not diminishing. The History of 
Economics Society, since it was launched in 1973, flourished into a respectable community. 
Despite those who called back to the history of science department (Schabas 1992), historians 
of economics cannot be thought away in the ASSA shrine. Could this count as a sign of 
resistance against the scientification of economics? To what extent are historians critical for 
economists? What is their ethos? 
 Let me go through some typical intellectual attitudes among historians of economics with 
their respective proponents. In the case Stigler has described, history of economics is the 
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history of economic theory, of thought, of ideas, of doctrines, etc. Here history mainly includes 
the texts that the present state of theory has made redundant to read, which in economics is 
roughly everything before the formalist revolution. Economists tend to think of this history as 
a history of errors that culminates in the present state of economics. Such Whig history, as it is 
called, is organized around an essence of economic theory that is arrived at by a teleological 
process. One of the first and path-breaking histories after WWII was of this kind – 
Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis (1954). Although perhaps the richest history in terms 
of social and biographical material, including ancient and medieval economics, and including 
economic history and statistics in “analysis”, Schumpeter believed that Walras’s GET is that 
economic theory toward which all theoretical efforts prior to Walras were heading, and the 
standard by which all future efforts must be appraised. At the very beginning of the history of 
economic thought as a sub-discipline, it was presented as a mere supplement to science rather 
than an alternative reflection within science.  
Such Whig history represents the history that came to be reproduced in textbooks, where, 
for example, Hicksean demand functions are inversions of Marshallian demand functions. 
Remember Thomas Kuhn’s warning about textbooks. They create an image of progress by 
making invisible the revolutions that changed the terms of progress: “A concept of science 
drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of 
national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text” (1970 [1962]: 1). History in 
textbooks is apologetic in that it justifies that no economist needs to read it. Here, for example, 
is all that Samuelson has to say about history in his Foundations:  
 
Beginning as it did in the writings of philosophers, theologicians, pamphleteers, special pleaders, and 
reformers, economics has always been concerned with problems of public policy and welfare. And at 
least from the time of the physiocrats and Adam Smith there has never been absent from the main 
body of economic literature the feeling that in some sense perfect competition represented and optimal 
solution. Of course, over time the exact form of this doctrine has undergone modifications (…) and 
there is considerable diversity in the attempted proofs (in the amazingly few places where rigorous 
proof was attempted (1961 [1947]: 203). 
 
After 1000 years of preaching, there followed 200 years of chewing on arguments about the 
optimality of competition, which could now finally be proven rigorously. From Thomas 
Aquinas to Adam Smith straight to Gerard Debreu: the invisibility of revolutions.  
To a great extent, the writing of the history of economics, even if more than Samuelsonian 
Whig history, is still oriented toward economic theory. One milestone in the writing of history 
that set new standards of rigidity (although it did not share Schumpeter’s teleology) was Mark 
Blaug’s Economic Theory in Retrospect that appeared only eight years after Schumpeter (1996 
[1962]). Though the later Blaug does show a sense of Schumpeter’s rich Geistesgeschichte (Blaug 
2001), in his young years he largely assessed past theory in terms of a standard body of 
economics. “Criticism involves standards of judgment”, Blaug opens his book, “and my 
standards are those of modern economic theory” (1996: 1). Even if there were merely humble 
numerical examples without curves in Ricardo, one can draw them and show what Ricardo 
actually meant with the decreasing rate of land rentals. In Blaug, there is hardly any mention of 
ancient and medieval economic writings, so that historians are trained to consider a standard 
narrative of the history of economics: the SMMS-narrative (Smith-Mill-Marshal-Samuelson). 
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The so-called “pre-Adamite” history thus needs to be done by other historians. Recently 
literary critics such as Mary Poovey have taken over that task (1998).  
The great majority of historians today are able to carry out their business only internally, as 
economists. Yet they are not uncritical of its present state. The most common motivation for 
writing history is a sense of loss of the richness of economics, be it the richness of early 
neoclassicals such as Marshall, or the infinite richness of Adam Smith – to whom historians of 
the last two decades still dedicate more research than any other economist (according to the 
Econlit research of Marcuzzo 2008). These Smith-still-knew-what-wealth-is-historians show 
exegetically how much needs to be forgotten to subscribe to the progress from “Smith to 
Debreu”. In their “nostalgia for the true humanist beginnings,” as Ruccio and Amariglio put it 
(2003: 109), they do, however, tend to simply reverse the textbook narrative. The standard of 
present theory as the reference point is maintained in such a reversal. Such an attitude can go so 
far as to claim that one or the other scholar of the past was more advanced even by the 
standards of today! Such could be called reversed Whig History: applying the standards of 
today to the past not in order to show progress, but in order to show decay! One finds this 
attitude, for example, among neo-Ricardians. Some historians of economics want to be the 
better economists (for a further discussion, see Marcuzzo and Roselli, in Weintraub 2002). 
 There are also critical historians who are sufficiently historically minded to treat the history 
of economics as an actual historical event rather than the accumulation of an archive. Margaret 
Schabas, for example, plead for intellectual independence of historians and for a treatment of 
past economists “in their own right” (2002: 219). These historians tend to ally or provide 
material for science studies. The master of the writing of the social history of economics is 
certainly A.W. Coats (1924-2007). He is best known for his work on the British and American 
professionalization of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (1993). He also made significant 
contributions to the early modern history of economics, and also to the social history of 
economics after 1945 (1996). Though critically minded, Husserl would have most likely put his 
work on the “history of facts” shelf. I suppose that most economists perceive his work in the 
same manner as Husserl would, without sensing its critical potential. Just as there is a tendency 
toward naturalization in science studies, the risk in social history is high not to address 
economists in their historical ignorance. In order to write social history in such a way that it is 
critical for the economist, one needs to account for how the perception of that very social history 
is operational for the self-understanding of economists today. Otherwise, one runs the risk of 
actually reinforcing this perception. Economists could be proud that even such “contingent” 
things as their social history are worth being studied painstakingly.  
This risk is perhaps best avoided in the challenging writings of Philip Mirowski. In 
painstaking archive work, he digs out the social motivations that shaped modern economics. 
He has traced the political conditions and consequences of the concrete and often symbolic 
interactions of epistemic imaginaries in economics and the natural sciences (1991), and 
computer sciences (2001). Mirowski mobilizes Foucault’s imperative of the “archeology of 
knowledge” in that one digs out the underlying power structures that produce particular truth 
claims in economics – military power during WW II and the Cold War, and today increasingly 
market power. When talking about his motivation for spending years in archives, he evoked 
this Foucaultian notion of archeology (though he skipped it in the 2004 reprint). 
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(W)hen I read a particular economist’s advocacy of regarding children as consumer goods, or another 
insists that Third World countries should be dumping grounds for toxic industrial wastes since life is 
cheap there, or a third proclaims that no sound economist would oppose NAFTA, or a fourth asserts 
confidently that some price completely reflects all relevant underlying fundamentals in the market, I do 
not view this as an occasion to dispute the validity of the assumptions of their “models”; rather, for me, 
it is a clarion call to excavate the archeology of knowledge which allows such classes of statements to 
pass muster, as a prelude to understanding what moral presuppositions I must evidently hold dear, 
given that I find them deeply disturbing (1994: 29; see also 2004: 39). 
 
Such frank lines are rare among historians. Yet does the strategy of an archeology of 
knowledge pay off? What are its effects on the profession? Does it address economists in being 
deceived about their history, or does it cast blame for feigning one thing (truth), but actually 
doing something else (exerting power)? Is the profession able to appreciate such an archeology 
as a liberating self-reflection rather than an estrangement of their professional dignity? 
Both ways of writing the history of economics – history of thought and social history – 
face the difficulty of relating to economists. Too easily does one supplement or even reinforce 
the historical ignorance of economists. On the occasion of assessing “the future of the history 
of economics”, Weintraub has put this dilemma in following terms.  
 
Suppose historians of economics were to take this advise [to critically assess the Whig history of 
economists, T.D]. I submit that the history of economics would soon stand in the same relation to 
economics as creationism does to evolutionary biology. (…) Suppose historians of economics were to 
(…) stop writing histories based on the ‘presuppositions of ahistorical economist’. The audience then 
would become, I suspect, scholars writing in the history of science and science studies. And as a 
subdiscipline, the history of economics would likely become even less interesting to economists than it 
is now, if that is possible (2002: 6-7). 
 
How could one avoid this dilemma? Note that in none of the mentioned approaches do we 
find a historical reflection on the very status of the history of economics for the practice of 
economics. Historians hardly engage in historical self-reflection. Such a history would be far 
more than merely a side-history. It concerns the very possibilities historians can seize upon. 
What needs to be written is the history of the historicity of economics, that is, the manner in 
which economics was able to acquire a history. History needs to be told as that history which 
enables economists “to have a task” – the history of the struggle of economists to understand 
themselves as economists. Such is the history of sense of economics that I trace in Part 2.  
Recall, for example, that the difference between the history of facts and the history of ideas 
in economics as opposed above was a result of the so-called Methodenstreit between historians 
and theoreticians in the 1880s. Before economic science could separate from its history, 
economists first had to perceive a split between history and theory. Insofar as this perception 
was motivated, it itself has a history. Only since the Methodenstreit does history appear equal to a 
smorgasbord of facts, which indeed is the prevailing image of what the empirical soil of “the 
economy” consists of: a hodgepodge of data. If one asks an economist if he has ever heard 
something of “reality”, he will, with a more or less uneasy feeling, ask himself when he has last 
look up data. And if one asks about “history”, he will bring out a stochastic model of these 
data. Historians of economics are the children of that attitude, insofar as there is no question 
whether economic historians need a place at the economics department. They work at the 
history department. Economic history, if it is dealt with in economics departments, is nothing 
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but a field among other fields of applied theory – such as in the case of cliometrics of Douglass 
North and Robert Fogel. The association of history with facts is only possible after the 
hierarchy of theory and history has already been established. A historicist position – that 
economic theory is economic history, and all epistemic concerns are historical – never existed 
in the history of economic thought apart from Marx’s historical materialism. 
Going back a little further, was not the very epistemic problem of early economic theory a 
historical question – namely, how economic growth happened? Although a perception of 
economic growth was essential for the very motive of practicing economics, the historical 
consciousness of economists never grew into a real conception of the history of “growth”. To 
the contrary, just as there is a tendency in capitalism to forget that there was ever a time before 
(let alone to envision a time after), so it is in economics. If economists ever spoke of a time 
before capitalism, it was “conjectural history”, the time of Robinson and Friday. Given that 
“the causes of growth” was one of the first questions of economic theory, as I will argue in Part 
2, the very perception of this question is already based on the neutralization of time, and in 
particular the cyclical time that dominated economic life before capitalism.  
As a last preliminary remark about the historicity of economics, consider how the tradition 
of economics has been handed over. What happened at the crucial junctures of the history of 
economic thought to the past of economics? How could economists generate their tradition so 
that it could culminate in the SMMS-narrative? History proceeds in economics mainly by 
means of codifying the body of economics. The main genre that made history in economics is 
that of Principles. Economists wrote Principles after Principles – as though it never really got 
started. Economists did never write in economics or in political economy, but they wrote an 
Economics or a Political Economy. Textbook culture dominated the discipline since the mid-
18th century. Instead of arguing with or against the views of one’s forerunners, one preferred to 
summarize them in such a way that the problematic context from which they were formed 
disappears. The disagreement economists had with their predecessors did not have to be 
argued through. They vanished in their re-codification. Economists did not acquire their 
tradition by means of contests, but by means of flattening differences. Economists since their 
earliest beginnings had the inclination to hide persistent conflicts. Contests – that is, what the 
rest of economic talk is mostly preoccupied with – were always poison for the scientific 
authority economists claimed. So better not to recall the past.  
Hence the history of economic thought, to a great extent, can be told in terms of 
syntheses: First, Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1976 [1776]) synthesized early modern liberalism and 
Scottish moral philosophy. He thereby detached economics from the political discourse of 
17th-century England and opened the door to academic scholarship. Second, Mill’s Principles of 
Political Economy (1994 [1848]) synthesized Ricardo’s abstract liberalism with his utilitarian and 
soft socialist aspirations. He relieved the student from the burden of reading Ricardo, and in 
part from the suspicion of being biased towards Laissez-Faire. Third, Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics (1938 [1890]) synthesized marginalism and classical economics. Since then 
“everything is in Marshall”, and not only were the ideological differences of the marginalist 
revolutionaries smoothed down, but also the foundational issues regarding the analogy of “the 
economy” and nature (see e.g. Mirowski 2004: 335 ff). Fourth, and most problematic, 
Samuelson’s Economics (1948) provided the ultimate synthesis of the science and (political) art 
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of economics. It made the apparent contradiction of the ‘engineering of liberty’ rigorously 
invisible. This synthesis could only be topped by Mas-Colell et al., Microeconomic Theory (1996). It 
synthesized mathematical rigor and scientific authority. At each step, economic science 
advanced by means of forgetting the past it stemmed from – “dangerous shifts of meanings”. 
Let me close these preliminary remarks on my historiography with the vertical section of 
Part 2. How did economic science intervene in the social history of economic writings? 
Economic science, so goes the fundamental first insight, is part of modern history. In social 
terms of, economic science was given an opportunity to contribute to modern life because it 
promised the closure of the modern triad of science, technology and growth, in particular insofar as it 
promised to close the link between science and growth. Economists took peculiar alliances 
with modern policies that attempted to liberate mankind – on the right and on the left. 
Economists toggled largely between two clarion calls of liberation: In-the-Name-of-Science: 
Laissez-faire, and By-the-Means-of-Science: Revolution! The history of economic thought was the 
history of attempts to claim scientific authority in such tones. It begins with the creepy re-
configuration of political life by epistemic concern for “the economy”, and ends with the 
silence of the axiomatization of the conditions under which a GE holds.  
If I adopt this broadest possible view on economists’ intervention in modernity, economic 
science can be viewed as the attempt of a structuralist turn in economic talk and writings. This 
turn – which is one of my big claims – was never fully carried out. Economics could never 
establish a “paradigm”. This attempted turn is that from the temporal order of the oikonomia to 
the structural order of “the economy”. The exclusion of historical reflection, therefore, lies at 
the very bottom of the possibility of economics having an object at all (3.1). The concrete 
institution (Urstiftung) of an epistemic opportunity in economic talk occurred in the political 
discourse of late 17th century England. Science provided an opportunity to make an economic 
claim that was not a priori undermined by the economic suspicion that had dominated the 
intellectual culture of mercantilists. Nevertheless, scientific authority became associated with a 
particular position: the free-trade movement against the protection of merchants (3.2). After 
this “first wave” of scientification, scientific authority became politically contested during the 
century of high modernism in economics (1850-1950). Some began to claim “scientific 
socialism”. The battle of ideologies worked as the main engine to push science beyond its 
political roots, which was not finalized until the formalist revolution (3.3). This, I will argue, 
was the end of the social history of the scientification of economics, since the contradictions of 
the scientific ethos of economists can no longer be productive. There is no reason to expect 
another wave of renewing scientific optimism, since there is a declining need for scientific 
authority due to its loss of contestability (3.4).  
The nub of this narrative is that economists’ scientific practices are entrapped. Scientifi-
cation in economics made it impossible to reflect one’s motives for doing economics. What at 
the beginning led to economic theorizing – to avoid economic suspicion – at its end backfired 
in the form of the complaint of the irrelevance of economics. At its end, there can be a 
theoretical interest only if it is not directed at anyone. Hence the scientification of economics 
revealed ever more clearly its inclination toward becoming a formal science compatible with all 
theoretical interests. Scientification of economics took place by means of formalization. In the 
following chapter I introduce this problem of “formalism” as the oblivion of the life-world. 
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(4) Formalism and  
the Oblivion of the Life-World 
 
 
 
 
According to Husserl, the crisis of modern science has its root in its “objectivism”. 
Objectivism and, closely related, positivism are heavily burdened notions in the philosophy of 
science. In some circles, they are often equated with “scientific”, yet in two different meanings. 
‘Objective’ can be opposed to ‘subjective’ in that ‘subjective’ amounts to the same as distorted 
by various contingencies of perception, interest, history, culture, personality, etc. Objectivity 
means in this case, negatively, the mere exclusion of the subjective. Such is the more everyday 
use of the word “objectivity”. Objectivity, second, can also positively refer to an ontological 
vision of a totality of beings that are in principle fully determinable. This use of the word is 
hardly ever confronted in practical life. It matters mostly in the natural sciences, as discussed by 
philosophers of science under the title ‘scientific realism’.  
This difference is vital for the scientification of economics because, as I introduce in this 
chapter, objectivity in the second, positive sense never played a decisive role. The scientificity 
of economics was never achieved by means of things-being-out-there. There have never been 
any “discoveries” of objects that are of the same rank as atoms, hormones, neurotransmitters, 
or the like. Instead, scientificity was always achieved by means of not being biased. The 
scientification of economics, in other words, did not happen by means of the objectification of 
economic life, but by means of the formalization of a structure: “the economy”. Since the 
phenomenological critique of science is traditionally oriented toward the natural sciences, most 
phenomenologists tackle the metaphysics of scientific realism. Instead, I need to make a major 
stipulation regarding the reason why economic science forgot the life-world: it happened 
because of formalism, not because of objectivism.  
At first glance, the notion of the life-world presents in fact a different image of science 
than that associated with scientific realism. “The world (…) does not exist as an entity, as an 
object,” which I have made central in Husserl’s late phenomenology (Hua. VI: 146, E.: 144). 
World is horizon, and thus never totality. Husserl indeed was often opposed to the naive belief 
of science in a world in itself when speaking of a “constructive concept of a world which is 
true in itself” (Ibid.: 177, E.: 173).  
In, say, folk-phenomenology, one commonly equates objectivism of science with 
reductionism: the reality of subjective experience ossified in the sum of properties of objects. 
The properties of objects only softly echo the experiences that constitute them, if they do not 
silence them entirely. Economists, however, have never gained great authority by reducing 
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lived experiential reality to crude entities. To the contrary, they have always shown a sensibility 
for the intrinsic variety and irreducibility of individual realities of economic life. Economists 
gained a scientific ethos because they were able to point to the subjective realities of economic 
life, but with the same gesture also to steer away from it. If they would not point to it, they 
could not be identified as economists; if they would not divert from it, they could not be 
identified as scientists. Hence the theoretical perception of “the economy” was never meant to 
evoke the imaginaries of an object, but of a structure.  
Historically speaking, the difference between formalism and objectivism accounts for the 
differences between William Petty and Thomas Mun, William Whewell and Richard Whately, 
Irving Fisher and Vilfredo Pareto, Oskar Lange and Ludwig von Mises, and ultimately between 
John von Neumann and Gerard Debreu. This argument is fundamental in order to arrive at 
the conclusions I have envisaged. It is also vital for understanding the distinctness and 
necessity of a phenomenology of economics as compared to other commentaries. For a 
preliminary understanding of the difference between formalism and objectivism, let me here 
introduce it with Husserl. 
 
 
Objectivity and the Age of the World –  
Never Old Enough not to Shimmer with Reddish Shades 
 
What, according to Husserl, is the problem of objectivism? He characterized objectivism as 
the “belief in being” (Seinsglaube) that the “scientific attitude” has in common with the “natural 
attitude”. The phenomenon of the world, which is the object of phenomenological inquiry, 
renders in science and the rest of life a pre-given belief, a never questioned but continuously 
functioning Urdoxa (for example, Hua III: 257). In this sense of a doxic condition of science, 
Husserl speaks of the life-world as the horizon of obviousness. The existence of the world is 
never questioned but always presupposed for all practices of science. Science never gives an 
account of how something can appear to the scientist in the first place, nor how it arrived at 
the “belief in being”. 
That modern science forgot the life-world, at this point, means that it forgot that the belief 
in being in itself correlates with a history of sense. The belief in a world-in-itself is itself an 
accomplishment. Science forgets  
 
that even the apodictically persisting conviction of one and the same world, exhibiting itself subjectively 
in changing ways, is a conviction motivated purely within subjectivity, a conviction whose sense – the 
world itself, the actual existing world – never surpasses the subjectivity that brings it about 
(zustandebringt) (Hua VI: 271, E.: 337).  
 
Before there was the belief in a world-in-itself, there was a history that motivated that belief. It 
just so happened that the world “grew old”, so old that the scientist who accomplishes this 
belief and continues accomplishing it every moment when engaging in science, is inclined to 
believe that the world has been always there, and, moreover, that it even contains, hidden 
somewhere, all the answers to the questions this same world unceasingly poses to the scientist. 
The task of a phenomenology of science would amount here to catching hold of the world in a 
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moment when it evokes its image of an infinite age – to catch hold of a past of science that has 
been always already forgotten.  
Also in Heidegger, to mention another Husserl scholar, objectivism represents the disease 
of modern science, at least in his early work Being and Time (1962 [1927]). The distinction that 
made this book popular echoed precisely this worry about objectivism: the distinction of 
Vorhandenheit (being-present-at-hand) and Zuhandenheit (being-ready–at-hand). Heidegger’s 
entire analysis of Dasein could be read as a way to show how the ‘conviction of one and the 
same world’ is motivated within our pre-theoretical dealing with the world. Concerning 
science, Heidegger mentioned (but did not elaborate) an “existential concept of science” as 
opposed to the “logical concept of science” (§69b). Within the logical concept, science is 
viewed with regard to its results, that is, “something established on the interconnection of true 
propositions”. When considering the existential concept of science, instead, he asked, similar to 
Husserl, what were the “existentially necessary [conditions] for the possibility of Dasein’s 
existing in the way of scientific research” (1962 [1927]: 408). Science is a “mode of Being-in-
the-world”, a “way of existence”, as he puts it (see for an exegesis Gethman 1991).  
In this existential genesis of science, Heidegger argues, “objectification” in science is 
preceded by “thematization”. In terms of his jargon, “inner-worldly encounters” (innerweltlich 
Begegnendes) have to be there within a nexus of “in-order-to” which implies its own 
“circumspection” (Umsicht) before they can become “obtrusive” (aufdringlich), and can then be 
thematized in their obtruding. Then, by “bringing the object of concern close by interpreting it 
circumspectively”, we can deal with this object of concern in “deliberation” (Ibid.: 410). Only 
in this way, can things be singled out and subjected to an epistemic question of objectivity. In 
terms of his famous example: The hammer is the hammer we use for something else; only if 
the hammer becomes “too heavy” can it be singled out independent of the place where it 
belongs. Only then can the hammer be thematized in its “objective weight” (Ibid.: 413). 
Husserl’s attempt to catch hold of the world at a moment when it evokes an interest to 
consider it theoretically translates in Heidegger to ‘which things have to break to make us 
objectify the world instead of simply dealing with it’?  
As appealing as such tracing of scientific objectivity is, would it not be in the interest of 
science since it helps “making assumptions explicit”? Could this project not be potentially used 
in order to “filter out” even more of “the subjective”? Then one could even conceive of a 
phenomenological science that has as its “object” the horizon of the obviousness of the world, 
which would bring us back to the “regional ontology of the life-world” as discussed above. 
Indeed, Husserl’s notion of the life-world as a horizon of obviousness is still embedded in his 
early, Cartesian work. It belongs to the Kantian paradigm of a reflexive, transcendental idealism 
as a critique of metaphysics (see for a defense Held 1991, for a critique Landgrebe 1961, and 
for a comparison Luft 2004). The main intellectual virtue of phenomenology would be here 
“apodicticity” and “presuppositionlessness”, as hermeneutists mistakenly criticized Husserl.  
The phenomenon of the world, however, does not lie “behind” the being of the world as a 
reflective presupposition of our attempts to comprehend its totality. The oblivion of the life-
world is not the oblivion of a more fundamental level of the world principally still graspable 
within the horizon of reason. Life-world is the horizon of reason rather than a universal 
horizon as the totality of all partial horizons, which could be made an object of reason. With 
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the life-world, and here I follow what the second generation of phenomenologists such as 
Ludwig Landgrebe emphasized (1961), Husserl aimed rather to overcome Cartesian and 
Kantian reflexive philosophy, and thus the project of a foundation of science. The notion of 
the life-world rather affects what it could possibly mean to reflect on presuppositions. The 
oblivion of the life-world cannot be avoided by the means of modern science: reflecting on 
presuppositions. 
Apart from this philosophical reason, a genealogy of the scientific “belief in being” suits 
only a phenomenology of the natural sciences. For “nature” is just that world which is so old 
that we have forgotten the moment when we turned it into the prime locus of “objects”. 
“Nature” is the object par excellence. But if, as I suggested, we think of science as the practice of 
claiming scientific authority, then science does not require a perception of nature. Thinking of 
the life-world as a horizon of obviousness is oriented toward the natural sciences, and does not 
help understanding the problematic relationship of economic science and the life-world. I 
venture that objectivism (as well as its methodological brother, positivism) cannot serve as a 
guide for a critique of economic science. The problem of economic science is not that it 
forgets to reflect on the genesis of its belief that there is world, the economic world respectively. 
Economists, I will show at length, did indeed forget the genesis of “the economy”, but not 
regarding their belief that there is “the economy”. The scientification of “nature” from Galileo 
to, say, Hilbert, therefore, cannot be told in the same terms as the scientification of “the 
economy” from, say, William Petty’s Political Arithmethick to Gerard Debreu’s Theory of Value. 
Even Heidegger acknowledged with explicit reference to economic science that it is not 
necessary for science to objectify what is ready at hand. Economic science, said Heidegger, is 
the science that thematizes Zuhandenes as such: 
 
Even that which is ready-to-hand can be made a theme for scientific investigation and determination 
(…). The context of equipment that is ready-to-hand in an everyday manner, its historical emergence 
and utilization, and its factical role in Dasein – all these are objects for the science of economics. The 
ready-to-hand can become the ‘Object’ of science without having to lose its character as equipment. A 
modification of our understanding of Being does not seem to be necessarily constitutive for the genesis 
of the theoretical attitude ‘towards Things’ (Heidegger 1962: 413).  
 
The scientificity of economics, along these lines, does not depend on the objectivity of its 
objects. There are economic things only as long as they remain in a pre-objective state of 
‘equipment’. Most economists knew that. 
To be sure, objectivism was a mode by which economics became science, but it was not 
the driving force. To begin with, consider the official criticisms that positivism has earned in 
the last four or five decades in the philosophy of science (I mean the Popper-Lakatos-Quine 
tradition). Did it have any effect on how economists thought about their profession? Although 
philosophers of economics often proudly refer to this post-positivist tradition as the 
achievement of their work, having liberated, as it were, economics from positivism, economics 
itself was by and large not touched by these debates. In spite of the fall of the official doctrines 
of positivism, economists, in recent decades, increasingly use positivist methods, such as in 
econometrics or experimental economics. Economics gained its status as science independent 
of the received philosophy of science. The philosophical problem is rather that there is nothing 
in economics that suggests the need to take a position regarding the objectivity of its objects. 
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This theme of the secondariness of positivism and objectivism for the production of 
scientific authority in economics will be one of the running issues of my historical narrative. 
For a first taste, consider how the SMMS narrative of the history of economics had to be 
modified in order to grant full influence to positivist doctrines. Instead of “Smith”, economic 
science had to start with William Petty (1623-1687). In the 19th century, the standard history 
had to include more economists, such as William Whewell (1794-1866), and also historicists 
such as Karl Knies (1821-1898) who liked statistical, descriptive, or other ontological 
determinations. Ricardo would be a minor character. Comte’s sociological positivism could not 
have passed by so unnoticed as it did. Robbins’s definition of economics could not have so 
easily ended up in the textbooks in spite of the critique of Hutchison. In the early 20th century, 
the makers of science should have been Hotelling, Coals, Lange, and others. None of these 
economists, however, contributed to the scientific authority of economics. To know things in 
detail, and to look painstakingly, to the contrary, always had the touch of indiscreetness. 
Bacon’s eye was much too voyeuristic, in that it could help economists gain scientific authority. 
The ontological vision that there is a suitable object of economic science (scope) that can be 
discovered with particular techniques (methods) never made the economic scientist. At most, it 
functioned as window dressing for the hidden motivations of scientification. Positivism, now 
and then, may have shaped the belief in economic science. But the history of economic 
positivism is a history of a series of inhibitions. 
Empirical interpretations of economic laws – be it the falling rate of profit or the 
diminishing marginal utility – never found a large audience. It was not the sophistication of 
techniques for discovering things that made economics, but the sophistication of techniques 
for “reformulating” and “generalizing” preceding theories. Economists tended philosophically 
toward an apriorism, deductivism, blackboard economics, that is, to theory – which has been 
long acknowledged by commentators. Economics advanced by means of theory rather than the 
discovery of empirical laws. Economic theory and economic science are, to a great extent, 
replaceable expressions. What did find a bigger audience were innovations such as the use of 
calculus, of geometric representation, of convexity analysis, and other sobering 
“reformulations” of preceding theories. If economics “discovered” things, then they were 
theoretical relations: integrability theorems, continuity axioms, multipliers, Slutsky equations, 
Arrow-Pratt measures, and the like. Economics is held together by theoretical structures, not 
by basic beliefs or empirical truths. Of course, economists still can believe in the objective 
world, even if focusing entirely on theoretical structures, as Mäki has taught for decades (2001). 
However, there is simply no need for doing so. 
Economists, moreover, were always sensitive to the argument that basic economic 
phenomena are “subjective”. Economists never wanted to reduce a reality to a principle, never 
reduced the Social to the Natural, or, for that matter, the Individual to the Social. The 
dominant strategy to deal with subjective realities was not to make tangible objects out of 
them, but to establish a level of reflection at which the subjective constitution of economic 
reality becomes harmless for the economist. Economic science did not proceed by means of filtering 
the subjective from the objective, but by means of allowing and at the same time disregarding 
the subjective. Even if attracted by the analogy of “the economy” and nature, there was no 
economist who did not believe that such is nevertheless an analogy. The so-called natural 
54 
____________________________________
                      Preliminaries 
______________________
 
______________________
69
science-envy, which nourished much of the scientific optimism of 19th-century economists, 
was not decisive for gaining scientific authority. The natural sciences were merely instrumental 
for appearing to be beyond the subjective. No more! 
The decisive engine of scientification was not the lack being objective, but the suspicion of 
being biased. That lack of objectivity and biased science are two different things is most 
apparent when considering the political connotations of positivism. For those who did stress 
the objectivity of economics even ran the risk of evoking more suspicion of hiding their 
subjective biases. Objects may convince Bacon’s eye, but they do not convince a skeptical 
mind that sees nothing but the self-interests that lead to a claim. Those economists who looked 
closely with penetrating eyes, at least until the formalist revolution, have been those who 
stressed “scientific socialism”. Positivism was reddish colored. In economics, to believe in a 
totality of being that entails all the answers one poses to it, is to believe in the ontological 
transparency, determinability, and thus possibility to design “the economy”. If “the economy” 
is objective, a positive fact, then mankind is close to printing out the plan for economic 
heaven, abolishing all the miseries of capitalism. Many economists hoped so in the first half of 
the 20th century, as I am going to elaborate in the second part. To put it frankly, I venture to 
show that imitating scientific objectivity always sufficed economists’ discursive need for 
authority, while carrying it out harmed it. 
Those who wanted to avoid this association of positivism and socialism were those who 
did not look too closely – who remained discreet. The distance that the economic scientist adopts 
could not be that of the onlooker, who looks closely or counts carefully what people need, 
want, or desire. Fie! It is the distance of a discreet person that never asks too many questions 
and thus appears aloof from the quarrels others have – this granted scientific authority to 
economists. 
 
 
Instead, the Discreetness of Formalism: Suggestive but Silencing –  
the Genetic Code of the Theoretical Experience in Economics 
 
If the oblivion of the life-world is not due to the objectivism of science as the incontestable 
belief in the totality of being, what then makes the scientist forget the life-world? The belief in a 
world-in-itself, as I quoted Husserl above, is motivated. What needs to be motivated for science, 
I added, is not a positive vision of an independent reality, but first of all the claim to scientific 
authority – on whatever grounds that claim is made. Then the actual problem of objectivism is 
not that it is a particular epistemic presupposition, but that it hides to be a response to the need 
for epistemic authority. What must be motivated for science to settle, is, therefore, the 
exclusion of “the subjective” rather than the disclosure of the objective. Let me dwell upon this 
argument a little further. 
 Husserl refers repeatedly to the somewhat confusing notion of the finitude of science when 
talking about the oblivion of the life-world. The critical point of the finitude of science is not, 
as it may be conceived by scientists, that we do not have the cognitive capacities, or simply not 
enough time to enquire so long into objects that they really stand on their own. Finitude is not 
a problem of the limited cognitive economy of human knowledge. Instead, the finitude of 
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science means simply that scientific knowledge is limited by its scientific interest. The claim to 
objectivity, respectively, is “infinite” insofar as it does not reflect the need for this claim. If A is 
b it is so whether or not someone asked it to be. At least there is nothing within the act of this 
judgment that could suggest that. Objectivism excludes the possibility that there is always 
already a non-thematized horizon onto which there can be a claim to objectivity. 
As an illustration of the finitude of science, Husserl discussed in his famous §§ 8 and 9 of 
The Crisis one of the initiating rites of modern science – namely, the moment when pre-modern 
Euclidean mathematics was replaced with Galilean science. What happened when Copernicus, 
Kepler, and Galileo turned world into nature by mechanizing it? How did they relieve 
mathematics from its low esteem as part of engineering and grant it the height of the certainty 
of knowledge? While “Euclidean geometry, and ancient mathematics in general, knows only 
finite tasks” (Hua VI: 19, E.: 21), so Husserl states, 
 
the idea of nature as a really self-enclosed world of bodies first emerges with Galileo. (…) [It] soon 
brings about a complete transformation of the idea of the world in general. (…). The ancients had 
individual investigations and theories about bodies, but not a closed world of bodies as subject matter 
of a universal science of nature (Hua VI: 60, E.: 66).   
 
What makes this new idea of ‘the world in general’ infinite, according to Husserl, was the 
perception of a unique a priori of science, through which all scientific claims had to be articulated. 
Problematic in the notion of an objective world is not its objectivity itself, but that it imposes 
an apriori. The novelty of modern science, in other words, lies in its monism (of which its 
psychic-physical dualism is only a modality, as Husserl continues to argue in § 10).  
Husserl illustrates this monism of science with the “mathematization of nature”. He 
focuses particularly on the construction of a geometric “ideal space” – that is, a homogenous 
space in which all points are interchangeable. Problematic about the ideal space is not that it 
reduces manifoldness to one idea, but that it anticipates everything that could possibly be a valid 
spatial phenomenon.  
 
What “exists” ideally in geometric space is univocally decided, in all its determinations, in advance. (...) 
What is new, unprecedented, is the conceiving of this idea of a rational infinite totality of being with a 
rational science systematically mastering it. An infinite world, here a world of idealities, is conceived, not 
as one whose objects become accessible to our knowledge singly, imperfectly, and as it were 
accidentally, but as one which is attained by a rational, systematically coherent method (Ibid.: 19, E.: 22).  
 
The novelty of the mathematization of nature lies in the anticipation of what possibly can 
become a matter of reason. In Heidegger we can read similar lines:  
 
In the mathematical projection of Nature, moreover, what is decisive is not primarily the mathematical 
as such; what is decisive is that this projection discloses something that is a priori. Thus the 
paradigmatic character of mathematical natural science does not lie in its exactitude or in the fact that it 
is binding for ‘Everyman’; it consists rather in the fact that the entities which it takes as its theme are 
discovered in it in the only way in which entities can be discovered – by the prior projection of their 
state of Being (1962: 414). 
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The problem of mathematization is not that it is an abstraction from qualities – this is precisely the 
virtue of mathematics – but that it anticipates all that could possibly count as a valid case to be 
reasoned.  
The risk of this anticipation is, furthermore, not that it constrains what can be reasoned, 
but that it forgoes reasoning altogether. This risk lies in the suggestive force of mathematical 
experience, which let the scientist forget the reasons of the abstraction of the ideal space, and 
therefore also forget the preliminary character of the notion of ideal space. Mathematical 
practices are risky because they cover their own limitations. Husserl called this cover the “garb of 
ideas” (Ideenkleid) of formal expressions. It conceals the horizon from which such expressions 
were made. There is nothing in the mathematical experience that recalls what made it 
necessary. Even if mathematization begins as an abstraction it substitutes such reasoning “on 
the way”. The actual reason why the abstraction of an ideal space, for example, came up in the 
first place is not presentiated in its mathematical form. ‘Mathematical science’ is in this 
phenomenological sense self-defeating. 
 
It is through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is actually a method (…) It is because of 
the disguise of ideas that the true meaning of the method, the formulae, the ‘theories,’ remained 
unintelligible and in the naïve formation of the method, was never understood. Thus no one was ever 
made conscious of the radical problem of how this sort of naivety actually became possible and is still 
possible as a living historical fact; how a method, which is actually directed toward a goal (…) could 
ever grow up and be able to function usefully (Hua VI.: 52 E.: 51f.) 
 
This “garb of ideas” is the genuine phenomenological locus of criticism of the oblivion of the 
life-world. For it does not concern a particular, adjustable epistemological position or belief, 
but it concerns the experience of modern science in that it makes, willy-nilly, forget. Whatever 
philosophy, whatever pragmatic objectives inform modern science, these possible sources of 
meaning bestowal are never confronted while practicing it. Modern science, in other words, is 
not expressive of its motives. More than that, in particular in economics, it tends to equate this 
inexpressiveness with its scientificaty, because it feels like being free from subjective 
distortions. 
Philosophy apart, at the bottom of the phenomenological constitution of modern science 
is an affective identification of mathematics and scientificity. Although no philosopher of science 
has ever fully and explicitly made this identification, modern science is carried by the 
transcendental dream of a “mathematical science”. Although mathematics has never made up 
the actual work of knowing, it always felt like that. Being explicitly asked, scientists may very 
well restrict their claims, and point to the need of further specifications. These warning, 
however, are only meaningful before the backdrop of the suggestive force of the experience of 
mathematics that says that mathematics is All There Is about reason. The countless contests 
about the limited role of mathematics in science show the very strength of this affective 
identification. 
To be certain, nobody ever wanted or defended the oblivion of the life-world – for how, 
then, could it be an oblivion? Rather, the oblivion of the life-world can be called a side effect of 
the experiential nature of modern science. While being engaged in scientific practices, its 
horizon does not appear to be needed, and thus is easily forgotten. The forgetting has the 
character of an unlearning of a reflection in the course of engaging in the necessities of 
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mathematical reason. The problem of modern science is the misunderstanding it suggests, the 
misunderstanding that the practice of reason can be separate from its motives. Modern science 
represents a rupture of intellectual life that cuts off the scientist from his or her past. 
One may object that with a supplementary philosophical awareness this problem can be 
avoided. Certainly, but this is not more than question begging, as long as there is no motive to 
hold on one’s philosophical awareness. Even if a scientist believes himself to be a “scientific 
realist”, he or she may nevertheless be subjected to this misunderstanding since this belief is 
not confronted in scientific practices. This explains the gap between the institutions of 
philosophy of science and science itself, that is, in McCloskey’s terms, the gap between the 
official und unofficial rhetoric of science (1998). I would even go so far as to claim that there is 
a philosophical issue about modern science only because of its phenomenological 
forgetfulness. 
Economists were always aware of the inherent risk that “mathematical economics” may 
replace economics. Even John von Neumann showed this awareness when speaking of the 
“nature of intellectual efforts in mathematics”. “[A]fter much ‘abstract’ inbreeding,” he warned, 
“a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration (1961 [1947]: 9). Economists today may 
still agree. But they may have also forgotten how to do anything other than stabilize formal 
relations. Recall once more, in this context, Hicks’ poignant words when being asked to say 
something about what he considered relevant: “I’d like to if I could. But I think it is beyond 
what is left to my capacities” (1989: 180). 
The inherent misunderstanding of a mathematical science has clearly nothing to do with 
objectivism or the philosophical belief in the being of the world. It is rather the neutral 
appearance of formal methods that suggests this misunderstanding – that is, in Edgeworth’s 
words, the separation of “method and idea” (1889: 541), and in Koopmans’s words, the 
“separation (…) of reasoning and recognition of facts” (1957: viii). The problem is the 
separation of form and content of science: formalism. It is this very separation that makes the 
scientist insensible to the need for explicating the meaning of formal relations – the need for 
making science intelligible. 
Husserl’s discussion of objectivism indeed comes down to the point that the claim to 
objectivity makes science unintelligible. Unintelligibility, in turn, cannot be the result of the belief 
in a totality of being, but is the result of formalism in that it makes the scientist forget to make 
understood. The actual problem of objectivism is not the belief in “things in themselves” – as 
though we had to solve a metaphysical quarrel about being – but that objects interrupt the 
history of sense – that is, they establish a structure of meaning independent of its history. To 
put it differently, the problem of objects is not their independent existence, but that they allow 
for last words in the discourses they govern. Claims of objectivity are problematic insofar as they 
function as a “conversation stopper”, as McCloskey would say (1998). They represent the 
closure of scientific discourse. The problem of objects in modern science is that their objects are 
not telling. Modern science makes us silent rather than spurring us to think. Here is how 
Husserl made the link between objectivity and intelligibility: 
 
The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it. One must finally achieve the insight that no 
objective science, no matter how exact, explains or ever can explain anything in a serious sense. To 
deduce is not to explain. To predict or to recognize objective forms (…) and to predict accordingly – all 
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this explains nothing but is in need of explanation. The only true way to explain is to make 
transcendentally understandable. Everything objective demands to be understood (Hua. VI: 193, E.: 189).  
 
And for precisely this demand, modern science lost its sensibility.  
As long as the phenomenological problem of formalism is the rupture it represents in 
intellectual life, it applies equally to methods that are commonly opposed to mathematical 
economics, such as econometrics. Problematic in econometrics is not to ask: ‘How Much? Is it 
really as big as we believe or perhaps even bigger?’ Problematic is rather that quantitative 
methods are too easily formalized, which means here to standardize the procedure of counting in 
a, say, “mechanical” way. Problematic is thus not the counting itself but that, as method, it 
makes us forget to ask to ask: “How Big?” in the sense of: Is it “important”? Econometrics is 
formalist in precisely the sense McCloskey and Ziliak argued that “statistical significance” does 
not necessarily match with “economic significance” (2008). The point of the history of 
statistics in economics is not that it reduced economic life to numbers, but that it contributed 
to the diminishing need for asking what it means to conduct an economic life. And in this 
sense statistical methods are the offspring of, not a cure to, mathematical economics.  
Apart from mathematical and statistical formalism, there are many other kinds of 
formalisms that phenomenologically all come down to the point of a loss of expressive 
abilities. Let me simply list some that are common, and commonly complained of in 
economics. There is, of course, logical formalism, that even early economists like Nassau W. 
Senior stressed, along their idea of the deductive method; all derivation – not saying any more 
than one had said at the beginning. There is computational formalism as used in operations 
research and complexity theory, putting algorithms on different structures while waiting for a 
new meaning to emerge. There is the moral formalism of utilitarianism, in which to all motives 
one cannot say more than “I like it” – as though one were embarrassed to speak about one’s 
motives. There is naturalist formalism, cutting short reasoning by means of an analogy of “the 
economy” with a pendulum moved by gravitational forces – the analogy has never been spelled 
out whatsoever. There is the formalism of (national) accounting, saying that all there is about 
welfare must be somehow expressed in what we buy – as though there were not more to say 
about history than “1.2%”. There is geometric formalism, saying that understanding the 
difference between monopoly and competition is knowing how to draw the Harberger-
triangle. And there are mathematical formalisms of many kinds, at the top of which stands the 
axiomatic method as the separation of structure and meaning. With the axiomatic method, the 
latent conflict of all those formalisms can be illustrated in a most effective way. 
This latent problem – I repeat because of its importance – is not a problem of a particular 
mode of expression, or of a particular philosophy that informs this mode of expression 
(Husserl thought Kant was formal). Formalism is a problem of “lowering one’s tone”, of 
becoming indifferent to the weight and demand of meaning. Not sensing the urge to explicate 
formal structures amounts to a rupture of intellectual life. Such an approach to formalism gives 
an answer to what most critiques of formalism in economics forget to ask: How could 
mathematical expressions and other forms of formalism possibly be so successful in the first 
place? There must have been something appealing in being aloof from meaning. Philosophy of 
science may re-justify or charge the limits of mathematical science. Science studies may give an 
explanation of its success in social terms. But do they make it understood? 
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Scientific authority in economics was gained by means of arriving at a level of reflection at 
which one no longer can impose particular motives or interests – that is, by means of 
becoming formal. The corresponding ethos of economists was that of the elevated, the 
discreet, or even absent participant in economic talk. The engine of scientification of 
economics was, as I will trace along various facets, the suspicion of being ideologically 
motivated. Only this motive can make understood why the aloofness from meaning was so 
appealing to economists. There should be no economist left today who has not heard: formal 
theories are politically irrelevant. Yes, for precisely this reason they were appealing to 
economists! Considering both aspects of formalism, being attractive and risky at the same time – 
attractive for appearing beyond political bias, and risky for ending up politically irrelevant – 
formalism is the genuine phenomenological locus of the theoretical experience of economics.  
Given these preliminary considerations, I can anticipate the experiential genealogy of 
formalism in economics. In nuce, this genealogy runs as follows: First, scientific modesty is 
instituted as an opportunity to gain attention in a world where there is nothing but moral 
clamor. This modesty easily turns into aloofness and further into discreetness rather than 
scholarly respect for matters of concern. This discreetness, moreover, applies not only to the 
heated concerns of others, but increasingly to one’s own concerns, which, after all, makes 
economists forget their own motives for engaging in science. As a result, irony and cynicism 
about the belief in the worth of one’s effort are systematically induced. Such is the genetic code 
of the oblivion of the life-world. 
In Part 3, I will flesh out such an experiential genealogy of formalism along the intellectual 
becoming and aging of perhaps the protagonist of the formalist revolution, Gerard Debreu. In 
Gerard Debreu the scientification of economics found its peak, all scientific optimism 
culminated, and yet it turned out to be a dead end. I will write the intellectual biography of 
Debreu as a transcendental parable of the oblivion of the life-world. It does not aim at revealing 
the truth about Gerard Debreu’s life, but aims rather to help the economist to reflect on the 
motives of his or her intellectual life. Debreu’s life is an apologue in order to transmit the 
question of intellectual ethos in an indirect but nevertheless concrete fashion. 
This transcendental parable runs from “Bourbaki” to “Smith” – that is, from Debreu’s 
youth at the Ecole Normale in Paris in the last years of WWII, where he was taught by 
“Bourbaki”, to 1983, when he received the Bank of Sweden Prize in economics, roughly for 
‘having proven the invisible hand of Adam Smith’. When Debreu wanted to leave mathematics 
in the last years of the war, his fascination with mathematics constituted an existential dilemma. 
He has not learned how to deal with intellectual concerns. Rather than solving this dilemma, he 
entered economics without really knowing why – following a chance meeting with Maurice 
Allais. His further career at the Cowles commission until the mid 1970s was stamped by a 
rigorously discreet attitude. Debreu remained strictly Bourbakian and avoided making any 
economic claims. When in 1983 his work came to be celebrated with the Nobel Prize, the 
misunderstanding that kept economics going fell open at the feet of the Swedish King. The 
affective biography runs thus from Debreu’s fascination with Bourbaki’s mathematics, to his 
dilemma in his youth, to his discreetness as an economist, and culminates in the disaster of the 
Bank of Sweden Prize. Philosophically, this narrative runs from a position according to which 
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mathematics excludes science, as in Bourbaki, to the position that mathematics and science are 
identified, as is necessary to claim that ‘Debreu proofed Smith’.  
Debreu’s life thus consists of precisely the elements of a parable: a moral dilemma, a 
questionable decision, and the suffering of the consequences of this decision. Debreu’s 
biography is a transcendental parable of the phenomenological end of the ethos of the 
economic scientist. Economists may face problems in economic science (mainly how to 
provide a real alternative to Arrow Debreu 1954), but they no longer face problems of 
economic science. 
Concluding these remakrs on the oblivion of the life-world insofar as it is due to 
formalism, my critique aims at the difficulties understanding oneself when putting efforts into 
economics. The critical moment of The Phenomenology of Economics is the moment when 
there is silence, when there is nothing to say anymore as an economic scientist – a point, at which 
I will actually arrive with Gerard Debreu, who was celebrated for having nothing to say as an 
economist. I thus address a sense of inadequacy that accompanies scientific practices, regarding 
the feelings that keep the rest of economic talk moving. Husserl illustrated this, one may say, 
inherent estrangement of modern science with the image of the machine – as though he were a 
child of the industrial revolution: the product of man turning against himself.  
 
Are science and its method not like a machine, reliable in accomplishing obviously very useful things, a 
machine everyone can learn to operate correctly without the least understanding the inner possibility 
and necessity of this sort of accomplishment (Hua VI: 52, E.: 52). 
 
The French phenomenologist Michel Henry has put this ‘not understanding oneself in one’s 
own accomplishments in somewhat harsher words. He called science a self-negation of life, 
which summarizes the phenomenological problem of the oblivion of the life-world – the clash 
of the reality “of” and of science.  
 
Science, on the one hand, is a mode of the life of absolute subjectivity, and belongs to it in and for itself. 
On the other, every accomplishment of scientific subjectivity is achieved as the bracketing of this 
subjectivity (...). Science thus presents to us a form of life, that turns against life. A life, that negates 
itself, the self-negation of life as such, is that decisive event which makes modern culture a scientific 
culture (Henry 1994: 204*). 
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(5) The Correlate of  
Theoretical Experience:  
The Invisible Hand 
 
 
 
 
The invisible hand, according to the Nobel committee of 1983, is what Smith had in mind and 
Debreu proved. If we ask a historian about the invisible hand he or she could tell us that Adam 
Smith may have read the expression in Shakespeare (Macbeth, Act III, Scene ii), and that he 
used it for a somewhat non-Smithean argument. All later uses of this expression, the historian 
would add, go far beyond anything Smith could have had in mind. Debreu, most likely, never 
read Smith’s Wealth of Nations, let alone the Theory of Moral Sentiments where the expression is 
mentioned, too. A philosophically inclined person, moreover, could tell us how Hegel’s 
‘cunning of reason’ shares Smith’s intellectual flavor since both actually “discourage and deflect 
rational investigation” (Davis 1989: 65). Then, if we ask a ‘generally educated person’ about the 
invisible hand, he or she may perhaps say something to the effect of self-interest being good 
for “the economy”, or, conversely, governments being bad for “the economy”.  
There is no meaning authority for the expression “invisible hand”. Nor is there an 
authority that says what counts as a valid interpretation. If it denotes anything, then, I suppose, 
economic theory. The expression of the invisible hand has had considerable success in identifying 
economic theory in general economic talk. One could, as I do, also take it as an (empty) 
placeholder for large parts of the history of economic theory that ranges from Smith’s first 
humble use of the expression to the tradition of general equilibrium theory (GET). In order to 
capture both the identifying role this expression plays in economic talk and the tradition of 
(mis)interpreting “the invisible hand” in economics, I shall rather restrain from narrowing its 
meaning in advance. Particularly, I do not take position regarding the relation of the invisible 
hand, liberal laissez-faire policies, the market mechanism, general equilibrium theory, and the 
very perception of “the economy”. The ambiguities involved in the relation of these terms are 
rather constitutive for the establishment of an object of economic science. A prior definition 
would amount to nothing but question begging. 
With the title of the invisible hand, phenomenologically speaking, I discuss the “intentional 
correlate” onto which scientific authority is claimed. To start with, let it be “the economy” – 
whatever that means. Although I do address what economists are concerned with – their field 
of expertise – I do not intervene in their concerns. The invisible hand does not add much to 
my account of economics. It is not a new topic since an intentional correlate, according to 
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Husserl ‘parallelism’, cannot show “more” than this act itself. Hence “the economy” is the 
extract of economists’ intellectual discreetness. Just as formalism describes the degeneration of 
the act of economic theorizing, the invisible hand describes the degeneration of the correlate of 
this act – the actual theory representing something. While formalism is the title for adopting a 
low tone, the invisible hand is a title for saying less. 
The metaphorical aspect of the expression points neatly to the phenomenological dilemma 
I associate with economic theory: One cannot exhibit the reality of “the economy” for it is 
“invisible”, that is non-intuitable, and insensible – anonymous. Anonymity for Husserl meant the 
same as phenomenologically not being exhibited, but nevertheless functioning implicitly – as it 
were, “on the horizon”. What is anonymous, for Husserl, demands to be explicated, demands 
to go through, and in this sense to be made “evident”. Yet the anonymity of the object of 
economic theory goes further. “The economy” can never be made “evident”, cannot be 
inquired, and cannot be exhibited. The invisible hand refers to the deficient phenomenality of 
“the economy” as an object of theory. It describes “the economy” in that it is not bestowed by 
the meaning of the experiences of economic life. “The economy” is senseless. For this reason 
“the economy” is evasive of a phenomenological analysis. And for the same reason, as I am 
going to introduce in the following, the tradition of economic theory results in structuralism, in 
particular the structuralism of the axiomatic method. In this chapter I thus set up my 
phenomenological conception of the history of economic theory. 
 
 
The Search for a Generic Object of Economic Science  
as the Possibility of Claiming Scientific Authority 
 
As is well known Schumpeter has deemed Walras, “so far as pure theory is concerned (…) the 
greatest of all economists. His system of equilibrium is the only work by an economist that will 
stand comparison with the achievements of theoretical physics” (1954: 827). Schumpeter 
believed that Walras’ GET represents the analytic core of economic science, and all theoretical 
achievements until and since Walras ought to be judged in terms of this theory. For 
Schumpeter GET defines the very essence of economics. The proof of a uniquely determined 
equilibrium is vital for that essence:  
 
[F]rom the standpoint of any exact science the existence of a uniquely determined equilibrium is, of 
course, of the utmost importance, even if proof has to be purchased at the price of very restrictive 
assumptions; without any possibility of proving the existence of a uniquely determined equilibrium (…) 
at however high level of abstraction, a field of phenomenon is really a chaos that is not under analytic 
control (1954: 969). 
 
Essentialism apart, I do agree with Schumpeter to the extent that it is indeed difficult not to put 
GET in the spotlight when speaking about the history of economic theory. Most innovations 
in both classical and neo-classical theory found a sediment in an “advance” of the constituents 
of this grand theory – one exception may be Keynesian economics that had its heydays 
between 1940-1970, though considering its incorporation in the discipline, it hardly differed 
from GET. Economists today, of course, deem themselves to be free from GET. Only a small 
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minority still pursues it. The attempts to overcome its notorious “assumptions”, however, still 
hold economic theories together, as I venture to show. In 1971, Arrow and Hahn were the last 
who could proudly announce in their General Competitive Analysis:  
 
[T]he notion that a social system moved by independent actions in pursuit of different values is 
consistent with a final coherent state of balance, (…) is surely the most important intellectual 
contribution that economic thought has made to the general understanding of social processes” (Arrow 
and Hahn 1971: 1).  
 
GET, according to these lines, encompasses the whole of economic theory since the 18th 
century in its “most important intellectual contribution”. What are the constituents of this 
theory according to Arrow and Hahn? The object of economic thought is the “social system”, 
the units of analysis are the “independent actions in pursuit of different values”, and the 
scientific problem is the “consistency with a state of balance”. In this manner economics 
contributes to the “general understanding of social processes”.  
 In these lines, we get a glimpse why one can hardly conceive of the history of economic 
theory without reference to GET. With this theory economists gain a generic object of study, 
which they do not share with other scientists – a generic economic object. Only economists 
hold a theoretical perception of “the economy”. Economics could not have evolved as a 
separate discourse if it merely would have claimed what its discursive allies and opponents 
already believed (like ‘corn prices are too low for our British landlords’, or ‘poverty laws may 
not help the poor’). There needed to be something beyond all the particular concerns of the 
people, but nevertheless determining it: an object remote enough to establish the distance 
necessary for a scientific ethos, but still close enough to claim authority in economic talk. In this 
sense, the tradition of theorizing “the economy” represents the locus of contests for the 
discursive identity of economic science. I thus depict the scientification of economics along the 
search for this generic object of “the economy”. By means of cultivating the theoretical 
perception of this object, economists can claim epistemic authority. 
Putting GET in the center of economic theory, I thus do not, unlike Schumpeter and 
others, count this piece of theorizing in the essence of economics. Instead, I conceive it as a 
guide through the contests about a generic object, domain, and thus identity of economics. 
Thee contests, broadly framed, concern the relation of “the economy”, the market, and 
liberalism. Far from engaging in an actual argument in economic theory, my major claim 
concerning economic theory is this: Without the theoretical perception of “the economy” there 
is no opportunity for claiming scientific authority. Regarding all other topics in economic talk 
that are based on a notion of economic life there cannot be any motive, let alone the need for 
appealing to the authority of science.  
What, then, are the historical ingredients of this tradition? What had to happen in order to 
arrive at a formulation of the core of economic theory as described by Arrow and Hahn? 
According to my image of the history of economic theory, there are at least seven steps to be 
taken. Even before there was the expression ‘invisible hand’, first, a theoretical perception of 
“the economy” arose within the rhetorical strategies to avoid the imposition of self-interest to the 
economic author (Thomas Mun 1664). Second, it came to denote the credo of early modern 
liberalism, namely the belief in social beneficiary results of mercantile rivalry (Adam Smith 1776). The 
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third step in cultivating the perception of “the economy” was to sort out phenomena of 
production and consumption of wealth (John Stuart Mill 1848), which then, fourth, after the rise of 
the institutions of economic science, could lead to the doctrine of the self-regulation of supply and 
demand (Marshall 1890). Fifth, after marginalist reasoning became established, “the economy” 
was associated with the allocation of resources given certain ends (Robbins 1932), and, in particular, 
with the efficient allocation under the heading of the welfare theorems (Lange, Lerner). 
Beyond the political implications of these theorems, however, the core question of economic 
theory crystallized in the 1940s as, sixth, the determination of the price system (Samuelson, Hicks), 
that ended up, seventh, as the determination of the conditions under which a general equilibrium exists 
(Debreu 1959). In the 1970s this became the core of economic theory to which Arrow and 
Hahn referred as “the most important intellectual contribution” of economics. These steps 
represent the horizon within which I discuss the history of economic theory.  
These steps leave open what is special about economic theory. Why should not people 
other than economists deal with the analysis of competitive markets which seemingly is the 
threat of this tradition? The nub is, however, that only along competitive markets could 
economists cultivate the theoretical perception of “the economy”. The market is the “invisible” 
mechanism by means of which “the economy” is constituted. The decisive result of the “sense-
coverings” that resulted from the history of economic theory – its Whig history – was the 
belief that there is an “economy” independent of the perceptions surrounding competitive 
markets. “If one goes back a few centuries”, as Schabas agrees, “it is by no means clear that 
people, even the learned communities of Western Europe, perceived such an entity as the 
economy” (2006: 1). Without this belief in such an entity, I will argue, economic theory would 
have remained one among other political or social theories. For market theory differs from 
anything else social scientists could inquire since in markets there is “social order” independent of 
the nature of that which is ordered – the individual, its contingent needs, culture, history, 
morals, etc. Without that conception, there would be neither talk about “the economy”, nor a 
separate economic science. To come up with a concept of social order without presupposing a 
social inclination is the distinct and outstanding accomplishment of economics as a science – 
justifying without presupposing.  
Although “the economy” guarantees a generic object of scientific authority, economists 
have yet to say something about “how it goes with the economy” and what to do about it. By 
virtue of cultivating this issue economists virtually connect with economic talk. The market 
needs to be in some way or another expressive of economic life. At the height of its 
development, roughly between 1850 and 1950, the basic intuition of economic theory was 
indeed that the market represents the state of “the economy” as if it were a language of 
economic life. Such was perhaps the unifying image of the nature of economic knowledge. 
Knowing the market mechanism was to be able to assess how it goes with “the economy”, 
which in turn was believed to be an expression of economic life. When I speak of the self-
degenerating character of economic theorizing, it is because this intuition had to give space to 
scientific authority. Economists are increasingly less expressive of this notion of economic 
knowledge. Within the conditions under which a general equilibrium holds, there is nothing 
whatsoever through which “the economy” could count as a representation of economic life. In 
other words, only by means of the confusions between “the economy”, the market 
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mechanism, and liberal policies economists appeared to have something to say, and could exert 
scientific authority. Therefore, the social history of economic theory, as Frank Hahn was the 
first to acknowledge, is the history of confusions and misunderstandings. 
To put it straight, the strong claim I attempt to make regarding economic theory is this: 
Without economic theory there was no talk about “the economy”. “The economy” is a 
theoretical perception that arose from nothing but the need for scientific authority. Before 
economic science, there was no motive for such perception. Economic talk is about “the 
economy” (and how it goes with it) because of economic science. The contribution of 
economics to the modern economic talk is that “the economy” has become the locus of 
argument and authority. The rise of economic science and the perception of “the economy” 
mutually depend on, and reinforce each other. The more this perception dominated economic 
discourse, the more the social identity of economists and their academic institutions were 
legitimized. Saying so, I do not take position regarding the reality of “the economy” – in 
whatever of the seven meanings distinguished above. Such is the business of the philosophy of 
economics, and a different matter in each of the seven steps. Prior to the unhappy opposition 
of scientific realism and constructivism, I ask about the conditions of the possibility of the very 
perception of this elusive object, “the economy”. 
The key to this claim is that the formalization of economic theory did not happen by 
chance. The tendency to formalism says something about the very nature of economic theory. 
Some historians of economic thought have supported this association. Here, for example, 
Bruna Ingrao and Giorgio Israel in their classical study in the history of GET: “Our thesis is 
that the problem of mathematization is no secondary feature of general equilibrium theory but 
rather one of the basic reasons for its creation and development” (1990: x). Or here another 
historian, the often-quoted Christopher Bliss: “The near emptiness of general equilibrium 
theory is a theorem of the theory” (1993: 227). Rather than as a mere complaint, this historical 
insight provides a vital clue for the social history of economic theory. 
If I take the association of economic theory and formalism serious, the “invisibility” of the 
invisible hand is not an epistemic deficit, but is inherent to economic theory and the very 
reason of its public success. The epistemic problem of “the economy” in economic theory is 
then not whether, by virtue of which laws, principles, causal chains, or underlying mechanisms 
the market determines economic life and vice versa. “The economy” constitutes an epistemic 
problem only as a title of intellectually reaching a point beyond economic life, in particular 
beyond its special interests. As soon as the invisible hand is spelled out in its social political 
meaning, I will suggest throughout the text, economic science can no longer hold up its 
discursive identity. As soon as one disentangles the relation of “the economy”, the market, and 
liberalism, economic theory appears either politically irrelevant, or biased. The invisible hand is, 
therefore, the theory that allows for the disciplinary formation of economics and challenges at 
the same time the very possibility of intellectual responsivity.  
There is another apparent obstacle in order to appreciate my claim – namely, that present-
day economists deem beyond the “paradigm” of GET. For them, the preceding remarks must 
seem like economic metaphysics from yesterday. Is it not entirely outdated to put the invisible 
hand and GET in the spotlight of economic theory? It may be important for teaching 
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economics, but it is irrelevant for most actual research. Economic theory today has moved 
beyond GET, and also beyond its accompanying exclusion of empirical methods. Granted! 
Since the 1970s there has been a shift of the literary paradigm of economic theory from 
allocation of resources to, as one of the most energetic commentator of this switch has put it, 
“The New Modern Answer: The economic agent as a processor of information” (Mirowski 
2001: 8). This is true not only for behavioral economics and complexity theory, but also for 
heterodox economics such as institutional and Austrian economics. Focusing on the social 
history of economics, however, we should come to acknowledge that economists’ ethos is not 
affected by this paradigm. To the contrary, while the New Modern Answer may accurately 
describe what economists are concerned with today it does not describe what is problematic 
about it. Just as it is crucial for my phenomenological approach to take formalism instead of 
objectivism as a point of departure, it is crucial to depart from invisible-hand theorizing instead 
of theories of economic behavior. Against all talk about The Individual in economics, I will insist 
that the phenomenological problem of economic theory is not a particular conception of what 
economic life is about. Economic theory, today, just as half a century ago, and just as two 
centuries ago, is the diversion of the question: Who? What kind of people? 
That the individual defines the locus and unit of analysis of economic theory, as in 
contemporary economic theory, is a consequence of, rather than an alternative to, the received 
tradition of economic theory. The New Modern Answer is preceded by the Old Modern 
Question of the conditions under which a general equilibrium holds. Present economic theory 
is inconceivable without being preceded by this issue. Otherwise I had to suppose that the only 
problem of economists is that they are so astonishingly bad anthropologists. But no. The new 
paradigm, and this is what makes it nonetheless a modern paradigm, does not correlate with a 
commitment to a particular anthropological conception of economic life. If contemporary 
economic theory puts the individual in the foreground one does not seriously ask: What Kind 
of People? Instead, one asks: How can we escape from the neo-Walrasian trap without losing 
our face as economic scientists? My answer is clear: No Way! 
In part, an anthropological intuition of economic life was present in economic theory 
during its early and high modern period. Among the imaginaries that identify economic theory 
homo oeconomicus indeed ranks as prominent as the invisible hand. Until today, one hardly 
distinguishes between these two in general economic talk. The development of economic 
theory, however, was not accompanied by an advanced understanding of who homo oeconomicus 
is, but rather to divest this subject down to the so-called “atomistic individual”, an element in a 
structure, . In economic theory one did not ask what are the implications for the order of 
“the economy” if the individual behaves such and such (as it appears in most present-day 
textbooks). The question was rather: What do we have to require from the individual in order 
to maintain our theoretical perception of “the economy”? The success of economic science 
was that it did not have to require anything. The individual is secondary for economic theory. 
Xx∈
How far removed economic science is from an intuition of economic life, let alone an 
explicit anthropological notion of homo oeconomicus, is clear if one recalls those who seriously 
engaged in the what-kind-of-people question: All pre-modern writers have been preoccupied 
with it, above all the clergy who made a living from condemning some kind of people – mostly 
Jews for being merchants and vice versa. The same question dominated the intellectual milieu 
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of merchants during 17th century against which economists had to gain identity. It was central 
to Adam Smith and his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and was fatal for Marx’s image of the 
capitalist. It was turned on its head with Schumpeter’s entrepreneur (1934 [1911]), moved 
towards sociology with Max Weber’s Spirit of Capitalism (2003 [1904]), and once again took an 
anti-Semitic shape with Sombart’s Modern Capitalism and the Jews (1982 [1911]). How could we 
possibly think of The New Modern Answer as carrying on such writings? Today, those who do 
attempt to truly renew this literature, as recently McCloskey in her Bourgeois Virtues (2006), how 
could there even be the question that it could contribute to the body of economic theory? As 
soon as the question ‘What Kind of People?’ is posed, certain forces work against the 
possibility of claiming scientific authority. To exhibit these forces is one of the tasks of The 
Phenomenology of Economics. 
Ignoring the individual while pretending to care about it, and ignoring science while 
pretending to claim it are associated. Mirowski and Sent agree in a poignant opening sentence:  
 
It is a commonplace observation that economists love the Individual; it is just real people that they 
cannot be bothered about. A wag once added that economists also prefer to love Science; it is just real 
scientists that make them nervous (2002: 1).  
 
 
From the Temporal Order of the Oikonomia to the Structural Order of “the Economy”–  
From the Economic Suspicion of Mercenary Motives to the Topology of Existence Proofs 
 
In order to flesh out the phenomenological approach to economic theory in more detail, let 
me sketch the historical arch from the logic of premodern economic discourses, to Smith’s use 
of the invisible hand, down to the neo-Walrasian dead end of this tradition. The plausibility of 
my use of “the invisible hand” depends strongly on this historical perspective I adopt. 
Invisible-hand theorizing encompasses a history from Thomas Mun to Mas-Colell. 
First, what was economic talk before we, Europeans, started speaking about “the 
economy”? Before that there was no theoretical perception of “the economy”, but there was a 
different object of concern: the oikonomia. Oikonomic writings – that ranged from Xenophon 
360 BC to roughly the housefather literature around 1800 – did not claim epistemic authority, 
let alone referential truth. They adopted either an instructive or a preaching tone. The 
oikonomia was a matter of practical advice and moral imperative. It was certainly not the title of a 
distinct object of study. Instead, it was the primordial manifestation of an encompassing order 
to be achieved. Oikonomic writings were concerned with economic life as a task for everyone. 
Referential truth matters to these writings in the same sense as ontological assumptions matter 
for a good cooking manual. The “acquisition of wealth”, as Aristotle defined the purpose of 
the oikonomia in the same terms as later political economists, was a matter of learning how to 
do things and of being good. These concerns of economic life in some way or another were 
related with the experience of needing, the concrete material equipment associated with needs 
(tools), the efforts one puts into their acquisition (labor), as well as the social relationships one 
entertains with those who depend on one’s economic life (family). Most of economic talk 
outside the shrine of science still refers back to these terms.  
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The becoming of economic science amounts to the attempt of a structuralist turn in 
economic talk that excludes the expression of a notion of economic life. Until the formalist 
revolution, I will show, this exclusion was not clearly perceived. Most modern economists 
believed that the social structure of “the economy” somewhat represents the finite reality of 
economic life in whatever mysterious way. They did not give up their intuition of economic life 
that stem from oikonomic writings. Smith certainly did not; neither did Marshall, who thought 
about the “ordinary business of life”; nor Edgeworth, who spoke about “trade” and “war” as 
the primordial domains of applicability for economic theory. And most economists today still 
know that “the market for children” and “the market for ideas” are analogical expressions. Most 
economists thus grant that “the economy” has its home ground in economic life. Perhaps, as I 
indeed suggest, there was never any economist free from such an intuition of economic life. 
That is except Gerard Debreu!  
Debreu – standing at the top of the cultivation of the theoretical perception of “the 
economy” – however, did not aim at any economic claim and could not live up to a self-
perception of an economist! This is the skandalon I will hang my narrative on. The difference 
between economists before and after Debreu is that even if one may still share the common 
sense that “the economy” represents and means something for economic life, this intuition is 
not expressed, neither worked on, nor in any sense at stake when doing economic theory. 
Structures being the object of science, the economist does not face, encounter, or could 
express a notion of economic life. There is no phenomenological reason why economists 
should retain-in-grasp the “intended applications”, to use Stegmüller’s term, when engaging in 
economic theory – which buttresses Hands early critique of the philosophical position of 
structuralism in economics (1985). And this holds true, as I venture to show (2.4), even more 
so as long as The Individual is allegedly economists’ concern. 
Let me relate this notion of the structuralist turn to Husserl. The shift from the oikonomia 
to “the economy” can be compared with the shift from “world” to “nature”. In these terms, 
Husserl discussed the scientific revolution when natural philosophy was replaced by natural 
sciences. “Nature” in its depiction of ideal space and time initially meant a method to arrive at 
claims such as ‘the distance of a falling object is equal to half of the gravity force times the 
squared time the object falls’. But as a result of the suggestive force of the exactness of this 
“method”, as already discussed above, nature came to represent “the real world” – or better: 
reconfigured the conditions of what counts as real. This happened for the simple reason that 
one no longer asked: What was the purpose of developing the idea of ideal space and time? By 
means of the omission of a question, “world” became identified with “nature”.  
In which sense, then, was “the economy” initially method rather than object? In 17th and 
early 18th century Britain, an epistemic revolution took place in economic talk because of a 
rhetorical need to react to the pervasive economic suspicion to be guided by one’s own interests 
when pretending to instruct the King. Talk about “the economy” was an effective way to move 
beyond special interests. This diversion from interests was the initiating motive of economic theory 
and will remain its engine of scientification. For this reason, the basic tenet of economic theory 
is that there cannot be any interest for “the economy”, but only interest within “the economy” –
in the words of Hayek’s formula of the invisible hand: “The Results of Human Action but Not 
of Human Design” (1978), or, in Wall-Street jargon, ‘nobody can beat the market’. The 
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phenomenological problem of the market is its epiphenomenality. The market never presentiates 
(vergegenwärtigt) the experiences of economic life, but exclusively re-presents them. This 
epiphenomenality makes us believe that “the economy” can be an object of referential truth 
claims. It never has been, so my strong claim. More importantly, I show that this belief is self-
degenerating regarding economists’ ethos. 
Moving on to the originator of the expression “invisible hand”, Adam Smith, I like to give 
an impression of the richness of the moral connotations that later constituted the affective 
connotations against which the scientification of the invisible hand had to gain ground. The 
expression “invisible hand”, for Smith, was rather contingent. Smith used it not more than 
three times – in his Wealth of Nations, Theory of Moral Sentiments, and History of Astronomy. In the 
last case, he spoke about the “invisible hand of Jupiter”, referring to the superstitious belief in 
invisible forces (Macfie 1971). Smith did not use this expression out of conceptual rigor but 
rather out of a quandary in his argument for the sake of adding ironic wit to his text.  
There is no need to go through the subtleties of Smithean exegesis (see for example Persky 
1989, Rothschild 1994, Grampp 2000). None of these subtleties entered the history of 
economic theory. For how could economic theory possibly proceed by literary exegesis? 
Moreover, as Rothschild argued, the three times Smith used the expression were not even 
particularly representative for his work. The use of it referred to “a thoroughly un-Smithian 
idea” (Rothschild 1994: 320), for it expressed Smith’s disrespect of those who do not use their 
capacity of reason properly. Against his belief in human reason, Smith ridicules “silly 
polytheists, rapacious proprietors, disingenuous merchants” (Ibid.).  
Let me nevertheless consume some space to quote once more the respective lines of the 
Wealth of Nations. The expression was used, as all political economy in the decades around 1800 
in the context of an argument in favor of free trade. But Smith also could have argued the 
same without this expression, because it did not represent the core of the argument, but rather 
a response to a counter objection (Grampp 2000). Smith expressed his doubts about those 
merchants who pretend to act in favor of the common interest. 
 
By preferring the support of domestick to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and 
by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which 
was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he 
really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for 
the publick good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words 
need be employed in dissuading them from it (Smith 1976: 456). 
 
In the second mentioning in the Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith used the expression when 
discussing the use and uselessness of poverty laws, which was, next to trade, another great issue 
for economics in the 17th and 18th century. The rich, though acting out of self-interest, 
ironically end up sharing their riches with the poor. The point is trivial. The poor are less poor 
as long as there are some rich who need the poor for their services.  
 
(…) in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity…[the rich] divide with the poor the produce of all 
their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among 
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all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, 
and afford means to the multiplication of the species (Smith 1976b: 184f.). 
 
Rather than interpreting these lines, think of its intellectual wit. For definitions I would look in 
vain in Smith’s text. The text is grounded in the political discourse of mercantile capitalism of 
Britain and of no other country (economic writings during this time in France and Germany 
were by far more sober, like book-keeping of administrators). Smith’s theoretical interest is not 
apparent. The invisible hand is, rather, a literary expression in reaction to the contempt of 
merchants, which was common among intellectuals of these days. Smith is concerned with the 
political naivety to simply blame merchants, although he too shared this commonly held 
contempt. Smith moves beyond the belief that society is nothing but the manifestation of the 
moral commitments to society, but nevertheless remains within this moral sphere. 
Apart from Smith’s texts, consider the general connotations that the invisible hand can 
have in moral discourse. In nuce, the invisible hand represents a separation, a distance, a split, a 
distinction between economic order on the one hand, and economic motives on the other. 
This distance is vital for the possibility of a scientific ethos. But the same separation also has 
connotations other than epistemic. There are moral sub-tones. Separating economic order and 
motives can be said sardonically to be of good will, but cause bad results. This in turn can be said 
with a gloating tone against those who do want to be good. For the agents themselves such a 
situation is rather tragic in a very Greek sense of an imposed destiny that leads man to act 
against his own will – the moment of “what have I done?” Such ironic-tragic meaning can also 
be turned around when a bad result is excused with good motives – a rather Kantian position of 
as-long-as-we-want-the-good. This again can be an excuse for taking social responsibility. If this 
excuse does not convince, and the consequences gnaw at one’s conscience, the separation can 
also correlate with a rising feeling of guilt for the unintended consequences of one’s actions – 
the horror of nobody’s-fault-but-everyone’s-responsibility. Finally, it can be used, as most other 
economic discourses perceived the moral meaning of the invisible hand, as a free ticket for the 
pursuit of opportunism, fraud, and greed – of ‘stabbing in someone’s back’, as in Macbeth. 
Against the background of such manifold and contradictory moral connotations of the 
separation of economic motives and order, a scientific ethos of economists had to gain profile. 
Considering the two centuries of economic theory after Smith, what happened is, roughly, that 
this moral field of connotations lost its intellectual wit. Economists articulated a clear-cut 
structural vision of order that comes about “by itself” – sponte – without someone who orders, 
and without moral agents. But the path economic theory had to take crossed the one or the 
other mentioned moral connotations. From the point of view of economic theory these 
connotations describe the field of possible “misunderstandings”. In the course of the two 
centuries of economic theorizing the main contests that surrounded economic theory became 
ever lighter in terms of moral weight. The theoretical debates that accompanied this moving 
beyond moral discourse constitute the interpretive gulfs of the invisible hand.  
One of these gulfs was certainly the line between economic growth and efficiency. While growth 
and the causes of wealth was the question that made political economy “political”, growth 
theory today is not more than a macroeconomic surrogate of GET. And nothing is farther 
removed from the classical notion of ‘wealth’ than the “neoclassical” notion of ‘welfare’. Just 
think of the theorems of welfare economics. Who today would claim epistemic authority on 
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what economic growth, or wealth really amounts to? Growth and the pursuit of wealth are 
overly burdened with Marxian connotations of “accumulation”, or, since Galbraith, with 
connotations of “affluence”. The question of ‘the causes of growth’ is hardly a befitting 
question in the ranks of economic theorists.  
The great behavioral issue was certainly the difference of competition and rivalry. Rivalry 
referred to the aggressive behavior of a particular class, merchants. Rivalry was discussed as the 
engine of innovation and creativity (Schumpeter), or as the particular alertness of the 
entrepreneur (Kirzner). Competition, instead, refers to the structural condition of the giveness of 
prices, saying, that nobody can influence prices – the absence of market power. As a result, 
actual competitive behavior for “favorable locations, product innovations, advertising wars, 
quicker delivery, improved maintenance, and service guarantees” (Blaug 2003: 153), is 
ostracized from economics to business departments. Indeed, I remember a business 
economics class where students had to add prices as an argument in the utility function as 
though it was a property like “blue” or “delicious” – what an abuse! I thought.  
There are many other dichotomies that shaped the struggle for an identity of modern 
economic science, such as that between allocation and distribution replacing that of production 
and consumption, or the difference between historical vs. mechanistic time, the orientation at 
the natural vs. the human sciences, the degradation of Benthamian utilitarianism from a social 
doctrine (Mill) to a naturalistic program (Edgeworth) down to a behaviorist devise 
(Samuelson), furthermore the difference of science and art of economics, and, of course, the 
system question par excellence: socialism vs. capitalism. Such and many more interpretive issues 
of economic theory circumscribe the field of expressive activities of economists – at least until 
the formalist revolution. At the same time, however, these interpretive issues made economic 
theory vulnerable to the moral misunderstandings of others. 
The actual history of economic theory did not result in the resolution of any of these 
interpretative issues. Economists have never proven whether Kant or Bentham suits “the 
economy” better, whether rivalry does good to mankind, whether growth happened by means 
of becoming more efficient or more creative, and by no means did anyone ever show whether 
the market is what led us into the present disaster or what will lead us out of it. The history of 
economic theory is a history of becoming evermore indifferent to matters of meaning. The 
decisive question in 1945, for example, was not whether socialism or capitalism could 
guarantee that history will never repeat itself, but how to get topology – a field in mathematics 
– into the price system! From the imposition of mercenary motives to the topology of 
existence proofs leads one Big History of softening edges, lowering tones, oppressing what is 
at stake. At its end there remains one structuralist Gestell, the Arrow-Debreu model in which all 
interpretive gulfs of economic theory are covered by one mathematical mantle: . Xx∈
 Certainly, economists today believe that the Arrow-Debreu model really implies particular 
economic claims. There are substantive assumptions of agents (transitivity), of the 
commodities (convexity), and the allocation mechanism requires some sort of tatonnement 
process including an odd subject that sets the price system. For Arrow such “assumptions” 
were indeed crucial since they made him move beyond GET to other theories, such as social 
choice. For Debreu, however, these problems did not affect his theoretical interest. How could 
he possibly believe that “transitivity” describes or demands anything of the conduct of an 
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economic life? The following lines taken from the first page of the Arrow Debreu paper of 
1954 – the “centrepiece” of the formalist revolution (Blaug 2003: 146) – illustrates the self-
degeneration of economic theory. They tear away the great interpretive marks in one move.  
 
The investigation of the existence of solutions is of interest both for descriptive and for normative 
economics. Descriptively, the view that the competitive model is a reasonably accurate description of 
reality, at least for certain purposes, presupposes that the equations describing the model are consistent 
with each other. Hence, the check on the empirical usefulness of the model is the prescription of the 
conditions under which the equations of competitive equilibrium have a solution (Arrow and Debreu 
1954: 265) 
 
Subtle lines. It seems as if Arrow and Debreu really have concern for “empirical usefulness” 
and “normative implications”. But what these lines say is that their model gains scientific value 
by means of abstracting from both. Koopmans, the most outspoken defender of the axiomatic 
method, repeated: “The descriptive theory of competitive equilibrium (…) and the normative 
theory of the use of prices for the efficient allocation of resources appear as two sides of one 
coin” (1957: viii). What Debreu achieved (and Arrow made looking for other answers) was to 
gain control of the Walrasian framework before only the slightest issue of interpretation could 
arise – in particular regarding the nature of economic agents. At this juncture my narrative will 
differ markedly from that of Mirowski: “the computer was the instrument that permitted 
marvelous latitude in interpretation and flexibility in negotiations over that vexed imperative of 
‘rationality’” (2001: 311). For precisely this reason Debreu was not inspired by it. His work 
represents a real rupture and was not merely “little better than the nineteenth-century yearning 
for a perpetual motion machine” (Ibid.: 414, see also 9). Debreu represents a rupture since he 
liberated the economist from the burden of negotiating the meaning of theoretical principles. 
His achievement was to free economists from the weight of meaning. Here my Preliminaries 
return from where they started.  
What remains after this liberation from the weight of meaning, is a sensual experience that 
is no longer of an epistemic but of a sensual kind – the sensation of an aesthetic void of a self-
entailed system. Also Adam Smith spoke of the invisible hand, particularly in the context of the 
invisible hand of Jupiter, of beauty. “We take pleasure in beholding of so beautiful and grand a 
system” (in Rothschild 1994: 320). This is perhaps the only aspect of the invisible hand that 
actually remained the same throughout the history of economic theory. “Economic theory”, 
Rothschild adds, “was in the 1750s, and is now, an aesthetic experience” (320). This experience 
that frees the economist from the dirt of the cultures of economic suspicion is the last source 
of affects that keep economic theory going. It appeared most clearly in the structuralism of 
Nicolas Bourbaki that informed Debreu’s axiomatization of GET.  
Let me repeat. I will, as my exposition should have made clear, hardly argue about 
economic theory itself. If there is anyone who should do so, it is the economist. Instead, I read 
economic theory, socially, as a reaction to the moral suspicion that guided all pre-modern 
economic discourses and, moreover, as a corner stone of all efforts put in the scientification of 
economics. The epistemic problem of “the economy” in economic theory is not a matter of 
referential truth. “The economy” constitutes an epistemic problem only as a title of 
theoretically reaching a point beyond special interests. For this reason the history of economic 
theory correlates with a tendency to formalism. The invisible hand describes, on the level of 
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theory, the phenomenological problem of scientific practices between the search for a generic 
object and the risk not saying anything.  
 
*** 
 
So far The Phenomenology of Economics in its vertical section. Before I enter its exposition, 
let me remind that phenomenology serves less as a conceptual scheme or even method 
imposed on the body of economics. Most of the understanding depends on the so-called 
“phenomenological reduction” that I tried to introduce rather informally in the preceding 
pages. The Phenomenology of Economics does not deal with what economists are interested 
in, but mainly with this interest itself – the subjective constitution of economics. Philosophy of 
science being concerned with properties of scientific theories, science studies with the reality of 
the theorist, the correlation was never tackled.  
Since I am skeptical about the possibility of a phenomenological science of economics, I 
cannot call this reduction a “method”, as Husserl did. Phenomenology is not a method for 
apart the essence of economics. If at some point the notions presented in the preceding 
Preliminaries will no longer be conceptually recognizable, it nevertheless informs every line of 
it (it would, for example, take another book to conceptualize fully the notion of affective history). 
Phenomenology merely determines the tone, and the attitude of the analysis. Phenomenology 
is not a method in the sense of a tool, but it is method in the sense of ηξεισ − attitude towards 
the other. And this attitude is inviting instead of teaching, evoking instead of delimiting, 
provoking instead of calming, but above all addressing, and at last motivating for a reflection 
on the motives for claiming scientific authority in economic talk. In this sense my exposition is 
a “way into transcendental phenomenology”, for the purpose of which Husserl once has 
designed the notion of the life-world. 
For the phenomenologist who is interested in the social sciences, there is sufficient news in 
terms of the material I present. For great parts of the text, I do not suppose training in 
economics. Even the most exclusive spheres of economic science, GET, I discuss, thanks to 
the phenomenological reduction, without the technical issues involved. For the economist, 
instead, the material I present entails no great news (apart from some fine points on Bourbaki 
as well as some details about the person of Gerard Debreu). The argument lies more in the 
way it is presented and the associations it evokes. The novelty and challenge of The 
Phenomenology of Economics is that it claims (rather than represents) economics in its 
historical whole, reflects on the horizon that makes it a human practice, and thus goes beyond 
the scientistic limitation not to reflect on the significance of science.  
In this project I combine both, the historically broadest view on economists’ intervention 
in modern history (Part 2), and a piece meal approach to the intellectual becoming of the most 
inconspicuous mathematical economist, Gerard Debreu (Part 3). For the historian of 
economics it is vital to keep in mind that I am not arguing as a historian, but in favor of the 
historian. I do not turn to history as an object of representation. History is the locus of 
intellectual tasks. As soon as history degrades to the history of facts, the historian gave up 
treating history historically. If I cannot and do not pretend to meet the standards of the history 
of facts, then it is mainly for the reason that I have doubts about the historical genesis of these 
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standards. After the following narrative, economists will perhaps be more interested in the 
Wealth of Nations than that Gerard Debreu proved it.  
And so the character of my argument is not to convince the economist of something. The 
text does not argue for a particular truth, but wants to appeal to an instance that somewhat 
became stunted in the three or four years of becoming an economist, in the three or four 
decades of gaining an academic ethos as an economist, in the last three or four decades in 
which economists have tried to regain significance, in the last three or four centuries scientific 
authority has intervened in economic talk. I neither aim at a judge of today’s situation in 
economics, nor at a judge of any economist. This is up to the economist him- or herself! I 
rather want to take economists in charge and invite them to respond to their current situation, 
and have them take social responsibility for their profession. It is this social responsibility of 
economists that The Phenomenology of Economics calls for. The following exercise can be 
read as a long invitation to a self-reflection on the motives of doing economic science. 
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Visible economists 2002:  
Princeton Economics Department chairman Ben Barneke  
takes over the FED Board from Alan Greenspan,  
co-author of Ayn Rand’s Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (1967). 
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Invisible economists 1946:  
Friedrich Hayek launches the Mont Pellerin Society. 
Other members are Ludwig Ehrhardt, Walter Eucken, Milton Friedman,  
Luigi Enaudi, Karl Popper, Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup, Georg Stigler... 
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Part 1 
Discourse 
The Public, Professional, and  
Pedagogical Ethos of Economists 
 
 
 
 
A phenomenological analysis – as I suppose economists, too, associate with this tradition – 
begins with a certain naivety. Phenomenology is associated with a “mere” description of things 
“just” as they appear to us, that is to say, without intending to judge them, without questioning 
their existence, without trying to explain them, etc. When withdrawing from a judgment 
(εποχη), the difference between a richly described character in fiction and a hard fact in an 
analysis vanishes. They are, prior to that difference, given to us. They can be described in such 
way that the difference between fact and fiction is the result of the “modes of giveness”, as 
Husserl liked to say. A phenomenological εποχη is like the democratization of meaning. 
Everything is given the occasion to appear in the mode proper to itself.  
In this part, I invest this favor for naivety in a description of the world of economists “as it 
appears to us”. This description is a first heuristic step. It is written in the naïve attitude that 
economists’ practices can be described just as any other human practice. Such description is 
pre-critical. The limits of this exercise will introduce the phenomenological problem of 
economists’ world. In this way I grant voice to the lamentations about economics in its present 
state as they pervade most skeptical critiques of economics.  
What is the nature of this phenomenological naivety and how does it relate to my guiding 
notion of the life-world? The early Husserl framed this naivety of “mere description” in one of 
his major works, the Ideas I, in a rather pontifical and Kantian fashion as “the principle of all 
principles”:  
 
No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary 
presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ 
actuality) offered to us in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what is presented as being, but also only within the limits 
in which it is presented there (Hua III/1: 43, E: 44, emphasis Husserl) 
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Because of such lines, phenomenology came to be known as a description of original, 
immediate experience. In a Cartesian fashion, Husserl believed the ‘originary presentive 
intuition’ to be capable of a foundation of knowledge. Pure experience represents a ‘source of 
cognition’ in that it presents to us the stuff of meaning before it becomes meaningful.  
The naivety of this principle of naivety is apparent. How could this layer of pure 
experience be an object of description as though there were not only an originary presentive 
intuition, but also an originary presentive language? Hermeneutists critiqued Husserl on such 
grounds. They deemed it necessary to move beyond his Cartesianism, and to take meaning as 
an entirely discursive rather than experiential title.  
With the notion of the life-world, however, the late Husserl corrected his Cartesianism. 
Figuratively speaking, the life-world grants some ‘thickness’ to the originary presentiation of 
meaning, to such extent that the life-world inheres in the language that articulates it rather than 
being opposed to it. With the life-world, the unfathomability of meaning became mundane. 
Not the purity of experience, but its pervasiveness and its being prior to cognition moved into 
the foreground. Instead of a realm of pure experience, there is already a habitus of the world, 
in which we “accept simply as what is presented as being”.  
This mundanization of transcendental analysis was indeed revolutionary since it upgraded 
the ‘natural conception of the world’ (natürlicher Weltbegriff) to an epistemic instance of first rank. 
With just this move, the young Heidegger became famous when he spoke of the 
“everydayness” (Alltäglichkeit) as a primordial layer of phenomenological (or existential) 
analysis. Thanks to Heidegger the life-world came to be known as the everyday world, the 
world as it appears “first of all and for the most part” (zunächst und zumeist) in our daily 
practices. In a similar fashion as Heidegger, Alfred Schütz later utilized the life-world as the 
everyday-world, and that of common sense for the social sciences (Steven Shapin, among 
others, quotes phenomenology as one of his sources on that point, 1994: xxv, 29). What 
Heidegger, Schütz, and many others have in common is that they thought of the life-world as 
an original order. The life-world reveals a primordial practical and epistemic structure. Heidegger, 
for example, spoke about the world as the ‘nexus of meaning’ (Bedeutungszusammenhang, 1962: 
83 ff.), and Schütz as a ‘relevance structure’ (1982, Schütz and Luckmann 1980).  
In the Preliminaries, I have introduced this original order as the hermeneutic notion of the 
life-world. It serves as the background for this first part. It is present in various hermeneutic 
aprioris of order (not only in Heidegger’s pre-understanding, Gadamer’s pre-conceptions, Schütz’ ideal 
types, but also in Bourdieau’s habitus, Kuhn’s paradigms, down to Hacking’s styles of reasoning, and 
perhaps even Foucault’s episteme). Without denying their different emphases, life-world refers in 
these cases to a habitus on which we rely, to the obvious and unquestioned world that grants 
consistency to a domain or phase of life, to a historical period, to a discipline, to cultural 
spheres, to social milieus, and of course, to discourse. A characteristic feature of the 
hermeneutic notion of the life-world is a certain dialectic of what is obvious and what is 
problematic, of the habitus and the potential, of tradition and project, of author and reader, of 
the present and the absent, the concrete and the abstract, etc. This I call the hermeneutic play of 
meaning. In which hermeneutic play of meaning, I ask in this part, are economists enmeshed?  
Going back to Husserl, the hermeneutic notion of the life-world cannot be more than a 
first heuristic step in a phenomenological analysis. Husserl, too, considered such hermeneutic 
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idea of a pre-structured world, but he did not call it life-world. He called it “the world for 
everyone” (Jedermanns Welt), on the one hand, and the special world (Sonderwelt), on the other. 
We are living in different worlds, but nevertheless share one world. This constitutes what one 
might call the right to understanding, which is claimed by the naivety of a description. Life-
world here is a title of intelligibility. In precisely this sense of a world in and of which everyone 
has an equal right to claim understanding, Husserl spoke of an “objective” world.  
 
The world, in natural attitude, is experienced with the sense of a world for everyone, which thus 
everyone can experience and reflect upon as the same world, and, by experiencing in such an approving 
way, can positively determine as the same: correlatively, it is in itself (Hua XXIX: 86*). 
 
In this part, I will employ the hermeneutic notion of the life-world as a first heuristic step in a 
phenomenological critique of economic science. With its help, I can informally introduce 
economic science in its concrete appearance for us, that is, for you-and-me-and-our-fellows. To 
say that economics presupposes the life-world means here that, on the one hand, it “has” its 
own world, and, on the other, participates in the world-for-everyone. We can demand the right 
to understand economic science in the same terms as any other human practice. “Practices” 
indeed became the watchword for most commentary on science that probes beyond the 
philosophical issue of justification – which is “bracketed” and “falls under the epoche”, as 
Husserl would have said. 
The questions that I attempt to answer are thus: What is the relevance of economics, in 
the same terms, as we would speak of the relevance of the cobbler? How can the special world 
of economists be described so that it is intelligible within the world-for-everyone? On the basis 
of which intellectual interest can economists provide knowledge? Such an exercise helps me to 
introduce economic science without, at least tentatively, taking a position within economics – 
which falls under the epoche, too.  
The special world of the economist, in a hermeneutic image, cannot be other than that of a 
discursive order. Economists participate in the world-for-everyone by means of speaking up in a 
particular fashion. Economists participate in economic talk as those who make epistemic 
claims. Economists’ practices are determined by a particular way of relating to other economic 
discourses. The manner in which a speaker relates to his or her audience can be said to reflect 
one’s ethos. Gaining an ethos is to acquire a special world within the world-for-everyone. In 
order to describe the special world of economists, I ask for their ethos as introduced above.  
Gaining ethos in front of one’s audience is not to gain ethos in front of another audience, 
as rhetoricians and hermeneutists know. Between the world-for-everyone and the special world 
of the economist, there are degrees of discursive vicinity. There is a continuum between 
audience and speaker in accordance with degrees of shared interests. The loosest relation 
economists have with those who are not directly addressed: the general public, or “laymen”. 
Economists do now and then address “everyone”. They have a public ethos (for a largely western 
public, I should add). Facing the layman, economists gain a public ethos as specialists on 
particular issues. How does this happen? Why do laymen believe in the economic specialist, 
and what makes them interested in following their talk? What is the economist as a “worldly 
man”? (1) A second, closer way of identifying economists is by their professional ethos. Husserl’s 
special worlds and also Heidegger’s being-in-the-world often referred to professional practices 
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(Berufswelt). A professional ethos demands the exclusion of skills and the inclusion of services, 
which form the pragmatic character economists’ ethos. What do economists produce? What 
are they good for? (2). The third relationship concerns the most intimate audience: the 
descendants of economists who need to internalize economists’ interests in order to 
themselves become economists. What is it like to become an economist? (3).  
In this fashion I attempt to descriptively determine the discursive ethos of economists as 
they appear to you-and-me-and-our-fellows. What are economists, insofar as they are perceived 
as particular kind of people, as people who live in their own special world in the world-for-
everyone? As Plato tried to nail down the Sophist in a particular class, the impossibility of 
which let the actual problem of the sophist emerge, I ask by what type of practices economists 
gain discursive identity. This part reads as an introduction to the problem of economics. It 
begins with the naive demand that economists should occupy a clear-cut place within the order 
of the life-world, and results in the critical lament that they cannot. The punch line is thus the 
indeterminacy of the economists’ ethos. With that I will arrive at the complaints that is found 
in much of the commentary of economics: that economists are by far less relevant than you-
and-me-and-our-fellows would expect.  
For a first hint at where this ambiguity of the economists’ ethos is located, think of the use 
of the word “economist” in everyday language. As compared with social characters such as the 
medical doctor, the engineer, the scholar, the artist, the politician, the lawyer, the worker, etc., 
there is no clear perception of the academic economist (Reay 2008). Just as there is confusion 
between “the economy” as a field of reality and “economics” as a discipline of research, there 
is confusion between academic economists and, loosely speaking, those-money-kind-of-people 
including businesspeople, bookkeepers, bankers, administrators, and other number crunchers 
and decision makers. They are all broadly perceived as economists. Against such a backdrop 
academic economists have to establish their discursive ethos. How? 
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(1) The Public Ethos 
 
 
 
 
Economists, now and then, address us – people like you and me, the unwashed. They make 
statements and assertions, comment on changes and surprises, make predictions for years and 
decades to come, warn of risks, but mostly calm down worries, only occasionally cast blame, 
and are never too personal. They do so on various issues from governmental deficits to organ 
donations through various channels of public discourse, mainly via news channels, a range of 
magazines, and too many talk shows. What happens when people’s faces are captioned 
“economist” – be it “Princeton economist”, “Chief Economist General Motors”, or “World 
Bank Economic Speaker”? By what means do economists appear to be worth listening to and 
moreover, credible? What kind of interest makes us listen to their claims? What is the public 
ethos of economists and how do they gain it?  
 
 
Experts in Economic Talk – Aloof, but Exposed.  
Exposed to “Everyday Economics”? 
 
To begin with, not everybody under whose name is written “economist” relies on actual 
epistemic authority. In public, almost anyone can make economic claims without clear 
grounds. Some do so because of the business they have done in new markets or in other 
economically remote areas, others because they lost a wad of other people’s money on Wall 
Street. Among the various people who participate in public economic talk, academic 
economists do not have a strong profile. Only a handful of them are known. Thinking of the 
U.S., the New York Times columnist, Princeton economist, and now also Nobelist Paul 
Krugman may come to mind to some. Perhaps also the World Bank and Nobel economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, or the Harvard economist Robert Barro, who consults the public on nearly all 
economic issues. Other “economists” in public are actually businessmen, economic speakers of 
firms, of parties, of think tanks, etc. Some have are trained in economics, others not – and yet 
come off as more convincing. In a blurry field of economic talk, academic economists who 
claim scientific authority have to cultivate a public profile. How do they do that? 
The most straightforward way of showing one’s epistemic authority could be to avoid 
messy economic talk and gain status in the public science genre. But economists hardly appear 
in the world between Science News and National Geographic – though some economists do make 
their living in science parks. In public economic talk, there is in general not much discussion 
about science. Economists are not the makers of science. One merely relies on scientific 
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authority when applying phrases such as “a recent Princeton study”, or “latest research has 
shown…” and the like. What that means, what kind of methods are used, and on what 
grounds these claims are made, I have hardly seen discussed in public – at least not as often as 
in sciences like medicine, astronomy, or physics. The public is better informed about new 
methods and techniques in biomedicine than about recent innovations in computer-simulated 
market laboratories. Economic scientists do not grow in the safe cocoon of science parks, but 
are exposed to the “transgressive” character of its discursive environment, ‘threatened by its 
overflows’, as Amariglio and Ruccio have put this basic hermeneutic situation of economists 
(2003: 280). Science talk is a different genre than economic talk.  
Instead, economists appear in the politics section – more on a national than a local level, 
but even more at home on a global scale. There they have to use their epistemic authority as 
specialists, experts, and advisors. Economists participate in politics by either speaking up 
themselves or informing journalists, politicians, and other decision makers. This is their service 
to the public. As a New York Times editor praises this service to the journalist:  
 
Journalists have ready access to smart, fast-talking, and politically savvy economic analysts on nearly 
every issue. Dozens of high-quality think tanks and policy groups, liberal and conservative, produce 
mountains of readable reports that reach decisive policy conclusions with firm evidence, but little 
distracting details (Weinstein 1992: 73).  
 
As advisors, economists take political positions. Yet they are distanced and remote from 
politicians. When economists claim epistemic authority, they claim to know better than 
politicians, but do not achieve the status of doctors and engineers. Economists do not rule 
political talk like doctors rule the operating room. Economists know better than day-to-day 
politicians, yet they do not make politics – aloof, but exposed.  
Being experts in economic talk, what identifies their field of expertise? Economists, as the 
namesake implies, are specialists on “the economy”. What is “the economy” in public? A 
bunch of catchwords come to mind: unemployment, growth, poverty, governmental spending 
and deficit, development, financial markets, etc. Klamer has identified more systematically four 
typical sub-genres of economic talk (2007: 162 f.). First, a Keynesian perspective that focuses 
on government spending and taxation; second, a Wall Street perspective that focuses on 
supply-side entrepreneurial activities of CEOs and their fellows; third, a monetarist perspective 
of financial markets including the magic art of Greenspans; and last, the Aristotelian 
perspective, which is perhaps the most natural and most ancient style of economic talk, 
modernized by Marx and handed over down to unionists such as José Bové: moralizing.  
Donald Lamm, the head of the publishing house W.W. Norton & Company, uses roughly 
the same categories when splitting up the sub-genres of economic books published for sale 
(1989: 97). In the books market, economics competes with other nonfiction books such as 
Sociology and “Customs, Etiquette, and Folklore”. Each sub-genre in economics has its 
bestsellers. One classic of the Keynesian perspective is surely Galbraith’s work in the 1970s 
(such as Economics and the Public Purpose, 1973). But the business literature of successful CEOs 
holds hitherto the greatest market share in economic literature. It ranges from General Electric 
CEO Jack Welch (Jack, 2001) to Koch’s popular adaptation of Pareto (the 80/20 Principle, 
1999). Financial market literature is big, too – be it Greenspan’s diagnosis in The Age of 
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Turbulence (2007) or George Soros’ revelations in The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What it Means 
(2008). The moral genre is the most secure option, for there seems to be an infinite demand 
for books such as John Perkin’s Confessions of an Economic Hit Man (2005), a firsthand 
exploitation report; or more moderately, Stiglitz’s Globalization and its Discontent (2003) – let 
alone all the Black Books of Capitalism that flood the shelves of bookshops. If moralizing 
describes one basic tone of these various genres of economic literature, the other side is clearly 
instruction. Grabbing one of these books from the shelf, the general reader does not want to 
know, but wants to be told what to do or shown who is to be blamed. Such are not epistemic 
concerns.  
When classifying economic talk in the way Klamer and Lamm do, the risk is therefore to 
foist theory on it. In the little commentary that exists about public economic talk in relation to 
the academic conversation, such is hardly acknowledged. There it is common to speak about 
“everyday economics”, and even more problematic, about “ersatz economics”, as McCloskey 
has coined the term with pejorative undertones (see Amariglio and Ruccio 2004: 252 ff., 
McCloskey 1999). These terms suggest that people do hold, even if implicitly, actual economic 
theories. “No one”, Klamer states grandly, “can live without beliefs about the economy” (2007: 
160). If that is so, one could, for example, embark on a study of The Child’s Construction of 
Economics, as Berti and Bombi did (1988). They asked children about their theory of prize 
determination, income differentials, interest rates, etc., and showed where they persist to 
recognize contradictions. Children “argued”, for example, that workers earn little because the 
plastic bags they produce are so cheap (148). Do such replies reveal implicit economic theory? 
Are there two types of theories, academic and non-academic? (Klamer 1991) 
When approaching economic talk in this way, the argument usually results in the 
acknowledgement of the incommensurability and irreducibility of everyday and academic 
economics because of the so-called theory-ladenness of economic reality. This approach aims 
thus at relativizing economic knowledge, and at acknowledging or blurring the boundaries 
between academic and public economic talk. Ruccio and Amariglio, for example, want to 
“challenge the terms in and through which academic economists have sought to subvert the 
discursive standing of everyday economics” (2003: 281). Though I am sympathetic to their, say, 
democratic intention, they do not question how the boundary between academic and non-
academic comes about in the first place. The emphasis on discursive differences may lead to 
more tolerance, yes. But it also risks reinforcing the notion that academic economics can only 
be understood from within, rather than from the world of you-and-me-and-our-fellows. 
Prior to acknowledging “everyday economics”, we need to ask what a theoretical interest in 
economic talk can be. Phenomenologically speaking, the first thing to acknowledge is not that 
there is a plurality of theories, but that in economic talk a theoretical interest first needs to be 
accomplished. It is all but obvious that the explicit theory of the economist and the so-called 
implicit theory of the layman are related. Just that link, to the contrary, is most problematic 
when considering the economists’ place in the world for everyone. It is not economic talk as 
seen from the point of view of economics that needs to be understood, but rather how 
economists gain discursive authority on the basis of a theoretical interest in the first place. For 
this reason the question of the public ethos of economists is how economists are perceived by 
you-and-me-and-our-fellows. I do not attempt a reform of discursive boundaries. I ask how 
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they come about. By which means can a theoretical interest in economic talk be established? 
And at what cost?  
 
 
Why the Layman Watching the News Knows he is a Layman: Complexity  
 
If there is a general concern of economists by which they are identified in public, economic 
performance certainly ranks high. “The economy” in public does well or poorly – which is one, 
some say the corner stone of the logic of contemporary political discourse. Is there any law that 
is not made in support of or despite its effects on economic performance? Economists are the 
judges of economic performance, but not its guards. Economists are not politicians. They 
deliver research reports with which politicians can decide and act. Economists, as all scientists, 
need to adopt a distancing attitude to “the economy” to such an extent that the stuff of 
economic policy appears like facts. Only for facts are specialists needed. How then is a 
perception of the facts of economic performance motivated?  
Economic performance is not trivial. Laymen have no natural sense for it. Before one can 
judge how it goes with “the economy”, one has to count. The material the economist deals 
with are measures of economic performance: growth rates, unemployment rates, inflation rates, 
stock-indices, consumer prizes, and, of course, the GDP. To assess the overall performance, to 
predict future performance, and to advise political decision makers of society about possible 
strategies are all supposed to fall under the economists’ field of expertise. The typical questions 
economists answer are, for example, whether stagnation in the EU is due to the U.S. economy, 
the global economy, or a lack of domestic innovation; whether the rise of interest rate has 
indeed affected the governmental deficit as the opposition says; why the Enron crash or the 
2008 financial crisis did not after all affect the “real” economy; whether the NAFTA agreement 
increased poverty in Mexico; or whether landowners are really better off if one demands tariffs 
on the imported corn from Poland, which was hotly debated throughout the first decades of 
the 19th century in the British parliament. There are also less typical cases in which the public 
has become accustomed to consulting economists, such as in the debate over whether one 
should “invest in social capital” or allow for a “market of organs”. Economists take epistemic 
positions in politics. From such knowledge laymen who do not consider themselves 
economists are excluded. They accept the authority of economists to some extent. Why? 
Specialists are needed for things one has to examine very closely with eyes that are trained 
for a long time. The measures of economic performance are not immediately comprehensible, 
intuitable, or visualizable. As we cannot see the forest for all the trees, we cannot see whether 
“the economy” goes good or bad. You-and-me-and-our-fellows are too busy with all the things 
that have to be done, bought, and sold day by day. Who knows how much is an annual GDP 
of 12.623.113.000.000 dollars of the European Union in 2005 or defense expenses of 
320.000.00.000 dollars of the U.S. in 2006? And who knows why one debates and studies for 
months whether economic growth will be 1.6% or 1.7%? Isn’t this below any significance? 
Whether the layman and his fellows had a good or a bad year, lost their job or added little to 
their wealth the bank handles without their knowledge, does not help understanding that 
difference of 0.1%. Just as the German minister of finance once explained the governmental 
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deficit by comparing the height of bank notes with the height of the highest dome, the public 
knows that economic measures can just mean everything. Climbing up the dome, how could it 
help in understanding the governmental deficit?  
Only the economist can say something sensible about the meaning of measures of 
economic performance. For economic performance is not a simple matter, but complex: the 
meaning of one measurement depends on that of all the others. Whether 1.6% or 
12.623.113.000.000 dollars is big or small depends on all the other measures – non-intuitable 
things multiplied by non-intuitable things. What seems minor on one side of the globe can 
have severe effects on the other. In “the economy”, everything is connected with everything – 
dizzying. Who else could be the authority of meaning if not those who are able not to lose, in 
Heidegger’s word, the “circumspection” in all these inter-dependencies and trade-offs? Is it not 
fascinating and appealing to know how All That hinges together? What lets economists appear 
as specialists and worth listening to, is that their knowledge seems to cope with complexity.  
Economists like to refer to such complexity when they start to settle the world of their 
specialty – not only since the academic complexity-hype of the last decade. “[T]he economic 
system is a whole all parts of which hold together and react upon one another,” Cournot made 
a principle of his economics of 1838 (146). Later, Kenneth Arrow, talking to a general public in 
his Nobel Prize lecture, illustrates his field of expertise with the consequences of oil discoveries 
– liquid global power:  
 
The price of oil became very low in the 1930’s because of discoveries in Texas and the Persian Gulf 
area. Homeowners shifted in great numbers from coal to oil for home heating, thereby decreasing the 
demand from coal and employment in the coalmines. Refineries expanded, so more workers were 
employed there. There was as well a demand for refinery equipment, a complicated example of 
chemical processes. This in turn induced demands for skilled chemical engineers and for more steel. 
Gasoline was cheaper, so that more automobiles were bought and used. Tourists areas accessible by 
road but not by railroad began to flourish, while railroads (…) (Arrow 1972: 51). 
 
(…) ad infinitum. “The economy” is a complex system, held together by everything and nothing, 
circling on its own.  
Such is the dominant manner by which economists gain epistemic authority. Only 
economists can make sense of the composition of markets, the logic of which goes beyond 
mere ‘supply up, price down’; only economists know how market forces subtly slide into the 
numeric world of “the economy” that fills the journals and news; only economists can come 
up with an almost miraculous account of the world like, ‘because of oil discoveries in the 
Persian Golf, your favorite bakery around the rail station closed down’. It is this dizzying 
impression that is necessary for economists to claim an ethos as a specialist. They need to 
evoke the wooziness of “the economy” again and again in order to claim authority as 
specialists and keep us listening. If the public acknowledges “the economy” to be complex, the 
economist is granted a free ticket for epistemic authority and intellectual unintelligibility, as well 
as years of research in order to go through “all that”.  
Only insofar as the world appears as a complex system in which whatsoever is connected 
with whatsoever, economists can raise their voices with epistemic authority. Because the 
market connects worlds that have nothing to do with each other, people who never have heard 
of each other, because we are alien and not familiar with each other, because “the economy” 
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goes beyond the oikos – that is, because “the economy” is beyond all negotiations of meaning 
that constitute it: the economist can strike roots.  
 
 
Why the Layman Nonetheless Does not Accept Being a Layman: Anonymity 
 
For just the same reason of complexity, however, the credibility the public grants to 
economists is limited. As easily as laymen may accept economists’ authority in the abstract, so 
hard is it to hold on the belief in the concrete when it comes to their own participation in the 
economy – the world of economic life. Then, most, like you-and-me-and-our-fellows, are 
reluctant in following economists’ truths. Only a few dash to their bank after economists claim 
that the interest rate may fall – perhaps those who think about the “structure of their 
portfolio”, about the difference of 1.6% and 1.7%, thus these-money-kind-of-people, but 
certainly not you-and-me-and-our-fellows. Who feels addressed when listening to statements 
like ‘the clammed U.S. consumer temperament of the last months caused panic sells at the 
European stock markets’, even if the bag we carried home from the grocery was slightly lighter 
than usual? Do we start to panic? Is it a reason to even shrug shoulders?  
For most of us, I suppose, not. The attitude we adopt when listening to economists is not 
one that could move us to act. The curiosity that makes us follow economists’ talk – for some 
it may rather be out of boredom – does not grow into an actual practical interest. The relation 
of economic knowledge that economists claim, and economic behavior that you-and-me-and-
our-fellows reveal is not trivial. As important as “the economy” seems as long as we are kept 
under the impression of a woozy “all that”, as irrelevant it is for everything we deal with from 
morning to evening. The interest rate we receive from the bank is simply not the same interest 
rate as the interest rate economists talk about. We may believe they are the same, but we may 
not know what that means. After we switch channels, turn pages to the culture section, but at 
the latest when we take up to work again, there is hardly anything that reminds us to what 
economists have said. 
Laymen, or, as some economists have called their epistemic counterpart, “practical man” 
do not live in a complex world. They live in a world that passes for better or for worse from 
morning to evening. Here there is no “economy”, but there are people conducting an economic 
life. In this life, the next morning never waits too long to call for work; we pinch pennies at the 
end of the month, but not at all on holidays; we go once or twice a week shopping, getting 
nothing but in one another’s way; children turn out more expensive than expected, though we 
do not regret; we can feel safe or cannot stop worrying about the future and the assets hoarded 
in the last decades… . Conducting an economic life – only vaguely confined, sometimes too 
intrusive, but after all never pervading all the rest of life – there is nothing that connects our 
practical interest with the casual interest in listening to economists. If we want to know how 
“the economy” goes for us, we are negligent in granting too much weight to what economists 
say. “The economy”, for most parts of our life, has nothing to do with the economy.  
In their empirical study of the general public’s perception of “the economy”, Robert 
Blendon and his team at Harvard, for example, arrived at the following result: 
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Asked to choose from a list of nine possible sources, the two indicators they [the U.S. public asked by 
telephone] think give them the best indication of how the economy is doing, only 32 percent of the 
public mentions news reports on government unemployment and cost of living statistics. Nearly as 
many Americans (28 percent) cite as a key indicator the amount of buying activities they see in the 
stores. More than half (55 percent) rely on the personal experiences of family, friends and coworkers 
(Blendon et al. 1997: 115) 
 
If I deny the accuracy of such lay judgments, why is it not the same as denying the accuracy of 
a patient’s judgment who takes how he or she feels as an indicator of the success of the doctor?  
The answer is clear: It is not the people who are “the economy”. The forces economists 
speak of do not touch us in person. They are anonymous. Market forces are exerted by 
everybody and nobody. Economists do not speak about this or that concrete person, about 
you or me or our fellows, but about “consumers”, “investors”, “producers”, “entrepreneurs”, 
and a handful of other characters that are defined by the relations they hold to each other. For 
the economist, not the people living the economy, but the relations of these people make “the 
economy”. These relationships are not those among associates – mother and daughter, master 
and slave, boys and girls. Instead, in a complex system relationships are relations with features 
on their own – which is perhaps the abstractive move of all modern science. “The economy” is 
a structure, a system, a complex, but not a world we possibly could live. Economists can only 
claim authority when speaking about anonymous forces structurally induced. 
The public ethos of economists may be that of specialists. But they are specialists of a not 
very engaging sort. If academic economists are urged to translate their findings about “the 
economy” in terms of economic life, they often appear trivial if not easily ridiculed.  
 
A highly embarrassing moment usually follows a new Nobel Prize-winning economist being asked, 
“What for?” I remember Franco Modigliani on the morning news (…) When asked what he had 
invented, he said something like: “Well ... uhm ... I had this idea that people save for the future.” James 
Tobin told the reporter of public radio that his great idea was that people, when investing their money, 
“do not put all their eggs in one basket.” You could hear the reporter’s gasp. “Is that it?” “Yes, more or 
less, that’s it,” Tobin responded. When James Buchanan explained that he got the prize for the insight 
that politicians pursue their own interests just like everyone else, Mike Royko, a columnist, claimed half 
the prize because it had been his insight, too (Klamer 2007: 158). 
 
Certainly, laymen do not know the complex implications such trivialities can have for 
economic theory, as Klamer continues excusing this embarrassment. However, if complexity 
needs to be evoked in order to speak of facts of “the economy”, and if this requires 
anonymous relations between agents, it is not only not surprising, but necessary that the 
economists’ bonds with the rest of economic talk are weak. Complexity allows for the 
appearance of the economist, but at the same time makes it difficult for the economist to 
address the people in their personal situation. One accepts economist’ authority on the one 
hand, while everyone is still allowed to hold his or her private opinion on what is really going 
on the other. Precisely as the economist is able to associate with “the economy” worlds that 
have nothing to do with each other, you-and-me-and-our-fellows are able to associate with the 
economy a world that has nothing to do with the economists’ world.  
Economic talk beyond the control of epistemic authorities follows different rules. When 
laymen consider matters of how “everything is connected with everything” as personal matter 
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economic science is hardly of interest, let alone of authority. The image of complexity 
economists evoke justifies a belief in science only regarding those things in life that do not 
move us from our chair. Laymen reply to the wooziness of complexity with a very different, 
personalized account. If everything is connected with everything, everybody can be blamed for 
everything – in particular the disliked people. Again the example of oil prices:  
 
We also asked about gasoline prices in our survey, at a time when they were rising. Nearly three-fourths 
of the public believed that the increase in gasoline prices was due more to the oil companies trying to 
increase profits than to supply and demand, while 85 percent of economists said the price increase was 
due to supply and demand (Blendon et al. 1997: 116). 
 
What is apparent to Arrow and his fellows – that oil discoveries let gasoline prices fall – the 
public successfully ignores. Klamer and Meehan, too, have put much emphasis on the gap 
between the economists’ and the public perception of “the economy”: 
 
Everyday economists are most likely to personalize the economy; they think in terms of people doing 
things, of right and wrong, of victories and defeats, of special interests, and of identities. Whereas 
academicians choose to think about the economy as a (general equilibrium) system of markets, everyday 
economists prefer to think in anthropomorphic or biological terms. That is to say, the economy is 
populated by people who are emotionally driven, and functions like an organism as a whole with 
functionally interdependent parts. The academic narrative is minimal whereas the everyday economists 
prefer to dramatize the economy, endowing it with villains (big corporations, unions, foreigners, or 
presidents of the other part) and heroes (entrepreneurs, small business, unions, presidents of one’s own 
party) (Klamer and Meehan 1999: 69 f.). 
 
In economic talk there is only one question that moves the mind: Who? And: What kind of person 
is that? Partaking in the economy always bears names – the names of these idlers who make a 
living from evading taxes, the names of these wannabes who drive expensive cars, the names 
of these greedy CEO’s of the low-cost airline that controls employment in our region, and the 
names of these politicians who pretend to represent values while seeking economic power. 
When laymen come to consider their own partaking in the economy, the knowledge of the 
economist serves at most as a symbolic factor in their attempts to make sense of their economic 
situation. Economists’ claims can be a mere vindication of our bad luck and failures. What 
unpleasant situation or unfortunate course of actions cannot be chalked up to “the economy”?  
I repeat, the question here is not to upgrade the personal attitude of “everyday economics” 
as an irreducible modality of knowledge, but to question the conditions by which this boundary 
can be established. The gap between the academic and the everyday perception of “the 
economy” become unbridgeable if they do not ‘see the same with different eyes’, but the latter 
sees through its own eyes, and the former through nobody’s eyes. The difference between the 
anonymity of relations and the personality of agents is not a theoretical difference. It is prior to 
a theoretical interest. If the anonymity of relations is a condition of the very difference of 
episteme and doxa, economists as such cannot relate to actual persons.  
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The Culture of Economic Suspicion: Some Instances 
 
Laymen never fully internalize that the forces that rule the economy are anonymous. Behind these 
forces there are, or better, there must be some fellows who choose among “systems” – 
preferably politicians, but also other liked and disliked groups of people. Economic talk today, 
as centuries and millennia before, prior to any theoretical interest, is ruled by economic suspicion. 
There are present governments speaking of freedom while thinking of oil, there are 17th 
century traders speaking of honor while ruining the treasure of the British Kingdom, and there 
are those who gained power at the expense of those excluded from the economy, as it happened 
for millennia in Europe to the Jews. The economic suspicion says, among other things, that 
behind all complex systems, the motives of those who profit persist. To say that everyday 
economics is more “declarative” understates the indiscreetness of this suspicion (Amariglio and 
Ruccio 2003: 268). The economic suspicion is the great force to see persons where others 
claim necessities, to see intentions where other claim causes. There are global players, those who 
meet invisibly but nevertheless really, annually, there in snowy St. Davos, people making GATTs, 
and NAFTAs, sitting in WTOs and World Banks. And this suspicion can befall the economist: 
For there also must be some people who do profit from the belief in anonymous structures!  
Economic talk, in all its genres, moves within the discursive cultures of economic 
suspicion. Marxists have always done so when blaming capitalists and other potential 
exploiters. Sociologists do so when speaking of class, groups, and roles – the science of what-
kind-of-people. In business literature everybody does so anyway – is it not the job of 
businesspeople to know what kind of people they deal with? All anti-globalizers do it anyway – 
it’s Bush fault, isn’t it? Authors of sale books on the ultimate capitalist plots do so – or was it 
Bill Gates? Other emphatic apologies and cruel historical score-settings of capitalism do so – 
perhaps it all started with Roosevelt’s New Deal? Religious economics on bearing or abolishing 
poverty do so, too – from Jesus to Therese, were they not economic heroes? Esoteric 
economics on the latest ego-technologies that show how to liberate yourself from the spirit of 
mammon contribute to the culture of economic suspicion in their way. And so on. Beyond the 
control of epistemic authorities, there is a considerable amount of economic discourses 
speaking against the anonymity of the economy.  
Such are the sources, easily accessible and comprehensible, that help people understand 
themselves in their present-day economic life. They provide instructive advice with one hand 
and moral support with the other. If any academic discourse informs them, it is hardly 
economics proper, but other disciplines such as political science, anthropology, psychology, 
sociology, and philosophy. If there is any reference to economic science, then it is at most to 
the invisible hand – mentioned either enthusiastically with Smithean connotations of liberty or 
pejoratively with Marxian associations of selling exploitation as just that.  
Economic suspicion rules economic talk. The study by Klamer and Meehan on the 
political process that, at the beginning of the 1990s, led to the NAFTA vote, illustrates a case 
of this suspicion. At the beginning of the debate, the U.S. International Trade Committee 
considered extensive academic research about the effects of NAFTA – mostly computable 
general equilibrium models. When the decision came closer, however, it turned out to be a 
matter of special interests, national pride, and personal credibility rather than a matter of Truth. 
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The pro-NAFTA turn in public opinion took place when Vice-President Al Gore and NAFTA 
opponent Ross Perot debated on television.  
 
In front of a national television audience Al Gore and Ross Perot personified the two sides; they 
became the issue themselves. The debate became a contest in character. [Al Gore] challenged Perot by 
pointing out contradictions in earlier made statements and interest of the Perot family in the 
continuation of trade barriers between Mexico and the United States. While Perot tried to make an 
emotional plea against the NAFTA treaty, alluding to losses in the United States and likely exploitations 
of unprotected Mexicans by US corporations, Gore tried to deflate the emotional plea by calling the 
character of the spokesman himself into doubt. (…) The public response to the debate suggested that 
Gore had been successful in making the opposition suspect, by making the individual who personified 
that position, suspect (Klamer and Meehan 1999: 77f).  
 
The influence of academic economists on the passing of NAFTA, too, happened by virtue of 
their character. 300 economists, including all American Nobelists, wrote a letter in support of 
NAFTA that was continuously quoted by the pro-NAFTA camp – whatever the Nobelists 
actual arguments.  
The study of Blendon makes another case for the culture of economic suspicion. 69% of 
the public, as compared to 12% of economists, believes that “the economy” is not doing better 
than it is because top executives are paid too much. You can see by the numbers the poise with 
which the public says, “Yes, because of these-kind-of-people!” And you equally see the affects in 
the economists’ reply: “No, it’s more complex!” Neither wants to appear naïve.  
 
Views of Reasons Why the Economy Is Not Doing Better Than It Is 
 
 General Public Views of Economists 
The federal deficit is too big 77% 32% 
Too many people are on welfare 70% 11% 
Foreign aid spending is too high 66% 1% 
Taxes are too high 61% 18% 
People place too little value on hard work 59% 18% 
Too many tax breaks for business 48% 5% 
Source: Washington Post/Kaiser/Harvard (1996), quoted in Blendon et al. 1997: 113 
 
For another instance of the culture of suspicion, consider how the assessment of “the 
economy” functions in the political discourse. Although one grants economists their specialty 
in making such judgments, to believe those who claim “the economy” is doing well, does it not 
amount to the same as saying ‘I am so naïve as to believe what the government says before the 
elections’? Saying that “the economy” performs poorly does it not amount to the same as 
saying that one is politically critical-minded? Why should we even conceive of ourselves as 
political beings if we believed “the economy” was doing just fine?  
The economic suspicion does not spare the economist. Appearing remote, trivial, or 
boring at first, if the economist actually makes a claim, he or she is subjected to suspicion just 
as anyone else. Although economists can come up with an account that handles the utmost 
complexity, there is also the common knowledge that they, in principle, could have come up 
with an alternative account resulting in the opposite claim. Although there is some 
acknowledgement of economists being scientists and well seated at Princeton, Harvard, and 
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Chicago, there is also the widespread belief that this science is as flexible as the specter of 
political interests at Princeton, Harvard, or Chicago. Even our grandmothers may have heard of 
President Truman’s saying about the lack of one-handed economists. Accordingly, when 
hearing one-handed claims – such as ‘Princeton economists have shown that a minimum wage 
has little to no effect on employment’, or ‘the economic council assured that last year’s 
unemployment was caused by the lacking reforms of the tax system’ – being wary is 
appropriate. Who are You, Dear Economist, Arguing This! 
And so, the New York Times editor’s praise of economists in the media quoted above has 
its pessimistic backside: 
 
Will they (economists) fuel the cynical presumption, deeply embedded within journalists, that expert 
testimony reflects little more than the self-interest of a client? (…) Where once scholars served as 
reliable authorities, they now serve as advocates (…) Rather than to clarify public debates, economists 
are too often trapped by it (Weinstein 1992: 77).  
 
Thus, if one has a practical interest in a particular claim, there will always be an economist with 
the suitable political inclination to support it. If everything is connected with everything else, 
everything can explain everything else – in particular what suits my interest!  
Under this rule of public economic talk, economists’ judgments on “the economy” are 
easily undermined. Measures of economic performance, so the rule has gone for centuries, are 
expressions of special interests. This could be called the methodological Ur-suspicion of modern 
economic talk.  
 
Asked to judge government reports on how well the national economy is doing, including statistics on 
the rates of unemployment and inflation, 26 percent say they think these reports are not too accurate, 
and an additional 13 percent say they are not accurate at all. (Fifty-three percent said they thought these 
reports were fairly accurate, while only 7 percent said they were very accurate.) (Blendon et al. 1997: 
116) 
 
Roughly fifty-fifty – enough to govern. Choose your party, and you know how “the economy” 
performs. This methodological Ur-suspicion is both the great engine and, at the same time, the 
main stumbling block of the scientification of economics. 
Within the culture of economic suspicion, the woozy perception of everything-is-
connected-with-everything can play out in a different way than epistemic authority. Compare, 
for example, Arrow’s illustration of the market system quoted above with the following 
description of a cultural critique. Wondering who could be blamed for the misery of farmers in 
Asia, he travels through the market’s complex system, asking everyone he finds: Who should 
be blamed? 
 
My trip led me first to the caoutchouc plantations of Southern Thailand. The small planters referred to 
the Chinese intermediaries as the reason for their miserable destiny. The Chinese traders, instead, would 
explain later that it’s not their fault. It’s the fault of the multinationals that push prices down. The 
agricultural minister of Thailand could confirm that. He himself was powerless. So I drove to Akron, 
the seat of Goodyear, in order to ask the president, a pleasant Egypt called Sam Gibara. He emphasized 
that the “market” is responsible for everything. ‘Effectively’, he added, ‘we have to say that the annuity 
funds became the main actors in the market’ (Toledo 2005: 51*).  
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The layman is thus able to come up with an equally miraculous claim that we all – only thanks 
to holding a bank account and thus supplying annuity funds – can be blamed for the misery of 
the caoutchouc farmers in Southern Thailand. If everything is connected with everything, then 
everyone is responsible for everything – in particular for all the misery of the world. Terrifying. 
Everyone – so why not turning the moral discourse on its head? Mirowski illustrates with 
the following fictive reply to a beggar asking for change. 
 
Look, my man, if I give you a dollar, your income will go up, so average spending will rise without any 
offsetting rise in production. That will push inflation up, devaluing our currency after worsening our 
trade deficit, not to mention shifting the tax burden into the more productive sectors of society. The 
dollar becomes worthless, and more people are thrown out of work. So I’d like to help ya, guy, but 
don’t you think things are bad enough already? (2004: 379).  
 
Such one may call the moral end of the theoretical abstraction of “the economy” in which 
everything is connected with everything. 
As a last, peculiar, but highly virulent example of the culture of economic suspicion, 
consider a remark by Hans Sinn, head of the Institute for Economic Research (IFO), on the 
recent debate about the 2008 financial crisis. He warned the public not to blame the managers, 
since in the crash of 1929 Jews were blamed in the same way. The public’s clamor was great, 
obviously. Sinn touched on the respectable German taboo of comparing anti-Semitism (read: 
Holocaust) with any other event in history. Historically, however, there could be no more truth 
than that: suspicion–violence–liberation by anonymity forms the key-chain for understanding 
the epistemic culture in Western economic talk.  
 
*** 
 
The public ethos of economists, to sum up, is double: On the one hand, in order to claim 
scientific authority, “the economy” has to appear as a complex system. Only by a complex system 
can the economist establish systematic knowledge. Yet, for the same reason, economists have 
difficulty addressing the general public, since market forces in complex systems are presented 
as anonymous. Moreover, just because of this anonymity, if there is a political claim made with 
the authority of science, the economic suspicion rules; other than anonymous forces must lead 
to such claim. Measuring “the economy” does not help since numbers are the first objects of 
will, as you-and-me-and-our-fellows know better than governments and their economic 
advisors before elections. Only when kept under the dizzying impression of a non-intuitable 
complex system is the economists’ knowledge suggestively important. Only a moment later, 
when facing our concrete world, it is of no interest whatsoever.  
The perception of “the economy” is decisive for this gap of interests. The perception that 
“everything is connected with everything” can institute a theoretical interest to come to grips 
with “all those” interwoven facts. Regarding such interest, we grant economists’ knowledge 
specialty, unintelligibility, and, moreover, formality. Yet the same perception can also correlate 
with an excuse for one’s bad luck, a reason to blame whomever one wants, or the burden of 
the guilt of the entire world. The perception of “the economy” can reflect a theoretical notion 
of a complex anonymous system, but it can also reflect the entire moral spectrum of our 
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economic life. These two attitudes draw a dividing line in economic talk: here we are 
concerned, there we want to know. The former attitude we adopt when it comes to our own 
participation, the latter when it comes to everybody’s and nobody’s participation.  
This problem of economists’ public ethos runs deep. If I am right that the perception of a 
complex system is constitutive of, rather than a flaw in economists’ ethos, we cannot avoid the 
skeptical question: Is it a priori impossible for economists’ knowledge to be relevant for anyone 
else? Is it a priori impossible that economists’ knowledge explicates or intervenes critically into 
the public’s perception of economic life? How can economists be influential at all if the very 
condition of their discourse is their inability to address anyone in particular? Could we still find 
people claiming epistemic authority in economic talk if economists became more personal? 
Thus, the least I can say is that the problem of the relation of the economist to public 
economic talk is not only a matter of discursive incommensurability, of the lack of pluralism in 
the epistemic business, which leaves the inherent solidity of economics intact. But the public 
ethos becomes a problem for economists themselves since there is no apparent reason why one 
should engage in supporting epistemic culture of economic talk? 
From this point of view it is questionable whether the problem of economic science, as 
Blendon et al. conclude, is “that economists need to do a better job educating the public about 
economic matters” (1997: 117). Of course the general public does not “know” much about 
“the economy” – only a third of American adults knows that the Federal Reserve sets 
monetary policy (Ibid.: 116). But will people believe more in “demand and supply” if they 
knew? What does public economic education accomplish? How can the National Council of 
Economic Education, for example, seriously promote the belief in science by lamenting that the 
lack of profound knowledge of economics makes people “more likely to have money 
problems, career problems, and credit problems, and less likely to make informed decisions as 
citizens and voters” (quoted in Ruccio, Amariglio 2003: 264). Public economic education 
serves different purposes, as I suggested in this chapter, and as a closer look at the Test of 
Economic Literacy confirms. One question of this test is the following: 
 
In a market economy, the social purpose of profits is to (a) get business to follow government 
regulations; (b) get business to provide what consumers demand; (c) provide funds to pay workers 
better wages; (d) transfer income from the poor to the rich (in Nelson, Sheffrin 1991: 159). 
 
Answer (b) counts as most “literate”. But does such literacy help reduce “money problems”? 
Did I not present sufficient reason to doubt that the different perceptions of “the 
economy” are a mere matter of education, of knowledge and ignorance, of doxa and episteme? 
Perhaps this gap is, to the contrary, the condition of the very identity of economists’ as 
specialists? Perhaps the difference between doxa and episteme comes about simply by ignoring 
economic talk? 
The theoretical perception of “the economy” represents the gulf between economic 
science and the rest of economic talk. Large parts of the following phenomenological remarks 
about economic science will trace this theoretical perception of into various facets: its historical 
genesis, its manifestations in economic theory, and its existential effects on the character of 
economists.  
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In the philosophical commentary on economic science, the gap between public and academic discourse is
discussed and partially celebrated as the distinct achievement of economics using invisible-hand-
explanations. Reference goes usually to Hayek’s formula of ‘the results of human action but not of 
human design’. Invisible hand explanations, a classic commentator said, need to be “non-natural”, 
“counter-intuitive” and “implausible” (Ullmann-Margalit 1978). If science says what the rest of the people 
anyway say, she argues, it is not worth having a science. Complexity as a condition of such explanations is
granted, too. “Only when the social pattern or institution to be explained has a structure beyond a certain 
degree of complexity the invisible hand explanation of it has a point” (Ibid: 267). She furthermore speaks
of a “constructive character of invisible hand explanations”, while non-economists reveal an “artificer 
bias” (268). The value of invisible hand explanation, she argues in line with Hayek, lies in the surprise that 
there is actually nobody who is responsible for market allocations. Is it, however, perhaps the other way
around that the conspiratorial thinking (artificer bias) is even reinforced through the abstinence of 
economists from the responsibility question? What then are the costs of using invisible hand
explanations? And what are the costs to defend them?
 
But first let me ask: Who is the economist? Since in public there is hardly any reflection on the 
scientific grounds of epistemic claims, the identity of economists is rendered rather vague –
hidden somewhere behind politicians, without great entries in the science section. This fuzzy 
image does not lead us to the actual practice of claiming epistemic authority. Let me thus move 
closer to economists’ actual institutions and social identity by asking: What kind of profession 
is it? How do economists gain professional ethos?  
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(2) The Professional Ethos 
 
 
 
 
The ‘who’ question is the preeminent concern of most economic discourses. It was, to 
anticipate a historical remark I will come back to in the next part, also the exclusive concern of 
European pre-modern economic writings before there was economic science. The who-
question was posed mainly as that of professions, around which economic institutions have been 
organized. As Plato would have been content if he were able to determine the exact profession 
of the sophist, days and years in the middle ages passed smoothly as long as the order of the 
professional guilds gave meaning to all stages of economic life. The great challenge of these 
pre-modern writings was the classification of particular persons: traders. What kind of 
profession is trade? What do they produce? What do they contribute to society? The answer 
was far from trivial. Traders only bring things from here to there but do not bring things about. 
And the usurer, the money-trader, does not even do that! So how could they survive? Most 
economic writings before economic science concluded they must be thieves!  
Did I not make a similar charge in the previous chapter? If economists have difficulty 
addressing the general public, what does the economist actually accomplish? If economists do 
not address or relate to anyone, but only to the relations we entertain in “the economy”, then 
what are economists good for? What is it to be a professional economist? What do economists 
produce? What do they contribute to society? Stigler explains: 
 
A world full of mistakes, and capable of producing new mistakes quite as rapidly as the economists can 
correct the old mistakes! Such well-meaning, incompetent societies need their economic efficiency 
experts, and we are their self-chosen saviors (Stigler 1982: 8).  
 
The saviors of incompetent societies? Many objected – among others, the young Colander:  
 
[S]ay that all garbagemen got together and went on strike. What would the effect on society be? The 
Answer is clear: Society would be a mess. Now say that all economists got together and went on strike. 
What would the effect on society be? Most people’s answer would be, ‘None. Things would be just 
about the same with or without economists.’ Hence the question: Why aren’t economists as important 
as garbagemen (Colander 1991: 19). 
 
To pose the question of professional service in such a blunt way is somewhat forced. 
Academic life is usually granted freedom from the need for an “immediate” outcome for 
society. Academia is worth having because it provides criticism of society at large, because the 
conduct of an intellectual life is regarded as something virtuous, or because it is part and parcel 
of our cultural heritage. Academic practices, then, are not associated with proficiency, but with 
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scholarship. If economists make a living from scholarship, there should be no reason to 
complain that they are not like doctors, lawyers, engineers, or managers. But why do we expect 
economists to be like them anyway? 
Be it a professional or scholarly community, I can ask how the discourse of economists 
plays out in society at large, how their worth is justified for those paying their salaries, and 
through which channels their efforts are utilized. Economists, I attempt to show in this 
chapter, are torn between the two. Neither did they accomplish a professional ethos by 
providing a distinct service to society, nor did they accomplish recognition as scholars beyond 
their immediate usefulness. Pragmatic justification is expected from economists, but at the 
same time threatens their identity. Economists are not like engineers, doctors, or lawyers, nor 
like philosophers – even worldly ones.  
What is interesting when speaking of professions is that a profession requires a balancing 
act between social exclusion and inclusion – a standard distinction in the sociology of professions 
(see Coats 1993: 395 ff.). In order to appear as professional, one needs to adopt a sovereign yet 
sensitive voice. A professional ethos, on the one hand, requires recognition and esteem from 
you-and-me-and-our-fellows. The product needs to be included in the world-for-everyone. On 
the other hand, a profession has to exclude others from their activity in order to claim 
authority, authorship, expertise, and responsibility on its products. A profession thus needs 
closure, needs to exclude others from its special world. These two conditions make professions 
the instance par excellence of the hermeneutic notion of the life-world, between the world-for-
everyone and special worlds. How do economists manage this double requirement? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note on the literature 
Approaching economics as a profession is an established part of today’s commentary of economics. For
an inspiring, though Austrian-biased, volume of how eminent economists themselves think about the
services they offer to society, including Hayek, Kirzner, Coase, and Tullock, see Klein (1999). Stigler’s 
essay on “Do economists matter?” needs to be added to that volume (in Stigler 1982). The self-
understanding of economists as professionals of less known (academic and non-academic) economists is 
reported in Raey 2008. Institutional data on the profession are gathered and interpreted favourably by 
Siegfried (e.g. 1998, 1999). For an early survey of the field in the 1960s under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Science, see Ruggles 1970. Colander’s work has disclosed much of present-day attention to the 
profession (Colander and Coats 1989, for an early survey Colander 1989). Standard topics are the ranking
systems of journals, universities, and economists, analysis of bibliographic data, etc. The growing field of
economics of science addresses issues such as the organization of science (efficiency of funding and
production), the resulting research patterns, wage-differentials, and also race and gender discrimination in 
an evermore market-dominated science (for an early survey see Sent 1999, more recent Diamond 2008). 
For a historically image of the economic organization of science that goes far beyond the static image I
present here see Mirowski and Sent (2002). For an economistic discussion of the production function of
economists, demand and supply constituents, see Frey (2003). The heterodoxy has a natural interest in
changing and thus first describing the rules of the profession of economists (see e.g. Lee 2004). The
classic historical work is that of the social historian of economics A.W. Coats on the professionalization 
of economics (1993). For another historical work on the professional ethos of British economists in the
20th century, see Middleton (1989). 
Let me thus open the black box of “the economist”. Who are those people making their 
money with economic claims of epistemic authority? The broadest spectrum of people I can 
conceive of ranges from those who have some training in economics but are employed outside 
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of academia, to those who are employed in economics departments. What I call the profession 
of economics must include all the in-between cases: from academic economists who do full-
time teaching, to applied economists, to economists in departments other than economics, to 
researchers in think tanks, to economic advisers in governmental and international 
organizations, and private companies. This excludes “economists” who work as accountants, 
statisticians, and managers, insofar as they are not informed by economic theory, nor utilize its 
authority, nor got their job because of a training in economics. Having observed above a gap 
between economic science and the rest of economic talk, we here find a rich institutional 
continuum between science and its paying audience. In which sense, then, can we speak of 
each instance of “economist” as a profession?  
 
 
The Producers of Economic Theory Associated in the AEA –  
Arcane as Artists, but Rigid as Taylor Workers: Social Responsibility? 
 
This range of academic economists is considerably broader than what in the literature is 
referred to as the academic profession of economics. There one often includes members of the 
American Economic Association (AEA), who hold a PhD and are employed full-time at a 
university or college (Siegfried 1998). The AEA had 17.143 members in 2007, having declined 
in recent years. It first reached this figure in the 1960s, when membership doubled from 10.000 
– itself up from 5000 in the 1950s. Approximately 13.000 economists in the U.S. are employed 
by around 400 colleges and universities, with a median salary of 72.780 dollar per year. Their 
overall research costs tally at 30.5 billion dollar – about 0.0006 % of the world income, as van 
Dalen and Klamer guess (2005). About 1000 economics PhDs graduate per year, half of which 
are not from the U.S. – though 80% white and male! Around 30.000 undergraduates choose 
economics as their major year after year (see Siegfried 1998, 1999, Klamer 2007). In order to 
receive an entry in Who’s Who in Economics, more narrowly, one must have published and have 
been quoted by others in one of the ranked journals. Today, 1168 economists, half of them 
alive, meet these criteria, which is twice the number in 1983 (see Blaug, Vane 2003). 
The AEA, founded in 1885, has gained the rank of the institution of the profession of 
economists. Noteworthy in the present context is that at its very beginning it was not yet clear 
whether it would be a professional or academic association (Coats 1993: 205 ff.). Many of the 
early members were not academics. Can we think of the AEA today as an institution that 
functions like a professional union or guild? The AEA always played an active role in unifying 
economics by setting the standards of research, and, moreover, by standardizing undergraduate 
and graduate teaching (Siegfried and Hinshaw 1991). Yet it has never handed out a certificate 
for economic services such as policy advice or forecasting. It neither has ever written a 
statement of professional ethics. The AEA is not held together by the services it provides. 
Instead, what holds it together is economic theory. If one has no training in economic theory, 
one will not excel much in that society. The professional skill of economists, as represented by 
the AEA, is teaching economic theory, on the one hand, and using it to structure data sets on 
the other. What kind of proficiency is that?  
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The skills needed to produce economic theory include, roughly speaking, some technical 
abilities like real analysis and dynamic programming, combined with the capacity to come up 
with a narrative that “explicates” the technical language in whatever context in which the 
economist wants to claim authority. Optional, but today ever more fashionable, are the 
technical skills of dealing with data, running tests, using econometric software such as Ox, 
Stata, or E-views, etc. Using these skills, economists’ actual products are journal articles – the 
more regular, frequent, and quoted, the better. Other writings, such as book-length treatises, 
textbooks for students, and books for a general audience do not contribute to the professional 
status of an economist. Contrary to the view that even children hold economic theories, 
economists are in fact the only people who engage in such arcane effort, as the following 
economist describes. 
 
[A]cademics are trying to solve the following problem: show that starting from a set of not completely 
implausible assumptions can lead one to an interesting (i.e., novel or counterintuitive) result. No one 
else (i.e., private sector economists, government economists, policymakers, economics undergraduates) 
has that as an objective. Thus, unless and until they adopt this objective as their own, the people listed 
in brackets above find much of academic economics misdirected, irrelevant, or esoteric. This leads to 
some understandable frustration (in Colander 2003: 161). 
 
Indeed, nobody outside the profession ever reads the theoretical work of economists. Most 
economic theorists never communicate their work to any other person than economists. 
Moreover, only a small part of all articles are read and quoted by others. In this respect, 
economists seem hardly like a profession, but more like artists, from whom only a few stars are 
noticed at all. As opposed to artists, however, the literary appearance of economic theory – 
including style, methods, technical vocabulary, and structure of articles – is highly rigid. 
Economists do not have to make up on their own what kind of text they are supposed to 
produce. This again suggests a professional rather than scholarly activity. Let me thus have a 
closer look at a typical journal article. 
The depiction of the motivation of the enterprise entails common-sense notions that have 
some intuitive footing in one of the topics an outsider could identify as an economic issue. In 
the last AER issue, for example, titles include notions such as “large pay-off”, “global 
imbalances”, “auctions”, “centralization”, “public spending”, “electricity markets”, etc. The 
actual problem, however, is defined in relation to already-established theories. Without 
knowing them, the article cannot be of interest: “large pay-off game shows”, “an equilibrium 
model of global imbalances”, “asymmetric auctions”, “a dynamic theory of public spending”. 
The actual audience is addressed in the literature survey, which consists of other articles to be 
refuted, qualified, generalized, applied, etc. They usually do not extend back more than ten 
years. The model follows. Models are assemblages of well-defined relations of technical terms, 
based on particular theoretical principles. There are basically two (four) theoretical principles 
that identify an economic article: (ir)rationality and (dis)equilibrium. A model typically consists 
of mathematical equations. However, other models, such as technically richer computer 
simulations, are coming into use too (see for example Kim, Morse, Zingales 2006).  
Then an “empirical” section follows. The model is specified in such way that it allows for a 
quantitative testing procedure – econometric testing. This testing, too, McCloskey has long 
protested, is highly standardized. What truth possibly means is not up to the economist. 
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Around the 1970s, when the fashion I describe began to dominate economists’ academic 
writings, theory had priority. But in recent years we can observe a turn to more empirical work. 
In 1970, 70% of papers were theoretical, and 13% included empirical data. In 2000, only 11,4% 
were solely theoretical, while 60% included data (Kim, Morse, Zingales 2006: 203). Some speak 
of an “empirical turn”, to which I will return at several points below.  
The conclusions of a typical article do entail moderate political claims, but never without 
reference to further work. In order to offer a taste, here are the concluding lines of an article 
on public spending, taxation, and debt. Note how the author gains policy relevance and 
epistemic authority by moving back and forth between technical and political notions. 
 
The result [of combining tax smoothing and pork-barrel spending] is a tractable dynamic general 
equilibrium model that yields a rich set of predictions concerning the dynamics of fiscal policy and 
permits a rigorous analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium policies. There are numerous 
ways the theory might usefully be extended. A particularly interesting extension would be to introduce 
cyclical fluctuations in tax revenues due to the business cycle. This could be achieved by specifying a 
stochastic process (with persistence) for the private sector wage (…). It would be interesting to know 
what the type of theory developed here predicts (Battaglini, Coate 2008: 223). 
 
These extensions may be interesting for both the author and the politician who uses these 
predictions – but, as the reader may imagine, for rather different reasons. In the appendix of 
the article, the formal proofs of the model’s Lemmas and Propositions follow. In the quoted 
case, these proofs take up about a third of the space of the entire article, and perhaps most of 
the time spent on it. That not being enough, the author needs to refer to an additional Web 
appendix with yet more proofs.  
Such rigidity represents the black hole into which the efforts of most economists fall. 
“Close to a thousand manuscripts a year” – reviewed by the former editor of the AER, Robert 
Clower – “and I swear that the profession would be better off if most of them hadn’t been 
written, and certainly if most of them hadn’t been published” (Clower 1989: 23). Better they 
not, as long as proficiency is gained at the cost of the expressive strength of intellectual efforts, 
as, among others, Frey argued (2003). Academic publishing, he complains, goes at the cost of 
originality, creativity, and other scholarly virtues. Frey called the process of getting an article 
published in one of the ranked and peer-reviewed journals as “intellectual prostitution”:  
 
The system of journal editing existing in our fields at the present time virtually forces academics to 
become prostituted: they sell themselves for money (and a good living). (…) [A]cademics sell their soul 
to confirm to the will of others, the referees and editors, in order to gain one advantage, namely 
publication. Most person refusing to prostitute themselves (…) are not academics: they cannot enter, or 
have to leave, academia because they fail to publish. Their integrity survives, but the persons disappear 
as academics (Frey 2003: 206).  
 
Frey’s suggestion is to treat economists more like artists. But, then, could economists still claim 
epistemic authority?  
The dominant control apparatus that reinforces this intellectual culture is the ranking system. 
Rankings contribute a great deal to the appearance of professional closure. They are the 
“measure” of intellectual accomplishment (Husserl would turn over in its grave). As aloof as 
the practice of economists may seem, rankings make their accomplishments tangible. They 
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provide structure to most of the professional life of economists: which conference to go to, 
what kinds of topics to address, which references to make, which contacts to pursue, which 
department politics to support, whose tenure to grant, which curriculum to enforce, etc. All 
professional activities can be viewed in light of such rankings (rather than, as in scholarly 
disciplines, being oriented by, say, intellectual communities). 
There are about two handfuls of high-ranked journals that set the profession’s field of 
attention, the oldest of which are the Journal of Political Economy (1892, Chicago), Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (1886, MIT), American Economic Review (1911, AEA), Econometrica (1933, 
Econometric Society), and the Review of Economic Studies (1933, LSE) (see e.g. Kalaitzidakis et al. 
2003). The majority of the middle-ranked journals have been founded between the 1960s and 
the 1980s. EconLit, the relevant research database, lists around 600 economic journals. There 
are notably no non-English-speaking journals in any ranking. Rankings exist not only for 
journals, but also for economics departments and universities. The highest-ranked institutions 
for decades have been departments such as Harvard, Chicago, MIT, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, 
etc., trailed by LSE and two or three European and Asian Universities in the double-digit 
rankings. Even single economists are ranked (see Coupé 2003). Not only the top ten, but a list 
of more than a thousand economists can be found at IDEAS. I could fit 216 on the following 
page. Which notion of scholarship can such a list possibly convey? 
Although rankings dominate the everyday life of economists, I suppose no economist 
would not agree with Van Dalen and Klamer, who reminded us that “not being cited is not 
necessarily a sign of waste, just as receiving many citations is not necessarily a sign of scientific 
breakthrough” (2005: 407, see also Gillies 2006). Though nobody may have ever had doubts 
about that, the pile of rankings grows and grows. Ironic commentary presents itself readily. 
Rankings, says Colander, play different roles. They play  
 
(…) political (show them to the dean to support your budget increase request), psychological, and 
sociological (show them to your friends and to yourself to make them feel worse and you feel better) 
roles. More rankings increase the probability that one’s school will have done well on one of them; 
cognitive dissonance takes care of the rest (Colander 1989: 142).  
 
Is the number of rankings not a clear sign of insecurity about the palpability of intellectual 
accomplishment, lack of an inherent criterion as to what an intellectual accomplishment 
amounts, and the lack of social feedback from outside the profession? Assuming that 
economists, anyhow, at least secretly dislike such measures, are they not a bad surrogate for a 
discursive judge? What else than an ironic attitude about the profession is induced if 
professional closure is achieved by rankings nobody believes in, but everyone orients 
themselves by?  
When viewing the profession along such rankings, professional closure comes at the costs 
of excluding professional services. Economics is inward-oriented. If publications in ranked 
journals are the main occupation of the profession, one is inclined to believe that economics is 
beyond both proficiency (for providing no service) and scholarship (for showing no inherent 
discursive judge). Many have embraced that image, and sung lamentations similar to that of 
Mark Blaug: “modern economics is sick. Economics has increasingly become an intellectual 
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1 Joseph E. Stiglitz  
2 Robert J. Barro  
3 Andrei Shleifer  
4 James Heckman  
5 Robert Lucas Jr. 
6 Peter Phillips  
7 Jean Tirole  
8 Olivier Blanchard  
9 Martin Feldstein  
10 Edward Prescott  
11Daron Acemoglu  
12 John Campbell  
13 Mark Gertler  
14 Lawrence Summers  
15 Christopher Baum  
16 Thomas J. Sargent  
17 Maurice Obstfeld  
18 Lars Svensson  
19 Alberto Alesina  
20 Stephen Turnovsky  
21 Gregory Mankiw  
22 Nicholas Cox  
23 James H. Stock  
24 Robert G. King  
25 Alan B. Krueger  
26 Michael Woodford  
27 James Poterba  
28 Ross Levine  
29 Barry Eichengreen  
30 Elhanan Helpman  
31 Robert J. Gordon  
32 Jordi Gali  
33 Ben S. Bernanke  
34 Pablo Fernandez  
35 Kenneth S Rogoff  
36 Gary S. Becker  
37 David E. Card  
38 Martin Eichenbaum  
39 Jeffrey Frankel  
40 Edward Glaeser  
41 Paul R. Krugman  
42 Bennett McCallum  
43 Sebastian Edwards  
44 Richard Freeman  
45 Jean Laffont † 
46 M Hashem Pesaran  
47 John B. Taylor  
48 Eugene Fama Sr. 
49 Robert F. Engle  
50 Paul Romer  
51 Christopher Sims  
52 Peter A. Diamond  
53 Dani Rodrik  
54 Donald Andrews  
55 Alan Auerbach  
56 George A. Akerlof  
57 L. Christiano 
58 Lawrence F. Katz  
59 Raghuram Rajan  
60 Joshua Aizenman  
61 Angus S. Deaton  
62 Lars Peter Hansen  
63 Paul Milgrom  
64 Andrew Kenan Rose  
65 Oliver D. Hart  
66 Boyan Jovanovic  
67 Clive W. J. Granger  
68 Rudiger Dornbusch † 
69 Robert C. Merton  
70 Zvi Griliches † 
71 Gene Grossman  
72 Patrick Kehoe  
73 Avinash Dixit  
74 Florencio Silanes  
75 Richard Blundell  
76 Martin Ravallion  
77 Frederic Mishkin  
78 Bruno S. Frey  
79 Timothy J. Besley  
80 Robert J. Shiller  
81 George Borjas  
82 Eric S. Maskin  
83 Stephen John Nickell  
84 Robert Ernest Hall  
85 Kevin M. Murphy  
86 Sergio T Rebelo  
87 Tim Bollerslev  
88 Kenneth R. French  
89 Ricardo J. Caballero  
90 Rafael La Porta  
91 Bruce D. Smith † 
92 Guido Tabellini  
93 David Romer  
94 Drew Fudenberg  
95 Joshua D Angrist  
96 Francis X. Diebold  
97 Peter Nijkamp  
98 Daniel Hamermesh  
99 M. Carmen Guisan  
100 Paul A. Samuelson  
101 John H. Cochrane  
102 Julio Rotemberg  
103 Sherwin Rosen † 
104 Allen N. Berger  
105 Finn E. Kydland  
106 Edward Lazear  
107 Willem Buiter  
108 Xavier Martin 
109 Martin Shubik  
110 Martin Weitzman  
111 Alan S. Blinder  
112 Richard H. Thaler  
113 Jeremy Stein  
114 Robert Feenstra  
115 Laurence Kotlikoff  
116 Douglas Bernheim  
117 James Hamilton  
118 Kenneth West  
119 Andrew Abel  
120 William Easterly  
121 Mark Taylor  
122 David Neumark  
123 James Markusen  
124 Pierre Perron  
125 René Stulz  
126 John Haltiwanger  
127 David Cutler  
128 Torsten Persson  
129 John Whalley  
130 Sanford Grossman  
131 Andrew Oswald  
132 Halbert White  
133 Robert Hubbard  
134 Carmen Reinhart  
135 Charles Engel  
136 Steven Levitt  
137 Chris. Pissarides  
138 Larry G. Epstein  
139 Jonathan Eaton  
140 Asli Kunt  
141 Richard Rogerson  
142 Anthony Venables  
143 Ernst Fehr  
144 Jeremy Greenwood  
145 Charles Jones  
146 David Hendry  
147 Randall Wright  
148 Amartya Sen  
149 Roland Benabou  
150 Glenn Rudebusch  
151 Ray C. Fair  
152 Douglas Diamond  
153 Jonathan Gruber  
154 Shang-Jin Wei  
155 Alvin E. Roth  
156 Soren Johansen  
157 Ellen McGrattan  
158 Douglas Gale  
159 Jose Scheinkman  
160 Geert Bekaert  
161 Michael C. Jensen  
162 David N. Weil  
163 John Moore  
164 James Tobin † 
165 Charles F. Manski  
166 Jess Benhabib  
167 Christopher Carroll  
168 Robert Moffitt  
169 John List  
170 Robert M. Townsend 
171 Orley Ashenfelter  
172 Oded Galor  
173 Athanas. Orphanides  
174 Stephen Morris  
175 Varadarajan Chari  
176 Richard J. Zeckhauser  
177 Danny Quah  
178 Campbell Harvey  
179 Vernon L. Smith  
180 Matthew O. Jackson  
181 Assar Lindbeck  
182 Jacques Thisse  
183 Dale T. Mortensen  
184 Carl Shapiro  
185 W Kip Viscusi  
186 Anjan V. Thakor  
187 Anil K Kashyap  
188 Gilles Saint-Paul  
189 Adrian Rodney Pagan  
190 Michael David Bordo  
191 Alex Cukierman  
192 Joseph G. Altonji  
193 Daniel Kahneman  
194 Andrew Hallett  
195 G. William Schwert  
196 Steven N. Durlauf  
197 Janet Currie  
198 Martin Browning  
199 Stephen P. Jenkins  
200 Eric A. Hanushek  
201 Richard R. Nelson  
202 Manuel Arellano  
203 Bruce E. Hansen  
204 Thomas F. Cooley  
205 Gordon Hanson  
206 Kenneth A. Froot  
207 Michael B. Devereux  
208 Steven Shavell  
209 Charles L. Evans  
210 Glenn Ellison  
211 Naray. Kocherlakota  
212 Philip Lane  
213 Peter Howitt  
214 Walter Erwin Diewert  
215 David M Newbery  
216 Enrique Yacuzzi  
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game played for its own sake and not for its practical consequences for understanding the 
economic world.” (2002: 36) We read another rendition of this song in Colander:  
 
By the late 1960s, the formal techniques necessary to undertake the noncontextual arguments [theory] 
had become so great that younger economists were no longer being trained to know about real-world 
institutions, a requirement if one is going to talk seriously about policy. Unless an economist has 
inherent or independently acquired abilities in communicating ideas to the outside world, becoming an 
economist is like join a priesthood sworn to communicate only among its members (1991: 22). 
 
The riddle that such complaints leave open, however, is how it was possible that economic 
theory, in spite of the closure of its production, could nevertheless leave considerable traces in 
the economic talk of the last decades. There is an astonishing gap between the inward 
orientation of economic theorists and the scope of its impact on its environment. This impact, 
in other words, takes place indirectly, which is to say that there is nobody who actually mediates 
between economists and the rest of economic talk (see Colander 1991: 19 ff, Frey 2003). The 
impact of economic ideas can be a total mismatch with the intentions of their originator. Those 
who utilize, or are in any sense influenced by, economic theory are not the same people who 
design it. To be sure, this is always the case in scholarly discourses. However, the closure of 
economic theory makes us wonder if the absence of economists from the production of 
meaning in economic talk is perhaps constitutive of its impact. This represents the problem of 
social responsibility of theoretical economists, to which I will return again and again.  
 
 
Rather than Civil Servants, the Social Engineers of Freedom – All around the Globe, 
Even in Totalitarian Regimes: The Epistemic Dialectic of Neoliberalism 
 
Part of this puzzling success of economics is its ongoing internationalization. Academic 
economics, no doubt, has its home in the U.S. The greatest majority of all ranked journals, 
universities, and economists, including those who have earned the greatest of all accolades in 
economics – the Bank of Sweden Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel – are based in the U.S. This is not 
surprising, to the extent that the criteria of success in other countries are not exactly the same. 
Since WWII, but primarily since the 1970s, these cultural differences have faded. Economics 
has internationalised – or, better, Americanized (see in full detail Coats 1996).  
European economics departments, for example, traditionally have close ties with their 
local institutional and political environment, but are on the way to becoming equivalent to 
second-ranked American departments (Frey and Eichenberger 1993). Latin American 
departments have traditionally been more rooted in political economy and socialist traditions, 
but now they too obey to the North-South hierarchy (Montecison, in Coats 1996). This is true 
since the 1950s at the latest, when Friedman send Harberger to Chile, after which “half of the 
economists trained at leading foreign institutions studied at Chicago” (Harberger, in Coats 
1996: 302); Korean and also Japanese departments are traditionally socialist, yet were greatly 
influenced by the U.S. through their homecoming graduates (Choi, in Coats 1996, and 
Bernstein 1999). Samuelson comments:  
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Again and again I have seen in recent decades the tremendous stimulus that top postdoctoral scholars 
from abroad have received from a year’s soujourn in the States. They go back home fired up to change 
the old world (in Breit and Spencer 1995: 62).  
 
Samuelson did contribute his share to fire up the rest of the world. For the greatest force of the 
Americanisation of economics are certainly textbooks. Ever since his Economics, they tend to be 
the same all over the world. This is reinforced, for example, by the “charity” of institutions like 
the University of North Carolina, which in 1990 donated economics textbooks to universities 
in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and ex-Yugoslavia (Bernstein 1999: 112).  
According to the inward orientation stated above, this international success is a mystery. 
What makes economics departments all over the world stand in queue to get into the U.S. 
rankings? Is it part of the general success of markets in shaping political discourses? Is it part of 
a shift in the bias of science from socialist to liberal? No, not at its surface. Economics 
departments, when adopting to the U.S. institutions, rather, change the perception of the 
profession they represent: from that of the civil servant to that of social technocrat – apparent in the 
case of the countries formerly under the cultural influence of France. Economics in France is 
traditionally embedded in the education of public administrators, who are trained in order to 
function in particular public institutions and required to be knowledgeable in legal and 
historical matters (for similar observations regarding Korea, see Choi, in Coats 1996: 106 ff.). 
So it happened, for example, in Iran in the 1960s. “Higher education was revamped and 
expanded in response to the growing demand for technocrats” (Behdad 1995: 195). It was 
John Hicks who helped carry out the Samuelsonian reform of the economics department in 
Teheran. The great promise of U.S. economics was not to infiltrate western politics in 
academia, but, to the contrary, to find a way to remove economic discourse from its socialist 
and liberal bias. For this reason, economics survived the so-called Cultural Revolution in 1978.  
 
There has been little ‘Islamization’ in the structure of the economics program in post-revolutionary Iran 
(…) It is ironic that the Islamic rejuvenation of higher education and the ideological cleansing of 
economics, one of the most seriously contested disciplines of learning by the Islamic Republic and its 
ideologues, have only strengthened the process of Americanisation of the economics discipline 
(Ibid:.212).  
 
Such is one of the riddles of present-day economics: it grows from the most advanced market 
society (the U.S.), but easily merges with the educational politics of totalitarian regimes (and 
increasingly with the quasi-democratic politics in the U.S. itself). The most well known case is 
Friedman, who, in the 1970s, made Pinochet’s Chile his “laboratory” of economic 
liberalization (for a participant account see Harberger (in Coats 1996), for an early critic see 
Letelier 1976, for a philosophical assessment Schliesser 2007). Economic freedom and political 
violence can easily coexist, while the former, as the left insists, legitimizes the latter. 
It is the spirit of social engineers that stamped the pragmatic conception of the economic 
profession most intrusively. Despite the rigidity of economic theory, some eminent economists 
have managed to go beyond teaching and publishing as sources of income and make direct 
epistemic interventions in the political sphere. At least this is the case for the economists, the 
Samuelson-Summers-Sachs’s. Paul Samuelson can be held most responsible for the public 
image of economists as social engineers. He was able to push both economics as a science and 
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its political utilization at the same time. Having merged Keynesian aspirations, neoclassical 
ambitions, and econometric sophistication, economists can thank him for the fact that they are 
constantly held to the standard of political relevance. It is worth quoting his advising activities, 
for it reflects the institutional scope of the demand for epistemic authority in economic talk.  
 
Professor Samuelson has served widely as a consultant. He worked for the National Resources Planning 
Board from 1941-1943 (in charge of war-time planning for continuing full employment); the War 
Production Board and Office of War Mobilization and Reconstruction in 1945 (economic and general 
planning program); the United States Treasury, 1945-1952; the Bureau of the Budget in 1952; the 
Research Advisory Panel to the President’s National Goals Commission from 1959-1960; the Research 
Advisory Board Committee for Economic Development in 1960. He was a member of the National 
Task Force on Economic Education from 1960-1961 and has been a consultant to the Rand 
Corporation since 1949. He is an informal consultant for the United States Treasury and the Council of 
Economic Advisors. He is also a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank. He was Economic Advisor to 
Senator, candidate, and President-elect Kennedy and was the author of the January 5, 1961 “Samuelson 
Report on the State of the American Economy to President-elect Kennedy” (nobelprize.org). 
 
The list only includes activities until the mid 1960s. Samuelson is still alive!  
But Samuelsons are rare. He became an economist because he could not understand the 
fuss about such a trivial discipline (1992: 236). For most economists, to get one article 
published per year is full-time occupation, so that theoretical and political engagements do not 
interact. They exclude one another because they require different skills. Is Samuelson a 
successful advisor because he is a successful theoretician? Even though those who demand his 
authority may believe so, there are different skills at work. As Coats concludes from his study 
of economists active in the contexts of governments:  
 
Though professional skill (that is, knowledge of an ability to use economic ideas and techniques) is a 
necessary condition for success in an official bureaucracy, (…) it is by no means sufficient. The list of 
desirable qualities required by an ideal government economist is indeed daunting. It includes tact; 
patience; adaptability; the ability to communicate with non-specialists in a variety of circumstances and 
at different levels of audience comprehension; skill in the arts of persuasion; recognition of the limits of 
one’s professional expertise (…) (Coats 1989: 117f.). 
 
Etc. One acquires none of these skills by trying to publish one article a year. To the contrary, 
exceptional of economists like Samuelson is that they are able to maintain their intellectual wit 
despite their theoretical ambitions.  
If the skills necessary to produce theory do not match the skills necessary to produce 
economic advice, then more is going on than “applying theory”. I consider the very word 
“application” as misleading for describing economists’ practices. Economic theory and political 
advice do not relate like the general and the particular. Applying means to be more careful, but 
not creative. An application is supposed to add nothing new in principle, only in the concrete. If 
one can derive contrary results from the same theory in the same situation, as is the case, more 
is going on than mere application. Economics and politics do not relate like positive theory and 
normative applications. They are mediated by something else.  
The influence of economic theory on its discursive environment, Samuelsons apart, does 
not occur by means of the economist, but indirectly. And this indirect effect – so it seems since 
the 1970s – tends in one direction: in support of pro-market policies. Is economic science 
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today not the science of the NAFTAs and GATTs, of privatization of public services, of 
deregulation of energy markets, road pricing, auctions for IT property rights, etc.? The riddle is 
this: By which murky path does the aloofness of economic theory from economic policy lead 
to an advocacy of market policies? 
 
In the economics community the academic ideal, namely that of pure research truth-seeker, the 
detached non-partisan experts, outweighs any more pragmatic conception of professionalism or public 
service; and when this ideal is transported into the non-academic realm it often takes the form of 
partisan advocacy of efficiency and market methods (Coats 1993: 398). 
 
Epistemic authority of “non-partisan experts” and partisan market policies are in a secret 
alliance. In this mutual support, they both reveal their inner ambiguity: theory being aloof from 
economic policy as a truncate policy, and market policies being theoretically founded as being 
aloof from politics. In its appearance as science, when coming in touch with the political 
sphere, economic theory supports a particular politics, supports economically-oriented politics, 
supports the anti-politics of neoliberalism. Doing theory for science’s sake, economic claims 
are led as if by an invisible hand into the political sphere. How can we impel the economist to 
take responsibility for such effects if the very motive of science is to be beyond politics? As 
indirect are the influences of economists, so indirect is the suspicion that falls back on them: Is 
the very pursuit of an economic science politically tinctured? 
Such is the epistemic character of economic talk in a post-1945 neoliberal world in which 
free markets count as a reply to the failure of politics in that they substitute politics. This 
dialectic will be a repeating theme in the coming considerations, and I leave the reader with this 
irritation about the pragmatic image of economists. Here I merely want to maintain that due to 
this dialectic, economists defy a trivial conception of professional pragmatism.  
There has been one economist who has acknowledged the full consequences of the non-
trivial character of economic knowledge in a neoliberal world – Friedrich von Hayek. Arguing 
forcefully against social engineering, he was the only one who defended scholarship at the cost 
of professionalism. When addressing his LSE students in 1944, he plead that “Being an 
Economist”, as he titled his speech, requires being irrelevant, because the knowledge of 
economists is ineffective if it not realized by the society on its own. Economists’ influence can 
only be indirect, for a direct influence is against the ideology that allows for this knowledge in 
the first place: free markets. Although the economist may know what is better for society, he or 
she cannot truly claim it. If you really believe in economics, you need to keep it for yourself! 
 
In this economics differs from other disciplines. We do not, as the other sciences do, train practitioners 
who are called in when an economic problem arises (…) The reason why I think that too deliberate 
striving for immediate usefulness is so likely to corrupt the intellectual integrity of the economist is that 
immediate usefulness depends almost entirely on influence, and influence is gained mostly easily by 
concessions to popular prejudice an adherence to existing political groups (Hayek, in Klein 1999: 143). 
 
When Hayek spoke about “popular prejudices” in 1944, he meant socialism. At the end of 
WW II, Hayek saw the university insinuated by social engineering. “[T]he attraction of a 
planned and directed economic system is now as strong among the American intellectuals as it 
ever was among their German or English fellows.” (Hayek 1949: 371) Intellectual integrity, 
according to Hayek, thus demands to withdraw from immediate utilization of economics, and 
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to take influence via general scholarship. For this reason he launched an alternative institution, 
which I discuss below. Rejecting the idea of a political party, he suggested the following:  
 
I would join with other in forming a scholarly research organisation to supply intellectuals in 
universities, schools, journalism and broadcasting with authoritative studies of the economic theory of 
markets and its application to practical affairs (quoted in Backhouse 2005: 368). 
 
The perversion of such a political scholarship happens when it falls back on the institutions of 
economic science. The best instance is – who else – Stigler, who speaks about “professional 
integrity” with the following words:  
 
One evidence of professional integrity of the economist is the fact that it is not possible to enlist good 
economists to defend protectionist programs or minimum wage laws. The groups who seek such 
legislation accordingly must seek elsewhere for their spokesmen and theorists (Stigler 1982 [1976]: 60). 
 
 
Applied Economics – the Intellectual Acrobatics of Maintaining one’s Interest in a 
Domain, and the Unifying Rejection of Economic Imperialism 
 
The field where the greatest numbers of economists make their living is not economic science, 
but the economic sciences, that is to say all the countless “applied” fields in economics. For an 
impression of what the profession consists of in this sense, have a look at the list of 
associations on the next page that, centred in the AEA, have “allied” at the Allied Social Science 
Conference in 2007 and 2008. To this list I should add other economists working in other 
disciplines at other departments at which economic theory is part of the curriculum, such as in 
business economics, public finance, public administration, and a number of recently invented 
studies such as “innovation design and management”, “information architecture”, etc. I  
should also add the interdisciplinary specializations such as economics and law, economic 
sociology and social economics, economic geography and geographic economics, economic 
psychology, etc. The diversity of the realm of the economic sciences – as is also apparent in the 
list – is not older than some decades. Many of these associations were founded after 1970. This 
is not surprising if we believe Mirowski and Sent that the very distinction of pure and applied is 
“an artefact of the Cold War regime” (2002: 22). I will return to that below.  
What differs between applied and theoretical economists must be their perception of a 
distinct domain of application. This perception serves as the source of relevance and 
motivation for the economist. What is important for health economics, how could it be the 
same as what is important for public finance? Proficiency here comes down to specialized 
knowledge of a field that includes institutional, historical, and technical knowledge: ‘How much 
agriculture will be feasible in Greenland in a century?’ ‘Who benefits from tax cuts on private 
care if the demographic situation will have changed in a couple of years?’  
If so, what makes applied economists ally in economics? Do they share an encompassing 
perception of a unified domain? Is there an Ur-domain of economic theory that encompasses 
all special worlds where it is applied? Hardly. It is rather the kind of question that applied 
economists pose, which often can be reduced to: market, yes or no? The main question, for 
example, in environmental economics is ‘Should we restrict pollution by law, or sell rights for 
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Allied Social Science Associations 2007-2008 
 
1885: American Economic Association 
1907: National Tax Association  
1919: American Agricultural Economics  
Association 
1930: Econometric Society 
1939: American Finance Association 
1940: Economic History Association 
1941: Association for Social Economics 
1946: Transportation and Public Utilities Group 
1947: Labor and Employment Relations  
Association 
1949: National Council on Economic  
Education 
1959: National Association for  
Business Economics  
1963: Omicron Delta Epsilon  
1963: Peace Science Society International 
1964: American Real Estate and Urban 
Economics Association 
1967: Association for Evolutionary Economics 
1968: Association for the Study of the Grants 
Economy 
1968: Union for Radical Political Economists  
1969: National Economic Association  
1970: Society of Government Economists  
1974: History of Economics Society 
1975: Association of Indian Economic Studies 
1977: International Association for Energy  
1977: International Society for New 
Institutional Economics 
1978: Middle East Economic Association 
1979: Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists 
1980: National Association of Economic  
Educators  
1982: American Committee on Asian 
Economic Studies 
1982: Association of Christian Economics 
1982: International Society for Inventory 
Research 
1983: Cliometric Society 
1983: Association of Financial Economists 
1984: The Korea-America Economic  
Association 
1986: Association for Economic and 
Development Studies on Bangladesh 
1988: African Finance & Economics 
Association 
1988: International Trade and Finance 
Association  
1988: National Association of Forensic 
Economics  
1989: Chinese Economic Association in 
North America 
1990: Association for the Study of the Cuban 
Economy 
1990: North American Economics and 
Finance Association 
1990: International Association For Feminist 
Economics 
1990: Society for Economic Dynamics  
1993: Society for Policy Modelling 
1994: International Network for Economic 
Methodology 
1995: Society for Computational Economics  
1996: Economic Science Association 
1998: International Economics and Finance 
Society 
1998: International Health Economics 
Association 
2000: Association for Comparative Economic 
Studies 
2001: Health Economics Research 
Programme  
2003: Industrial Organization Society 
2006: Economists for Peace and Security  
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pollution?’ In health economics: ‘Are we ‘healthier’ if we pay our doctors directly or via the 
state?’ In international and developmental economics: ‘Did foreign aids prevent the people in 
central Africa from specialization in labor-intensive products?’ And in cultural economics: 
‘Should we subsidize the art although hardly anyone is willing to pay for it?’ Certainly these 
questions are of public concern, but they do not stem from how the public perceives the 
problems of each domain. They stem from economic theory being the theory of markets, 
whatever domain is at stake. Theoretical rigidity prevails also in applied economics:  
 
In the 1970s many fields that had previously been open to less technical work followed suit. Industrial 
economics, development economics, and even international trade and macroeconomics began to 
require understanding of mathematical techniques not required a decade before (Backhouse 2005: 382). 
 
Economic theory does not unify applied economics by means of being more general in terms 
of scope of applicability. Instead, it unifies by means of pre-determining the kinds of questions 
that can be posed, and by means of narrowing the conceptual borders of economic talk. The 
perception of a particular domain hardly functions as a guide for applied economics. The 
philosopher’s concern for the scope of economic theory does not enter the consciousness of 
practicing economics. If this is the case, an interesting question is again which skills are needed 
in order to apply economic theory? Does mastering the theory amount to the same as knowing 
how to apply?  
Consider, for example, the division of labor between economic sociology (done in 
sociology departments) and social economics (a heterodox approach), between industrial 
economics (including theory of the firm) and parts of business economics, between political 
economics (say, social choice theory) and political theory at political science departments, 
between economic geography and geographical economics, etc. They do share the same 
domain. But how can we believe that they will ever merge? Does this not suggest that the skills 
here and there compete with each other? Doing applied economics, does it prevent the 
economist from gaining proficiency in other discourses about the same domain? The more one 
engages in economic theory, the less one is guided by one’s perception of a concrete domain? 
And if so, what is it that leads to claims in applied economics?  
If we believe the joke our grandmothers know (about the one-handed economist), 
applying economic theory leads instead to a range of all possible economic claims, but not yet to 
an actual economic claim. Is the effect of economic theory in all those fields not to structure the 
discussion, and to provide the form of argument without actually contributing? Think for 
example of the capacity of economists to engage in interdisciplinary relationships: What does 
economic theory contribute to other disciplines? What happens when market theory is applied 
to “pollution”, “health”, “art”, “education”, etc.? What kind of intellectual labor is it to specify 
MaxU as MaxUP for P= “pollution”? What is it to view the world in light of economic theory? 
Do economists not face the sheer impossibility of the intellectual acrobatics of holding onto a 
conceptual frame that hardly interacts with the intuitions oneself and others have about the 
field – continuously confronted with the inappropriateness of this conceptual framework? Are 
not the best economists those who are able to keep their intuitions apart, pretending never to 
have made any contact with the field, and really claim, “Yes, art, children, pollution – all that is 
utility, is a commodity, is an asset etc.” – whatever that means!  
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The origin of this problem is the well-known idea of Becker (1976) that economics is 
indeed not a discipline among others, but a method of the social sciences. Then there is not a 
discipline called economics applied to various domains, but a discipline that gains discursive 
power by taking over others: “economic imperialism”. For this Becker has received the Nobel 
Prize in 1992, and the Presidential Medal for Freedom in 2007.  
 
Indeed, I have come to the position that the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is 
applicable to all human behavior, be it behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, 
repeated or infrequent decisions, large or minor decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor 
persons, men or women, adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, 
businessmen or politicians, teachers or students (…) Subsequently, I applied the economics approach to 
fertility, education, the uses of time, crime, marriage, social interactions, and other “sociological,” 
“legal,” and “political” problems (1976: 8). 
 
I suppose that there is no single applied economist today who embraces Becker’s attitude, and 
conceives rationality and equilibrium as principles of all human behaviour. No applied 
economist, I suppose, believes that economic life is not a “compartment” of life – the point to 
which Becker brings his approach home (Ibid.: 14). No applied economist does not believe 
that some things of life should concern the economist more than others. And yet, despite this 
disbelief, discursive boundaries between economic sociology and social economics, between 
cultural economics and cultural studies etc. hold strongly. Perhaps precisely because of this 
disbelief? Perhaps what makes applied economics ally under the ASSA umbrella is neither a 
shared interest in particular phenomena, nor a particular theory or method, but the rejection of 
theoretical principles? From finance to cultural economics, is what differentiates the economist 
from others not that the economist believes that rationality is not a sufficient principle to speak 
about the economic domain? 
 
 
Economists in Think Tanks – Non-Partisan Neoliberalism and the  
Treasonous Division of Labor between Doing and Utilizing Economics 
 
For now, I leave applied economics with these questions open, and move on to the close 
environment of academia. There, economists work in so-called ‘think tanks’ (Heidegger would 
turn over in his grave). Think tanks fund research, both theoretical and applied, both at 
universities and at their own institutions, and infuse it into the political discourse or directly 
into governments. In think tanks, economists do policy research of an academic sort, but in a 
non-academic context. There, they produce both policy reports and academic publications. 
Thinks tanks cultivate epistemic authority in politics. Think tanks are the institutions that 
mediate between the culture of academic research and policy making (for a general assessment 
see Stone 1996, regarding economics e.g. Smith, in Colander and Coats 1989).  
Let me list some of the more famous think tanks that have flourished since the 1970s. In 
the U.S., worth mentioning are the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute (1943), the 
libertarian Cato Institute (1977), and the Heritage Foundation that supported the Reagondom of the 
1980s (1973). In Great Britain, most important is the Institute of Economic Affairs (1955), 
launched with the help of Hayek, later followed by the Adam Smith Institute (1977), and the 
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Centre for Policy Studies (1974), which was founded by Margaret Thatcher in order to disseminate 
free market ideas and to protect the independence of Britain. Recently established is the 
Globalisation Institute (2005) affiliated with British Conservatives, which likewise fosters the 
perception of benefits of global markets. One of the first, biggest, and most influential 
think tanks is the RAND Corporation, which was founded in 1945 by the U.S. Air Force 
and proliferated in the 1970s. Many Princeton-Chicago-Stanford economists work there in 
close association with the U.S. and many other governments all over the world. It includes 
the RAND Journal for Economics (1970) as well as a graduate school. One of their core values is 
“objectivity”. The father-organization of think tanks is Atlas (1981), the mission of which is to 
“bring freedom to the world by helping develop and strengthen a network of market-oriented 
think tanks that spans the globe” (quoted in Backhouse 2005: 370). One World, One Market, 
One Science? 
Rather exceptional are research centers that are in close affiliation with a particular school 
of thought and a particular political position, such as the Ludwig Mises Institute (1982) that 
promotes libertarian Austrian economics. Another candidate that is often mentioned as being 
responsible for the spread of neoliberal ideas is the Public Choice Society developed by James 
Buchanan, Gordon Tullock and Mancur Olson, located at the same place as the Austrian 
center, at George Mason University. It supported the spread of the idea that the market 
governs politics rather than politics governing the market (see Amadae 2003: 133 ff.). This 
research group, as opposed to the old and new Austrian school, found inroads in high-ranked 
journals, and can therefore be called a direct epistemic backdrop for neoliberalism: proving the 
inefficiency of state activities. The mother think tank of all think tanks, where academic 
economists, namely the economists from both Austrian and Chicago schools – both new and 
old – initiated the epistemic culture of neoliberalism, is the Mont Pellerin Society, founded in the 
aftermath of 1945 (see next page).  
Taking one step back in the chain of funding research, I should mention foundations. 
They direct science into specific political channels, yet seem to patronize science out of sheer 
philanthropy (see Goodwin 1989, Balakrishnan and Grown 1999). Apart from the National 
Science Foundation (its political leanings are disputable, too – see Newlon, in Colander and 
Coats 1989), much academic research at U.S. universities as well as think tanks is funded by 
private foundations such as the Ford Foundation (1936) that supported many of the above-
mentioned think tanks, the Koch Foundation, the William Volker Fund (1932-1965), and the 
Earhart Foundation (1929). The last two, at least, were expressly market-partisan. Earhart 
fellowships were granted to Becker, Buchanan, Stigler, Vernon Smith, Hayek – which happen 
to be just the line-up of the Mont Pellerin Society. In order to close the circle of academic 
economists and the-money-kind-of-people, one may find beneath foundations certain 
industrialists, such as Joseph Coors of the eponymous brewery. He pays. Cheers to the market. 
These and countless other thinks tanks, foundations, and research centers are the most 
apparent manifestations and clearest pushers of epistemic culture in economic talk since 
WWII. Commentators, who are sensitive to conspiratorial thinking, and want to spell out the 
murky link between economic science and the master narratives of neoliberalism, need to go 
into the archives of Mont Pellerin in Switzerland, or ask the fellows of Antony Fisher what it 
was like talking to Thatcher and creating the Atlas network. One may certainly find links to 
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One science, one party? The Mont Pèlerin Society (1947) 
This image shows Ludwig van Mises with Karl Popper at the opening meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society
in 1947. Friedrich von Hayek was its central maker. The society aimed, in Hayek’s words, at the
“professional secondhand dealers in ideas” (1949: 417), in order to exert a long-term influence via
“journalists, teachers, ministers, lecturers, publicists, radio commentators, writers of fiction, cartoonists, and
artists” (Hayek 1949: 372). The Society fostered the belief in the “competitive market; for without the
diffused power and initiative associated with these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which
freedom may be effectively preserved” (Statement of Aims). Was this the moment when monist scientism
and neoliberal hegemony allied for the first time – the moment when “scientific liberalism” came to earth? 
Considering the list of founding members, one is inclined to reply in the affirmative: Maurice Allais,
Milton Friedman, Georg Stigler, Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup, Walter Eucken. Later economists like Ronald
Coase, Gary Becker, James Buchanan, and Vernon Smith were part of the shrine, too – Austrians, Old and
New Chicago united, and all Nobelists, of course. Other members were government officials, most famously
the makers of the European “social market”, such as Ludwig Ehrhard and Luigi Enaudi. This society can be
called the mother of all think tanks. Today an entire empire of think tanks is associated with this society,
from the London Institute of Economic Affair that has advised Thatcher, down to Atlas, which became the father
of all think tanks (see Plehwe and Walpen 1999, and for a more extensive archival material, Walpen 2004).  
Crucial for the understanding of this intellectual birth of neoliberalism is the experience of WWII. The
group believed itself to be on the good side of mankind because politics as such has failed. The market
appeared as the only viable alternative. In the name of all the deaths before 1945, Hayek took over the “fate
of liberalism”. In the Statement of Aims, we read:  
 
The central values of civilization are in danger. Over large stretches of the earth’s surface the essential
conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared (…). The position of the individual
and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power. Even that most
precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the spread
of creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in the position of a minority, seek only to
establish a position of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all views but their own.  
 
Thus, one science, one party? No. Although there was from the beginning an ally between the anti-political
politics of neoliberalism and the political neutrality of science, Hayek, at least, did not push science. The
Society was neither a party nor an academic corpus. Hayek has always associated scientific authority in
economics with the planning of society. His emphasis on, for example, uncertainty has to be understood as a
critique of scientific determination. Hayek was clear about his ambiguous position between science and
politics: “what is essentially an ideological movement must be met by intellectual argument” (Statement of
Aim). ‘Ideological intellectualism’ meant for Hayek not to rely too much on data, nor on math, but rather on
human nature, cultural evolution, etc. May be the same could be said about Friedman, but certainly not
about Stigler or Becker, or later Presidents of the society. As soon as scientism went hand-in-hand with
neoliberalism, and the association of science and socialism lost its historical ground, the members again relied
fully on academic institutions. This reflects the situation today, in that scientific engineering sneaks into
neoliberal politics: a boom in market liberty combined with an ever-increasing apparatus of state control of
the market. The question is less: “One Science one Party?” But rather: “Which misunderstandings make
science and politics ally with each other?”
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both economic theory (such as public choice theory) and to economic institutions (such as the 
IMF that gives grants to developing countries under the condition of accepting policy advice 
from U.S. think tanks). In think tanks we find a non-inhibited coalition of economic theory 
with hard science on the one hand (using high-powered technologies, operations research, 
mechanism design, etc.) and explicit dedication to partisan values of neoliberalism on the other 
(privatization, reduction of the welfare state, tax cuts, deregulation, auctions for media and 
pollution rights, etc.) Here, for example, is the mission statement of the American Enterprise 
Institute:  
 
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research is a private, nonpartisan, not-for-profit 
institution (…) AEI’s purposes are to defend the principles and improve the institutions of American 
freedom and democratic capitalism – limited government, private enterprise, individual liberty and 
responsibility, vigilant and effective defense and foreign policies, political accountability, and open 
debate. Its work is addressed to government officials and legislators, teachers and students, business 
executives, professionals, journalists, and all citizens interested in a serious understanding of 
government policy, the economy, and important social and political developments (www.aei.org). 
 
Such “serious, non-partisan neoliberalism” – how could it be written on the flags waving in the 
Berkeley-Chicago-Yale community? If economics since the postwar period, but at the latest 
since the 1970s, became associated with a neoliberal ideology, it was mainly the 
accomplishment of such think tanks and the economists they hired. People like John 
Williamson of the Institute for International Economics were those who proclaimed that the 
Washington consensus  
 
embod[ies] the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists, whose implementation 
provides the minimum conditions that will give a developing country the chance to start down the road 
to the sort of prosperity enjoyed by the industrialized countries (quoted in Middleton 1998: 344).  
 
Rather than to “serious economists”, Williamson could better refer to intellectual movements 
such as that of Ayn Rand (1905-1982). She was one of the few who believed that objectivist 
epistemology and market capitalism amounts to just the same “philosophy” (1967). But a 
movement as obscure as that of Any Rand would clearly undermine the scholarly ethos of 
academic economists. Hardly any “serious economist”, I suppose, would subscribe to 
Williamson’s statement without reservations.  
If economics represents the hegemony of economic talk, it was thanks to the work of 
people like Williamson. If there are some who made us believe that the market governs 
politics, that there is a market for law just as a market for health and education, it was the work 
of think tanks. There we enter the dirty world of economic researchers educating, for example, 
television writers, who later drop the subject in daily soaps: “Darling, excuse me, I need to do 
some paperwork for my private pension fund”. I later learned of one of my economic 
instructors doing just that in service to the Initiative New Social Market-Economy that wanted to 
replace the public pension system in Germany. It was replaced, but people still do not hold 
private pension funds.  
Historically speaking, this scary presence of economists has flourished since the 1970s, and 
does not go further back than 1945. The few existing equivalents in the prewar period hardly 
engaged in day-to-day policies, but rather mid-term developments (e.g. the Fabian Society, 1884, 
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Brookings Institute, 1916, see Backhouse 2005: 370). In Keynesean times between the 1930s and 
1950s, economists did not need separate institutions to make their theories politically relevant. 
Economic theory was “soft” enough to lean spontaneously with the institutions of its time.  
Rather than entering the archives, I invite the reader to consider what the very existence of 
“think tanks” tells us about the epistemic culture of economic science. Why is there the need 
for non-academic institutions in order to produce policy advice from roughly the same 
economic theories that in academia lead to nothing but moderation about epistemic claims? 
Should we not expect that the political interpretation of economic theories is a contested 
matter within academia? And why is the role of think tanks so little discussed within academia? 
Is there a division of intellectual labor between doing and utilizing economic theory? Do think 
tanks utilize economic theory in a political discourse, or do they show the hidden political 
interest of economic theory? Does the existence of think tanks reveal the actual destination of 
economic theory that in academia is inhibited for all-too-obvious reasons? Is the status of 
science jeopardized when politics are too openly contested within academia? Which 
understanding of science allows for such a separation? And again the question of Coats: Why is 
it that most think tanks tend to promote pro-market policies? Why is it difficult to imagine 
Marxist think tanks – or, at least, why do I hesitate in calling them “think tanks”? Does the 
existence of think tanks show the secret alliance between scientific monism and neoliberal 
hegemony? 
To be sure, there is no reason to take to the streets because of the ideologies of think 
tanks. It is their job to do politics. But the institutional separation of theory and political 
utilization shows at least this: in order to arrive at a political claim from economic theory, 
another practice is needed that is not or cannot be part of the official ethos of an economic 
scientist. In order to make a career as an economist in one of the Cato-Centre-Institutes, other 
skills are needed. The existence of think tanks shows the ambiguities in the relationship 
between economic theory and the political sphere. From this point of view, it is no longer 
surprising that academic economics to some seems politically irrelevant. So it must in order to 
maintain its academic status. No wonder that “economists’ specialized knowledge is used to 
support already-decided-upon positions, is ignored, or is used in a ‘cover your backside’ role”, 
as Colander complained (1991: 20). It cannot be any other way, for in politics, epistemic 
authority is instrumental for power. It did not take Foucault to tell us that. 
 
 
Why People Employ Economists and Why Others Would Do as Well –  
Occupational Discrimination and Specificity of Skills 
 
At the other end of the spectrum of the profession are graduate economists who got a job 
outside of academia without ever having done academic research. Their economics degrees 
paid off in one of the countless McKenzies, Deutsche Banks, local governments, trade unions 
and commissions, public offices, or, if lucky, in one of the IMF or World Bank offices, or even 
in the Council of Economic Advisors. The certificates of these economists make them appear 
skilled, either for administrative, advisory, bureaucratic, or managerial activities, or for a job as a 
number cruncher in General Accounting Offices. These economists are not the enactors of 
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scientific authority, but they profit from it. They may have received their job because Micro-
Macro is written on their diplomas, but the on-job training they receive provides them with 
most of the skills actually necessary. Their job activities are usually far removed from economic 
theory. If they use economic models, they provide a rather symbolic input in a process that is 
dominated by those who persuade rather than “know” – lawyers.  
What happens when trained economists enter the market and try to sell their expertise? 
What kind of intellectual changes do they undergo? Does their economic training contribute to 
their professional ethos? Barely. The moment of graduation as an economist is for most the 
moment they realize that that university does not provide a professional education. An 
economic degree serves as a signaling device of thinking in economistic terms, not as 
document of approved skills (see e.g. Choi, in Coats 1996: 110). Rather than the skill of 
economic theory (being able to solve the equations and coming up with a narrative about 
them), other interests one acquired elsewhere are decisive in order to succeed in the interview – 
mostly those related to the institutional knowledge of a certain branch. Students are advised to 
forget the curriculum as soon as possible rather than asked to bring new theoretical insights 
into practice. Most students already become aware of that during their studies, oriented toward 
other institutions, doing internships and the like. There is a clear gap between the skills needed 
to pass one’s exams and the skills required to be a successful economist outside academia. 
“Application, communication, and instruction are much more important for success in their 
jobs than for success in graduate school, while the opposite is true for mathematics” (Stock 
and Hansen 2004: 270, see also Coats 1993: 618 ff). 
This insight seems trivial. But for students who enter economics it may not. A quick look 
how the Mission Statements of some average-ranked universities try to recruit students for 
their education suffices to show how the image of economists as professionals is exploited. 
(Harvard-Chicago-Stanford, of course, does not need Mission statements; they list their Nobel 
Prize winners.) According to the mission statement of the University of Georgia, economics 
 
endeavors to prepare the university community and the state for full participation in the global society 
of the twenty first century (…) The department strives to (…) provide students with an excellent 
education in economics as a foundation for general understanding of the world, successful undertaking 
of business endeavors, and advanced studies and research (www.uga.edu).  
 
Going through economics is an important contribution to society, and moreover is well paid, 
the student may believe. Thus, does it pay off? What difference does it make to be a trained 
economist or trained in any other science? In monetary terms, it does pay off, at least if one 
graduates quickly (Siegfried and Stock 2001). “Many of those employed in business and 
industry, however, were not satisfied with their jobs despite receiving significant salary 
premium relative to academics” (Siegfried, Stock 2004: 272, see also 1999). Why? 
The skills economics students acquire are not specific. Whether one has a degree in 
economics, sociology, statistics, or any other discipline in the social or even human sciences 
does not make a great deal of difference.  
 
Even now, when the level of technical sophistication of PhD students from so-called elite graduate 
departments has reached heights that to older professionals seem dizzyingly abstract, there is often still 
no clear occupational discrimination in the non-academic world between (a) those with advanced as 
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well as undergraduate degrees, (b) those with joint or mixed rather than single honours undergraduate 
degrees, and (c) those in higher management or civil service positions with no formal training 
whatsoever in economics (Coats 1993: 399):  
 
No wonder that in recent years some Wall Street firms hire fewer and fewer economists for 
jobs that decades ago were exclusively reserved for economists (Cassidy 1996). “Practitioners at 
the major international and foreign-aid agencies complain that recruiting is much harder than it 
used to be”, the welfare economist Arnold Harberger reported (1993: 3). “Candidates for job 
are less in tune with policy analysis, and less able to answer relatively straightforward questions 
about it, than they were 15 or 20 years ago” (Ibid.). Economists in non-academic institutions 
are not able “to think on their feet” (Ibid.). The officials of the AEA, such as here Hansen, 
admit that “new PhDs are well prepared technically but limited in their ability to function 
effectively as professional economists particularly in the non-academic sector” (quoted in 
Coats 1992: 346). Economists learn professional skills “on job” because their academic 
knowledge does not “suffice as a foundation for claims to expertise in non-academic settings” 
(Coats 1993: 399). Thus, a degree in economics is for most a “similar intellectual requirement 
as the skill of writing beautiful poems among applicants for public servants’ careers in China” 
(Frey 2003*).  
Although there is a distinct education for economists quite different from other social 
sciences, market forces apparently annihilate economists’ specificity. Economists are either 
employed as number crunchers next to statisticians, mathematicians, operations researchers, or 
other engineers, or as piecemeal researchers and advisers next to political scientists, 
sociologists, and lawyers – who dominate most of the actual process of economic and political 
decision making. In both cases it is difficult to see what exactly the comparative advantage of 
an economic training is. If there is income discrimination between economists and other 
graduates, then it is because economists may be less afraid of numbers, or simply expect a 
higher income – since, after all, they more easily accept being one of these-money-kind-of-
people.  
 
*** 
 
In this chapter, I opened the black box of “the economist” and listed some of the institutions 
they rule, they dominate, they sneak into through the back door, and from which they would 
better keep distance. I did not present a unified image of the profession. The utilization of 
epistemic authority is unstable, in that it results in neither a clear scholarly nor a clear 
professional identity of economists. The least I can conclude from the multifaceted image I 
have drawn is that the social inclusion of economic science in economic service is not as trivial 
as ‘economists apply positive theories to economic domains’.  
A common feature I have observed is the separation of the making and the utilization of 
economics. The use of economics seems to exclude the economist. Be it that the proficiency of 
economic theory does not stem from an economic context but from other, mainly formal 
sciences, be it, as in applied economics, that economic theory undermines the perception of a 
distinct domain of application, be it that economics needs separate institutions in think tanks to 
utilize its policy research, be it the strict hierarchical organization of the institutions centred 
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around MIT-Stanford-Chicago – social inclusion does not happen by means of economists 
themselves, but rather by means of others who know how to utilize economics. If economists 
appear like professionals or scholars, then it is not because of something specific to 
economists. The skills necessary for the utilization of economists’ service are largely 
independent of the skills necessary for producing economic theory. Thus, the perhaps most 
important question of this chapter: How, then, can economists take social responsibility for their 
services if their utilization necessarily excludes their participation? Do the institutions of 
economics not stand on one foot?  
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(3) The Pedagogical Ethos 
 
 
 
 
The profession of an economist requires social inclusion in economic services, which was the 
theme of the last chapter. It also requires the social exclusion of others from providing these 
services. This happens by means of education resulting in certificates. Given the not-so-trivial 
case of the service of the profession, the making of an economist becomes interesting. How do 
economists reproduce? Why do young people study economics? And what happens to these 
motives during their study? How are students taught? And why do they graduate? Thus, what 
is it to become an economist?  
Students of economics represent the vast majority of those who encounter economic 
theory – in a quite intimidating way. There are many more students who pass through the 
industry of economic teaching than those who will profit from their Micro-Macro certificates 
in jobs. Around a million U.S. students, as Klamer and Colander estimate, pass undergraduate 
courses in economics each year; 30.000 choose it as their undergraduate major; and around 
1000 PhDs graduate, the majority of whom enter again into the chain of reproduction (1990: 7 
ff.). Given the unclear prospects for becoming a professional, one may ask skeptically about 
their reasons for pursuing careers as economists. 
 
Tireless young economists trying to get into the profession write papers that will not be published or, if 
published, not read, spend money traveling to conferences where they will not be heard and sacrifice 
home and family to do it all (…). Some may ask why, why be an economist when the returns are so 
hard to detect (Klamer 2007: 13). 
 
The critique of becoming economists deserves extra attention – all the more of if comes from 
the students themselves. This happened in 2000 at the Ecole Normale in France. Economics 
students wrote a petition for a teaching reform and triggered a movement that received some 
publicity: the post-autistic economics movement. Listen to the tone they adopted:  
 
Open letter from economic students to professors and others responsible for the teaching of this 
discipline: We economics students of the universities of France, declare ourselves to be generally 
dissatisfied with the teaching that we receive. This is so for the following reasons: (…) we no longer 
want to have this autistic science imposed on us. We do not ask for the impossible, but only that good 
sense may prevail. We hope, therefore, to be heard soon (in Fullbrook 2003: 13).  
 
To such a desperate appeal to ‘good sense’, the community of economists was to some extent 
sensitive. The reason is apparent. As opposed to the layman’s critique, or the critique of those 
complaining that economists paid by Cato support the Liberals, the student touches the 
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existential interest of the economic profession. Without students, no offspring – without 
students, less funding. But since the students are not yet economists, one can easily downplay 
their critique by paying lip service to the demand for reform.  
Students of economics occupy a critical point within the phenomenological coordinates of 
economic science. Since they have to pass from the world-for-everyone to the special world of 
economists, they are the actual critical character of the economists’ world. Students stand amid 
the biographical aging of economists (teachers, too, have once been students), the history of 
economic science (the economics of tomorrow, if at all, will be written by the students of 
today), and the socio-historical environment of economists (the motivation of students to enter 
economics is rooted there). Students stand at the threshold of economics and other economic 
talk which triggered their first interest in economic issues. An actual experience of a period in 
which one’s intellectual life gains shape describes the hermeneutic play of meaning between 
economics and the rest of the world – an experience that swings between excitement and 
disappointment, hope and doubt, effort and evasion. The disciplinary identity of economic 
science correlates here with the intellectual acrobatics the student is asked to perform, and 
which the French students described as the imposition of autism. Because of this critical status 
of students, it is worth devoting this chapter to the teaching of economics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes on Literature 
Since Klamer and Colander’s study (1990) at the latest, academic teaching culture in economics has justly 
become a critical topic of research. In this landmark of skepticism, Klamer and Colander interviewed
graduate students in the triad of Chicago-MIT-Stanford on the self-image they adopt while becoming 
economists. This study caused bigger waves than other similar critiques. The AEA appointed a Commission 
on Graduate Education in Economics (COGEE) that included Arrow, Blanchard, Lucas, Stiglitz and others
who had assessed the need for reform in graduate teaching (Krueger et al. 1991, as a reaction see 
Colander 1998). Colander – only Colander – recently updated the survey to match his new views on the 
empirical turn, allowing for little more optimism (2000, 2005). Ever since this study, teaching is on the
agenda in official commentary. In the orthodoxy, the empirical work of Siegfried and Stock needs to be
mentioned (2001, 2004, 2007); and in the heterodoxy, the vivacious discussions surrounding the post-
autistic movement (Fullbrook 2003: 45-107). One finds more research in the Journal for Economic Education, 
though less politically heated. Yet teaching culture was an active topic since the foundation of the AEA
(Siegfried and Hinshaw 1991, Bowen 1953, Coats 1992). Since the AEA was launched, it has always
concerned itself with teaching standards – be it in high school, undergraduate, or graduate teaching. As
many knew before, teaching the youth is an effective way of building walls around worlds. 
 
Students as the Critical Character between the Layman and the Professional – 
Understanding Generation or Authoritative Indoctrination of Economists 
 
First year students decide on economics and against other sciences for reasons which are to a 
great extent beyond the control of the profession (except the promotional activities of 
economics departments, recruitment days and the like). Part of this motivation is naturally 
some kind of interest in economic affairs, which students know from their previous milieu, 
from public economic discourse, or from their first contacts with professionals. At this time 
students usually do not know whether they want to continue with academia or find a job in 
other public or private institutions.  
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A student’s life can thus be described as the transformation of the interests, motives, and 
values that gave rise to the decision to study economics into those interests, motives and values 
that are necessary either to contribute to economics or to be able to expose oneself to one’s 
fellows as an economist. The question ‘What am I actually up to? – which describes, according 
to Husserl, the act of critique – is unavoidable and omnipresent in this transmission. Students 
are in this sense the actual critical character in the discipline: on the one hand, they have to 
accept the authority of their teachers, since teachers know what they themselves do not know. 
On the other, they also have to make sense of what is presented to them regarding their former 
ideas, expectations, interests, wishes, political and social identity, and so forth. Only so long as 
one is able to perceive some kind of integrity in these motives are students able to personally 
internalize the curriculum and then smoothly pass the point of deciding whether to continue 
with graduate school or go into other institutions. Otherwise, studying is like gradually building 
a conflict that will end in a state in which the student’s past does not translate into a future.  
In accordance with this critical situation, I can think of two stylized modes of becoming an 
economist drawn along the student-teacher relation. The first may be called ‘understanding’, 
the other ‘authoritarian’ – drawing in black and white my experience as a philosophy and 
economics student. An understanding teacher, first, tries to share his or her own interest in 
doing science, and thereby giving the students the chance to develop and articulate their own 
motivations in their own terms within the tradition of the discipline. Learning, hermeneutists 
would describe, amounts here to a continuous renewal of the interest that gave rise to the study 
of economics in light of the present course – a play of pre-understanding and project. The 
position of the teacher in the discipline, his convictions and research interests, are crucial for 
the student’s learning process. Only within a close relation of teaching and research can there 
be a continuous history of economics from generation to generation. The “rules of the game” 
are not given, but are open to change for each new generation. Even if this process occurs by 
means of an “attack” “with ever-increasing violence” against prior conceptions about 
economics, as McCloskey puts it in her early textbook (1982: 3), students learn by being 
confronted with their prior conceptions rather than ignoring them. To become an economist, 
then, is to develop the ability to come up with, elaborate, develop, and defend an economic 
claim of one’s own, and so to hand over the tradition by challenging it in light of present social 
life. Becoming an economist is to become an apprentice, to become well read and learned, and 
thus to become a scholar. Becoming an economist is to grow into economics. Practizing 
economics is in this case the generation of economics. 
Alternatively, the teacher can rely on the students’ ignorance and willingness to accept the 
authority of the teacher. The student is taken to be incapable of relating to the values of 
economic science for being not yet an economist. Becoming an economist, then, is to acquire 
the tools of research and to learn the rules of the game. Studying economics is preliminary to 
research. The acquired knowledge does not allow for making a claim, but for applying tools to 
a field, and for enlarging science. Because tools are general and independent from actual 
economic problems, the teacher’s research is immaterial to the process of learning. Teaching 
and research are separate institutions, like tools are separate from their ends. Furthermore, 
there is a definite “core” of the curriculum, for which there are particular “pre-requisites” to 
meet, to use the words of the COGEE report (Krueger et al. 1991: 1052). The image of 
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science as a ‘body of knowledge’ follows naturally. Practicing economics is then the specialization 
rather than generation of knowledge. The rigidity, and the costs associated with education 
produces a “deep hold” on students’ mind, which keeps them on the reproductive track. 
Studying economics is less to grow into it, but rather to be indoctrinated into economics.  
Hardly contestable, the prevailing treatment of students in western economic departments 
is of the latter kind. It may seem trivial, yet is by far obvious that 
 
based on their pedagogy, economists appear to believe that one studies core subjects to become 
socialized as an economist, then one masters several fields of specialization for teaching purposes, and 
finally one selects a problem in one of these fields in which to become a specialist (Weintraub 2002: 1). 
 
In order to produce this image of economic knowledge, economic teaching culture is fully 
authoritarian – except some U.S. departments that lean their teaching on neighboring 
disciplines or on more heterodox traditions, such as UC Riverside, Notre Dame, and, of 
course, the New School (see for a survey Lee 2004). But the greater part of graduate students 
would still hurrah the following statement made by one of them 20 years ago: 
 
The first year seem to shape the rest of our career as an economist. It is really disturbing. We are 
moving into something but nobody really knows what it is (…) It’s like being brainwashed. You are 
deprived of sleep. You are subjected to extreme stress, bombarded with contradictory notions, and you 
end up accepting anything (Klamer and Colander 1990: 28).  
 
Becoming an economist is to forget what has motivated it. The technical efforts are so all-
consuming that one looses one’s breath. There is simply no more energy for the task of 
internalizing economics. Once one has passed the first obstacles, the costs will have been so 
high that some may become economists in spite of knowing better. 
Let me list some evidence regarding the ruptures between higher education, graduate 
teaching, and professional life. When entering higher education, in the so-called “science of 
choice”, as it is called on the Harvard homepage, there is usually not much choice. The first 
thing a student notices is a highly standardized curriculum. Courses are obligatory, topics are 
assigned, lectures are fully structured, and course objectives so narrowly defined that 
undergraduate teaching simply waits to be automatized (Sheflin 2008, Noble 2002). In the 
“pre-requisite courses” of mathematics and econometrics, students hardly find a material link 
to their discipline. Introductory economics courses leave no doubt that there is an 
uncompromising, analytic core: market theory, which is as free from its contextual meaning in a 
capitalist society as Euclidean truths are independent of the Greek state (are they?). This core 
relates in one way or another to the question of price determination, entails the principles of 
rationality and equilibrium, and produces the theoretical conception of “the economy”.  
Given the difficulty of finding one’s personal access, it is hardly surprising that the general 
appearance of economics students on campus is marked by negligence and reluctance, which 
the COGEE report stated as a “a lack of creativity on the part of students” (Krueger et al. 
1991: 1037). Regarding the relation of teaching to the initial motivation of the students, 
Amariglio and Ruccio doubt that there are “many economics instructors (…) even interested 
in asking their students what theories they invoke to understand or explain the economic 
dimensions of the society in which they live?” (2004: 260). They speak of learning economics 
122 
____________________________________
                    Part 1: Discourse 
______________________
 
______________________
137
as a “process of unlearning” (Ibid.), that is to say, forgetting the language in which one 
formerly articulated one’s interest in economic issues. Asked what determines success in 
academia, as was one of the most quoted results of Klamer and Colander’s study, there was 
almost unanimity that knowledge about “the economy” – that is, what students had in mind 
when first showing an interest in economics – is irrelevant: 85% in the first graduate year, 99% 
in the third year (1990: 20).  
When moving into graduate programs, there is another gap to be bridged. Those students 
who graduate with a major in economics are more likely to do their PhDs in other than an 
economics department (Coats 1992: 344). Many graduate students thus have a weak 
background in undergraduate economics, though not to their disadvantage (Stock and Siegfried 
2004, 2007). Graduate students in the all-but-dissertation stage, those who are supposed to leap 
the last hurdle from acquiring to applying tools, are more troubled with finding a research topic 
than financing their studies (Colander 2005: 177). And, although they passed technically high-
powered courses, in their theses they end up not using more mathematics than they knew at 
the beginning of graduate school (Coats 1992: 347). As one of the graduate students told 
Colander: “The first two years were miserable [the Mas-Colell years, T.D.]. Now it is kind of 
fun and exciting, but I’m not sure the pain was worth it” (Colander 2005: 179).  
Passing on to teaching and research, there is hardly any overlap. Teaching is institutionally 
separate from research, so that teaching is perceived as a loss of time instead of complement to 
research. This leads to the peculiar situation in economics that the standard body of economic 
theory being taught does not overlap with the way theories are used in actual research 
(Colander 2005). Graduating students, both those who leave the university as well as the ones 
who continue their research, face a strong discontinuity in their intellectual lives. Students 
applying for jobs outside the academy, as already hinted at above, rather signal the ability to 
acquire knowledge within a particular time frame – knowledge they should nevertheless forget 
as soon as possible. Inside academia, rather than being trained for a job as an economist, 
academic careers are favored over non-academic careers. In Klamer and Colander’s survey, 
53% of graduate students were planning to pursue an academic career, 33% were planning to 
go into policy-related work, 17% into business, 8% into research institutions, and 2% into 
journalism. Siegfried and Stock confirmed roughly the same numbers for 2002 (2004: 275). 
The hierarchy is also guarded symbolically. “I mentioned to one of my advisors last year that I 
might be interested in policy research, which I really am interested in, and she was definitely 
dismissive” (Colander 2002: 179). 
If the training of an economist does not really make one qualified for a job either outside 
or, to some extent, inside of academia, then what makes an economist? Is the informal 
character training more decisive for one’s career than the formal skills? I leave associations 
regarding what kind of people economic students are to the reader: Do you need to be one of 
these-money-kind-of-people? Particularly power-sensitive? Technocrat or liberal? Boring like 
bookkeepers? At the university where I write this thesis, not a day passes without the 
promotional activities of one of the McKenzies trying to recruit students, brimming with anti-
academic rhetoric such as: “Success is a choice” – rather than a result of education or skill; ‘Do 
you know the difference between theory and practice?’, ‘Do you have the entrepreneurial spirit 
in your blood?’, etc. The sooner you choose, the better.  
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If I believe Borg and Shapiro’s empirical study (1996), economics students are indeed a 
particular kind of people (see Frank et al. 1996 for more on the moral education of 
economists). Borg and Shapiro conducted a study on students’ personality types, according to a 
certain Myers-Briggs-Type-Indicator as to their performance in an undergraduate macro 
course. Being of the ISTJ-type had a significantly positive effect on earning a good grade. 
These kind of persons are Introverted – interested more in concepts and ideas than in 
impressions. They Sense immediate reality and practical facts rather than the meanings of 
relationships and possibilities – the friends of reality. They Think in an impersonal way rather 
than weighing values – recall that “everyday economics” is rather personal. And they are 
Judicious in that they plan rather than doing things spontaneously. Thus, ISTJ-kind-of-people 
somewhat resemble the people who meet the axioms of rational choice – not because they are 
self-interested and greedy, but because they invest most of their meaning-labor into 
maintaining a neat line between matters of fact and matters of reason. Is becoming an 
economist to become (or, anyway, to already be) like these-kind-of-people?  
Whatever kind of people, important here is the discontinuity between both the student’s 
motivations for studying economics and his actual experience of going through the curriculum 
– and between studying and then either claiming to be an economist outside academia or doing 
research inside academia. Students live in two worlds: one described by the development of 
their interests and motives, the other described by the acquisition of the skills needed to pass 
exams. To put it more severely, learning to succeed in the exams without taking them seriously 
is the hallmark of the becoming economist. From first year courses until the graduate stage, 
those do well who are most willing to forget what they were initially up to. If those students 
who do not take their study seriously do better, what else than cynicism is induced by the 
teaching of economics? In response to the question of what he most disliked about graduate 
school, one student stated: “Being made more cynical than most would think possible. It is like 
seeing the inside of a sausage factory.” (Colander 2005: 44) 
There is a decisive building block of such teaching culture: textbooks. Rather than classical 
treatises or contemporary research, textbooks are by and large the only texts students need to 
read. How comparatively big is the business of textbooks, one can imagine, when considering 
that Samuelson’s Economics, like any other intermediate textbook today, exceeded in only one 
year the entire lifetime sales of Keynes’s General Theory (Lamm 1989: 104). From university to 
university in the western academic world, textbooks do not differ much. All economics 
students around the globe go through the same Varian-Kreps-Mankiw courses, and face 
ultimately the last line between studying and research: Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995. 
Again, I should mention the exceptions. Already in the 1970s, there had been attempts to write 
alternative textbooks, such as the Anti-Samuelson of Linder and Sensat (1977), updated recently 
as Stanford’s Economics for Everyone (2008). Less biased to the left, but likewise with a pluralistic 
approach to economics, is the recently published Economic Conversation of Klamer, McCloskey, 
and Ziliak (2009). 
Textbooks are a crucial means to the production of a core of economics, because 
textbooks as such do not reveal the position they represent in the profession. In this sense, 
Colander could state that the practices of teaching “play a larger role in determining 
economists’ methodology and approach than all the myriad papers written about 
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methodology” (Colander 2005: 175). Remember what Thomas Kuhn once said about the role 
of textbooks (1970 [1962]: 136 ff). Kuhn argued that textbooks normalize science in that they 
make scientific revolutions “invisible”. They neutralize the different pasts, different paradigms, 
and different questions that motivated science within one well-ordered, ahistorical body of 
knowledge. Textbooks recondition science in such a way that the contested contexts from 
which research initially stems is reformulated, or better: substituted as the uncontested core of a 
discipline. Textbooks 
 
need to be rewritten in the aftermath of each scientific revolution, and once rewritten, they inevitably 
disguise not only the role but the very existence of the revolutions that produced them. (...) Textbooks 
thus begin by truncating the scientist’s sense of his discipline’s history (Ibid.: 137).  
 
Because scientists socialize in their discipline by means of textbooks, Kuhn developed a strong 
skepticism about the beliefs scientists hold about their disciplines, and, for that matter, about 
the philosophers of science who comment on science as though it had been inscribed once 
and for all in the textbook of Truth. 
Samuelson has received the Nobel Prize precisely for that. He has “simply rewritten 
considerable parts of economic theory” (Nobleprize.org). His textbook, Economics (Samuelson 
1948) meant the breakthrough of the authoritarian teaching culture. It appears now in its 18th 
edition. It set the standard for generations of following textbooks. Only a little historical 
knowledge suffices to see that he did not merely “rewrite” “the same” “in a different style”, but 
that he fostered a different image of economic science that is informed by the formalist 
revolution of the 1950s. Samuelson made neoclassicism Keynesian, and vice versa – which was 
inconceivable in the 1930s. In 1998, Samuelson had a second look at the book:  
 
With the objectivity that 50 years of perspective brings, I examined it minutely. To my surprise, it read 
much better than I could ever have suspected. No wonder it was an instant bestseller, which set a new 
pattern for all the late 20th-century economic textbooks. For, as I had almost forgotten, it was not 
merely the first text to bring effectively to beginners macroeconomic modeling along Keynesian and 
post-Keynesian lines. It was that (1998: 352). 
 
Samuelson’s textbook wiped out effectively the difference between Keynes’s economics and 
the neoclassical tradition with the help of formal sophistication. Textbook economics since 
1948 is constituted by the continuous deprivation of the historical environment out of which 
research evolves. In today’s textbooks, there is nothing left that could remind to any 
environment of research, which is certainly true for the textbook admired and even mystified 
by my economic instructors, Mas-Colell et al. 1995 (see next page). 
 
 
How I Did not Become an Economist – the Beauty of Perplexity,  
the Skill of Question Begging, and the Interpretive Indifference of Economics 
 
Let me recall some moments from my days as an economics student (1998-2003), for I 
conceive of them as typical experiences that give rise to the complaints like those of the French 
students. Moreover, to depict those days reveals my “preconceptions” of economic theory. I 
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Mas-Colell, Whinston, 
Green 1995. Microeconomic 
Theory. London: Routledge
This 1000 pages textbook is presented to 
students as the ultimate hallmark between 
studying and research, which happened to me 
in the first lesson as an undergraduate. It is 
commonly used as the standard reference in 
graduate teaching. Studying the book is like 
chasing a carrot on a stick bound on one’s 
back. The book is always a step ahead, and 
each step one takes, complicates the next step 
to be taken. Such exercise is very effective in 
producing the impression of an 
insurmountable core. Although I belonged to 
the first generation of students who had to 
study this book, I never even considered if 
there ever has been another generation that has 
not studied precisely the same. Informative for 
those who are not familiar with economics, and 
in reminiscence of the days others went 
through that book, I re-printed the full table of 
content. 
What appears like the eternal core of 
economics, is the result of a row of historical 
truncations. The misunderstanding began more 
than 50 years ago with a publication of a 
textbook in mathematics that was decidedly 
aversive to all applications in science, the 
Elements of Mathematics of Nicolas Bourbaki. 
Although without this book Mas-Colell could 
not have been written, there is hardly any 
economist who ever heard of that name 
“Bourbaki”, let alone read it – apart from 
Gerard Debreu. Because of Bourbaki and 
Debreu Mas-Colell is full of , Definitions, Xx∈
Axioms, Theorems, Propositions, Lemmas – in that 
order –, the last of which students are allowed 
to derive in their problem sets.  
At the core of the book is certainly General 
Equilibrium Theory (GET). Its position is 
peculiar. It comes after Game Theory that is 
presented like a special case of GET, as well as 
after Market Failure that applies only to Partial 
Equilibrium. Moral hazard, incomplete 
information etc. do thus not show the 
shortcomings of GET. This order would 
suggest that most of the research done today 
takes place on an analytically lower level than  
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Mas-Colell’s GET. The reversed positioning of 
GET is only conceivable if one considers the 
history of mathematical economics all the way 
down to the different conceptions of 
mathematics of Debreu and von Neumann. This 
I am going to do in the third part. 
Here the first lines of the textbook that 
already covers great parts of the history that led 
to it.  
 
A distinctive feature of microeconomic 
theory is that it aims to model economic 
activity as an interaction of individual 
economic agents pursuing their private 
interest. It is therefore appropriate that we 
begin our study of microeconomic theory 
with an analysis of individual decision-
making (3). 
 
If there is a credo of post-war economic 
science, this is it: microfoundation. As harmless 
such a statement sounds, its degree of implicity 
is astonishing. Is the student committed to a 
sort of individualism when he understands the 
use of the word “appropriate”? In which sense 
does the study of “interaction” presuppose the 
study of individuals? Why “private” and not 
“self-interested”? The student has no time to 
sinuate about these questions. After having 
gone through the following 1000 pages, the 
student may be inclined to believe that such 
study must be the last expression of the 
tradition of invisible hand theorizing – if only 
there is not another page or problem set!  
The first and last message of the textbook is 
thus that everything what substantially can be 
said about economics is a matter of the 
modelling of the individual. Between “social 
order” and the analysis of decision-making are a 
bunch of theorems and lemmas, but no 
economics. Indeed, with unanimity (9 of 10) 
students, interviewed by Colander believe that 
the rationality assumption is crucial in 
economics (2005: 35). Rationality is the 
assumption which indeed most post-war 
economics jumps on – and all critique stumbles 
over. Is the only problem that economists are 
poor anthropologists? 
It took me a while to understand that the 
order of analysis goes the other way around. 
The question of economic theory is not: Which 
social order follows if we assume that 
 
____________________________________
                  Pedagogical Ethos (3) 
_______________________
                                                       127 
________________________
142
  
 
individuals behave like this or that, but: What 
do we need to say about individuals in order to 
speak about a social order at all? The less the 
better. Not that economists are poor 
anthropologists, but that they are not 
anthropologists at all. This is what Mas-Colell 
et al. prove page by page. 
Today I also know that it was a very 
particular teacher who gave us undergraduates 
this book to read. I remember him saying that 
studying this book later will be an advantage 
for a career in the U.S. The authority of the 
book was reinforced by the fact that my 
teacher did never loose a word about his own 
involvement in the research that Mas-Colell 
represents. Only later during my historical 
work, I run again into his name. I learned that 
he himself even published together with the 
economist who brought the Elements of 
Mathematics to economics: Gerard Debreu. It 
was Egbert Dierker, a friend of Debreu. He did 
never give us students the slightest hint that 
could make us ask whether he represents a 
particular tradition. Mas-Colell et al. was
economics for me. A lot had to happen that 
the contingency of my education could become 
clear.  
Nevertheless, such is not only a personal 
episode that shows nothing but that I have an 
axe to grind with economic theory. I deem it to 
be the very principle of the constitution of 
economics since the formalist revolution: The 
problem of economics since 1945 is not that it 
is too formal, but that because of its formality 
those who originated it do not appear – even if 
they themselves speak up!  
What we need in economics teaching is 
thus not more emphasis on the application of 
theory, or textbooks that are able to put the 
same theory in more intuitive narratives. Such 
only reinforces the blindness that constituted 
the power of Mas-Colell “mainstream”. What 
economics needs is a teaching based on the 
history of economics, and the reading of 
economic literature. Then the size of the empty 
hole of economics since 1945, of which Mas-
Colell is an expression, can appear in its full 
light. 
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will go through three moments of my studies – one at the beginning, one in the middle, and 
one at the end.  
The task of the first lesson in microeconomics introduced firmly the style of teaching: 
Assume that  is complete and transitive. Proof that  is reflexive, f  is not reflexive, ~ is 
reflexive, transitive and symmetric. This is exercise 1.01 of Mas-Colell et al. Since it was 
mentioned that f  means “better than”, the task was roughly to prove the following: if 
something is either better or worse than, or about the same as all the other things, and this is 
the case in a specifically consistent way, then something is always at least as good as itself, is 
never better than itself, and always as good as itself. Puzzling, not because such a task seems 
odd, but because I did not know how to make the proof. For the answer – proved by means of 
intuition – I received no credit. I was not told about the status of intuition in economics – in 
particular not about the values of a certain school in mathematics in France in the 1930s, which 
conceived of mathematical proofs as the “music of reason”. But even my perplexity had its 
beauty.  
At the heart of the course in microeconomics is certainly the proof of the existence of a 
general equilibrium, which graduate students have to learn year after year “as if a rite of 
passage” (Weintraub 2002: 183). For most students, even those who turn out to be academic 
economists, this proof is probably the most mathematically abstract piece they encounter in 
their careers. It is an indirect proof using a topological fixed-point argument that comes with 
the name of a certain Kakutani. Nevertheless – or just because it is a piece of math one never 
encounters again – it sets the standard of research. The message of the proof as presented in 
class is roughly that market equilibrium is “consistent” – whatever that means – as long as 
preferences and technology behave in accordance with specific conditions that are put in 
mathematical terms. To be precise, commodities need to be i) finite, ii) convex, iii) with a lower 
bound, preferences j) continuous, jj) strictly monotonously increasing, jjj) strictly quasi concave, 
and technology k) strictly convex. Therefore, only the preference relations are interesting in 
market theory, I thought.  
Microfoundations are indeed a great topic of research that seemingly have some 
philosophical bearings. The rhetoric of that research, which most students learn early on, is 
taken from everyday philosophy of science. One wonders about “anomalies” in that the 
“assumptions” made about the “individual” do not fit “reality”. Libraries are filled with 
discussions of such “anomalies”, with which one could map great parts of the entire current 
discipline. Let me mention only one anomaly of “context dependency,” that the young 
Amartya Sen discussed in the 1970s before becoming famous for his work on developmental 
economics (1973). We may reject the last piece of cake at dinner with our beloved, though we 
prefer the same piece when it comes along in the supermarket. No consistent preference can 
be inferred by those two actions. The unscholarly answer is to claim that the example is 
misplaced because the dinner is not a consumption phenomenon, but a love-scene. This would 
be a bad move, because we would accept the slippery ground of counter-examples. There may 
be a commodity we choose consistently in love and supermarket situations. Reasoning by 
examples is not what satisfies the intellectual wants of economists. The proper answer, instead, 
is to point to the definition of the problem, which leads to a “reformulation” of the 
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“commodity space” – that is, keeping the structure straight and adapting the interpretation – the 
cake, in one case, is not the same thing as in the other. Problem “solved”.  
All students who understood what “U” for utility does not mean are able to give such an 
answer after the first year – however, with the murky feeling that “U” turns out to be an 
“elaborate pun”, to use Sen’s words (1973: 243). After such a lesson, the upcoming economist 
learns perfectly how to do question begging. Economic theory, as students know better than 
most philosophers of science, does not follow the logic of examples, of the general and 
particular, of the theory and its domain of applicability. Instead, it follows the logic of structure 
and interpretation.  
At the end of my studies, the same lesson was affirmed once more. It made me believe 
that not only the teaching culture, but also economic research, amounts to a great extent to 
nothing but elegant question begging. My task was to write an essay on recent research in 
“bounded rationality”, which is one of the official replies to the problem of “anomalies”. The 
paper I had to write on, published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, started with an entire 
opposite intuition of decision-making, in contrast to the received expected utility theory (Gilboa 
and Schmeidler 1995 – the authors being longtime friends with Mas-Colell). The theory tries to 
cope with the blatantly implausible assumption of expected utility theory: that people are able 
to consider the probabilities and weigh the values of all possible future states of the world. Not 
forward-looking rationality – “expectations” – but backward-looking rationality – “memory” – 
serves as the intuitive ground of their so-called Case-based Decision Theory. People do not 
anticipate the future, but recall whether there was a similar case in the past and act in 
accordance with what they remember – a difference that indeed makes the world for some 
evolutionary and institutional economists. In a reply to this theory, a sophisticated 
mathematician, Matsui (2000), designs a transformation algorithm that makes both theories 
analytically equivalent. All results can be generated by the opposed theory simply by 
reinterpretation. The sophisticated mathematician concludes that the difference lies rather in the 
“descriptive theory” that underlies the intuition of backward- and forward-looking rationality. 
Where could such a theory come from? And what kinds of standards are entailed in order for it 
to count as an economic theory?  
Intuition and the skill of reinterpretation from one context to another seem to be a 
second, but also secondary source of economic theorizing. It is not part of the training of an 
economist. Instead, the message put across at the end of my studies was that even in the case 
of basic differences regarding intuitions of how people behave, there always could be a 
sophisticated mathematician who wipes out such differences. All kinds of behavior can be 
made consistent with a general equilibrium in markets simply by reinterpretation. “So the 
results keep flip-flopping, endlessly, pointlessly,” as McCloskey commented (2002: 45). And it 
is precisely this that makes the ethos of the economist problematic: the interpretive indifference of 
their theories. Economists are beyond the common rules of the hermeneutic play of meaning.  
With this indifference, the threats I followed in this part slowly come to merge. It is not 
the case that economic science is a particular, more founded, more objective way of thinking 
about economic life, but that it is a practice that is particularly indifferent to meaning. The 
interpretive indifference is not only a problem of how economists explain. It determines the 
attitude of economists to their discursive environment – their ethos. It determines their 
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relationship with their students, in that their study appears to be analytic, rigid, free of history, 
and beyond non-scientific discourses; it determines their relationship with those who believe 
economists to be professionals in that their theories appear to be beyond political bias; and it 
determines their relationship with the general public, in that economists cannot address the 
concerns of you-and-me-and-our-fellows because of the anonymity of their talk.  
It was probably experiences similar to those I have just described that gave rise to the 
French students’ petition. The reasons they listed for being dissatisfied resemble common 
points of postwar critique of economic science. All reasons, I venture, relate to the interpretive 
indifference of economic theory: the students wanted to “escape from imaginary worlds”, and 
thus come closer to reality – truly empirical work in institutional and historical contexts. They 
were “opposed to uncontrolled use of mathematics”, and thus against model building as an 
“end in itself” that “leads to a true schizophrenia in relation to the real world”. They were “for 
a pluralism of approaches”, and thus more teaching oriented at schools of thought, against the 
“dogmatism” of one sort of economics, and against the “pretence of being scientific”. They 
wanted the teachers “to wake up before it is too late”, in spite of the “academic constraints” of 
the profession. The French petition was a call for economists to be self-responsible subjects of their 
theories and to stand for their profession – thus against “autism” (Fullbrook 2003. 13f.). 
On the level of theory, all critical points in the petition are all too well known. The petition 
covers the full list of standard (not entirely consistent) objections against economics: 
economics makes unrealistic assumptions, disregards distributional and environmental issues, 
plays down conflict and class, disregards intrinsic values, is useless for politics and the people 
facing real-life problems, is trivial, tautological, unfalsifiable, too scientistic, spuriously 
authoritative, biased, imperialist, hegemonizing, reductionist, and, last, and perhaps the most 
valid yet subtle objection: too economistic. Although economists are all too familiar with such 
(contradictory) voices, not much has changed in the last, say, four decades. Already in 1971, 
Leontief, who acknowledged this criticism and also contributed to it, spoke in an ironic tone 
about the policies that try to respond to such critiques.  
 
Much of current academic teaching and research has been criticized for its lack of relevance (…). In a 
nearly instant response to this criticism research projects, seminars, and undergraduate courses have 
been set up on poverty, on city and small town slums, on pure water and fresh air. In an almost 
Pavlovian reflex whenever a new complaint is raised, President Nixon appoints a commission and the 
university announces a new course (Leontief 1971: 1). 
 
The same as in the 1970s happened in 1991 after Colander’s and Klamer’s survey. The 
COGEE commission appointed by the AEA, on the one hand, acknowledged the 
“considerable scope of improvement in ensuring that student’s knowledge of economic 
problems and institutions enable them to use their tools and techniques on important 
problems” (Krueger et al. 1991). On the other, they concluded that merely a greater emphasis 
on applications is necessary, though the principle structure of teaching can be maintained 
without a “complete overhaul of graduate education” (Ibid.: 1052). Similar reactions the 
French Petition earned. Although the report of Fitoussi for the French Minister of Education 
acknowledged the need of reform, other eminent economists, lead by MIT Olivier Blanchard, 
even wrote a counter-petition (Fullbrook 2003: 4 ff.)  
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This raises doubts about the very sensibility of economists towards critique. In this part, I 
gave several hints that this sensibility depends on the sensibility of economists to the 
utilizations, perceptions, and interpretations of their theories by their discursive environment. 
Only if the practice of economists is in some sense or another informed by their discursive 
environment, critique can find entrance in the discipline. Critique can have an effect only if 
economists are responsive to their audience – be it their indirect audience in public, their direct 
audience that pays, or their intimate audience that will replace them. However, the meaning of 
economic theory, I argued in various ways, is not constitutive for the ethos of an economic 
scientist. To the contrary, the meaning indifference grants economists social identity: be it the 
anonymity of their object in that it differs from the rest of economic talk, be it the unspecificity 
of the public service they provide, be it the authoritarian mode of teaching. The problem is not 
which economic theory economists pursue. The problem is rather that their theories do not 
commit them to a particular ethos.  
This locus of critique, beyond the usual lament about economic theories, is reflected in the 
French Petition. What the students saw at risk in their education is their intellectual 
responsivity: “Most of us have chosen to study economics so as to acquire a deep understanding of 
the economic phenomena with which the citizens of today are confronted.” (Ibid.: 13, e.a.) Economic 
science, the students repeated the common complaint that I imitated in this part, is not 
concerned with the experiences of the people who conduct an economic life. It is therefore 
insignificant. But the French students did not speak about this illusive thing, economic theory. 
They spoke about themselves. Their petition expressed that they are not able seeing their 
interest in economics addressed in the theories they are taught. This is the main point of their 
political slogan “autism”: there is no context through which they could understand themselves 
in their engagement into economic science. And this I regard symptomatic for economic 
science as such: the students cannot make sense of themselves studying and at the same time 
being interested in economics. Economic theory does not allow reflecting on the motives that 
give rise to it, with which I arrived at a first formulation of the main argument of The 
Phenomenology of Economics.  
 
*** 
 
I began this part with the notion that economics is a particular practice as any other human 
practice. I supposed economists’ special world could be described from the point of you-and-
me-and-our-fellows as to determine their place in the world-for-everyone. In this fashion, I 
asked for the discursive ethos of the economic scientist. 
What then is the economists’ ethos? What makes them a discursively identifiable 
character? What makes them interesting listening and worth paying? Do economists inform 
the public about the reality it faces day by day? Does the economist provide a particular good 
that can be shared with others? Is it to give professional political advice based on economic 
theory? Are their theories utilizable for some practitioners to glimpse through the economic 
aspects of their work? Do economists provide a platform for those young fellows who show a 
special interest in economic talk in order to develop intellectually their understanding of ‘the 
economic phenomena with which the citizens of today are confronted’? More generally asked, 
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do economists help us orienting ourselves intellectually in economic life? Do they help us in 
the challenges we face in the now already fourth or fifth century of capitalism? In which sense 
are economists relevant?  
The preceding chapters suggested that economists are largely evasive of such questions. It 
is impossible to present a clear-cut pragmatic analysis of the discursive place of economists in 
economic talk. Their practice cannot be judged on pragmatic grounds. Economists do not 
provide a sharp and distinct contribution like cobblers, medical doctors or lawyers or any other 
profession. Economists’ epistemic authority depends on the anonymity of their “object”, the 
indirectness of their impact, and the indifference to the utilizations of their theories. Concerning 
their public ethos, economists’ authority requires to evoke an image of complexity that in turn 
requires abstaining from the interest of the public. If economists enter into seemingly 
pragmatic relationships with their discursive environment, it is not clear by virtue of which 
feature. Their contribution may not be specific to economists (like in the job market), may be 
due to the image that has been created around economics that corresponds hardly with their 
practice (social technocrats), it may be due to mere authority suppressing the rest of economic 
talk (as in economic theory, and in teaching), or it may be due to political leanings that would 
undermine academic institutions if too openly defended (as the case of think tanks shows). 
This analysis could lead me to conclude: what grants the economist an identifiable character in 
the world-for-everyone do not stem from scientific practices of economists. Did I perhaps 
even suggest that all discursive effects of economists even threaten the ethos of the economic 
scientist? Is the only way to gain discursive identity as an economist to be “irrelevant”?  
Nevertheless, as soon as economists’ authority does play out, it tends to support a 
particular politics. Since a couple of decades, this seems to be neoliberal politics. How this 
influence happens is difficult to trace. Between the claim to scientific authority and its political 
effects, there is like an invisible hand that leads non-partisan science into partisan economic 
talk. Economists toggle between political irrelevance and political bias. This toggling explains 
that both images of the social character of economists can prevail: useless for being two-
handed, and not credible for being “hired guns”. Economists’ ethos is torn between 
professionalism and scholarship, between social technocrat and market ideologue, between 
preacher and educator, between savant and priesthood sworn. Being (politically) relevant and 
(politically) biased are two sides of the same knife that cuts the line between economic science 
and the rest of economic talk.  
Therefore, seen in light of the world everyone has the right to claim intelligibility of, the 
practices of economists cannot be trivially determined. This is the source of frustration of many 
commentators of economics since more than a couple of decades, be it outside of academia in 
the bad press economics earns, or inside academia regarding the skepticism between Colander 
and the French students. If there is common sense about the identity of economists, it is not 
without a good portion of these skeptical images.  
In terms of my guiding notion of the life-world, the problem is that economists stand 
outside the hermeneutic play of meaning that moves the rest of economic talk. It is not that 
economists inhabit their own special world, but they do not seem to live in any world 
whatsoever. For there is nothing that leads from the practical and moral interest of economic 
talk to the theoretical interest in economic science. Nothing leads from the word-for-everyone 
 
____________________________________
                  Pedagogical Ethos (3) 
_______________________
                                                       133 
________________________
148
to the special world of economists. Economic science represents a rupture of the life world 
that no play of meaning could bridge. If economists’ claims are nevertheless drawn into that 
play, it happens not by virtue of the economist. They enter the play of meaning only via effects 
for which they cannot take responsibility. In other words, the contribution of economic 
science to economic talk cannot be more than the misunderstandings they cause.  
There is no reason, I announced in the introduction, to continue complaining about this 
lack of discursive integrity. I have promised to go beyond the genre of lamenting. In order to 
become critical in a truly phenomenological sense, I need to take a further step and give up the 
naivety of determining the actual ethos of economists. The critical question is rather: What 
could possibly be the ethos of an economic scientist? And this means first of all to ask: Has 
there ever been an integer ethos of economists? The question that needs to follow the 
lamenting tone of this part is thus: How did it come that way?  
The image I presented in this part, I emphasized numerous times, applies to economics 
since roughly the 1970s. Since the 1970s economists and their institutions gained the shape as 
described in the preceding chapters. Since then, the critique of economics from the inside says 
that economics is politically irrelevant and does not relate sufficiently to real life problems, 
while, paradoxically, the critique from the outside says that economics fosters a particular 
neoliberal discourse. In order to assess both critiques, I need to adopt a different perspective. 
Rather than seeing economics in light of its discursive environment, I need to see it historically 
in light of the social history of European ideas. How did economists themselves gain a tradition 
through which they were able to perceive themselves as economists in the first place? How did 
it happen that at one point of history people began to think about economic affairs in a 
scientific way? How could this tradition become so powerful and at the same time so 
powerless as described in this part?  
The further task is not to continue lamenting the crisis of economics. Instead, I need to 
understand the genesis of this crisis, that is to say, its necessitating forces. Only then its scope 
becomes intelligible. Precisely this was Husserl’s motivation for a historical reflection:  
 
What we must do, however, in connection with our problem of the crisis, is to show how it happens 
that the ‘modern age’, which has been so proud for centuries of its theoretical and practical successes, 
finally becomes involved in a growing dissatisfaction, indeed must view its situation as one of distress 
(Hua VI: 342, E.: 294). 
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An oikonomia (here, a manor) as imagined by Franziskus Phillipus Florinus in 1702,  
in his work The prudent and righteous house-father: advices, teachings, and other considerations, Nürnberg.  
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“The economy” (here, a private ownership economy) as defined by Gerard Debreu in 1959,  
in his work The Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium, Chicago 
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Economic science is there, firmly rooted in Western universities with considerable, and 
nontrivial influence on society at large. In light of such intrusiveness, is it not too far-fetched to 
envision a post-epistemic culture of economic talk that is free from those claiming scientific 
authority? If we stretch our historical minds, as I invite the reader to do in this part, and take 
economic science as a practice that is situated in a historical line of, say, Xenophon-Smith-
Hayek, it appears, if not contingent, then at least historically late and peculiar, as Husserl said 
about science in general: “For the human being in his surrounding world there are many types 
of praxis, and among them is this peculiar and historically late one, theoretical praxis” (Hua. 
VI: 113, E. 111).  
The reality of economic science is historical. Economic science happened. It happened to 
be a case of modernity. This occurrence I sketch with a large brush, outlining a social history of the 
scientification of economic writings. In order to understand economic science phenomenologically, 
we need to get an idea of the historical finitude of economic science: its concreteness, its 
richness, but also its contingency, and thus fragility. What, I ask in this part, is the historical 
horizon from which and in which the practices of economic science took root?  
To answer this question, I need to adapt the notion of the life-world. It no longer refers to 
a priority of the world-for-everyone through which the special world of science is articulated. 
The priority of the life-world refers no longer to a primordial order of meaning within which 
economics “makes sense”. Rather than an order of meaning, life-world refers to the genesis of 
meaning. In order to become critical and ask how economics possibly could be meaningful, I 
need to consider its history of sense. The history of sense, as opposed to the history of facts, is the 
history of economics insofar as it is its own. It is critical in this sense that matter is not a given 
order of meaning into which economics should integrate, but rather insofar as it concerns 
itself. Historical criticism is intimidating, since the basic phenomenon of history, according to 
Husserl, is “humanity struggling to understand itself” (Hua. VI: 12, E: 14). 
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Scientific practices have historical provenance. Only there do they find their own task rather 
than the task given by the present order of the world. The life-world in this part does not refer 
to a world one “has” as a given stock of meaning, but the world that is handed down as a 
historical task. The basic questions of the history of sense of economics, adapted from Husserl, 
are thus the following: How did economics come into being? What was it supposed to be? 
How has it given itself its tasks? And how have these tasks been handed over? How did it get 
where it is today? What brought it to its eminence? How did economics gain a history?  
This history – how could it be else? – takes the form of a narrative. It begins, happens, and 
is open to an end. First, the scene: Why is it that in European economic writings there were 
not always people who claimed scientific authority? Thus, what is the pre-history of economics? 
Second, what gave occasion to, what was the need for, and what kind of contests accompanied 
the initiating scientification of economic writings? Thus, what was its Urstiftung (institution)? 
Third, in which way did this instituting motive inform its further development? How did one 
act upon this initial motive? What is it to “hold in grasp” the past of economics? How did its 
instituting motive develop over the course of its historical modification? How did economic 
science grow up and grow old? What kind of “sense-modifications” has it experienced? Thus, 
how could it settle as a tradition? Third, how about today, and what could we expect from the 
future of economic science? If there once was a rising need, could there perhaps also be a 
decline in need for scientific authority? In what sense is economic science historically finite?  
How far, then, is it necessary to stretch our historical minds? Certainly further than Adam 
Smith, but, I propose, not as far as pre-European cultures. Economic science is a case of 
modern history. Political economy, under the name of which economics came to be known in 
late 18th-century England, emerged in an atmosphere beyond the point of return to the cyclic 
comforts of premodern times. It emerged at a time when European man was pulled “ahead of 
himself”, to recall Heidegger’s word for the Verfallenheit of modern man (1962). Modern man 
strives, as though he never wanted to arrive anywhere else than at its (never-quite-yet) modern 
state. Modern man is liberated from the erroneous oppression of the forces that prevent him 
from looking forward. In the spirit of striving, modern man was no longer reminiscent of the 
Aristotelian flourishing being. Instead of a being in the midst of the forces that pull down to 
the ground of earth and push up in the divine sky, as man is represented in the premodern 
triad, a new modern triad constituted the forces of human life: science, technology and growth. 
All three took the challenge of liberating man – of liberating man from authority (be it 
epistemic or political), of liberating man from the narrow limits of means, of liberating man 
from the burden of needs, and liberating man from the burden of a dark past toward a bright 
new future. Modern times are promising times.  
When stretching our historical mind to such extent that economic science can be seen as a 
phenomenon of modern life, to question its existence is all but far-fetched. What gave occasion 
to economic science was the promising role it could play within this triad of modernity. If there 
was something that necessitated economic science, then it was that it promised to close an 
otherwise open link between science and growth. Instead, its relation to technology – 
particularly political technology – rather calmed the enthusiasm about this alliance.  
In giant steps I will go through this modern history of economics. I tell it in not more than 
three episodes that are necessary for a narrative: a beginning, a middle, and an end; an early, a 
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high and a late modern economic science; its rise, its heyday, and its decay; the coming into 
being and passing away – the “biography” of economics, to borrow a historiographical notion 
from Daston (2000). The history of sense, from beginning to end, runs as follows: After having 
set the scene for premodern economic writings, the rise of economics encompassed roughly 
200 years of British history, from 1650 to 1850. The time of modern economic science proper 
encompassed roughly 100 years of European history, from 1850 to 1950. Since then, the 
present situation in economics encompasses roughly the last 50 years of U.S. history. Today, I 
will argue, the need for pushing further the ethos of economic scientists fades away. At the end 
of this narrative, we will have gained a historical understanding of what remained a riddle in the 
last part: that since around the 1970s, inside the institutions of economics the greatest charge is 
the complaint that economics became (politically) irrelevant, while outside the greatest charge 
is that it became (politically) biased. 
How did economic science intervene in modernity? I will view this intervention as the 
attempt to push a structuralist turn in thinking about the world in which economic life is lived: 
from the oikos to “the economy”. I speak of a structuralist turn, as explained in the 
Preliminaries, in that in oikonomic writings the order of the oikos is the temporalization of 
economic life, while in economic science “the economy” is constituted by the structural effects 
of economic life. I do not speak of the oikonomia and “the economy” as two paradigms, 
because neither did oikonomic writings have a distinct discursive identity, nor could the 
structuralist turn ever be carried out to such an extent that there was a full-blown paradigm of 
economic science. Never in European history was there something that could meet the 
pragmatic criteria of a normal science. For it was always haunted by the tensions between the 
reality “of” and of science, as the following history will explicate. The tension between the 
reality that was claimed in science, and the reality of claiming scientific authority describe the 
rise and equally the fall of economics. It is in precisely this sense that the following 
phenomenological genesis is critical, because it shows that economic science never did grow 
into a full-blown “paradigm”. It never found its way into its own, because its history is the 
oblivion of its own history of sense – the history of the oblivion of the life-world.  
In order to keep track of this critical impetus, the reader may keep in mind the 
cornerstones of this narrative from the oikonomia to “the economy”. First, scientific authority 
was claimed in response to the economic suspicion, diverting attention from the question: 
Who are You – Arguing This! Economists managed to avoid this suspicion by means of 
cultivating a level of reflection beyond the imposition of special interests: the structure of “the 
economy”. Such is the nature of abstraction in economic science: abstraction from one’s own 
interests. How, secondly, did economists do so? Mainly by means of ignoring their past. The 
increasing ahistoricism of economics amounts to a tendency toward formalism. These are the 
two cornerstones of the scientification of economics: the oblivion of its past is operational for the 
structural object of “the economy”, on the level on which the imposition of the economic 
suspicion is impossible.  
Claiming scientific authority, to be clear about my argument on this point, is nothing but 
cheating in economic talk. Scientific authority was never claimed for the sole sake of truth 
(which truth could that be?). It was claimed in order to avoid the issues others had. Economic 
science does liberate, yes, but it liberates into nothing. In other words, the scientification of 
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economic writings was not a particular sense-achievement, but was the covering of past sense-
achievements. It is this history that describes the “oblivion of the life-world” as the 
scientification of economics.  
 
*** 
 
Such an argument, it is apparent, requires a different manner of arguing than is common 
among historians of economics. Apart from my remarks on the historiographic approach in 
the Preliminaries, let me remind the reader that this narrative is not designed in order to 
uncover historical truth. On this ground, I had to add countless specifications that would 
prevent me from arriving at an image of economic science as a case of modernity. The 
narrative from the oikos to “the economy” is not written in order to inform economists about 
their past. But it is written in order to address the problem of today’s ethos of economists.  
The historical consciousness of economists today is so underdeveloped that most may 
believe that there always was and will always be a need for economic science. Conjectural and 
Whig history together results in an attitude toward history that can be paraphrased as follows: 
‘When men began cultivating the soil, resources were scarce, and so there was the need to form 
concepts of how to deal with that basic human problem. If at one point in time these concepts 
were rather underdeveloped, it was due to the wrong-minded moralists that dominated 
European culture for too many years, and caused too much inefficiency’. Instead, I turn this 
attitude around: Remembering the history of the scientification of economics is to remember 
what had to be forgotten so that economists could evoke such an image of its timeless need. 
The need for a Big History of economics is this: The history of the scientification of 
economics is the history of how economics forgot its history, a history of the decreasing degree 
to which historical reflection matters for science. A history of the scientification of economics 
is thus not a history of facts, but a history of the historicity of economics: how economics gained 
history. This purpose indeed requires an alternative narrative to the presently dominant 
narrative which allows the profession to be indifferent about its history – roughly speaking, the 
1770s Smith classical – 1870s marginal revolution neoclassical – 1970s getting real again – sort 
of narrative of economics that was codified as the Smith-Mill-Marshall-Samuelson tradition 
(SMMS). The history of sense, alternatively, is rather of an MMM kind: Mun-Marx-Marshak.  
There is an obvious misunderstanding in writing a social history of economic ideas that I 
had better anticipate at this point. What else could the oblivion of its history mean other than 
that economists have forgotten they are the children of capitalism? As in capitalism one too 
easily forgets that there was not always capitalism, economic scientists tend to forget that there 
was a time they could not have found a job. Is it this “best guarded secret of the profession”, 
as Heilbroner and Milberg called it (1995: 113) that makes historical reflections for economists 
so awkward, at least in comparison with the splendor of announcements of the following sort: 
‘There is Economic Theory, the Problem of which Is: Price-Coordination.’ Is this not a 
definite sign of the completion of the scientification of economics that this secret does not 
threaten or even challenge the ethos of economists? No economist needs to think about the 
historical genesis of one’s ethos – therefore, economics is a science? 
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Do I thus write a materialist as opposed to an idealist history, to recall two somewhat dusty 
historiographic categories? Did history make economics or did economics make history? If I 
associate economics with capitalism, pointing to all the historical dirt on which economics was 
built, what is the difference from a Marxist materialist reading of economics? Do I aim at 
explaining economics via the history of capitalism insofar as capitalism required an epistemic 
instance of justification? Is it this, to be critical in a Marxist sense, unveiling the material base 
and thus the interest that informs the scientific claim to objectivity?  
Why should I not associate economics with the great virtue of the enlightenment: the 
belief that reason, science, and the good life do not contradict each other? Why should I not 
associate economics with the belief in freedom, truth, and the moral law that come “from 
within” man instead of from beyond human bounds? Should I not focus, as historians of 
economics are inclined, on how economists were appealed by Newton’s, Bacon’s, and 
Descartes’s metaphors for knowledge? Shall I celebrate how economists contributed to the 
success of modern science, and even ended up walking a line between “peace” and “physics” 
in Stockholm – only a couple of years after they helped out in Los Alamos? Are economists 
members of the modern liberators of man, or of those justifying the decay of modern man? 
More moderately asked, how do social history and the history of ideas relate in the following 
phenomenological narrative of economics?  
Factually speaking, the social history of the scientification of economics certainly 
encompasses both great virtues and material dirt, visions of truth and ideologies using truth. 
Economists were both liberators and smooth talkers for modern man. In 17th century England 
there were both – new material problems and new worldviews of mankind, and they both 
came together in the political discourse of the time. Economic science is both the product of 
modernity and has informed the perceptions of it. Having said that, the historical approach of 
the oblivion of the life-world does not require distinguishing the material from the spiritual. To 
the contrary, I ask in which mode intellectual values are responsive to their concrete times. The 
two ways of understanding the history of economics are rather part of the contest about its identity, 
and thus constitutive of its social history. The idealist tradition represents the belief in the 
(social and political) relevance of economics, while the other materialist tradition represents the 
charge of its (social and political) bias. If I had to choose between the two historiographic 
paradigms, I could not even pose the question of history of sense. 
The social history of the scientification of economic writings as the oblivion of the life, to 
come back to the seed of this chapter, is the tendency toward indifference to both (idealist) 
vision and (materialist) bias. The evasion of the ideological suspicion, I am going to illustrate 
numerously, happened at the cost of its modern vision. These costs are manifest in the 
tendency to formalism insofar as it serves as the last ground on which the scientification took a 
stance. To forget the life-world means that the contested line between vision and ideology 
disappears – that the claim to science neither responds to a vision nor to an ideology. In other 
words, it has always been an advantage in economic writings to say less, to merely indicate, not 
to spell out, to leave the meaning of one’s claims to others. Such an attitude could be exploited 
as epistemic authority. Thus, a historical misunderstanding leads from the oikonomia to “the 
economy”: that there is something to say in economic science. 
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(1) The Pre-History 
 
 
 
 
In European history, there was not always an economic science. But there were always 
economic writings. And these writings had all but epistemic concerns. Among the first were 
Hesiod’s poem Works and Days (1973 [700 BC]), and Xenophon’s Socratic dialogue, the 
Oeconomicus (1923 [360 BC]). The literary genre they represent is that of manuals. It lasted until 
the rise of economic science. Most oikonomic writings, popular by their very nature, were 
manuals for how to run a house, how to till the soil, how to practice one’s craft properly – that 
is to say, how to be cultivated. The main concern of these writings were the classification and 
description of all sort of (productive and reproductive) works that correlated with different 
professions and with specific social relationships, be it between the oikoi with one’s fellows, or 
the relationships within the oikos with those who could not take care of themselves (children, 
women, slaves, and animals). Around 1700, one of the last revivals of this genre of oikonomic 
manuals was the so-called housefather literature.  
While dealing with money was considered a necessary part of running a house insofar as 
there was surplus that could be exchanged, trade was not considered a profession proper for 
reasons central to any genealogy of economic science. Only late in early modern Europe, after 
merchants gained more and more social recognition, can we observe how the Xenophonian 
tradition of manuals also included manuals for traders. One of the most popular of these 
manuals was Jacques Savary’s La Parfait Negocian (1993 [1675]). It was translated into most 
European languages throughout the 18th century. It included information about weights and 
measures of goods, exchange rates and fairs at different cities, rules on bookkeeping and letter 
writing, and an abundance of local customs of various European merchants. Such writings 
made the merchant appear skillful, learned, and thus honorable – as though trading were the 
same as housekeeping (see Cipolla 1994).  
In premodern times, I explicate in this preparatory chapter, there was no need for 
epistemic authority. As manuals, these writings were not in the realm of the contestable, that is, 
not in the realm of actual public discourse. Manuals were kept in private at a secure place for 
the case one does not know what to do. They did not contribute to the premodern culture of 
knowledge. There was nothing to claim, but only to instruct. Oikonomic writings did not demand 
a specific interest, but were popular writings for all who have to take care of themselves. 
Oikonomic writings are for this reason best-suited historical sources of the life-world of 
premodern Europe. The oikonomia, one may say, is the life-world to the extent that it is the 
locus where a correlation of life and world is achieved. Perhaps the very idea of everydayness, of 
man “having” a world roots in these writings how to cultivate the world. For this reason, 
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phenomenology may appear to some like a retro-philosophy, though it also can point to the 
particularly European origin of a natural conception of the world.  
 
 
Two Basic Tones of Premodern Economic Writings:  
Instruction and Moralizing – both Prior to Epistemic Concerns 
 
The pre-epistemic position of economic writings is perhaps best reflected in the text of the 
philosopher that set the tone of most other economic writings, namely Aristotle’s Politics. If 
economics was taught (rather than be instructed) in early modern universities, it was Aristotle’s 
Politics. Economic matter was not actually part of the political discourse, but it was preliminary to 
it, a preliminary to the question of the perfect state. “The household is antecedent to the city, 
and more necessary,” Aristotle wrote (2000: 160). The reason is simple. Only insofar as 
someone is able to care for himself one can speak of human beings as political beings, and 
furthermore as beings capable of a virtuous and epistemic life. This preliminary character is the 
simple key to the premodern conception of economic life and writings. A “political economy”, 
for the premodern world, is a contradiction in itself (though, for a factual history, economic 
policies can be observed, see Booth 1993: 55 ff.).  
The instructive tone of economic writings, however, could not always be maintained. 
When it came to the issue how to deal with money, with traders, and in particular how to deal 
with those who trade with money, the usurer, clamor was great. Money, trade, and usury 
represented the greatest intellectual challenge premodern economic writers knew. Money and 
those dealing with it made economic talk contestable. Only there did one need actual 
authorities beyond mere instructors: moral authorities. After Aristotle’s discussion of usury, 
this authority has been for most of Europe’s history the clergy.  
The most famous of these authorities have been the many Augustinians, Thomists, 
Franciscans, who moralized on the misuse of trade and money, down to jurists like Carolus 
Molinaeus (1500-1566), who began to turn more liberal about the use of money (see 
extensively Langholm 1992). In the 13th century, Summae like that of Thomas were the writings 
where the clergy reflected on the virtues and vices of economic life. They were used as manuals 
for confessors (Le Goff 1988: 12). Most efforts went into questions like that of Thomas’s 
“Whether a Man may Lawfully Sell a Thing for More than it is Worth?” (1924 [1265]: 53). 
What for us seems like the condition and definition of the use of money – why else should 
someone sell anything at all? – prima vista for most clergymen was simply a contradiction in se 
– where should this “More” come from? It was not until 1850 that the moralizing on the use 
of money disappeared entirely from economic writings. Until Jeremy Bentham’s attempt to 
convince Adam Smith that the interest rate should flow freely, no economic writing could pass 
moral muster without discussing the limits of trade usury (see Persky 2007).  
Neither the instructing Xenophonians nor the moralizing Augustinians – even if the 
debates were deadly serious – claimed epistemic authority. It was not how things are in 
economic life that was interesting, but how they are supposed to be, and what to do if they are 
not as they are supposed to be. One never appealed to the authority of science, but rather to 
common sense, traditions, one’s experiences and those of others, learned practitioners, and, in 
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the moment when quarrels came up, religious virtues. To recall these writings is not to suggest 
that economics “originally” and therefore somehow “actually” is a practical or a moral matter. 
Rather, in order to get an idea of the historicity of economic science, we should come to 
acknowledge that there was no need for epistemic authority in oikonomic writings. Thinking 
about the Greek notion of the oikonomia in relation to the modern “economy”, as one of the 
few social historians who did argued, “invites us to remove those very modern blinders that 
cause us to see the economy as a discrete set of phenomena with theoretically distinct borders 
(Booth 1993: 2). Before there was economic science, economic writings did not have a strict 
discursive identity because economic life itself was not worth quarreling about. It rather had to 
be done. And if things got shaky, one had to appeal to those other than economic authorities.  
In Xenophon’s genre, there was no reason to distinguish between the moral appeal to a 
virtuous life and the “scientific” appeal to experiential and expert knowledge. Seeds must be in 
the soil in spring because one’s ancestors did so, because God told us to do so, because this is 
what the good diligent farmer does, because otherwise the neighbor would think we are lazy, 
because the Prince needs his share, and because otherwise there is no harvest in autumn. All 
good reasons to actually do it. Necessities are not contestable. Premodern economic writers, as 
Appleby wrote in his classic study, “enjoyed a freedom from a consensus on the meaning of 
the evidence. They lacked a paradigm” (1978: 21). Nobody claimed epistemic authority since 
everyone knew that economic life is only preliminary to actual matters of debate. Those who 
did care about truth were free from economic worries. Economic life, short and simple – how 
could it be of epistemic concern as long as it was the condition of epistemic life?  
The pre-epistemic character of economic life had to do with its, say, metaphysical embedding. 
Economic life was meant to be the manifestation of a transcendent order. Economic order was 
given to economic life. Economic order was handed up from the bottom of nature and down 
from the moral sky. In this respect, economic science is clearly a child of the enlightenment: 
only after those other authorities grumbled could economic science take root. To say the least, 
scrutinizing the “causes of growth”, as Adam Smith later would do, hardly made sense in a 
society that ran cyclically around some kind of transcendent order – be it the Greek cosmos or 
the Christian divine realm. If economic order comes from the stars running smoothly in 
circles, how could there be a perception of such a thing as “the economy” that could be 
subjected to causes? “The very meaning of ‘economic’ would be unintelligible outside 
capitalism”, as Heilbroner and Milberg acknowledged (1995: 111). 
The history of the emergence of “the economy”, as is my general outlook, describes the 
history of the phenomenological becoming of economics. As before there has been natural 
science only natural philosophy could claim authority over the physical constitution of the 
world, so in oikonomic writings there were authorities other than science. As in natural 
philosophy metaphysical and theological principles like “One”, “Being”, and “Becoming” 
described nature, so was oikonomic order a manifestation and reflection of another order of 
higher dignity. In the same sense as the theoretical perception of nature replaced truth as the 
virtue of epistemic life with truth as the object of referential claims, reference to “the 
economy” allowed scholars to think about something beyond one’s immediate human 
condition when engaging in economic talk.  
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The Metaphysics of the Oikonomia: The Calender.  
Economic Life and the Appropriation of World 
 
What, then, was the metaphysics of oikonomic writings if not reference to “the economy”. 
The task of oikonomic writings was to determine the way in which the transcendent (divine or 
cosmic) order was manifest in the oikos. The guiding clue as to how this happened was time. 
The oikonomia is an order of time. To know the oikonomic order was basically to know the 
calender. From Hesiod’s Works and Days to almanacs still used today, oikonomic order is the 
order of days, weeks, months, years, and generations. Oikonomic things are things to be done 
at specific times, over and over again. Here some lines of Hesiod:  
 
The eighth and ninth, of the waxing month, are good for men to do their work, and very fine are the 
eleventh and the twelfth; those days are good for shearing sheep and picking fruit. But more 
outstanding is the twelfth, for then the spider floats on air and spins her web in daylight, and the 
Knowing One collects her stores. Upon that day a woman should set up her loom, and push her work 
ahead. Avoid the thirteenth of the waxing month for sowing; it is best for setting plants. Plants do not 
prosper on the midmonth sixth, but it’s a lucky birthday for a male (…) (Hesiod 1973: 84). 
 
In the oikonomia things are determined by the time they need to be done. “The economy”, 
instead, being essentially an order in itself and beyond all particular conduct of economic life, is 
not a temporal, but a structural order. The rising paradigm of “the economy”, therefore, must 
have taken place by means of the neutralization of time and the ossification of the oikonomia as a 
structure. The passage from the social order of the oikonomia to that of “the economy” is a 
passage from time to structure. This passage was less an event in history, but rather an event of 
history, a change of the historicity of economic life. My interest in this part is less the events 
that led from the oikonomia to “the economy”, but the changing perceptions underlying 
economic talk insofar as they amount to a neutralization of time.  
One of the historians of the Annales school, Le Goff, put this neutralization in the 
spotlight of the rise of modern life – in particular, in that the merchant demands the same 
place in professional orders as the economist. They both came to wear mechanical watches. 
 
For the merchant, the technological environment superimposed a new and measurable time, in other 
words, an oriented and predictable time, on that of the natural environment, which was a time both 
eternally renewed and perpetually unpredictable (Le Goff 1980: 35).  
 
The changing perception of time has often been described as that of time becoming an infinite 
continuum rather than a cyclic renewal. Such perception of an ever-continuing time was vital 
for one of the constituents of the modern triad: growth. While in oikonomic writings time passed 
cyclically, in modern economic writings time passes steadily – a single line merging into the 
horizon of growth. The future becomes the object of projects rather than something for which 
one needs to be prepared. The principal and often also first line in modern economic writings 
is this image of a mankind in a continuous growth of cultivation: conjectural history that spans 
one arch from the so-called savage to modern man – economic teleology. Though Adam 
Smith doubted that mankind’s situation really improved, he also believed that nature had 
rightly imposed that deception on mankind, for it keeps people busy. 
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It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind. It is this which 
first prompted them to cultivate the ground, to build houses, to found cities and commonwealths, and 
to invent and improve all the sciences and the arts, which ennoble and embellish human life; which 
have entirely changed the whole face of the globe, have turned the rude forests into agreeable and fertile 
plains, and make the trackless and barren ocean a new fund of subsistence, and the great high road of 
communication to the different nations of the earth (1976b [1759]: 183f.). 
 
What Smith celebrates as the achievement of a growing mankind (to turn forest into fertile 
plains), in Xenophon’s tradition simply had to be done – day by day, year by year – before one 
could speak of a mankind proper.  
To approach economic history – and for that matter, the history of economics – as factual 
history would be to misperceive this fundamental change in the perception of time. For only 
after the structuralist turn toward “the economy” was a sequence of irreversible events 
conceivable, which could relate like cause and effect. In the oikonomia, there were never 
irreversible events, but always a next round in which one got punished for the mistakes of the 
last, and hoped, God willing, to do better in the next. Economic history did not have to be 
written, but had always already been written in the calendar. There was no economic history 
before economic science evoked the opposition of theory and history. This is not to say that 
the change I consider did not correlate with a factual history. However, this factual history does 
not provide a clue as to its meaning.  
In order to illustrate this calendar principle of oikonomic writings, consider, for example, 
one of the last pieces of oikonomic writings, taken from a short-lived genre of the early 18th 
century: housefather literature (1660-1730). In the midst of the years when European 
economic history crossed the threshold of modernity, this literature once more provided 
voluminous manuals for the aristocrat’s household, often titled oikonomia. The period falls in 
the immediate dawn of cameralist writings that emerged in the 18th century (for example 
Johann von Jüsti, 2008). Cameralist writings were manuals for civil servants of the royal 
chamber, too, but they were already written within the mindset of ‘counting the economy’. The 
housefather literature illustrates the edge between premodern and modern economic writings.  
Franziskus Phillipus Florinus alias Philip von Sulzbach, a protestant priest, wrote two in its 
time popular, more than 1000 pages heavy pieces of this genre, one for the landowner and 
another for the aristocrat. The former was published in 1702, Der kluge und rechtsverständige 
Hausvater: Ratschläge, Lehren und Betrachtungen. Franziskus mentions as a first order rule of the 
household the notion of a “house clock”. The rule describes what is required “to live in order 
with” the world (which is another meaning of the Greek word οικοειν). 
 
The household ought to be kept in proper order. Order is like a house clock, to which everyone ought 
to conform by going to sleep, waking up, eating, drinking, working and carrying out other affairs. What 
can be done at night and under the roof in bad weather, ought not to be done in bright and nice 
weather outside the house. The daily distribution of ordinary business ought to be in front of everyone’s 
eyes displayed, as it were, on a board how to conduct the day, hour for hour. Then work goes ahead 
easier than if everything takes place in confusion and disorder (1988 [1702]: 41*).  
 
Franziskus expresses here the basic economic sense that things belong here or there and have their 
time to be done. Human beings are economic beings by means of their sense of being-in-
order-with-the-world. That this order is designed in such a way as to require the least effort –
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that is, an efficient order, as the Paretean historian may interpret the second and last sentence – 
is not part of this economic sense. Franziskus’ first principle does not describe how the burden 
of economic life can be avoided or minimized, but calls for carrying and enduring this burden 
“in posture”. The economic sense of propriety and belonging is manifest in this “posture”: the 
willingness to stand the persistence of the world and to endure its duration. The oikonomia 
represents a duty rather than something to economize. To put it in phenomenological terms, 
order referred to the sense of having as a task the correspondence of life and world, not the 
minimization of the burden of economic life in an already well-specified world. In this sense, 
one spoke in the stoic tradition of the verb oikoiein, referring to the act of appropriation. The 
oikos is the world to be appropriated. In the oikos, like in “the economy”, everything is 
connected with everything, but as the result of appropriation, not as the result of disregarding 
our sense of propriety (which I ascribed in the preceding part to present-day economists). Both 
a phenomenological critique of economic life in markets as well as an economic critique of 
phenomenology had to begin at this point (see Supplement 1, Henry 1994, Düppe 2008). 
This notion of economic life as the sense of propriety and the task of appropriation could 
be fleshed out along three distinctions, which describe the economic human condition, as 
perceived in premodern times. First, needs – associated with concrete material objects, the threat 
of nature, the necessity of work, and the virtue of sedulity – condition the life of desires – 
associated with the “actual” human life: moral, political, religious, and epistemic life. Needs are 
met in the world, and desires grow through the world; they flourish, to use the key term of 
Aristotelian ethics. Only those who were first good economists could be truly human, which 
included, for example, full citizenship or credibility as an orator. Even until the 17th century, a 
condition of being part of the scientific community was possession of a particular amount of 
wealth (Shapin 1994: 48 ff.). Economic life was preliminary to “actual” life.  
Second, means – associated with tools, goods, and all practices of production – are 
valuable only in light of ends. Only those who knew what was good could know what was 
good for what. The capacity of seeing means in light of ends was called phronesis. Phronetic 
reason embeds the economic into “actual” life. Third, private life – associated with self-care, the 
family, and other dependants – was the condition of political life – associated with speech, 
discourse and conflict. Only those who could take care of themselves could have conflicts and 
relate to the foreign. Only those who did not have to be concerned with their economic lives 
from morning to evening were free men. They had leisure at their disposal. “True wealth, in this 
sense, is freedom from the necessity of labor” (Booth 1993: 41). Economic life enabled “actual” 
life. In this threefold sense of preliminary, embedded, and enabling, economic life demanded a 
life beyond itself. It was never fulfilled in itself, and was thus finite.  
Economic life is constituted by these three basic experiences: needs and desires, means 
and ends, and private and political life. All major issues of oikonomic writings refer back to these 
terms. Economic talk, premodern and modern, I venture, is identified as “economic” by 
reference to such experiences. They allow economic talk to be concrete. If there is no reference 
to them, we do not identify a speech as economic. To trace the genealogy of these distinctions 
would be a work on its own. Concerning economic science, I deal with these experiences in a 
moment when they lose their hold on theoretical practices. Economic science formed its 
discursive identity at the cost of the perceptibility of these experiences. Needs loose their 
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Franziskus’ oikonomia  
The drawing depicts how Franziskus, a not-too-gifted painter, imagines the order of a proper estate or 
manor – a “Meierhof”, as it was called in feudal Frankish society. A “Meierhof” served as the
administrative site that mediates between the earl and the dependent farmers. With this drawing we can
intuit the metaphysical motif of the οικονομια that was valid for more than two millennia of European 
history. The oikonomia is the reflection of a given order. It was a primordial order, the first manifestation of an 
encompassing, transcendent order within the very locus we live. Oikonomia, phenomenologically speaking, 
is the world of concretization. 
Let me go through this premodern imagination of the oikonomia by going through the table of
content of Franziskus’ handbook (left page). His “Meierhof” is a spatio-temporal order: the water well at 
its heart, its yard in pieces, the soil in parts, the fields surrounding. Rooms for all times: the dining room to
eat, the library (tabularium) to read, the sleeping room to the right of the closet for the lord and left of the
closet for the lady, a dormitoriolum for a nap, the parlor always warm, the “reeking-rooms” apart, well-
watered and clean, an armanium to store weapons, a pinakothek for the prestigious stuff. There are barns
for corn, an oven to bake, stables for animals, a garden inside the walls, and fields before the woods. All 
that is directed by the order of day and night, wind and light, weather and seasons (the Greek word oikoi
also meant seasons). In the cycles of sun and moon, all moments of life pass between baptism and last
rites. To know what to do was basically to know where the sun stands at the moment. 
This reflection of order raises a major difficulty regarding the metaphysics of the oikonomia and the
finitude of economic life that scholars have long discussed and I can merely touch on: how does the order 
of the oikonomia relate to the order of the polis? In which sense is political life “like” economic life? This
was the opening question of Aristotle’s politics: Is the politician an “economist of the state”, as Plato has
argued? Is running a state like running a household? Is the politician a special kind of economist, like all
other professions? The question is fundamental to the extent that, if so, “political economy” could have
been perceivable – but, if not, would amount to a sheer contradiction. The notion of the finitude of 
economic life suggests the latter, but the encompassment of the oikonomic order suggests the former. Is
the metaphysics of the oikonomia ambivalent in this respect? (See Arendt 1958, Booth 1993: 37f, 55ff).  
It is a misperception to think of the oikonomic order as a “model” for political life. It was one of
Foucault’s points that only in early modern Europe did the notion of a unified order between the 
governing of the soul and the governing of states and continents arise (2006). For this reason, one needs 
to be careful in identifying the oikonomic order with the romantic conception of an organic society. In an
Aristotelian world, political order cannot be reduced to the same “principle” as economic order, and
particularly not to a common structure, even if thought of as organic. The former may “reflect” the latter,
but not in the way of two kinds being subsumed in one “genus”. I would rather argue that economic life
as a necessary condition impresses what it conditions. Political life, in other words, refers back to economic
life by means of being in debt, and thankful to it. I could thus conceive of the political sense of justice, the
scientific sense of truth, and the religious sense of transcendence as sensibilities that are different in kind, 
but nevertheless have their provenance in the economic sense of propriety.  
But these are questions beyond my present scope. What is important here is to remember that it was
impossible in premodern times to think of a common structure of the oikos and the polis, which would 
allow for the conception of a common principle. No microfoundations in Athens. 
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concrete, finite, necessitating character. In political economy they become the object rather 
than the condition of politics, while the striving of desires becomes the placeholder for all 
economic motivations. The phronetic relation between means and ends, at the latest since the 
marginalist revolution, is dissolved in the concept of instrumental rationality that is currently 
replaced with the acquisition of “information”. And political life disintegrates as that which 
secures private life, rather than the other way around – which became the dominant political 
message since the 1970s.  
This degeneration certainly has far-reaching implications for cultural analysis in general. My 
task here is to assess the contribution of economic science to the degenerating perception of 
economic life. The cultivation of the theoretical perception of “the economy”, I am going to 
show, amounts to the same as the degeneration of the perception of economic life. Economic 
science, to be clear about what follows in this part, never promoted a new or different notion 
of economic life. If economists explicitly referred to such notion, it was always in the same 
terms as Europeans always did. However, this notion never informed their theories, and 
became ever more redundant to point out. The intuition of what it is to conduct an economic 
life is given to economic science. As a consequence, the scientification of economic writings 
results in a state in which economics is no longer identifiable as a part of economic talk.  
Think for example about the decreasing number of explicit references to the acquisition of 
“material well-being”. Who was the last economist who did so? Who would still do so today? 
While wealth, as Schabas has described this degeneration as denaturalization, once “was 
equated with “the fruits of the earth, and sea, with minerals, fish, and exotic plants” (2006: 2), 
Marshall insisted that “[m]an cannot create material things (…) he really only produces 
utilities” (Ibid.: 16). And that utility is a placeholder rather than a notion of economic life, 
Marshall’s successors have made sufficiently clear. The increasing redundancy of expressing 
one’s perception of economic life, I will show, describes the oblivion that accompanies the 
scientification of economics. 
 
 
The Premodern Culture of Economic Suspicion: Paradoxes of Trade and Usury 
 
If the rise of the theoretical perception of “the economy” goes along with a diminishing 
expressiveness of economic life, it prompts us to consider the possibility that economic science 
did not come as a response to a long-awaited problem of premodern economic talk. Then, it 
neither would have happened by means of a change in the sorts of problems tackled in 
economic talk, as Kuhn requires for a paradigm change. Economic science, instead, would 
have meant a calming of the virulence of the problems by which economic discourses were 
haunted before. Economic science would have enabled avoiding a pandemic problem. What 
could that problem have been that plagued the premodern world?  
In accordance with the notion of a finite economic life subjected to a transcendent order, 
the plaguing fact was that the economist could be merely an economist, as though economic life 
were not merely preliminary and enabling, but All There Is. In these terms the culture of 
economic suspicion found its lasting premodern expression. Here are the illustrious lines of 
Aristotle’s Politics that stamped this culture for centuries to come:  
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Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and 
the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate 
not to lose it. The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon 
living well; and, as their desires are unlimited, they also desire that the means of gratifying them should 
be without limit. (…) [A]nd so there arises the second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment 
is in excess, they seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment (1996: 24).  
 
Next to the economist, there was a second way of conducting an economic life, an “unnatural” 
kind of wealth-getting: chrematistics. It intents upon “living only” instead of living “really”. To 
condemn such people was particularly intricate because they, as “merely living beings”, do not 
develop a sense for the good life in the first place. Due to misunderstanding the preliminary 
nature of wealth, there are some economists who get somewhat stuck between animal and 
human being, between the life of needs and that of desires. They meet their desires in the 
world, and therefore need always more. And the placeholder of desires that are met in the 
world is, of course, money. Hence, chrematistics referred to the greedy money-kind-of-people.  
Chrematistic practices were ascribed in particular to two kinds of persons: first, to the 
trader, and more severely to the usurer. The trader and the usurer subverted the oikonomic 
order, for they did not fit in the categories designed for economic life. When “living only” is 
All There Is in life, according to Aristotle’s categories, it is not clear what one actually does. If 
one is merely an economist, one does not really do anything, at least nothing of the status of 
human praxis. This we could call the ancient paradox of trade, which is the key for much of 
premodern economic literature: when dealing with money, one does not “really” do anything. 
Illustratively speaking, traders did not bring things about, but only from here to there. And the 
usurer, who lives on the trade of money, did not even do that! Moving things from here to 
there, the trader did not have an address, was not addressable, not reliable, and could not be 
made responsible. The trader, coming and leaving, is always already somewhere else when 
being asked, “What did you mean when praising this ‘good’ that turned out to be useless?” No 
reply – already gone. As loud as one may shout, the trader cannot hear it from the middle of 
the ocean. For this reason traders were excluded from civil law, and were not conceived of as 
political beings. The trader was like the cunning counterpart of Hermes in that he did not leave 
his message but took it with him in his jingling purse. Trade means silence!  
The quarrels about the status of trade and usury were the locus of argument in all oikonomic 
writings. Those who wanted to show intellectual wit instead of merely giving advice had to 
argue why the usurer would not pass Peter’s gate. That is, one had to interpret Psalm 15: “O 
lord, who shall sojourn in your tent? Who shall dwell on your holy mountain? He who walks 
blamelessly, …who lends not his money at usury.” This literature encompasses more than a 
millennium of European economic writings, from Augustine, via Thomas of Chobham, Duns 
Scotus, down to Molinaeus, beautifully illustrated by Le Goff (1988), and exegetically analyzed 
by Langholm (1992). Bentham and Smith have contributed too (Persky 2007). Between them 
there is a whole industry of legal writings that designed economic policies excluding traders and 
usurer from the polis, from guilds, from the aristocracy, etc. If there was a premodern 
economic history, it was the history of the ostracizing of trade and usury. The success of 
economic science can be measured in terms of the gradual disappearance of this genre.  
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In order to seize how far-reaching the problem of trade was, let me compare the trader 
with the idler. As hinted at above, the imperative of oikonomic order was to be diligent. The 
trader who did not bring about anything was thus subjected to the same moral judgement as 
the non-economic character, the idle drifter. The arguments against idlers are crucial for a 
genealogy of economic science, for it represents a bulwark against the perception of the 
difference between consumption and production: idlers, just like traders and usurers, consume 
without producing. There are principally two ways of condemning the idle drifter, on 
consequential and inherent grounds. First, idle persons were blamed for the blatant reason that 
they did not do anything for their living and thus, sooner or later, needed to live from others. 
Having no work was, in some dark times, reason enough for the death penalty. In Hesiod’s 
poem Work and Days, the moral denunciation of the idler reads as follows.  
 
O noble Perses, keep my words in mind, and work till Hunger is your enemy and till Demeter, 
awesome, garlanded, becomes your friend and fills your granary. For Hunger always loves a lazy man; 
both gods an men despise him, for he is much like the stingless drone, who does not work but eats, and 
wastes the effort of the bees. (…) From working, men grow rich in flocks and gold and dearer to the 
deathless gods. In work there is no shame; shame is in idleness. (1973: 68). 
 
Idlers live at the cost of others, and thus annoy gods and fellows. Hesiod’s tone is threatening. 
At some point, when it comes to a moment of scarcity – in winter, say – the paradox of eating 
without working will be naturally solved. At the end of the day, or at the latest at the end of the 
year, you will understand that only those who work can live with prospects. This sense of 
prospect, care, and anticipation is what distinguishes the economist from the non-economic 
person. To live meant to do something for life; life cannot be merely living.  
Note that the Greek word for idler (ετοσιοεργοσ) did not only refer to someone who did 
literally nothing – the sunbathing idler. It also meant to do things in vain – that is, not obeying 
the instructions of one’s manual. Was the idler, then, someone who wasted his work, who did 
not work efficiently? Not really, insofar the opposite of being idle was, in Franziskus’ words, 
“unverdrossene Emsigkeit” – that is, assiduous, sedulous, diligent, not querulous, morose, and 
surly. In this sense, Franziskus’ second rule of the house reads as follows:  
 
Idle drifting (Müßiggang) is a vice in itself detrimental and, for that matter, petulant, by which man 
himself makes his life sour. For it takes strong feet to support lazy days. (...) Who does not work, ought 
neither eat (1988 [1702]: 44*). 
 
Being idle is to be dismissed in itself, on its own grounds. In idleness life turns against itself. 
Here “not working, but nevertheless eating” is not a problem solved by its consequences, but 
is unbearable in and of itself. And so the maxim of ‘who does not work shall not eat’ was as 
immediately understood, as production and consumption were two sides of the same act – like 
breathing in and breathing out. Eating is like the celebration of work, and work the assiduous 
preparation of that celebration. Eating without working and working without eating were not 
actually eating or working. For this reason medieval economic utopias such as that of Cockaigne 
were perceived as, rather than images of happiness, the horror of boredom (see Pleij 2001). 
The trader and the usurer did not do anything, but could still live off it! Disturbingly, one 
could not condemn them on consequential grounds. Those dealing with money ate without 
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working, and even ate well – more than those who work! This is the backdrop of the 
premodern “definition” of money: money is sterile: nummus non parit nummos (money does not 
reproduce), as Augustine translated Aristotle and others repeated over and over again. It was a 
sheer impossibility that money grows from money, and that one could get more money merely 
by exchanging things. Wealth that stems from trade or usury stems from nothing – a creatio ex 
nihilo, feasible only for God. Usury and trade meant a threat to the divine order. 
One of the arguments against usury was, for example, that taking interests is like stealing – 
profiting from something that belongs to someone else. How come? How could the creditor 
be conceived of as stealing from the debtor? Is the debtor not the one who does not own the 
money? Yes, but owning money is not to own wealth, but the mere possibility of wealth. 
Saying that money is sterile, it is never anything in itself, but what one does with it. In modern 
terms, prices are relative prices, which is still today the fundamental intuition of all market 
theory. In the oikonomic tradition, it meant a practical imperative. In the same sense as 
Xenophon wrote that buying a horse while not knowing how to treat it does not add to one’s 
wealth, so is money only money by means of its use (1923: 365). Those who do not use their 
money, like the trader and more clearly the usurer, may possess the money, but they do not 
have the right to it. Having money is to be indebted to someone else, not the other way 
around, as conceived of today – a document showing that someone else owes us something. 
Gaining profit without doing something for it is impossible (see Langholm 1992: 44 ff.).  
Another example of the reversal of today’s economic common sense is the conception of 
the relation of trade and exchange. Today we think of trade – selling in one place higher than 
paid in another place – as an institution of exchange, at least in an Edgeworthean and Wall-
Streetean world. But not in premodern times. Exchange, just like consumption, was part of 
the, say, articulation and communication of production rather than a different institution. For 
exchange to be possible, one had to live in the same world (koinōnia), or at least in the same 
city. Otherwise it would have been impossible to agree on the value of things. Dealing with 
traders, who themselves do not bring anything about, how could he know what things are 
worth? He had to stay for a while in order to know that. Trade and usury only appeared to be 
exchange, but were actually stealing: giving the world away. The philosopher Duns Scotus 
(1265-1308) was one of the first brave enough to consider traveling, and the risks and hassles 
connected with it, as a justification for gains from trade (in Braeuer 1952: 29). One had to view 
the world inclusively in order to appreciate his point.  
The usurer was considered an even worse case since he did not even travel. He gives 
money in cases of emergency and wants back not the same, but even more. The word chre in 
Aristotle’s chrematistics also means emergency. Trading with money meant living from 
exploiting others’ needs. The poor became dependent on usurers and therefore stayed poor for 
their entire lives, always kept at the edge of survival – just the opposite of a voluntary and just 
exchange. Because the violence exerted by usurers was so subtle and invisible, usury had a 
special status among criminal acts and had to be punished more severely. Carolus Molinaeus, 
for example, had to flee from the authorities after he wrote that usury is not unlawful per se, 
denying that there “was something peculiarly and inherently vicious about usury or usurious 
gains, more than in unjust deceitful sales, or other similar kinds of fraud” (1924 [1546]: 105). 
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Within these arguments against usury, we also find the guiding threat of all oikonomic 
writings, time. One of the clergymen wrote: “every man stops working on holidays, but the 
oxen of usury work unceasingly and thus offend God and all the saints; and, since usury is an 
endless sin, it should in like manner be endlessly punished” (in Le Goff 1988: 30). Usury did 
not fit into the temporal order of the oikos – the calender. Caesarius of Heisterbach writes in 
1220 in his Dialogus miraculorum:  
 
Novice: Usury seems to me a very grievous sin, and one most difficult to cure 
Monk: You are right. Every sin has its periods of intermission; usury never rests from sin. Though his 
master be asleep, it never sleeps, but always grows and climbs (Ibid: 30). 
 
An even more perfidious, but telling argument against usury is the following in a Tabula 
exemplorum of the 13th century. Ultimately, the judge became so radical that to deal with money 
was considered equal to stealing directly from God: stealing time. The unknown author argues 
along the lines of the sterility of money with a scholastic analogy of night/day and hell/heaven.  
 
Since they [usurers] sell nothing other than the expectation of money, that is to say, time, they sell days 
and nights. But the day is the time of clarity, and the night is the time of repose. It is, therefore, not just 
for them to receive eternal light and eternal rest (Ibid.: 41, e.a.) 
 
Selling expectations, selling time, neutralizing the difference of clarity and repose, of being and 
sleeping, of light and night, meant a deadly sin. What Aristotle formulated as a matter of 
excess, is here spelled out in terms of a neutralization of recurrent time. In order to become 
moderate about the violations of His Law and thus allow for another mode of economic 
thought, therefore, time has to become mundane. Only after time is subjected to order rather 
than being itself the order of economic life could economic modernity take root. The order of 
time becomes ordered time. The continuous renewal of a cyclical time turns into a time that 
never rests, that is never enough, infinite – the time of wanting.  
When considering the difference between premodern and modern economic writings 
(particularly its policies of exclusion) how could I silence the countless hells of oppression? If 
trade defined the boundaries of politics, these boundaries were of course politicized. The 
problem was that not only were traders ostracized for being traders, but that people became 
traders because they were ostracized. Those who had been excluded from the guilds and from 
social ranks in general could do nothing but trade, which, in turn, justified their exclusion. The 
sophistication of the literature on usury and trade only sealed their destiny. In this way, the 
premodern culture of economic suspicion falls together with the history of the many 
Diasporas, above all that of the Jews. In the late Middle Ages – which keeps us in the frame of 
temporal order – Jews/merchants were allowed to stay within the cities only from morning to 
evening. The time of sleep was left untouched by economic concerns (Cipolla 1994).  
The vital question regarding the cultural origins of capitalism is hence the following: What 
came first? Anti-Semitism or economic suspicion? Do liberals tend to embrace the former, 
socialists the latter? This question was perhaps the most urgent until 1945. But economists, 
who gained a discursive profile by moving beyond the culture of economic suspicion, have 
never done so. Hence, to associate the history of anti-economics with that of anti-Semitism, as 
Coleman concludes his apology of economics, is, to say the least, anachronistic and ignorant of 
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the social history of economics after 1945 (2002, 2003). Coleman should have made this point 
when reviewing Sombart’s 1911 Modern Capitalism and the Jew. Now it is too late.  
One of the great obstacles for developing a theoretical interest in economic talk was to 
become moderate about the ever more apparent violations of the laws restricting trade and 
usury. The tension between law and actual practice stamped European economic history 
throughout its early modern time. How difficult it was to move beyond the moralizing about 
usury we can imagine in this modest phrase of Molinaeus: “The necessity of allowing for some 
usury is similar to the necessity of using money, but not so great” (1924 [1546]: 118). What 
insecurity about an insight that is so obvious to us! Nevertheless, it took ages to overcome 
usury laws. Even in the U.S. one had to wait until Ronald Reagan. Only since then young 
students can accumulate debts to their hearts’ content. 
At the moment that one grants traders and usurers the slightest social recognition, the 
matter of debate changes. Then one runs into hair-splitting debates on where to draw the line 
between exchange and thievery, between a 5% and a 6% interest rate. Smith believed 5% traces 
the edge between good an evil, while Francis Bacon argued that next to the 5% for the public, 
another limit of 9% should hold for merchants. Others also set the limit at 30%. In this way, 
moral quarrels moved into the background of a new problem of exactness. How could one 
argue about numbers? William Petty, then, was able to make a systematic claim about the 
contested line between a reasonable interest rate and usury. He argued that the interest rate 
should be as high as the rent of land, using, as it were, an equilibrium argument (1899: 48). 
When listing the disadvantages of usury, Francis Bacon shows a peculiar mixture of the 
premodern and modern conception of money, laziness, usury, and trade:  
 
The discommodities of usury are, first, that it makes fewer merchants; for were it not for this lazy trade 
of usury, money would not lie still but would in great part be employed upon merchandising, which is 
the vena porta of wealth in a state (2005 [1625]: 121). 
 
The usurer is still perceived as an idler. But instead of being condemned, he appears in an 
equilibrium argument showing that a high interest rate leads merchants, who are the source of 
wealth, away from their honorable service to society. This neatly leads into the next chapter. 
Only after the issue of interest-rates was no longer a matter of life and death, but one of 
cause and effect, could economic science settle. The increasing price level of the 18th century, 
the first economists argued, is not the result of the bad economic character who greedily 
charges ever more, but a result of the money supply – that is, the supply of metals such as gold. 
The public ethos of economists could strike root only after economic modernity was already 
on its way, in particular in England in the late 17th and 18th century. Moving away from the 
premodern world of economic writings, I now turn to the concrete historical circumstances 
where scientific authority was instituted: reformation England in the 17th century.  
Summing up the pre-history of economics, between the oikonomic notion of an economic 
life that is prior and conditional for epistemic concerns and the dominance of the culture of 
economic suspicion, scientific authority was inconceivable. Within the resulting quarrels 
surrounding money a theoretical perception of “the economy” could not evolve. Economic 
science, as the preceding notes suggested and the next chapter will confirm, did not emerge as 
the solution to a long-plaguing problem, but as the avoiding of the culture of suspicion. 
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(2) The Urstiftung in the  
Late 17th Century 
 
 
 
 
Economic science is a child of the scientific revolution, but not one of its makers. Economists 
never made science, but science made a new kind of economist. Economists used science in 
order to gain authority. They relied on the belief in science as practiced and celebrated 
elsewhere. The social history of the scientification of economics is largely independent of the 
establishment of modern science itself.  
Instead, what economists had to put effort into, according to my approach, was the work 
of translation, mobilization, and yes, imitation of the science of nature as the “science of 
wealth”. They achieved to speak about “the truth” of “the economy”. Such was the social 
condition of exerting epistemic authority – whatever the epistemic grounds. The genuine 
achievement of the first economists was to subject economic talk to epistemic authority. This 
is more than a mere free ride on a new epistemic culture (or its application, for that matter). It 
was indeed revolutionary for European economic writings. Thus, I ask in this chapter, how did 
economists infuse epistemic concerns into economic talk?  
The epistemic revolution in economic talk, broadly conceived, did not come out of the 
blue. In early modern Europe, there was a clear opportunity for the alliance between epistemic 
and economic life. Did science and growth not share the same affective grounds on which they 
could prosper? If so, science came to economic talk not because of its distinguished methods, 
but because of its affective make up – namely, scientific optimism. Scientific optimism was 
expressed in manifold visions of discovery, of liberation, even of eternal piece – but certainly 
of progress and growth. Science prospered because of the hopes that man could cross the hill 
of history and get rid of the heavy burden of his past. Economic writers of the 17th and 18th 
century could rely on a fresh and booming passion for a prospering mankind by means of 
science. The decisive aid to the economist’s epistemic revolution was thus that early modern 
science had already been tinctured with connotations of “wealth”. Bringing science to wealth 
was in this sense not more than revealing its underlying political vision. Hence a ‘science of 
wealth’ was suggestive to early modern man. Thinking of modernity in terms of the triad of 
science, technology, and growth, the science of wealth was possible because it promised to 
close the otherwise open link between science and economic growth.  
On which grounds the first economists made their truth claims, and what kind of methods 
they applied were not the actual social obstacle. For how to get from the science of nature to a 
science of wealth was not contested. Issues one may have today about the philosophy of the 
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first economists did not describe their concerns. The object of their talk was simply assumed to 
be lawful, “like” in science. Early modern economists hardly used the words “science”, 
“method”, “knowledge”, let alone engaged in explicit conceptualizations of their discipline. 
Even Newton, let us not forget, did not hold an explicit philosophy of science. Neither did the 
first “great” economists between Smith and Ricardo lose much time discussing their ideas of 
science. Not until the mid-19th century, which marks the beginning of the second wave of the 
scientification of economics, have the grounds on which one claims scientific authority been 
questioned. Until that time the philosophical beliefs about the nature of science did not make 
the economic scientist.  
Given the purpose of a social history of the ethos of the economic scientist, therefore, I do 
not need to reflect on the epistemic principles with which early modern economists expressed 
their scientific optimism. Be it the so-called problem of induction, or the adoption of the 
mechanistic world view, be it Petty’s Baconianism, North’s Cartesianism, Cantillon’s 
conception of natural law, Turgot’s positivism, or Smith’s alleged Newtonianism, none of these 
philosophical issues are decisive for The Rise of Political Economy as a Science, which, for example, 
Redman discussed in precisely these terms (1997). For these issues the reader may rather 
consult other historians, such as Schabas and de Marchi (2003), who have spelled out the rich, 
intricate and often curious associations that were made between the political oeconomies of 
17th and 18th century and the spirit of Newtonian science. These associations, as Schabas (2006) 
has shown, did not after all contribute to the rising perception of “the economy”, which, 
instead, happened by means of what she calls the “denaturalization of economic order”. If the 
concept of nature appealed to economists, then it was the nature of natural philosophy rather 
than of science. I thus do not consider the association of the science of wealth and the science 
of nature as the actual accomplishment of early modern economists. Instead, they 
accomplished to subject political discourse to epistemic authority. For the present narrative, the 
beliefs of early modern economists about science were not more than the scenery before 
which they gained a discursive identity. Until the mid-19th century, science was not more than a 
stylistic device – but nevertheless an effective and path breaking device.  
The following remarks on the rise of economic science are neither on the philosophy of 
the first economists, nor on what they actually claimed. I rather ask what gave occasion to, and 
what was the need for scientific authority? In what kind of intellectual milieu could the ethos of 
an economic scientist gain ground? What had to happen to economic talk in order to open it 
to scientific authority? How did the perception of “the economy” qua locus of truth arise? Or, 
as also Mirowski wanted Redman to ask: “Why does it seem to matter so much to everyone 
from the eighteenth century onwards that they be granted the vaunted status of being 
‘scientific’”? (2000: 88)  
This moment of the initiating perception of the need and opportunity for scientific 
authority I call, with Husserl, the Urstiftung of economic science. As the mere perception of an 
opportunity, this moment refers to a prenatal state of the actual claim to systematic, scientific 
knowledge. It concerns late 17th-century economists rather than the “thirty-year Boom” in the 
late 18th century, as Hutchison called the time of the Hume-Steuart-Smith’s between 1746 and 
1776 (1988). The latter had already incorporated a different discursive milieu from France. 
There scientific authority has been cultivated by economists such as Jean-Baptise Colbert and 
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Francoise Quesnay, for which the reader rather consults, for example, Peter Groenewegen’s 
account of the rise of economics (2002: 48ff.).  
The critical question regarding the Urstiftung of economics is in which sense it presentiates 
the milieu it was responsive to. Only if such presentiation took place, can I speak of the 
initiation of a tradition. If not, as is indeed the case, the following generations will have 
difficulties expressing their historical consciousness. In other words, when science came to 
economic talk, was it a revolution that could be celebrated over and over again? Or was it a 
violence or even trauma that had to be suppressed once and for all?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes on the literature  
There are not many, but some substantial accounts of the epistemic revolution in economic talk. Most of
the work on economic writings before Smith is filtered by what Smith said about his “forerunners”.
Since he reduced them to a theoretically fallacious equation of wealth and treasure, and the balance of 
trade doctrine (1976: 429 ff.), most accounts discuss this period in terms of what they have or have not
achieved for economic theory – at least by many 19th- and early 20th-century economists who wrote 
about the origins of their discipline. I mention three historical sources: McCulloch (1825: 1-60) – perhaps 
the first historical account of economics – Ingram (1967 [1888]), and of course Schumpeter (1976). Two
of the standard reappraisals of late 18th-century economics include Groenewegen (2002) and Hutchison 
(1988). The latter has downplayed any external motivations of the theory boom since 1850 (187), which,
in turn, grants more importance to 17th century economist. The exegetically inclined reader may consult
the most complete and advanced study in mercantilism, by Heckscher (1955).  
For my purpose, I rather consulted “outsider” sources of historians of science, such as the classical
study by William Letwin (1963), on which much of this chapter is based. Appleby’s work has also been 
helpful, although he too runs into Smith’s Trap of Whig by being blind to the instability of the
theoretical perception of the 17th century (1978). For an insider who debunks these outsiders, see the
young Mark Blaug who missed in Letwin’s study the question “how realistic were either the assumptions 
or the conclusions of economists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” (Blaug 1964: 113) The
historian Michel Foucault, mostly neglected by historians of economics, presented a substantive account
of the rise of modern politics, liberalism, and political economy of 18th century (2008, a similar argument 
in Firth 1998). The most advanced of the more recent work is that of the literary critique Mary Poovey in
her History of the Modern Fact, which I invite all historians of economics to read. I also recommend the
account of the cultural historian Agnew (1988), who showed how the theoretical perception of “the
economy” came to be expressed first in 16th- and 17th-century theatre.  
 
The Perception of “the Economy” as the Germ of Modern Life: 
“the Phenomenal Republic of Interests” 
 
Cornerstone and stumbling block of the intellectual milieu of 17th-century economic writings is 
a notion that would haunt the scientification for centuries to come: the interest. It is crucial, 
since the notion of interests distilled the culture of economic suspicion in such purity that it 
could become the object of a new political: the Economic Political. Let me measure out this 
change in economic talk that I exhibit in this chapter starting from a simple comparison of 
Adam Smith’s only lines on the nature of political economy with those of Aristotle.  
First, as in Aristotle, economics remained a part of political science. Everything said in 
political economy was directed to ‘the statesmen’ – although the difference between science 
and (political) art already ranked prominently in France (Fontaine 1996). Political economy 
was, as it is still called in German, Volkswirtschaftslehre, or Nationalwissenschaft. Second, as in 
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Aristotle, political economy was that part of political science that is concerned with the 
“acquisition of wealth”. But apart from these two commonalities, modern political economy 
differed in that economic life lost its role as the condition of political life. Economic life 
became the object of politics. This move is standard among the writers of modernity such as 
Arendt (1958), Foucault (2008), and Agamben (1998).  
Here the few lines that Smith has spent on characterizing the nature of political economy.  
 
Political economy considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator proposes two 
distinct objects, first, to supply a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to 
enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state 
or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public service. It proposes to enrich both the people 
and the sovereign (Smith 1976 [1776]: 428).  
 
Recall that in Aristotle man can be a political being only insofar as he is able to take care of 
himself. In politics people cannot take care of each other because they need to argue against 
each other. Now, in early modern Europe, self-care is conceived of as something that needs to 
be secured from politics. The task of caring about oneself in order to become a political being 
turns into the political right not to be constrained in one’s self-interest. The duty of self-care 
becomes the right to self-interest. Self-interest is not conditional for the public interest, but can 
contradict with it. Self-interest is a matter of excluding, not disclosing the other. Here, for 
example, in one of the frequently quoted lines from Smith’s Theory of Sentiments: “Every man, as 
the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended to his own care; and every man is 
certainly, in every respect, fitter and able to take care of himself than any other person” (1976b: 
219). The first sentence is in line with Aristotelian thought; the second would hardly make 
sense to Aristotle – as though there were a (political) choice of caring about oneself. In this 
manner, economic life became a prime concern of, rather than a condition for, politics. 
This reversal has affected the political discourse to the extent that the consequences for 
economic interests moved to the fore. At the beginning of the 17th century, even the clergy 
adopted this new tone when speaking of usury: “To leave the proofs of the unlawfulness of 
usury to divines, (…) here is only to set down some arguments to show how great the hurt is it 
does to this Kingdom” (in Letwin 1963: 82). It was in this manner that the oikonomia was no 
longer a matter in accordance with which law one conducted an economic life (be it cosmic or 
divine), but could be conceived of as a locus of epistemic judgments: “the economy”. Is the 
corn price high (and thus people poor) due to the tariffs of corn or due to the speculation of 
bankers? “The economy” becomes the locus of “veridiction”, as Foucault discusses this new 
“sovereign”. “The market must tell the truth (dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to 
governmental practice” (2008: 32). 
On this ground, Foucault has suggested an alliance between the rise of the ‘science of 
wealth’ and the rise of the new state – the nation state. The nation state required an epistemic 
instance in order to govern. Government from the late 17th century on, he wrote,  
 
no longer has a direct hold on things and people; it can only exert a hold, it is only legitimate, founded 
in law and reason, to intervene, insofar as interest, or interests, the interplay of interests, make a 
particular individual, thing, good, wealth, or process of interest for individuals, or for the set of 
individuals, or for the interest of a given individual faced with the interests of all, etcetera. Government 
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is only interested in interests. (…) Government is now to be exercised over what we could call the 
phenomenal republic of interests. (2008: 46 f) 
 
In the moment when economically determined interests become the objects of government, 
according to Foucault, an epistemic space between economic and political life is disclosed: a 
“phenomenal republic of interests”. What else could that be than the object of “the economy”? 
For Foucault, changes in the political required political economy. For those familiar with his 
vocabulary: “it was political economy that made it possible to ensure the self-limitation of 
governmental reason.” (2008: 13) 
From Foucault’s point of view, the idea that a sense for economic theory developed by 
means of abstracting from the social and political context is myopic. Such is one of the 
standard accounts of “mercantilist economics”, presented for example by Appleby (1978: 26, 
70ff). The point of Foucault and others, instead, is that this abstraction had its own political 
motives and also changed the political discourse. Economic theory, just by means of 
abstracting from the socio-political context, could serve as a means in politics.  
In a similar fashion, Mary Poovey has emphasized the role of interests in her account of 
the rise of economics. Rather than an alliance of political economy and a new form of 
government, she suggested an alliance between political economy and modern science itself 
(1998). Scientific optimism had its source in the impression of dealing with a problem as 
though nobody else, including oneself, has ever dealt with it before – unbiased, “disinterested”. 
Speaking “science” meant first of all to adopt a different, less heated tone of disinterest. This 
notion of disinterest, Poovey suggests, was only possible on the basis of the perception of “the 
economy” that economists cultivated.  
 
The modern concept of ‘disinterestedness’ arose in the second half of the seventeenth century, for not 
until society was conceptualised as a congeries of competing interests that lacked an institution capable 
of negotiating those interests was it possible to imagine a state of mind that might be called 
disinterestedness (Ibid.: 86).  
 
Therefore, if I spin this threat further, the perception of “the economy” as the institution that 
is capable of negotiating interests was conditional for, or at least supportive of, the very idea of 
unbiased knowledge – and thus for modern science as such! Only in an economic milieu in 
which questions of veracity and mendacity were omnipresent could science flourish. No 
modern science without “the economy” – the primordial object of modern science! The 
perception of “the economy” was thus operational in moving from an image of intellectual life 
as the virtuous exercise of human reason to that which unveils referential truth. 
For Foucault and Poovey the epistemic revolution in economic talk was thus crucial for 
both the transformation of the political and the establishment of science itself. For both, the 
theoretical perception of “the economy” represents the germ for modern life to prosper. The 
critical point is less, as Foucault continues, that the truth of “the economy” was nevertheless a 
truth that legitimizes, or hides power relations. More interesting regarding the ethos of 
economists is, as Poovey argued, that there was an inherent tension in the very project of a 
“science of wealth” for the economist. In Poovey’s terms, the constitution of the “modern 
fact” is coined by the tension between the interest of recognizing something as a fact, and the 
recognition of the fact as something beyond interest.  
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On the one hand, facts seem (and can be interpreted as being) simply the kind of deracinated particulars 
that Bacon claimed to value; on the other hand, facts seem (and can be said) to exist as identifiable units 
only when they constitute evidence for some theory – only, that is, when there is a theoretical reson to 
notice these particulars and name them as facts (1998: 9). 
 
This distinction resembles the distinction between the reality “of” and of science, with which I 
opened the present exercise. Since the very beginnings of economic science, I will argue in this 
chapter, this tension was operational. The decisive question regarding the Urstiftung of 
epistemic concerns in economic talk is this: How could one theoretically perceive “the 
economy” beyond interests in such a way that it nevertheless could nourish both the hopes for 
political prosperity and the optimism of science.  
The virulence of this tension increases if we additionally consider Shapin’s account of the 
social constitution of truth in early modern Britain. “Disinterestedness” of scientists was not 
the absence of character, but was connected with a particular ethos. To appear disinterested, 
one had to meet the norms of a “gentlemanly conversation” (1994: 42 ff.). But these norms 
traditionally have excluded those dealing with money – the traders. As soon as the trader 
demanded political representation, the politics of scientific disinterest had to face its double 
morale. Although the idea of a science of wealth was thus politically suggestive, it was 
precarious for reasons that those who increasingly dominated economic talk – traders – did not 
meet the criteria of a gentlemanly conversation. The alliance between the disinterestedness of 
science and the perception of “the economy” as an institution beyond interests had to 
surmount the hurdle of a different perception of the trader. 
Within these intermingled concerns for science, politics, and trade, the economic scientist 
had to find a place. In this central chapter, I will show how that happened. At the beginning of 
this early modern period, around 1650, economic discourses were still fully determined by 
economic suspicion. Every claim was virtually undermined simply because it was made by 
someone in particular. At the end of this period, around 1850, there was a full-blown science 
called “political economy”, that had gained epistemic authority within a particular political 
position of free trade, saying: In the Name of Science: Laissez-Faire! How? 
 
 
The Feeling of Economic Abstraction in 17th-Century Britain,  
and the New Epistemic Genres 
 
Britain in the mid-17th century. In 1649, the Civil War between Parliamentarians and Royalists 
came to and end, followed by a short-lived government of Cromwell’s commonwealth, and 
then the years of Restoration under Charles II. When in 1660 the Royal Society for Science was 
founded with Robert Boyle (1627-1691) as its leading figure, William Petty (1623-1687) as a 
Charter member, and Newton (1643-1727) as its rising star, people may have had Bacon’s eye 
in mind, but they had the Civil War in their bones. Science promised a new conversational 
culture free from the old regime of ancient rhetoric – the reliance on authority, on Aristotle + 
deduction = truth. Science was modern method against ancient rhetoric, replacing autocratic 
talk with Observation and Measure. There certainly were great philosophical issues to be 
resolved in these days. Think, for example, about the difference between Descartes’s and 
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Bacon’s image of knowledge, or later between Leibniz and Newton. But the Royal Society was 
rather liberal in its philosophical politics. “To cast a mathematical mantle over a problem”, 
Letwin commented, “was tantamount to solving it”, (1963: 91). If I additionally remember 
Shapin, who showed that Robert Boyle was not at all very learned in mathematics (1994: 126 
ff), I rather turn to the political environment of science, leaving their epistemic principles aside.  
What were the issues of the new political discourse that brought economic issues to the 
fore? After the Civil War, the governance and land reforms of subjugated Ireland was one of 
the pressing questions. Often mentioned as a context for getting economic abstractions off the 
ground are the declining British sales of cloth in the 1620s, the abundance after the good 
harvest of the 1660s, as well as the recoinage crisis of 1680. Much political attention went also 
to the Low Lands, which had quickly become the economic elite in Europe throughout the 
17th century. The rivalry with the Dutch remained a reference point for all political and 
intellectual discourses, before and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In 1651 the 
Navigation Acts granted England, but particularly the East India Company, a monopoly of 
trade. These acts led to the Dutch-English wars that may be called the first wars conducted 
solely for economic reasons (the first in 1652, the last in 1780). Though prospering only later in 
the 18th century, colonial issues of the occupied and the New World had, already in the 17th 
century, a great impact on political order. At the end of the period I consider in this chapter, in 
the first decades of the 19th century, Britain with its growing capital London became the 
economic head of Europe.  
In this pre-industrial mercantile capitalism, when merchants dominated the political scene 
evermore, epistemic claims in economic talk settled. It was the time when politics gained its 
modern shape, when the res publica became to be referred to as the commonwealth. The liberation 
from authoritarian politics, roughly stated, came as the subordination of the political under the 
economic. The common wealth of England was still a matter of its land, but moreover of its 
“treasure”, which in turn was a matter of international trade. Such became one of the doctrines 
assigned to late 17th-century writers. Until the mid 18th-century, the domain in which scientific 
authority could find expression was the foreign trade of Britain. The perceptions surrounding 
production, instead, were only crucial for gaining the first fruits of this new epistemic culture in 
the 18th century (Groenewegen 2002).  
The object onto which scientific authority could be established was political. Rather than 
the sudden fascination of ontological transparency (as one may associate with the Royal 
Society), and rather than sudden technological and manufacturing innovations (as one may 
later believe when reading Adam Smith), science was first an opportunity within the political 
discourse. To write economics was to make politics. Economists were “partisans, fighting for 
particular policies; they aimed at persuading their fellows to act in certain ways rather than 
teaching them new truths” (Letwin 1963: 47).  
The new genre of economic writings where epistemic claims could settle, was thus the 
political pamphlet. Sophistry in denunciating the usurer was replaced by emphatic pamphlets in 
favor of or against specific economic policies. The titles of economic writings changed from 
the preaching like John Blaxton’s 1634 “The English Usurer, or usury condemned by the most learned 
and famous divines of the Church of England” to pamphlets like Ferguson’s 1677 “The East-India-
Trade a most profitable trade to the Kingdom, and best secured and improved in a company, and a joint stock” 
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(both in Letwin 1963: 33). The audience of these pamphlets was the Council of Trade, 
Parliamentarians – that is either Whigs or Tories – and the King between Charles and the 
Georgians. The issues were exclusively daily, specific policies circling around the balance of 
trade, protection versus free trade, and exchange rates as in the recoinage crisis of 1696.  
But perhaps the most important change was that the authors of late 17th-century economic 
writings were the traders themselves – simply inconceivable in the Aristotelian world where 
traders were not even allowed to enter the gates of the polis. Within the new political, traders 
gained ever more power in society, and thus claimed political representation. One of the 
earliest “unions” was that of the Merchant Adventurers, from which the East India Company 
later sprung (1600). The presence of traders in politics challenged the social conditions of 
epistemic authority. How could they possibly be credible? Skepticism was great, as the 
following words of an anonymous writer of The Rich Cabinet show: 
 
The Merchant is only traduced in this, that the hope of wealth is his principall object whereby profite 
may arise, which is not vsually attained without corruption of heart, deceitful protestations, vaine 
promises, idle oaths, paltry lyes, pedling deceit, simple denials, palpable leauing his friend, and in famous 
abuse of charitie (quoted in Shapin 1994: 94).  
 
In this discursive milieu, there was an opportunity to make politics with science. Although in 
political pamphlets there was no clear reference to “science”, what is important for us within 
this genre is that a theoretical perception (rather than the expression of it) has been cultivated. As 
the cultural historian Jean-Christophe Agnew ascribed to the 16th century, this abstraction was 
first not more than a feeling of a “problematic of exchange” that rose from the frustrations of 
continuous lamentations about commercial culture.  
 
What stands out in the ‘long-sixteenth-century’ inventory of complaints is its groping to envisage a 
social abstraction – commodity exchange – that was lived rather than thought. (…) In the century 
preceding the English Civil War, then, Britons could be described as feeling their way round a problematic 
of exchange; that is to say, they were putting forward a coherent and repeated pattern of problems or 
questions about the nature of social identity, intentionality, accountability, transparency, and reciprocity 
in commodity transactions – the who, what, when, where, and why of exchange. The answers to such 
questions form the basis of any ruling class’s claim to authority, legitimacy, and justice (Agnew 1988: 9). 
 
The question of what kind of people one’s fellows were became so encompassing that it 
evoked an impression of something else. Economic talk seemed like a play that was subjected 
to rules nobody was aware of while being enmeshed in issues of credibility and trust. Everyone 
struggling for his or her share in the common interest – how could one still take that clamor 
seriously? Perhaps there is more to say than declaring sincere motives and denouncing the 
opponent. Such were the suggestive questions of the intellectual milieu in early modern Britain. 
Economic science came out of a genre in that the culture of economic suspicion climbed to a 
peak and gave rise to a reconfiguration of the political.  
Seeing such perception as the main precondition of science rather than the actual claim to 
it, I do not have to draw a strict line between those writings that Smith has termed mercantilist 
and others who have been titled first economists, such as William Petty. To ask who were the 
first economists is certainly one of the less fruitful discussions one can entertain. If there were 
first convinced economic scientists, one could rather find them in France (see next page). It is 
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Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) Presenting the Members of 
the Royal Academy of Science to Louis XI 
The rise of economics as a science encompasses more cultures than I discuss here for the British case
between “mercantilism” and “political arithmetic”. There are other candidates that may seem more
suitable for narrating the first encounter of epistemic and economic concerns. Above all, the French
episode in which Colbert – who initiated the Royal Academy of Science in Paris – give way to the
liberalism of the physiocrats in early 18th century could be considered (Hutchison 1988, Groenewegen
2002, Schabas 2006: 42-57). In Germany, one had to inquire how cameralism was adopted and how it
changed the image of the civil servant. And in Italy, writers such as Ferdinando Galiani changed the
political scene, too. One could even go back to the 15th and 16th centuries, when double entry
bookkeeping gave economic talk its first epistemic taint (Poovey 1998: 29ff.). These developments took
place largely independently from each other. So why do I focus merely on the British negotiations
between mercantilism and political arithmetic?  
In France, the new epistemic culture of economic talk, both empirically and theoretically, flourished
more intensely than in Britain. Marshall, Marx, and McCulloch all agree: Political economy comes from
France. French economic writers, such as Boisguilbert, Quesnay, Condorcet, Turgot, Mirabeua, and later
Say were more advanced in claiming scientific authority, more outspoken on their epistemic principles
(natural law), and also more explicit on the theoretical conception of “the economy” as an object on its
own – manifest in Cantillon’s Tableau of 1732. At the beginning of the 18th century, Britain even lagged
behind in terms of scientific pretensions. The distinction between the science of political economy and the
art of government, for example, is a French invention. “Political economy is not concerned with the
motives that drive governments, but with their acts,” Say announced (in Fontaine 1996).  
France does yet not figure prominently in my social history of scientification since the social
resistance French economists had to deal with was lower. Although the social role of merchants was even
more contested in France, the epistemic culture was protected by the world of public administrators. This
will remain the same throughout the history of economics in France until Edmond Malinvaud. French
physiocrats were “consultant administrators”, and as such mostly free from suspicion (Schumpeter). The
need for epistemic practices came from the centralization of bureaucracy. All authority was thus gained
from the existing governmental institutions without challenging them fundamentally. Economists did not
have to make politics with science, but could make politics by the means of science. For this reason it is
tempting to interpret the physiocrat’s notion of economic life – that land is the only productive factor – as
an echo of pre-modern ‘who does not work, shall not eat’. Agriculture and the administration of it
resembled the ancient ethos of the oikonomist. In a similar way, I would approach cameralism. 
Around 1830, the British scene had incorporated much of the scientific verve from France and other
countries. The achievement of the British political economists, however, was not only to translate the
French texts, but to establish scholarship in something that was previously ruled by economic suspicion.
Issues of veracity and ethos were most pressing on the Island rather than on the continent. From the
point of view of economic theory, France and all the other developments in Europe were certainly
important for the establishment of political economy. From the point of view of the social history,
however, the decisive milieu in which the breakthrough of the epistemic revolution took place was Britain
in the 17th century. Economic science made its way not via the concerns of the advisor, but rather as a
political agenda opposed to the rhetoric of merchants. The Urstiftung of economics took place in Britain.  
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not that important when exactly I draw the line, but we should not lose the sense of the 
existence of this line. At one point in history there were no people making truth-claims in 
economic talk, and then at a later point science was an effective way to make one’s point. I 
follow Letwin, who stated for the case of Britain: “Before 1660 economics did not exist, by 
1776 it existed in profusion” (Letwin 1963: ix). 
The title ‘mercantilism’, as it is well known, is misleading for there was no –ism, but rather 
a genre of writings in that merchants pushed into the political discourse. Thomas Mun held the 
balance of trade doctrine, yes, but not all have shared it. If not by means of a theoretical 
position, one could draw the line politically in that the first economists argued for free trade, 
and mercantilists for protection. But this line too, if I believe Appleby, is drawn in black and 
white. Appleby argued that the landlords, rather than the traders themselves, have achieved 
political protection for traders (1978: 242 ff.). And Heckscher argued that mercantilists and 
laissez-faire proponents shared the same Weltanschauung (1955: 271). I thus simply list without 
distinction some of the first writers who infused epistemic concerns into the political discourse.  
The mercantilist, according to Smith, was Thomas Mun (1571-1641), one of the heads of 
the East India Company. In his England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade (1949 [1630, 1664]) he started 
by arguing morally about “The Qualities which are required in a perfect Merchant of Forraign 
Trade”. He thus connects to the business literature that buttressed the social recognition of the 
profession of merchants. But Mun ended arguing rather theoretically that “Forraign Trade is 
the only means to improve the price of our Lands” (Ibid.). The real surprise is less that he 
argued that the accumulation of treasure is the result of a positive balance of trade that, in turn, 
is equated with wealth – the position to which Smith later would reduce him. More surprising 
is that Mun did not refer a single time to Aristotle. Yet the heritage of clergy’s discourse is 
apparent: merchants need to care about the common interest in order to demonstrate social 
acceptability. The achievement of writings such as that of Thomas Mun was that care for the 
common did not necessarily go at the cost of the trader. Trade could be good for everybody. 
The greed of traders does not contradict moral codes, even if they do not directly pay their 
share to the poor. Trade contributes to the commonwealth, of which everybody profits in turn.  
This new tone of early modern writings is well met in the case of The Merchant 
Adventurers, perhaps one of the first monopolistic trade guilds of overseas merchants. In their 
Discourse Consisting of Motives for the Enlargement and Freedome of Trade; Especially that of Cloth, and 
other Woolen Manufactures ..., they claimed political influence with the following words: 
 
The strength of a Kingdome consists in the riches of many subjects, not a few, in so much that were 
this Trade enlarged, it would tend to the multiplying of able and wealthy Merchants, it would disperse 
to it to a greater latitude, and further ennobling the Trade, and prevent the encrease of poore men and 
beggars up and downe the Land: For it is one of the maine reasons why there are fewer beggars seene 
in Commonwealths than in Kingdoms, because of community and freedom of trading, by which 
meanes the wealth of the Land is more equally distributed as amongst the natives (Merchant 
Adventurers 1645: 22-3). 
 
The authors respond to the premodern logic of economic talk, and by doing so shift emphasis 
to a different issue. The question is that of traders being virtuous or greedy – the reply is free 
trade, yes or no.  
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The character of the merchant was central for reasons of social acceptability, but was also 
interesting in order to understand their professional success. One moving question was who 
are the Dutch that they are so successful. Here for example the opening of Sir Josiah Child’s 
(1630-1699) Brief Observations Concerning Trade and Interest of Money. 
 
The prodigious increase of the Netherlanders in their domestick and forreign Trade, Riches, and 
multitude of Shipping, is the envy of the present, and may be the wonder of all future Generations: And 
yet the means whereby they have thus advanced themselves, are sufficiently obvious, and in a great 
measure imitable by most other Nations, but more easily by us of this Kingdom of England, which I 
shall endeavour to demonstrate in the following discourse (1668). 
 
Child continues discussing various characterizations of what kind of people the Dutch are. But 
he concludes that their success is due to their low interest rate (see also Appleby 1978: 73 ff.).  
The interests of merchants gave occasion to political debates about trade. These motives 
are not yet stigmatized as later in the 18th century, or even ossified as an assumption in a 
deductive analysis, as later in the 19th century. They are contested. Merchants can be good and 
bad. One of the first “theoretical” debates discussed in the literature, for example, is that 
between the assay master of the English mint Gerard de Malynes (1586-1623) with his Centre of 
the Circle of Commerce (1623), and the Hackney merchant Edward Misselden (1608-1654) with his 
Circle of Commerce or the Balance of Trade (1623). Hackney argued against Malynes in favor of free 
trade. Occasion for this quarrel was the depression in clothes trade – in particular, whether it is 
due to exchange rates or coinage shortage (which is in turn also a matter of speculative 
behavior by bankers). A political issue could be discussed in theoretical terms rather than in 
moral or legal terms. Poovey has emphasized in this debate that although both have used 
numerical examples, they did not use them as representations of reality, but, being suspicious 
of their accurateness, as a mode of illustrating (1998: 77 ff.). They drew their authority rather 
from appealing to good faith – that is, their ethos. Misselden, for example, opened his treatise 
with the following words:  
 
It is true that I am a brother, though unworthy, of that worthy society (of Merchant Adventurers) (…) 
and also I am a member, though one of the least, of the great common wealth of this Kingdom; 
wherein I have learned to prefer the public, to all these particular obligations (in Letwin 1963: 91).  
 
The highlight of this period of cultivating truth claims in economic talk was certainly the 
meticulous William Petty (1623-1687) with his Political Arithmetick (1963 [1676]). Petty was a 
sort of English cameralist who cultivated the authority of numbers and measure (see e.g. 
Hutchison 1988: 27 ff.). For perhaps the first time “the economy” (or better: “the income of 
the people”, as he called it) becomes an object of a truth claim: “the United Kingdom has 
improved in wealth and economic health” (1676: 96). That was not the way the people felt at 
that time, and it was by means of including some and excluding other measures, thus by means 
of definition, that Petty could warrant his claim (see Poovey 1998: 133).  
The culture of theoretical reasoning had been clearly developed by the end of the 17th 
century. At the time when Dudley North (1641-1691) published his Discourses Upon Trade, there 
was no longer any doubt that theoretical reasoning would replace the old moralizing of the 
clergy (2004 [1691]). Deductive reasoning combined with a strong appeal to free trade, and a 
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changing focus from trade to production phenomena came to set the tone for what followed 
in the second half of the 18th century.  
 
 
The Rhetorical Opportunity for Science within the Merchants’ Milieu,  
but Against their Protection: In the Name of Science – Laissez-Faire! 
 
Taking part in economic talk in Restoration England meant to be able to show a credible 
commitment to the public interest, which was confined narrowly by the “treasure of England”, 
and broadly by the rivalries England had with other nations. Letwin illustrated in full color the 
common practice among economists to blame those who allegedly talk in the public interest. 
“Most men evidently believed that anybody’s recommendations on economic affairs ought to 
be examined suspiciously” (Letwin 1963: 19). Economic talk was associated with political 
lobbying, cunning, covetousness, and being base, a fraud, or a hypocrite. Arguing in economic 
talk meant handling others’ doubts to argue in one’s own interest.  
 
No group of Restoration society that might interest itself in economic questions could escape the 
imputation of mercenary motives. A universal cynicism had become dominant. (…) Accusation and 
cross accusation had become the most constant feature of economic writings (Ibid.: 86/88).  
 
Sir Josiah Child, for example, writes in his pamphlet: “My ends have only been to serve my 
country, which I can with a sincere heart declare, in the presence of God and men” (Ibid.: 19). 
However, Child was a merchant, a member of the Council of Trade, and later director of the 
East India Company, so that such lines were taken to demonstrate the opposite. Only to 
mention “a sincere heart” could already show that he serves only his own ends. Although 
Child argued in favor of the protection of merchants as a way to actually increase the treasure 
of England – thus serving the public interest – his ethos undermined the grounds on which he 
argued. All his arguments were undermined a priori, or, better, ad hominem. This indifference 
about what is said in relation to who says it made it possible to perceive an order beyond actual 
economic talk, which is governed by something other than what is said.  
The critical task of economic writings in order to pass from a premodern to modern stage 
was rhetorical. Early modern economic science “was inspired by the needs of rhetoric” (Letwin 
1963: 47). By what means could economists made themselves credible? What I have discussed 
above as the paradox of the trader – bringing things from here to there without being 
responsible for them, or at least for their meaning – now found a last expression in that the 
ethos of merchants made it impossible to make a claim. “(W)hy should a London merchant 
[trust the writer of a pamphlet] who had prospered by never trusting a stranger?” (Ibid.: 83) 
Economic talk was entrapped, run into the dead end where mutual suspicion undermined any 
position of the opponent. “If the magnitude of the difficulty rather than the extent of the 
achievement be the measure, then the making of economics was the greatest scientific 
accomplishment of the seventeenth century” (Ibid.: 148).  
How then did the first economists deal with this rhetorical challenge? There are several 
conceivable strategies (Ibid.: 79-98). One is to publish anonymously (as, for example, the first 
edition of Dudley North’s Discourse of 1691), or to use a pseudonym, showing willingness to 
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renounce the personal honor of the author. Others pretended to hold other professions than 
they actually did, diverting the suspicion of being involved in matters discussed. Yet such a 
move could also hide a well-known base identity. Others simply returned to appealing to the 
authority of other people who were known as honest subjects of the nation, as was the 
intellectual rule in all scholasticism (Aristotle + deduction = truth). Yet all strategies involving 
the identity of the person could be easily used against the intentions of the author. 
A subtler move is to present the argument as being opposed to one’s own interest, as, for 
example, Nicholas Barbon (1640-1698) did in his Discourse Concerning Coining the New Money 
Lighter (1696) as a reply to the honorable John Locke:  
 
So that if I were to consider my private interest, I ought to be of the contrary opinion to that I argue 
for. And therefore I hope I shall be believed when I declare that I have no other design in writing this 
discourse than the service of my country (quoted in Letwin 1963: 94).  
 
Whether or not this was the case was a matter of debate. Perhaps, if events turned out 
favorably, Barbon, the well-known banker and financial speculator, would win if his proposal 
for recoinage went through parliament. Either way, he showed a clear perception of the need 
for rhetorical innovation to deal with the hermeneutical dead end of cross-accusations.  
This need could only be met by switching the locus of argument to a structural level. It was 
Thomas Mun who argued that public and private interests cannot possibly conflict (in Letwin 1963: 
92). He showed it numerically, and added that such holds as long as King and people restrain 
from their excessive appetite (for that would be unfavorable for the balance of trade). 
Therefore, he suggests, traders need to be supported. Thomas Mun introduced a lasting move 
with which later economists would claim scientific authority: to argue on a level where one’s 
own interest is systematically excluded from the argument; a level beyond, prior, and preliminary 
to – or in any sense not affected by economic suspicion. In this way the horizon was disclosed 
in which the theoretical perception of that elusive thing “the economy” was possible.  
An open question is for which position such abstraction could be mobilized. Could 
scientific authority be employed for any political claim? Was it possible that science could have 
served the protectionist lobby of merchants? As subtle and surprising as the argument of 
Thomas Mun may be, what good does it do if the author, a merchant, concludes that 
merchants should be protected? Though only within the discourse that is ruled by the 
imposition of mercenary motives was there a need for an economic abstraction beyond 
mercenary motives, this abstraction could nevertheless not be played out for any interest. The 
argument ad hominem still holds despite the detachment of reason. Although it was only a 
matter of the ethos of merchants that disclosed a perception of systematic knowledge, it was 
reserved for others to earn its fruits. The merchants’ discourse only set the scene for economic 
knowledge, but could not claim it. Late 17th-century economic writings could not achieve what 
made 18th-century economists in the Hume-Steuart-Smith line so prolific: being scholars.  
The punch line is apparent. I do confirm the alliance of the liberal and epistemic 
revolution in economic talk that Foucault and Poovey stated. Scientific authority came into 
being on a level beyond interest, yet was claimed against a particular interest – against the 
protectionists’ demands of merchants. Only there, within the discourse of trade, but against the 
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protection of trade could one gain a discursive identity by claiming scientific authority: In the 
Name of Science – Laissez-Faire! 
 
 
The Formalism of William Petty’s Empiricism: Bacon’s Blind Eye 
 
Rather than the rise of science, is this not a farce of it? Which role did science play in this 
account – science in the sense of a practice that aims at the referential truth of “the economy”? 
Was the rise of political economy not the rise of a culture of claiming economic facts rather 
than coming to terms with a particular abstraction? Let me thus add a defense to my account of 
the Urstiftung of economic science.  
“The economy” did not come about as an object if object means to be described in terms of 
distinct qualities. For this reason I continue using quotation marks. It only came about as an 
object in the sense of being independent of one’s own interest. Although these two aspects of 
objectivity do not exclude each other, the latter does not necessarily imply the former. And it is 
precisely for this reason that economic science, granted, came with evidence, but it was not 
made by evidence. Instead, it was made by theory.  
In order to assure clarity at this point, consider William Petty’s enthusiasm for Bacon. This 
enthusiasm made him appear an economic scientist, but it did not grant him the ethos of an 
economic scientist. Here, his Baconean credo:  
 
The Method I take to do this, is not yet very usual; for instead of using only comparative and 
superlative Words, and intellectual Arguments, I have taken the course (as a Specimen of the Political 
Arithmetick I have long aimed at) to express my self in Terms of Number, Weight, or Measure; to use 
only Arguments of Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as have visible Foundations in Nature; 
leaving those that depend upon the mutable Minds, Opinions, Appetites, and Passions of particular 
Men, to the Consideration of others (Petty 1899: 244). 
 
In William Petty (just as in German cameralism), “the economy” was an object of 
measurement and counting. There we find an image of “the economy” that seems ready-made 
for a phenomenological critique of economics. There we find a world objectified in numbers. 
What Petty called the “income of the people”, Heidegger had called the Gestell, the world qua 
resource. “The economy” refers for Petty to the amount of acre of fruitful land, of corn 
growing on it, of people harvesting it, of things one could trade with the harvest, of 
populations one could feed with it – the world qua “petrol station”: “Now the world appears 
like an object, upon which counting thought (das rechnende Denken) sets its attacks, which 
nothing can resist. Nature turns into one huge petrol station” (Heidegger 2000: 523*). Petty 
was moved by the question of How Much? – which meant above all: How much does England 
depend on its colonies? And how much of the British population needs to migrate in order to 
re-cultivate Ireland after the massacre of the Civil War? The title of Petty’s treatise illustrates 
the point:  
 
Political Arithmetick: Or a discourse Concerning, The Extent and Value of Lands, People, Buildings: 
Husbandry, Manufacture, Commerce, Fishery, Artizans, Seamen, Soldiers; Publick Revenues, Interest, 
Taxes, Superlucration, Registries, Banks Valuation of Men, Increasing of Seamen, of Militia’s, Harbours, 
Situation, Shipping, Power at Sea, &c. As the same relates to every Country in general, but more 
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particularly to the Territories of His Majesty of Great Britain, and his Neighbours of Holland, Zealand, 
and France. By Sir William Petty, Late Fellow of the Royal Society (1899: 233). 
 
“The economy” in Petty’s image was finite, countable, and in this sense objective. For this 
reason, others have counted him the first economist – Marx, for example. “By the early 
eighteenth century numbers had acquired a set of connotations that would soon make them 
central to what counted as knowledge in numerous domains” (Poovey 1998: 143). However, it 
was not the mere fact that Petty counted that made him appear scientific, but the complexity of 
what he counted. What he counted were not merely total amounts (1, 2, 3…), which people 
always did when determining King’s tenth. Petty, rather, was interested in the relation of the 
amount of land and the number of mouths that can be fed with what grows on that land:  
 
‘twould be expedient to know the Content of Acres of every Parish, and withal, what quantity of Butter, 
Cheese, Corn, and Wooll, was raised out of it for three years consequent; for thence the natural Value 
of the Land may be known, and by number of People living on within a Market-days Journey, and the 
Value of their Housing, which shews the Quality and Expence of the said People (1899:180). 
 
Is this not the same concern of which Ricardo, the so-called “inventor” of economic theory, 
would later be driven – namely, whether the rising cost of corn (and thus bread, and thus 
poverty, and thus starvation) was due to the rising land scarcity and growing population, which 
makes the rate of profit on capital decline? (see Blaug: 1996 [1962]: 86 ff) Neither the fact that 
Petty counted made him an economist, nor that he perceived it as a completely determinable 
thing to be measured. But he was economist by means of perceiving a structure of “the 
economy”. Theory, not evidence. This is why Petty was also a child of the discursive culture 
described above that first has disclosed the opportunity of epistemic claims.  
Even if Petty’s self-image were as anti-theoretical as Bacon’s eye itself, all economists after 
him were interested in his work only because of the structure that made him count. At least ex 
post, in light of what Petty helped getting off the ground, how could we believe that his 
empiricism made him a founding economist? Petty did not accomplish that those after him, 
from Steuart down to McCulloch and Nassau-Senior including Ricardo, would not look at 
numbers with suspicion. Petty’s statistics were soon outdated – just like the weather in 17th 
century Ireland – but not the structure he conceived. Even Poovey acknowledged that in the 
passage of the 18th century  
 
instead of promoting the elaborate infrastructure necessary to collect numerical information, British 
theorists of wealth and society developed a mode of analysis that could be used in absence of numerical 
data. (…) (W)hat counted as knowledge (…) was a form of theoretical generalizations that devalued 
observed particulars in favor of something that could not be seen and, in so doing, made collecting 
numerical data all but redundant (1998: 215).  
 
What made numbers appealing for claiming scientific authority was not their referential 
accuracy or precision. It was the formal procedure with which the numbers were produced. Rather 
than Petty’s counting, but the trope of his “gestural mathematics”, as Poovey called it, made 
him an economist (Ibid.).  
In other words, Petty was “objective” not in the sense of referring to the existence of 
particulars, but he was objective in the sense of appearing beyond his interest to claim 
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something particular. This difference is vital when returning to Foucault’s and Poovey’s 
argument about the alliance between liberalism and the science of wealth. Foucault has argued 
about that link that only in the absence of political intervention can “the economy” reveal its 
nature independent of human design (2008: 30 ff). Thus only a spontaneous order of “the 
economy” is capable of being the object of an epistemic claim, while everything else is man-
made and thus possibly corrupted. Only a self-constrained politics can be sensitive to the 
“veridiction” of “the economy”.  
 
[W]ith political economy we enter an age whose principle could be this: A government is never 
sufficiently aware that it always risks governing too much, or, a government never knows too well how 
to govern just enough. (Ibid.: 17) 
 
Foucault’s analogy of objectivism and liberal discreetness means less that in the political 
discourse there is a new agreement among all parties on a particular object that actually does 
show its truth, let alone an agreement about the methods to gain that truth. “The economy” – 
you can quote me on this – has never shown itself, even if government was on holiday. “The 
economy” does not denote a phenomenal object for Foucault, but a new order of the political 
discourse that is subjected to the truth of “the economy” – whatever that truth means. Without 
this “whatever” we miss the point of the alliance of the epistemic and liberal revolution in 17th-
century Britain.  
Consider, for example, how the inflationary use of natural metaphors functioned within 
the new economic political (Schabas, de Marchi 2003). Did liberalism not go hand-in-hand 
with the adaptation of the mechanistic worldview as applied to the political domain? No. The 
metaphors of natural scientists (who were the actual makers of science) did indeed suite the 
relation between political actions and consequences on “the economy”. To talk about interests 
as though they are related like cause and effect is to talk about interests in such a way that they 
cannot harm the author who states them. It was for this reason that the metaphors of 
Newtonain science were just as good, or even better than those of Bacon’s eye. They indeed 
came to stamp the self-perception of economists’ practices for years to come. This inclination 
of economic science to borrow from the ethos of successful – particularly hard sciences – 
remained an effective rhetorical tactic throughout its modern period. Political economy was 
“like” science. That was sufficient. Whatever the grounds of science, its discursive role was 
always the same: to avoid the question Who Are You – Arguing This! 
Be it by virtue of observation and accounting or by virtue of Newtonian metaphors of 
physics, neither stems from the discursive need for science in economic talk. What economists 
needed were not statistics, were not causes; they needed to go beyond the logic of economic 
suspicion. They needed to appear detached. Whatever met this need, it contributed to their 
ethos. Yet implicit philosophical beliefs did play a buttressing role. The obvious tension 
between arguing beyond interests and nevertheless arguing in favor of or against a particular 
interest was softened by the use of metaphors that were successful in other sciences. In other 
words, as long as economics could free-ride on the image of other sciences, as long as there 
was a developed scientific optimism, it was possible to hide this tension and declare 
wholeheartedly in the spirit of modern life: In the Name of Science – Laissez-faire!  
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The Oblivion that Made Adam Smith a Scholar:  
Beyond the Merchant’s Suspicion, yet not Falling Back on the Clergy’s Lament 
 
What then about Adam Smith – to whom the profession of historians still today allocates 
more time than to any other economist? Letwin concludes that Smith did not invent political 
economy from scratch, but was able to gather and summarize the finest pieces of all topics that 
had been discussed before. “Everything useful that they [17th and 18th century economic 
writers] did, Adam Smith incorporated” (Letwin 1963: 221). Granted, he substantively took 
more from the 18th century than from the 17th century, more from the Hume-Steuart-Franklins 
than the Malynes-Misselden-Muns. In the passage of the 18th century, the detachment from the 
mercantile milieu had already taken place. In light of the rising manufactories, focus shifted 
slowly from trade to production phenomena. The epistemic genre switched from pamphlets to 
treatises, and the science of wealth gained its first Principles – such as Steuart’s Inquiry into the 
Principles of Oeconomy, 1993 [1767]. The last echo of oikonomic writings vanished. Adam Smith 
reaped the benefits.  
Adam Smith was not a revolutionary of science. He was indeed rather a moderate believer 
of science. Smith was a literary scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, gathering rather than 
measuring. He was open to moral philosophy and the rhetorical tradition rather than 
constrained by observation and suspicion. The contribution of Smith to the present history of 
scientification was not that he pushed science, but that he substantiated its body. Adam Smith 
– this made him special – was a scholar. His achievement was to re-codify political economy, 
which is to say that he managed to detach it from the discursive milieu I have described in this 
chapter. Smith’s distinct achievement was to be able to solve the rhetorical dilemma of doing 
two things at the same time: abstracting from particular political interests by means of relying 
on a theoretical perception of “the economy” – based on the idea of division of labor – and 
addressing political interests. No ambiguity appeared in arguing beyond interest but 
nevertheless for a particular interest. Smith’s Wealth of Nations – therein lies its greatness – is 
policy-oriented yet not a pamphlet!  
 
Fortune saw to it, for one thing, that Smith faced no special problem in establishing his credentials. 
Granted that his use of deductive demonstration would have guarded him, as it did North, against the 
charge that he wrote to feather his own nest; still he needed no protection. He certainly took none. Not 
one word in his book follows the apologetic formula that seventeenth century writers used (Letwin 
1963: 221).  
 
There could be an Adam Smith only thanks to countless pamphlets that had prepared the 
ground for his economic abstractions. Smith, using the abstraction of the merchants, was 
himself also suspicious of them, and in particular of those who, like Tomas Mun, pretended to 
act in favor of the common interest. “I have never known much good done by those who 
affected to trade for the public good”, Smith writes after his mention of the invisible hand 
(Smith 1976: 456). What made Adam Smith the first of the moderns (rather than an early 
modern) is that neither did he have to defend himself against the suspicion of being guided by 
his self-interest (like all merchants), nor did he fall back into the clergy’s moral lament. Beyond 
the clergy and the merchants, there was the scholar. Modern times have moved on.  
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Here I arrive at a first step in the phenomenological genealogy of the invisible hand. We 
have now gained an initial understanding of the success of the phrases that made Adam Smith 
famous: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest (…) Nobody but a beggar 
chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens” (Smith 1976: 26f.). Such 
statements only softly echo the intellectual milieu of the 17th century, in which those gentlemen 
appear respectable who argue subtly against the motives of their opponent. Merchants since 
Smith are admittedly self-interested. They no longer have to pretend to be of good will, 
because there is a level of reflection where such no longer counts: “the economy”. The 
character of merchants became stigmatized.  
Although the motive of the initiating economic abstraction was to avoid the imposition of 
self-interest on the author, self-interest since Smith came to be a matter of theory: one could 
allow for, or even “presume” merchants to be self-interested. This will constitute the central 
trope of the invisible hand in 19th-century political economy. Everybody who had done so 
before immediately had to face doubts about his integrity. Political economists, however, did 
not have to feel personally addressed. Since Smith, economists can see themselves as “outside-
judgers”, as Colander said about economists today (1991: 23). Yet even if they were outsiders, 
did economists not only assume, but also justify merchants’ greed? Were political economists 
able to bring an end to the culture of economic suspicion simply by avoiding it? This would be 
the question that prompted the second wave of the scientification of economics.  
Adam Smith, in order to anticipate the rest of the intervention of economic science in 
European history, was, so to speak, the first John Stuart Mill, the first Alfred Marshall, the first 
Paul Samuelson, the first Mas-Colell et al. They all codified the body of economics to such an 
extent that the problematic context from which their work was produced disappears. Since 
Smith, economists can make claims beyond the threat of the imposition of being guided by 
their own interest. Smith was the first step toward an economic science that forgets its history 
in an eloquent summary. He was the first who made it futile to read what preceded him. 
Considering the entire SMMS line, Smith would later be a victim of precisely the same move 
that allowed him to be popular for some time – later, when the invisible hand was axiomatised. 
Being beyond suspicion, economists could claim a place in academia. After Smith, but not 
until the first quarter of the 19th century, economists settled in the modern halls of truth. 
Before that, there was anyway no public ethos of a scientist. University before was academia (the 
Greek word), and economics was oikonomia (Aristotle’s text). Smith was less of a “scientist” 
than all economists before him and also less than those economists who promoted Smith as a 
scientist. I mean those who reaped the first institutional profits from Smithean scholarship in 
academia, namely the first professors like the Ricardian John Ramsey McCulloch (1789-1864), 
who took a chair in political economy at the University College of London in 1827, Nassau 
William Senior (1790-1864), who took the Drummond chair of political economy in 1825, or 
Richard Whately (1787-1863), who spoke in the 1830s of economics as the deductive science 
of catallactics as Edgeworth would later do. In this series of political economists, there were 
only a few new William Pettys, such as William Whewell (1794-1866), who defended an 
inductive image of economics. The rest celebrated the new freedom of economic abstraction, 
free of the annoying question: Who Are You – Arguing This! 
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Regarding this arrival of political economy in academia, it is noteworthy that not one of 
those economist who are today called the first classical economists, held a chair at the 
university. Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) was a clergyman, and David Ricardo (1772-1823) a 
stockbroker. Both were political agents. Considering the disgrace political economists would 
earn later in the 19th century, they indeed entered the social history of economics only as 
political agents, precisely as their pre-Smithean predecessors. Sure, Ricardo cultivated economic 
abstraction as no other before them, which made Mark Blaug believe: “if economics is 
essentially an engine of analysis, a method of thinking rather than a body of substantive results, 
Ricardo literally invented the technique of economics” (1996 [1962]: 132). Philosophically 
speaking, yes. But regarding the social history, Ricardo did not contribute to the ethos of 
economists. To the contrary, considering the harsh criticism he and Malthus would earn in 
mid-19th century, they have shown that the ethos of an “economic scientist” was not yet fully 
established, despite Smithean scholarship. The disgrace they earned showed how brittle was 
the ground on which one claimed: In the Name of Science – Laissez-faire.  
Regarding the present social history, there is one telling episode, though, in which Ricardo, 
Malthus, and James Mill (the father of John Stuart) were involved: The Political Economy Club of 
London, founded in 1821. It was founded in order to come at an agreement about the basic 
principles of political economy. Agreement is surely a basic feature of science. Political 
economy, if it deserves its name, could impossibly be a locus of contest, but needed to be 
capable of agreement. The project of The Political Economy Club showed that political economy 
could not afford to be an open field of contest and debate. If a discourse is undermined instead 
of constituted by the disagreement of its participants, we hardly speak of a scholarly 
community, as Adam Smith and his Scottish friends would have liked. The nerve-crumbling 
discussions in the club soon made Ricardo despair about the prospects of agreement.  
Disagreement remained a stumbling block in the further scientification of economics. 
Only as long as those who are committed to science are able to agree on the tenets of political 
economy can it be science. If not, what else is it than the expression of a particular political 
interest? Actual scholarship, gaining identity from debate, was never an option. The agreement 
was achieved, as I am going to show in the next chapter, not by means of merging opinions, 
but on the cost of different political interests. On a level where less is at stake, agreement is 
more easily achieved – arriving at a structural level beyond interests, which is the master key to 
the scientification of economics. 
Summing up this first wave of the scientification of economics, I have shown an instability 
of the Urstiftung of epistemic concerns in economic talk. Economics did not rise as a stable 
institution, did not rise as a new paradigm suited for the new modern world. The liberalism of 
early modern economists functioned doubly. On the one hand, as Foucault correctly argued, it 
discloses an epistemic realm and is thus the condition of scientific authority. On the other, the 
liberal position needs to be presented as the result of scientific reasoning. Therefore, what 
allows economists to claim epistemic authority and what they claim are somewhat the same. 
And so epistemic authority could be claimed only with a tone of inhibition, with a slightly 
trembling voice that neither fully accorded with the optimism about science nor about growth: 
In the Name of Science: Laissez-Faire! But please don’t ask: Who are You – Arguing This! 
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 (3) The Century of  
High Modernism (1850-1950) 
 
 
 
 
The first wave of the scientification of economic writings lasted roughly until the 1840s. At 
this point, political economy was dominantly British. It could incorporate much of the 
theoretical sophistication achieved in France and the rest of Europe. Moreover, British political 
economists have gained a disciplinary profile in association with a particular political position – 
namely, free trade. There were simply not many other people who appealed to the scientific 
authority apart from those arguing in favor of liberal policies. Political economy came to be 
known as a sophisticated way of arguing for the merits of laissez-faire (see e.g. Winch 1976).  
Fixing a date for the end of the first wave of scientification, I could choose 1846, the year 
when the Corn Laws were abolished, and liberals as the Peelites came to be. The Corn Laws 
were a protective import tariff on Corn. The debate surrounding these laws shaped British 
political discourse since 1815. It took place between conservative Tories supporting landlords, 
and Whigs supporting manufactures including their workers (at least, so it seemed). Ricardo’s 
doctrine of the comparative advantage served as one of the benchmarks in these debates. 
George Stigler, characteristically, disassociated the end of the Corn Laws from the acceptance 
of political economy. He argued “materialistically” that the laws had to be abolished anyway 
due to market forces of efficiency (Stigler 1982: 65). How would have Ricardo responded? 
The authority of political economists crumbled since the moment their doctrines came in 
too close contact with the folk doctrines that were inspired by them. Since the 1830s writers 
such as Jane Marcet (1769-1858) and Harriet Martineau (1802-1876), who were in close contact 
and had friendships with prominent economists, have watered down Smith’s and Ricardo’s 
abstractions to digestible teachings for the working class. The principles of free trade and 
division of labor should have enlightened the working class, and liberate it from its misery. 
Harriet Martineau published monthly novels, the Illustrations of Political Economy, that translated 
the tenets of political economy into laissez-faire apologies by the colors of heart-breaking 
stories in the worker’s milieu (2004 [1832]). And the textbook of Jane Marcet, Conversations of 
Political Economy: in which the elements of that science are familiarly explained (1839), presented laissez-
faire policies as a must-know of the same rank as the alphabet:  
 
Caroline: Well, Mrs.B., I see that you will not allow of any exception in favour of the corn-trade, and that 
I must consent to admit of the propriety of leaving all trade whatever perfectly free and open. 
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Mrs.B. That is certainly the wisest way. Instead of struggling against the dictates of reason and nature, 
and madly attempting to produce every thing at home, countries should study to direct their labours to 
those departments of industry for which their situation and circumstances are best adapted (1839: 359). 
 
Although there was no full agreement about the principles of political economy – at least not 
inside the shrine of the Political Economy Club – such too openly announced link between what 
‘reason and nature dictates’ and the laissez-faire politics was gnawing heavily at the credibility 
of economists.  
 
It was this body of literature, with its dogmatism, apologetics, and facile transformation of theories into 
policy conclusions, that was responsible for the chorus of abuse directed at the subject from all 
directions – from working class and Tory radicals, from aristocratic humanitarians, and from the 
spokesmen for the Romantic movement (Winch 1976: 541). 
 
Around the 1840s a crisis of political economy slowly evolved, which would not be resolved 
until, say, the 1880s. In a new political landscape there was a clearly perceived inadequacy of 
the discursive identity of political economists. The pressure I allude to, of course, are the social 
changes surrounding the second wave of industrialization – that is, those developments in the 
19th century that made people doubt that modern life will liberate mankind without conflicts. 
Metaphors of pre-stabilized harmonies in the rhythm of which “the economy” swung lost their 
grip. By mid-19th century it became clear to all British people, and moreover to all European 
people that there was a disturbing by-product of the liberation by growth: the culture of capitalism. 
It is worth risking superficiality when recalling some of the popular images of this new culture 
since they would come to represent the basic tone of all economic skepticisms.  
 
 
The Culture of Capitalism and the Battle of Ideologies:  
By the Means of Science – Revolution! 
 
Since mid-19th century trade ceased to be the source of perceptions surrounding “the 
economy”. Instead, economic talk became to be associated with the predicaments of 
production. This perception was more intensive for it affected the entire society, and also more 
extensive for it affected all of Europe. “The economy” was ripped from its British home 
ground. It crossed nations, and became enriched with a new international consciousness: the 
class-consciousness. The new subjects were “the workers” using machines, and “the capitalist” 
owning machines. Like previously merchants, workers claimed political representation, and 
thus challenged the social conditions of truth in economic talk. Initially legal acts tried to cope 
with this change, but the revolutionary spirit soon changed the modern economic political. 
Already in the first decades of the 19th century labor movements began to mobilize. Luddites 
stormed the machines, Saint-Simonean sects gathered, and Owenses built New Harmonies (for 
an early history of socialist movements, see Sombart 1968 [1896]). The Reform Act of 1867, to 
pick one event, marks one turn in Britain. Until then the formation of labor unions was a 
criminal act. Those reformers of life who around the turn of the century still did not have 
enough of revolutions met on Monte Verità.  
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Since the mid-19th century it became clear to many that the installation of freedom is itself 
a forceful act, which is one of the genuine Marxian thoughts. Foucault, for example, repeated 
this argument in his history of liberalism: “With one hand freedom must be produced, but this 
very act entails that the other hand establishes limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and 
obligations relying on threats, etcetera.” (Foucault 2008: 64) The liberation from corrupt 
politics by means of its subordination to “the economy” lost its grip and credibility. The 
culture of capitalism is not as harmonious as the modern triad of science, technology and 
growth suggests. There is conflict.  
One source of complaints about this new culture certainly was the loss of faith in progress 
by technology. One of the leading tropes of 19th century cultural criticism was that man-made 
machine turns against man. Adam Smith surely would have been more careful with his 
Newtonian metaphors of mechanics after his little needle manufactory came to be a sooted 
hollow of mass-production, as production phenomena came to be portrayed. The new era of 
self-moving heat engines shed a different light on problems of “poverty”. Being poor was no 
longer not only a matter of survival, death, and hunger, but became a social problem – a 
problem of “commodification”, as Thomas Carlyle said, and “alienation”, as Karl Marx said, 
and thus, of course, of “exploitation”, as many continue to say over and over again. The 
machine ceased working for man, and man began working like a machine – “an appendage of 
the machine” as Marx and Engels wrote in their Manifesto. 
Such social imaginaries of the industrialization went so deep into the European mind that I 
hardly need to illustrate further. Many, until today, have drawn from their humanitarian 
sentiments huge energies for describing painstakingly the social miseries of the culture of 
capitalism, for blaming its actors polemically, and envisioning en detail a world free of these 
miseries. A new genre of cultural criticism came to be, starting from the utopians, and 
continuing in novels like Carlyle’s Past and Present (1843), Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888), 
George’s Poverty and Progress (1871) – a genre that continued throughout this century as in 
Arnold’s Folklore of Capitalism (1937), and down to the present-day Galbraith-Bell-Klein 
literature. Never outmoded, always needed. Carlyle set the tone of this genre:  
 
And yet I will venture to believe that in no time, since the beginnings of Society, was the lot of those 
same dumb millions of toilers so entirely unbearable as it is even in the days now passing over. It is not 
to die (…). But it is to live miserable we know not why; to work sore and yet gain nothing; to be heart-
worn, weary, yet isolated, unrelated, girt in with a cold universal Laissez-faire: it is to do slowly all our 
life long, imprisoned in a deaf, dead, Infinite Injustice, as in the accursed iron belly of a Phalaris’ Bull! 
This is and remains forever intolerable to all men whom God has made (1848 [1843]: 211).  
 
This tone of cultural criticism entered deep into western literary minds of the 20th century, 
from romantic literature to realism, in theatre, film and music. Here is the literary root of the 
Marxian tendency in everyday economics that I have observed in the last part.  
Speaking of the culture of capitalism, how could I forget the new political in post-1848? 
Politics was no longer a matter of this or that special interest, but a matter of systems. And while 
laws are objects of parliamentarians, systems are objects of revolutions. In 1848 politics 
became revolutionary, it became European, and yet national. And most important, it became 
conflicting as almost all of Europe shouted one clarion call against each other: Liberty! In this 
clamor, the soft-spoken laissez-faire economists debating in their private Club could hardly 
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claim authority to this title of liberty. Liberty needs force; the force of those who are on “our” 
side. Thus, perhaps the most salient development for the social history of economics that 
stamped the modern image of “the economy” is the rise of ideologies. The “phenomenal 
republic of interests” turned into a battle between political systems. Ideology is the historical 
phenomenon that describes the political century between 1850 and 1950 – the century of high 
modernism in European politics. It encompassed nationalist, liberal, restorationist, fascist, 
cosmopolitan, bourgeois, democratic, socialist, communist ideologies, etc., fought for in all 
hemispheres of the globe. It was not before 1945 that politics ceased to be a battle of 
ideologies.  
Returning to the scientification of economics, in the decades between 1840 and 1880 the 
general esteem of political economy was considerably low. In 1876, “[o]n the occasion of the 
dinner given by the Political Economy Club of London to mark the centenary of the Wealth of 
Nations it was suggested that the economists ‘had better be celebrating the obsequies of their 
science than its jubilee’.” (Coats 1954: 143) The very existence of Section F “Political Economy 
and Statistics” of the British Association for the Advancement of Science has been openly 
challenged (Ibid.). The reason was that with the doubts about the integrity of the modern triad, 
there emerged a rising industry of blaming political economists for justifying social misery. 
Most popular are Carlyle, Ruskin, and Tawney – compiled with all their friends in Coleman’s 
history of anti-economics (2002). Again for the sake of tone it is worth quoting one of the 
popular lines of Carlyle.  
 
In brief, all this Mammon-Gospel, of Supply-and-demand, Competition, Laissez-faire, and Devil take 
the hindmost, begins to be one of the shabbiest Gospels ever preached on Earth; or altogether the 
shabbiest. Even with Dilettante partridge-nets, and at a horrible expenditure of pain, who shall regret to 
see the entirely transient, and at best somewhat despicable life strangled out of it? At the best, as we say, 
a somewhat despicable, unvenerable thing, this same ‘Laissez-faire;’ and now, at the worst, fast growing 
an altogether detestable one! (1848: 184) 
 
The verve of scientific optimism that political economists could once rely on passed away in 
these lines. Political economy disregards, if not distorts or hides, and is in any case inadequate 
for the miseries of 19th century capitalism. Clearly, with this culture the economic suspicion had 
to fall back on the British economist. But now it came not from the clergy, but from inside the 
profession, like here from the German nationalist economist Friedrich List (1789-1846). 
 
Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her 
manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no other nation can 
sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders of her 
greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she 
has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the 
truth (List 2005: 47). 
 
Back is the economic suspicion. Economic science had to prove itself not against the 
protective interests of merchants, but against those who believed in a better world for all 
human beings. Now political economists had to face up to the New Good as opposed to the 
Old Clergy.  
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The stigmatization of political economy could have been deadly. Political economy could 
have sunk back in some British debates about policies of yesterday if there had not been others 
who re-claimed science – socialists. If they had not re-claimed scientific authority, my narrative 
could have ended here. Socialists claimed their own vision of how technology (means of 
production), growth (towards the class-less society), and science (which I explain in a second) 
come together. The idea of “Scientific Socialism” combines loosely related attempts that 
associated scientific optimism with a vision of a post-capitalistic society. Marx added his share, 
as did the Austromarxists around Hilferding, and Otto Neurath gave it a real kick. Later, Oskar 
Lange and Jakob Marschak actually designed the socialist model of “the economy”. I will 
describe these attempts later in this chapter. One could also recall the British movements such 
as Bernalism, and the Association for Scientific Workers of the 1930s that associated scientism 
and Marxism (Werskey 1978). The difference between early utopian socialism of the first 
quarter of the 19th century and scientific socialism was that science was not merely a virtual ally 
within a political project, but socialists regained the very theoretical perception of “the 
economy”. Scientific socialism made science itself politically contested, and thus provided new 
ground for another wave of scientification. Without scientific socialism, the science of wealth 
could have ended at the margins of the archive for the Scottish Enlightenment. 
In 1848, two texts were published that mark the symbolic beginning of the second wave of 
scientification, The Communist Manifesto, and Mill’s Principles of Political Economy. Both nourished 
the belief that the project of economic science could be rescued. Marx and Mill mark the 
beginning of the century of the ideological battles for scientific authority. The difference of the 
first and second wave is that scientific authority is no longer employed in the political 
discourse, but scientific authority itself became politically contested. Now, political debates 
could be entertained along the question of which party can claim scientific authority. Science 
became politically contested, and politics became scientifically contested. 
Next to those saying ‘In the Name of Science: Laissez-faire!’ a second clarion call provided 
affective ground for the project of economic science: By the Means of Science: Revolution! 
Here are the origins of the division between “real” and “pseudo” economic science. The 
second wave of scientification marks thus the beginning of a philosophical awareness of 
economists. The outcome of this contest, I will argue in this transitional chapter, was not the 
victory of one over the other. The actual scientification did not happen by means of a decision 
between political systems, but by means of moving beyond them. Both political sides claimed a 
reality beyond economic life. Both sides fostered their own structural giant of “the economy” – 
“the market” and “capital”. Only on this structure, on the preliminaries to meaning, the 
scientification could ultimately calm. Since the marginal revolution of the 1870s, “the 
economy” ever clearer was only accessible for scientific concern as long as it was stated beyond 
this political contest. Efforts of scientification have been channeled into an abstraction beyond 
the ideological battles, not a solution within these debates. The rough-and-tumble of the 
ideological battles gave rise to a new discreetness, and a new moderation that made the success 
of the formalist revolution in the 1950s possible. The socialist calculation debate between 1920 
and 1945, which I discuss below, stands in this respect as a monument of high modernism in 
economics. 1850-1950 while heated on the one hand was the century for becoming moderate 
on the other; a moderation that culminated in the silence of the formalist revolution.  
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Thus, 1850-1950, the century through which I will slide in this chapter more or less neatly. 
I call it the century of high modernism for only then was economic science actually contested – 
for this reason the bulk of historians of economics focus solely on this period. There are at 
least three definite, and interrelated markers that allow for this periodization: (1) 1850 socialists 
began to re-claim science, while at 1950 the claim to scientific authority was free from the 
ideological battle between socialism and liberalism. (2) 1850 historicists began to claim 
representation in science, while 1950 any historical reflection was out, and history of economic 
thought became a separated sub-discipline – halfway, around 1900, economic history moved to 
the history department. (3) In 1850 economists became philosophical about their science, and 
started to think about the particular epistemic character of their science (thus they stopped 
using the metaphors of other sciences implicitly); while 1950 marks the end of the 
philosophical awareness of economists since there was no longer any need to make up one’s 
mind about the scientificity of the discipline – philosophy of economics became a separate 
sub-field in the 1970s.  
 
 
Marx’s Reclaiming of Scientific Authority between Materialism and Positivism:  
The Concern for the Concrete  
 
It would be easy to downplay Marx’s role in the scientification of economic writings if he had 
not snuck into the minds of so many others – though the point can quickly be made. Marx 
himself was disposed of such an abundance of affective resources that he could easily 
renounce scientific optimism as a source of his undertaking. He did not worry too much about 
science. His reference was German Idealism. His materialism comes from there. And all he 
said about science, in turn, comes from his materialism. Marx’s contribution to the 
scientification of economics had to be mediated by others.  
There is yet one overwhelming notion that overshadows the entire century of political 
battles for economic science: Marx’s conviction that political economy is bourgeois. In light of 
the time described above such a statement does not need to imply more than that Marx shared 
the common perception that political economy was insufficient for coping with the misery of 
the day. At the same time, Marx was clearly a political economist. Every exegesis of Marx’s text 
must recognize the debt he owes to the reading of Mill, Ricardo, and down to Boisguilbert and 
Petty. From where else did he take all his economic categories? One actually has to go into the 
writings of Engels in order to find a quote that confirms Marx’s blame of political economy 
being bourgeois.  
 
Political economy came into being as a natural result of the expansion of trade, and with its appearance 
elementary, unscientific huckstering was replaced by a developed system of licensed fraud, an entire 
science of enrichment (Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy). 
 
Though Marx acknowledged the preliminary accomplishment of political economy, he 
undermines it because of the historical situation in that it appeared. In this fashion, Marx took 
over the culture of economic suspicion. His materialism cultivated, and even systematized the 
critical question: Who Are You – Arguing This! How could such vigor have found ways into 
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the economists’ body of knowledge? A direct encounter was difficult since bourgeois political 
economy meant nothing but an effect of the capitalist mode of production. And those who 
believe the contrary will vanish anyway as soon as class struggle increases, as he wrote in the 
Afterword to Capital I. So how could have Marx engaged in a dialogue with political economists? 
Historical materialism, to say the least, makes it difficult to talk to each other.  
Marx would have not entered in the order of economists if he had not relied to some 
extent on scientific optimism. His materialism re-cultivated not only the culture of economic 
suspicion, but also the notion of “real” economic science. Both! Marx did claim science, real 
science of economic reality “as it is”, not merely as we think it is. Science begins, he writes in 
the German Ideology,  
 
where speculation ends – in real life – there real, positive science begins: the representation of the 
practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty talk about consciousness 
ceases, and real knowledge has to take place. 
 
These two associations of Marx’s materialism – one undermining past political economy, the 
other envisioning a future “real, positive” science – draw a huge cross in the constellations of 
economic talk since 1850. With one hand, Marx nourished positivism, and with the other he 
nourished cultural criticism. The former affirms reality, and the latter affirms reflexivity. The 
former refers to truth, and the latter evokes it. The economic genres inspired by Marx thus 
continued on two different continents: in science, and in social philosophy. Until today, 
references to Marx in the AER do not overlap with references to Marx in the New Left Review.  
To ask on which grounds Marx actually claimed scientific authority does not help solving 
this tension. It meant, first and simply, ‘not religion’, through which communists initially were 
identified. I cannot avoid associating Marx with the rigor of Hegelian dialectics, which makes 
his writings not less formal than what readers knew from Ricardo. But for Marx science also 
refers to the opposite of “philosophy”, in particular Hegel’s German Idealism. He even 
associated science with Bacon’s eye for he held some esteem for Petty and Boisguilbert: 
“Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring out empirically, and without any 
mystification and speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with 
production” (German Ideology). He moreover linked science with historicism: “We know only a 
single science, the science of history” (German Ideology, crossed). But ultimately science was 
simply knowledge that serves the class struggle. Interestingly, this does not mean that 
economic science became socialist, but “Socialism became a science”, as Engels wrote in 1877:  
 
To thoroughly comprehend the historical conditions and thus the very nature of this act [the universal 
emancipation of the proletariat], to impart to the now oppressed proletarian class a full knowledge of 
the conditions and of the meaning of the momentous act it is called upon to accomplish, this is the task 
of the theoretical expression of the proletarian movement, scientific Socialism (Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific). 
 
By the Means of Science: Revolution! – whatever science that is.  
Surly, Marx could inspire so many streams of thought that are perceived today beyond the 
limits of economics only because of this variety of meanings of “science”. Sociology, economic 
history, and political science are all disciplines that gained (new) shape in the second half of the 
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19th century with reference to Marx. But for the same reason of variety, those who obeyed the 
scientific clarion call never could rely heavily on Marx’s texts. “Scientific socialism”, at least to 
the extent that it entered the institutions of economics, was never “Marxist” since economists 
never wanted to make socialism a science, but they wanted to make economic science socialist. 
As another consequence of this variety, there are only a few writers who defended Marx as an 
actual “scientist” in accordance to the standard body of philosophy of science (Little 1986, or 
in their own way, analytical Marxists of the 1980s, such as Jon Elster 1986).  
What combines the various genres that owe credit to Marx is a certain sensibility for the 
concreteness of economic life. Marx could mobilize that same concreteness that I have 
downplayed in William Petty because of the latter’s structuralism. Concrete economic life for 
Marx is constitutive of social structure, not the other way around. After the economic turn of 
the political in 17th century Britain, Marx again reversed the relation of political and economic 
life: now once more political life comes from economic life. It is for this reason that there is, as 
compared to the liberal tradition of political economy, astonishingly much of Aristotle in Marx 
– not only if we think of chrematistics and the fetish of “merely for the money” (for an 
unheated comparison see Booth 1993).  
The materialist aspect of this sense for the concrete, I repeat, never entered the shrine of 
science. Material economic life was that from which we conduct an epistemic life. The hurdle of 
Marx’s materialism that is difficult to take for any intellectual is that economic life not only 
enables and liberates to a moral, epistemic, and political life, as in Aristotle, but also determines 
it. This relation of economic and epistemic life was supposedly the very object of Marx’s 
science – which made it much too philosophical to be possibly true. The difference of Marx’s 
materialism and any abstract reasoning is more than a simple opposition. The object of a 
materialist science is economic life before it takes form: ‘consciousness explained from the 
contradictions of material life’, as he wrote in 1859 in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy. The “form”, instead, as it will describe the scientification of economics, 
“captures” content only because it does not entail it – so that formalism after all has nothing to 
do with abstraction. Hence there could never be any real encounter between a materialist notion 
of knowledge and that of modern science, which views knowledge as referring to truth. How 
could reflexivity, or a simple reflection on the material conditions of science, ever meet the 
intellectual needs of economists who just overcame the culture of economic suspicion?  
This gap overshadowed much of the political contest about the meaning of science, even if 
Marx’s materialism came with softer and more coherent tones. Let me mention some of the 
streams of thought that were inspired by Marx and took hold in the prospering economics 
departments of the last decades of the 19th century. One that would have been impossible 
without the Marxian re-cultivation of the economic suspicion was the revival of the Who-
question. Marx’s conception of critique has incorporated, rather than avoided, the culture of 
the economic suspicion. If laissez-faire policies are not made In the Name of Science, but For 
the Sake of the Bourgeoisie, the question is: what kind of people make capitalism? Who are the 
bourgeois capitalists? Or more moderately, why does homo oeconomicus dominate capitalist 
culture? This question triggered a new series of writings: most notably are Veblen’s Theory of the 
Leissure Class (1994 [1899]), a critique of the envy, emulation, and swank of the modern 
consumer who inherited far more premodern irrationalism than usually imaged; Max Weber’s 
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Spirit of Capitalism (2005 [1904]), showing how protestant belief was decisive for homo 
oeconomicus to be self-constrained, and thus, Weber infers, successful; Sombart’s The Jews and 
Modern Capitalism (1982 [1911]), repeating the voice of three millennia of European history of 
economic suspicion; and, not to forget, Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1994 
[1942]) staring the heroic entrepreneur, with which Schumpeter turned Marx’s depiction of the 
capitalist on its head, yet confirmed at the same time the break-down of capitalism.  
Although these texts were written as contributions to economics, none of them made a 
contribution to the scientification of economics. Today they are perceived as part of sociology. 
After WWII, this genre fell for its political incorrectness. It had to give space to the discussion 
about an abstract notion of “rationality” as a normative principle of markets. In the same sense 
as in the later Marx the notion of the cruel character of the capitalist vanishes at the cost of the 
analysis of capital, so does the intuition of the homo oeconomicus vanish at the cost of the analysis 
of the market. In the case of those who still pose the who-question explicitly in a Marxian 
context – such as recently Boltanski and Chiapello in their New Spirit of Capitalism, (2005) – 
there is not even the question whether it could count as a contribution to economics. And the 
same is true if one indulges in such an exercise in the liberal tradition, as recently for example 
McCloskey, asking ‘does capitalism make us virtuous?’ (2006) The anachronism is blatant.  
 The political contest on scientific authority took place in two other schools of thought that 
were inspired by Marx’s sense of the concrete: historicists, mainly on the continent, and 
institutionalists, mainly in the U.S. There was also the romantic school between Adam Müller 
and Othmar Spann, the discussion of which I leave for another occasion. The historicist school 
in Germany reaches from Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894) and Karl Knies (1821-1898) to 
Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), and the last politically more problematic historicist, Werner 
Sombart (1863-1941), whose spirit spread in the dawn of nationalism. These historicists came 
to be pejoratively titled Kathedersozialisten. While for Engels they were philanthropic vulgar 
economists the appraisals among historians differ. Some show how much they anticipated later 
innovations in economics (Streissler 2001). Others deny them to be historical altogether 
(Pearson 1999), or show the distinctness of the school (Hodgson 2001: 56 ff., Caldwell 2001). 
In England there was a more moderate historical school represented by John Ingram (1823-
1907), and William Cunningham (1849-1919) (Coats 1954). In the U.S. the concern for the 
concrete flourished under the heading of institutionalism, notably Thorstein Veblen (1857-
1929), and John Clark (1884-1963). Though they coined the beginnings of the AEA, they soon 
lost their influence under the pressure of marginalists in the first decade of the 20th century 
(standard reference goes to Rutherford 1994; for a rather heterodox account from the point of 
view of Dewey’s pragmatism, see Amariglio and Ruccio 2003: 171-215). 
The rise and fall of historicists and institutionalists are vital to the scientification of 
economics in that both schools coined academic writings for several decades without much 
reference to the authority of received political economists. The association with the Marxian 
tradition rather than the Scottish enlightenment, even if loose, was apparent. “The economy” 
did not mean a structure beyond interest, but described the historical reality of capitalism with 
its concrete market institutions. The intellectual efforts of institutionalists and historicists were 
always informed by a notion of the finitude, contingency, dependency, or, as one says today, 
embeddedness of “the economy”. “The economy”, just as in the oikonomic literature, is 
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constituted by something that is in itself not economic. The market is, rather than a principle 
of society, an institution, and thus a matter of political design! Moreover, if the market is a 
historical reality, then this reality had a beginning and could possibly find its long-awaited end. 
Otherwise, even revolutions would not make a difference.  
With these more or less explicit connotations, Marx entered the history of the 
scientification of economics during the decades around 1900. Without going into details, let me 
ask also for the reason of the phenomenological concern for history: What made the historical 
school historicist? Historicists certainly did not start from a philosophical defense of a Marxian 
conception of history. Instead, they were historicists simply by virtue of their painstaking local 
studies, for example, on weavers in Strasbourg between the 13th and 17th century (Schmoller 
1879). The historicist came to articulate a methodological position only in the so-called 
Methodenstreit between Carl Menger and Gustav Schmoller in the 1880s to the result that they 
defended the position that economic theory should be found on economic history. Rather than 
defending a materialist conception of history, historicists argued in terms of a foundational 
empiricist position. The Methodenstreit had the effect that historicists came to be associated with 
“induction” as opposed to “deduction”. If there had been any materialist aspect of their 
historicist stance, they should not have engaged in the debate in the first place. Marx had never 
entered such debate because for him the very difference of history and theory was 
inconceivable. Theory, for him is an expression of history.  
Only after history and theory are opposed can history degrade to “historical-statistical 
Kleinmalerei”, and “historical micrographs”, as Menger polemically called Schmoller’s work in 
his Irrthümer (1884: 37*). History became factual history: the “collection of dead facts as it is 
with the empiricists (themselves still abstract)” (Marx, German Ideology). Menger and his friends 
achieved to let history appear as something prior to meaning, a sequence of events that are 
only understandable as long as there is a conception of it, preferably in terms of causes, 
occasionally in terms of reasons. History merely shows “whatever specialissima of certain 
cloth-weaver guilds” (Ibid.: 40*), or the “meat prices of Elberfeld, Pforzheim, Mühlheim, 
Hildesheim, Germersheim, Zwickau” (Ibid.: 38*), but never the laws according to which these 
prices are formed. Instead, history for Marx is the source of the concrete, not because it was 
opposed to the abstract, but because it evokes our conception of it. Only as long as there is no 
history/theory divide, can history be telling, and shows itself rather than its surface data. Could 
Menger have also referred to later works such as Sombart’s three volumes of Der moderne 
Kapitalismus (1902-1916) that could hardly be ridiculed as Kleinmalerei? Is not the very project of 
such a history a theoretical claim?  
Accordingly, the victory of theory over history was not the victory of one method to 
obtain truth over another, as it is usually discussed (Mäki 1997). There was no contested truth. 
Instead there was a contest about the meaning of truth. The institutional result was thus not the 
rise of two different schools or paradigms, but the crowding out of historical studies from the 
economics department. Economic historians in England, France, and the U.S. – though for 
different reasons – moved in the first decades of the 20th century into other branches of 
economic talk. Braudel, Febvre, Bloch, and their friends did not rank high in the growing 
AEA. If historians are unwilling to distinguish economic and non-economic phenomena, how 
could they provide a genuine approach in economics, let alone contribute to its scientification?  
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A similar argument could be made for other contests about the meaning of science that 
accompanied the turn of the century, such as the contest about the divide between the 
institutional reality and the theoretical logic of markets, as well as the contest about the 
normative/positive divide. But I spare that discussion for another occasion. There is still a lot 
of historical work to be done on how the connotations of scientific authority have been 
politically debated. Let me merely give a hint of the intricacy of these negotiations by 
considering the notion of “positive economics”.  
From the point of view of the liberal tradition, one had to embrace “positive economics” 
insofar as it was opposed to the normativity when penetrating into the individual sphere. On 
the other hand, one had to be opposed to it because “positive” also meant empirical determination. 
“Positive economics” implied ontological transparency of “the economy”, full determination, 
and thus the possibility of a planned economy. In order to avoid the science that prints out the 
plan for replacing government with scientific administration, one had to restrain oneself to 
“truth in abstract”. Such is the confusion Marx has caused in the history of the scientification 
of economics: Positive economics had to be embraced in that it had to be free from ideology. 
But it also had to be rejected since it was associated with the planning of “the economy”.  
This confusion around “positive economics” was operative, and fatal for economists’ 
scientific optimism. By means of this confusion, Marx resurrected the forgotten ambiguity 
inherent in the clarion call In the Name of Science – Laissez-faire! The ambiguity between 
arguing beyond any interest, but nevertheless in favor of a particular interest now takes the 
shape of supporting positive economics as far as it pushes beyond ideology, while keeping it at 
a distance in order to avoid ontological transparency that leaves no space to formulate liberal 
doctrines. The battleground, on which these connotations had to come to a point, was the 
socialist calculation debate, which I discuss below. The contest, to anticipate it right away, was 
not resolved until the formalist revolution, which met both requirements: it appeared to be 
beyond ideology and beyond determination. But before entering this debate let me survey some 
basics about the new genres in science that sprung from the liberal tradition.  
 
 
Moderation, Separation, and the Liberal Retreat: 
For the Sake of Science – Calm Down! 
 
Marx shared the belief that political economy is insufficient for capturing the new realities of 
the culture of capitalism with the economist he disliked most but nevertheless learned most of 
his economics from: John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Mill, too, wanted to update political 
economy in light of the new predicaments of modern life. He shared the skepticism of the 
culture of capitalism. Think for example of his unforgettable: “It is questionable if all the 
mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any human being” (1998 
[1848]: 129). Mill was an ardent reader of Thomas Carlyle, and shared his social concerns with 
his wife Harriet Taylor. He even embraced a “qualified Socialism” as long as it was democratic 
(2000: 191). Most honorably, he made these frank admissions to political economy after an 
exclusively liberal education from his father, and his father’s friends including Say, Ricardo and 
others. Mill attempted to combine political economy with the social ethics (not the 
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mathematics) of utilitarianism, and a considerably broad yet concrete notion of freedom. He 
was certainly more moderate in his political views than any other of his British colleagues 
before 1848 – the year he published his path-breaking Principles of Political Economy. About the 
changes in the second edition of 1849, he wrote:  
 
In the first edition the difficulties of Socialism were stated so strongly, that the tone was on the whole 
that of opposition to it. In the year or two which followed, much time was given to the study of the 
best Socialistic writers on the Continent, and to meditation and discussion on the whole range of topics 
involved in the controversy: And the result was that most of what had been written on the subject in 
the first edition was cancelled (2000 [1873]: 234). 
 
Mill’s Principles have been the most read book in the second half of the 19th century before it 
was replaced by Marshall’s Principles of Economics (1890). Mill’s contribution was to free the body 
of political economy from the political context in which it was stuck. He accomplished to re-
codify the body of knowledge of political economy. His Principles actually made political 
economy a body of knowledge, and thus, as Schabas has argued more thoroughly, represents 
the very first conception of “the economy” (2006: 125 ff). He organized political economy 
around the categories of production and consumption – which related for him like “nature” 
and “will”. Mill, as many after him, wanted to improve politics and science by means of 
separating them. Rather than the materialist denial of such distinction the master trope of the 
tradition that dominated the rise of economic departments was separation: the separation of the 
necessity of nature and the morality of justice, of the concrete and the abstract, of theory and 
application, and of science and art, as Jean-Baptiste Say must have told the young Mill when he 
came to study in Paris.  
The theoretical structure of Mill’s textbook coined all Principles in the rest of the 19th, and 
early 20th century. Even the textbook of historians, and to some extent of socialists obeyed 
roughly to this structure: (1) production, (2) distribution, (3) exchange, (4) a chapter on the 
“progress of society”, and then separate from the rest of the text, (5) a chapter on government. 
These categories, sufficiently abstract yet rooted in concrete intuitions about the constituents 
of economic life, made generations of economists believe in the expressive possibilities of 
political economy – the science of the production and distribution of wealth. Today, these 
categories still transmit much of the general perception of what is going on in “the economy”. 
Before Mill, these categories were not as distinctly perceived. Recall that in the oikonomic 
literature, for example, the difference of production, distribution, and exchange was a matter of 
whether one did one’s homework or needs to rely on the trader. Only for lazy rascals, 
production and consumption was not the same.  
With a body of political economy in his back, and its bad reputation in mind Mill initiated 
the battle for the epistemic grounds of scientific authority. In the political rough-and-tumble of 
mid 19th century it was no longer obvious what this authority really amounts to. The implicit 
image of science, and the mere reliance on Baconean and Newtonian metaphors was not 
sufficient to secure that authority. Until Mill it sufficed to say that political economy is “like” 
science. Now one had to acknowledge that it is just not like any other science. It is special. 
Thus, the questions arose: What is economic knowledge? What is the proper object of 
economics? What can economists really know, and what is beyond their scope? This was the 
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birth of the philosophy of economics that lasted for about one century – the century of a new 
genre in the epistemic culture of economics: The scope and method literature.  
Thinking of scope and method could be called the natural way of conceptualizing a 
discipline. It expresses the epistemic self-understanding of a scientist. Scope and method 
describe what scientists “have in mind” – the intentional correlate of their practice. With the 
question of scope one negotiates the perception of “the economy”. In question are the 
“distinctions between phenomena that are of chief economic importance” (Keynes 1999 
[1890]: 75). And with the question of method one negotiates the propriety of how one speaks 
about “the economy”. While before this philosophical turn the scope of epistemic claims was 
implicitly agreed upon through the social context in which this claim was made (the trade of 
England), now, after economics was uprooted from its home ground around the British 
Parliament, the scope of economics became a problem.  
Insecurity arouse around the common perception of “the economy”, and the proper way 
to talk about it. The politization of economic science made it necessary to cut the edges of “the 
economy”, since too much appeared to be put into the field: even revolutions! The scope and 
method literature was a defensive, or at least moderating literature. It lowered “the tone and 
temper of political thought”, as Marshall commented by hindsight in 1897:  
 
General economic principles had to justify their existence before a court which no longer had any bias 
in their favor, and perhaps had some little bias against them. Consequently, they became less dictatorial, 
and more willing to admit their limitations (…) Much must be taken on conjecture (117). 
 
Moderating one the one hand, as long as the scope of economics was contestable one thought 
of “the economy” as a particular domain, and thus as an institution, rather than a principle of 
society. There only could be a scope and method literature as long as an institutional reality of 
“the economy” was perceived. In Mill’s world between 1850 and roughly 1900 there was, 
therefore, not yet a clear difference between political economists and institutionalists. As a 
consequence, it would be shortsighted if I neglected the political connotations with which 
economic knowledge was characterized. The line between doxa and episteme was politically 
contested, though revolutions, everybody agreed, belonged to the former side.  
Let me shortly recall some essentials of that literature. It started with Mill (1874 [1844]), 
had its heydays in Robbins (1972 [1932]), and found an end in Becker (1976). It circles around 
the separation and combination of the concrete and the abstract, of induction and deduction, 
of theory and application, and of science and art. Mill’s Definition of Political Economy; and on the 
Method of Investigation Proper to it (1844) made the beginning. It was first published in 1836, and 
attempted to rescue Ricardo’s high flights in abstract reasoning with some empirical flavor. But 
hardly anyone embraced this flavor full-heartedly. After Mill’s essay in the 1850s, quarrels 
arouse between the old Nassau-Senior (1790-1864) together with Richard Whately (1787-1863) 
against William Whewell (1794-1866) about deduction and induction – though even the 
inductivist Whewell was critical about the leisure empiricism of Mill (Whewell 1849). Other 
texts that took up Mill’s discussion were Cairnes’ The Character and Logical Method of Political 
Economy, arguing that “no economic or social truth, meriting the name of scientific, ever has 
been discovered by such [inductive] means, and it may be safely asserted, none ever will be.” 
(1888 [1857]: 79). Favoring the deductive method, Cairnes argued that the political economy of 
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laissez-faire merely amounts to a theoretical exercise, not an actual political claim (in Coats 
1954: 146). John Neville Keynes’ Scope and Method of Political Economy rescued Marshall by 
moderately arguing for an ‘unprejudiced combination’ of art and science (1891). And Carl 
Menger’s Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences (1883), which caused the Methodenstreit, 
initiated the exclusion of the concern of the concrete.  
After revolutions and wars, a later wave of this contest took place in the 1930s when 
Robbins wrote his Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932) – with his 
astonishingly successful definition: “Economics is the science which studies human behaviour 
as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (16). Against 
Robbins, Hutchison took the positivist stance in The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic 
Theory (1938). Though at its surface, the issue was about positivist and abstract reasoning, it also 
increased the conflict between an institutional perception of “the economy” and scientific 
authority. Robbins shifted attention away from Marshall’s partial (thus institutional) market 
analysis to Lausanne’s general market analysis – although, as we will see below, he argued only 
two years later against the socialist use of Walras’s GET. By hindsight, Robbins essay was 
successful not because economists came to an agreement about the scope of their discipline, 
but because this question began to loose relevance. Hutchison did not contribute to the red 
color of positivism, and Robbins’ success may be due to its being the last of its kind. The more 
economists referred to Robbins, the less it meant something particular. In his Three Essays – the 
bible of economists’ formalism – Koopmans would later refer to both Robbins, and 
Hutchison supportively (1957).  
The scope and method genre is definitely past today. In the course of the following 
decades, Robbins’ definition would become a placeholder for the scope of economics beyond 
the perceptibility of scope. The anti-philosophical attitude that, as I will show in the next part, 
was constitutive of the formalist revolution in the 1950s undermined the grounds on which 
one could discuss scope and method. Such attitude is most apparent in Friedman’s much-read 
Methodology of Positive Economics (1953), and, even more popular, in Becker’s Economic Approach to 
Human Behaviour (1976). Becker rejected the very question of a scope of economics (since 
economics is itself a method), and Friedman rejected the question of a suitable method for 
discovering truth (since economic knowledge is instrumental). Friedman and Becker could thus 
be said to mark the end of the contests about referential truth in economics. Since the 1970s, 
one can be a successful economist even if one does not have the slightest interest, let alone 
opinion about the epistemic character of one’s claims (one can refer calmly to specialists in 
economic methodology). Moreover, one can be a successful economist without having any 
perception of what it is that is going on in “the economy”. It suffices is to believe that There 
Are Decisions Made – whatever that means. In short, the scope and method literature was 
initially meant to make explicit the image of “the economy” as a particular social institution, 
but it ended up supporting the image of the market as a theoretical principle of society.  
As an illustration of this degeneration of philosophical contestability let me discuss shortly 
the destiny of Mill’s main doctrine: the “method a priori”, and its principle of the “pursuit of 
wealth”. In terms of the passage from the oikonomia to “the economy” Mill’s considerations 
represent the move from phronesis to instrumental rationality, the nature of which accompanied 
the scope and method literature down to Robbins and Becker. When Smith wrote about the 
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homo oeconomicus he thought in terms of virtues, phronesis being one of them. Now instead, 
phronesis came to be used as a principle for science beyond the reference to particular kind of 
people. Mill set forth the pursuit of wealth as a deductive principle of economic science reflecting 
the deepest credo of modern life projected to a principle of mankind: to want.  
Recall that the pursuit of wealth in the oikonomic literature was possible only insofar as one 
is able to keep in mind what wealth is good for. Phronesis was the ability to see wealth in light 
of one’s needs. The greedy usurer was beyond practical wisdom because he lost sight of the 
meaning of wealth. For the usurer the difference of means and ends is just a matter of which 
side of the coin one looks at. Means could be an end in themselves just as ends can be means 
for yet another end. The contested line was, of course, where “mere” wealth ends and “truly” 
human eudaimonia begins. For this reason one quarrelled about the nature of wealth in 
opposition to those who believed it to be All There Is. 
Mill marks the end of this discussion when posing the pursuit of wealth (rather than wealth 
itself) as a deductive principle. Wealth is disassociated from a notion of material needs, and 
comes close to a notion of material means in general – whatever is the end. With Mill, a 
substantive notion of wealth was substituted with a principle of human motivation. Instead of 
discussing what wealth is, the issue became whether the deductive method of the “pursuit of 
wealth” leads to “truth”, or only to something “like” truth. Mill’s epistemic culture could 
flourish at the cost of avoiding a question – moderation.  
This moderation is present in Mill’s notion of deduction. Deduction prior to Mill (in 
North, Whately, and Ricardo) did not prevent from an actual claim, but simply was the way to 
make a claim. Instead, for Mill deductive knowledge was merely second best. Why? Since he 
no longer conceived an inherent nexus between various human motivations (like the 
conditioning of desires by the meeting of needs), Mill spoke of the pursuit of wealth as one 
motive next to others. Man not only pursues wealth, but his motivations are complex. With Mill 
political economy became cautious, moderate, and aloof of making a claim about motivations 
that were still so vital for anyone in the 17th and 18th century. Too direct claims were not 
permissible because economic reality that results from economic life is complex, and full of 
“disturbing causes”, as Mill expressed himself. Hence there was the method a priori.  
 
Since, therefore, it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at (…) while we look at the facts in the 
concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has surrounded them, and endeavour to elicit 
a general law by a process of induction from a comparison of details; there remains no other method 
than the a priori one, or that of “abstract speculation” (Mill 1844: 148). 
 
Marx also used the word “speculation” in precisely the same context: “where speculation ends 
– in real life – there real, positive science begins: the representation of the practical activity, of 
the practical process of development of men.” (German Ideology). Marx and Mill seem to agree 
on terms. But precisely where science in Mill holds still, it begins in Marx.  
But such does not do fully justice to Mill. He had a great sense of what he called 
“disturbing causes”, and most of his texts are concerned with them. How else could he express 
his worries about the human miseries of his time? His Principles did not exclude these 
disturbances, and he believed that its success was due precisely to this sensibility, as he wrote 
not without pride:  
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It [the Principles] was, from the first, continually cited and referred to as an authority, because it was not a 
book merely of abstract science, but also of application, and treated Political Economy not as a thing by 
itself, but as a fragment of a greater whole; a branch of Social Philosophy, so interlinked with all the 
other branches, that its conclusions, even in its own peculiar province, are only true conditionally, 
subject to interference and counteraction from causes not directly within its scope (Mill 1873: 236). 
 
Mill’s method a priori was not designed in order to prevent him from a concrete claim. It was 
designed in order to arrive at a claim with the caution matters deserve, and without loosing 
sight in the disturbances of a world that calls too quickly for revolutions.  
However, as a consequence of this separation of the abstract and the concrete – and of 
political economy and social philosophy – his notion of “disturbing causes” could also serve as 
an excuse not to engage in these turbulences at all. The pursuit of political economy was 
disassociated from making a concrete claim just as the pursuit of wealth was disassociated from 
the meaning of wealth. In short, the method a priori was initially a call for caution, soberness, 
and prudence in the rough-and-tumble of revolutions – a symbol of the respect for the 
concrete. Yet it backfired on the concern for the concrete.  
Until the last decades of the 19th century, Mill’s separation of science and art worked as a 
warning against the misuse of the authority of science, though art was nevertheless a necessary 
part of the full ethos of economists. Later the ethos of the economic scientist excluded art – 
that is, political, applied, normative, institutional, historical, or any other interpretive concerns. 
Beyond the separation for the sake of the concrete there arose an epistemic hierarchy of science 
and art, of the pure and the applied, of positive and normative, of theory and history, or even 
of ‘method and ideas’, as Edgeworth celebrated mathematical economics (1889: 541). In the 
decades between the marginalist revolution and the beginnings of the formalist revolution the 
epistemic distance that describes the ethos of economists was realized in these hierarchies. 
With this step from (moral) phronesis to (deductive) instrumental rationality Mill’s essay 
anticipated much of what happened in the decades around 1900 when marginalism settled in 
the institutions of economics. Notions of the scope and method of economics became 
evermore weakened in favour of greater scientificity. This was the time when political economy 
became economics, that is, freed itself from its “political” conditions. The marginalist 
revolution and its aftermath could expectably be the episode in a social history of the 
scientification of economics. Historians have granted it much attention (path-breaking 
Mirowski 1991). There emphasis is put on the role of other sciences such as psychology, logic, 
mathematics, and physics, which was indeed crucial for scientific optimism around 1900. This 
period is all the more interesting since it describes the professionalization of economics, as 
thoroughly researched by Coats (1993). Around the turn of the century academic journals 
emerged, which soon replaced the writing of treatises. It is common sense among historians to 
argue in one or another way for a degeneration of economics in this period that Veblen has 
labeled “neoclassical” – evoking therewith an idyllic image of political economy. Historians 
tend to argue that since the 1870s economics slowly went off track. Most expressively by Mark 
Blaug: “neoclassical economics indeed achieved greater generality but only by asking easier 
questions” (1996: 282). But what, given my previous remarks, was really new? 
In the history of economic theory, the marginalist revolution is called a revolution because 
it replaced the theoretical structure of Mill’s Principles (production, consumption, exchange, 
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etc.), with a unique principle of constrained maximization (of “utility”). Rather than the style of 
reasoning in marginal terms (already present in Ricardo and others), the path-breaking shift was 
that away from a clear perception of the constituents of “the economy” to a unique conceptual 
logic of economic theory. Economic theory was no longer designed in order to represent the 
“laws of the phenomena of wealth” (Cairnes 1888: 35), but in order to represent value in prices. 
Since Jevons, population, production factors, land rentals, subsistence rates, and all that was 
perceived as the scope of political economy, came to be given – that is to say shifted beyond 
scientific concerns. When Jevons represented labor as consumption with a negative sign, it 
meant the knock out for the possible expression of class-consciousness, or for that matter, the 
question of what-kind-of-people.  
By virtue of a steady dematerialization of economic life the marginal revolution gave way 
to the mathematization of economic theory. Revolutionary in one respect, early neoclassicals 
continued the steady “denaturalization of economic order”, in terms of which Schabas has 
discussed this dematerialization (2006). Late 19th century mathematical enthusiasm 
accomplished Mill’s task of sober separation – namely, to make it “impossible for the educated 
economist to mistake the limits of theory and practice, or to repeat the confusions which 
brought the study into discredit and almost arrested its growth,” as Foxwell celebrated 
mathematical economics in 1888 (in Edgeworth 1889: 552). In 1890, Simon Patten, later a 
president of the AEA, argued that economics should replace mathematics and physics in 
general education, and that moral and political thought should be separated (in Siegfried, 
Hinshaw 1991: 373). In the following decades, however, such demands had one great hurdle to 
take: the association of mathematical precision with scientific socialism. This association, which 
I discuss in a moment, hindered the depolitization of economic theory and represents the last 
remedies of a concrete intuition about “the economy”.  
According to the general outlook of my phenomenological narrative, I can only downplay 
the scientific efforts that have been invested in the scientification of the theories of values. The 
psycho-physiological branch of the marginalists (above all Francis Edgeworth, 1845-1926) took 
their enthusiasm from their readings of Helmholtz, Wundt, Delboef and others. The hope was 
to provide scientific substance to the law of diminishing marginal utility – precisely as today 
neuro-sciences make some behavioral economists believe to provide scientific substance to 
(ir)rational choice (see following chapter). These debates, however, were never contested for 
matters of an anthropological intuition of homo oeconomicus. Edgeworth may have read 
Veblen on the weekend without associating it with his own work. Scientific efforts rather 
resulted in a steady thinning out of substantial claims (for an classic account see Wong (2006 
[1978], more detailed Mirowski and Hands 2006). From cardinal to ordinal to revealed 
preferences, from psychology of utility via the logic of choice to the sets of convex preferences, 
these innovations were written in the spirit that was anticipated by Jevons:  
 
The food which prevents the pangs of hunger, the clothes which fend off the cold of winter, possess 
incontestable utility; but we must beware of restricting the meaning of the word (utility) by any moral 
considerations. Anything which an individual is found to desire and to labor for must be assumed to 
passes for him utility. In the science of economics we treat men not as they ought to be, but as they are 
(Jevons 1879 [1871]: 41)  
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Becker did beware restricting utility to ‘clothes fending off the cold of winter’ when speaking 
of children as utility. Since scientific authority was gained by means of not presuming a 
particular understanding of “utility” I may seriously ask: has there ever been any utilitarian 
economist other than Mill? The scientification of the theories of value moved economists away 
from the social philosophy of utilitarianism. More surprisingly, it neither moved it closer to the 
psychology department. Why else could institutionalists, who did not write “psychology” on 
their forehead, challenge the poor psychological foundations of marginalists, who did? (Veblen 
1961) 
Since scientification between the marginal and formalist revolution did not take either road 
via the psyche, or via moral intuitions, since economists thus never wanted to prove to be bad 
anthropologists – as behavioral economists assume when proudly observing that people do not 
behave rational – this scientification found its theoretical expression not at all in a different 
notion of economic life, but in the degeneration of the perception of “the economy”. Decisive 
in this time of prospering economic theory are thus rather the changing connotations 
surrounding “the economy”. This was the locus where all fruits of scientific optimism could be 
earned. The fall of the psychological imaginary behind the Theories of Value prepared the 
ground for the Theory of Prize as the theoretical problem of “the economy”. There the actual 
political battle for scientific authority took place.  
 
 
The Socialist Calculation Debate  
and the Diminishing Weight of Meaning of Economics 
 
The battlefield, where the political connotations of the theoretical perception of “the 
economy” were fought for, was not that of the nature of economic behavior, but the socialist 
calculation debate. It was the battle for science. The question of the scientific determinability of 
“the economy” employed for socialist policies stands in the background of most theoretical 
innovations in economic theory for the first half of the 20th century. The open clash of 
ideological and scientific motives in this debate make these decades vital for a social history. 
Most scientific optimism in economics of that period came to be expressed in this debate. 
“Market socialism”, as it was called, was the most ambitious project of the political utilization 
of science: science makes the market, and replaces competitive production with administration, 
which would amount to an end of the horrors surrounding the culture of capitalism. The 
debate stands as a monument for both, high modernism of economics between capitalism and 
socialism, and at the same time for the very degeneration of a possible scientific resolution. The 
debate was never resolved, but interrupted – 1945. It is worth recalling the debate in some 
length since it sets the scene for the following part. The debate starts with the time when 
positivism gained reddish shades, and ends with the colorlessness of the formalist revolution. 
Allow some preliminary remarks. What is said to be the core of the debate is the challenge 
liberal Austrian economists have perceived when leftish inclined positivists claimed that market 
theory could be utilized for socialist purposes. Today, the debate is still the hobbyhorse of 
some Austrian economists. Boettke has compiled an extensive documentation (2000). The 
lessons to be drawn are still open to debate. Don Lavoie has offered an Austrian-biased 
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interpretation (in Boettke 2000, VI), while others have reformulated the socialists’ stance 
against Austrians (for example O’Neill 1996). For Austrian economists the debate was an 
initiating moment to the extent that they distanced themselves from scientism, and as a result 
marginalized themselves in the decades after the war. Austrians remained literary economists. 
For this reason their liberalism today stands somewhat aside from the rest of the profession.  
In the Austrian community the debate echoed long after the rest of the profession already 
had forgotten it. Even Marxists of the 1960s, for example, hardly relied on the same scientific 
optimism of their pre-war predecessors. Most of them cultivated the same anti-scientism that 
Austrians have acquired with their “subjectivism” during this debate. This results in a highly 
irritating vicinity of the so-called “postmodern” Marxists and the epistemology of some 
neoliberals. I consider this vicinity as symptomatic for the subtle influence of economics in 
today’s economic talk. The road to post-modernism via the neoliberal critique of scientism has 
not been sufficiently considered by those who feel as though they make a contribution to 
cultural criticism by announcing the plurality of knowledge. Considering the following debate, 
one may seriously ask: Is post-modernism the new hermeneutics of capitalism? The 
subjectivism of Austrian economists, including their flirtations with scholars such as Alfred 
Schütz, also made me consider Austrian economics when starting this project (see e.g. 
Lachmann 1991, Madison 1994). Today my presentation of the debate is rather informed by 
the works of Steele (1992), O’Neill (1996, 2006), Mirowski (2001), but also Caldwell (2004). 
The socialist calculation debate was not only one but a continuous debate spanning 
through various decades and places. After first flaring up in Pareto’s Lausanne, the two main 
trouble spots were Vienna of the 1920s and Chicago of the 1930s. Additionally, the unity of 
the debate is questionable because the issue of debate – like in all good debates – was part of it. 
On the surface matter was theoretical, but underlying was the contest about the meaning of 
economic theory – and thus the political ethos of economists. As Mirowski has put it, 
“competing conceptions of the very nature of ‘science’ were at stake in the controversy, and 
not untrammeled Luddism, although this passed unrecognized at that time” (2001: 237). At 
stake was not the truth of “the economy”, but the meaning of this truth. Is economic truth 
something by means of which one achieves something, or is economic truth something in the name 
of which one takes a political stance? This contest was interrupted by 1945. But the theory went 
on. For this reason the debate hardly entered textbooks and most students of economics have 
never heard of it. The techniques that evolved from the debate, however, all students know. 
They entered without change into a McCarthy-clean environment of the years after the war.  
Socialist scholars also may not know a great deal about the debate. For the socialist 
prominence in the first half of the 20th century did not play a major role in it. They were busy 
with their ongoing revolution, power politics, and transition plans. For such activities they did 
not need the vehicle of scientific optimism to motivate themselves. When the revolutionaries 
had to face the task of economic design – Lenin’s New Economic Policy and Stalin’s Five Year 
Plans – the notion of installing the economic heaven of the class-less society was quickly 
crammed into the lower drawer. Nationalization is anyhow not the same as socialization, as 
Kautsky understood early. The socialist prominence was quick in agreeing on a slow passage to 
communism that includes (themselves as) governors. Russia, for example, first had to be 
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“civilized” for socialism, so that the ultimate plan of the classless society was never printed. 
Economic plans were political plans. They never substituted politics.  
The issue nevertheless touches at a sore point of their revolutionary spirit: how to actually 
design the administrative institutions of a socialist system, which are, in the end, supposed to 
replace the exploitative culture of competitive production, if not money itself. Marx’s question 
that formed the backdrop of the debate was this: “What social functions will there remain, 
then, analogous to the present functions of the State? This question can only be answered with 
the help of the scientific method” (in Boettke 2000, I: 301). Or more concretely, as Engels 
wrote in a letter to Marx in 1855, how is it possible to arrive at an “association of free and 
equal producers acting consciously according to a general and rational plan” (Marx, Vol. 13: 
241-242). The debate, however, was not “Marxist”, as Arnold has forcefully argued (in Boettke, 
IX). For a historical materialist talk about markets is meaningless in socialism. Revolutions 
change terms on which society is understood to such extent that it is futile to discuss it on the 
grounds of bourgeois science. No discussion. Marxists believed, like Engels, that socialism is a 
science, not that bourgeois economic science can serve socialists, which was the issue of the 
debate. For socialists, such issue is attractive and risky at the same time; attractive since one can 
reclaim science, but risky since one would prove that economic science is not bourgeois. These 
two aspects will be fatal for those holding strong positions in the debate. 
Socialist quarrels about economic policy, moreover, were hardly informed by scientific 
optimism. Bukharin and Trotzky did not quarrel about science, but about farmers – though 
Bukharin does refer to Mises on the occasion of explaining NEP (in Boettke 2000, I: 593). 
Socialist prominence had no time to discuss the scientific possibility of socialism. They had to 
make it – which took a long time. If they touched the problem at all they did not show 
scientific optimism, but mainly scientific naivety. When it comes to the point to get rid of the 
capitalist system, as Lenin dreamt, it will happen just like that, “immediately overnight”, only 
with the “knowledge of the four rules of arithmetic, and issuing, appropriate receipts” (in 
Steele 1992: 68). Simple accounting – like in a firm, like in an oikos – suffices to run the class-
less society. Also Bukharin’s ABC of Communism does not exceed basic arithmetic. Perhaps after 
educating the working class to socialist managers proper, Bukharin suggested, “the economy” 
will run just fine (in Boettke, I: 427f.). Social democrats in the west, like August Bebel, shared 
this naivety when speaking about the feasibility of statistically determining who gets what: 
“when some experience has been gained, everything will run smoothly” (in Steele 1992: 59). It 
remained a dream. Apart from the early 1930s, the Russian plans never performed ‘at least as 
good if not better than’ “free” markets in the west, which was the core claim of the debate.  
The debate, therefore, largely remained within the rising institutions of economic science. 
So what was the issue? It was the possibility of an economic organization of collectively owned 
means of production: expropriation and regaining surplus value that makes an end to the 
exploitative competitive culture of capitalists. By taking control of production, moreover, one 
has the possibility to distribute national income according to needs rather than productivity. 
This was the dream in socialist terms. Regarding economic theory let me present the issue in 
terms of the framework that slowly evolved from this debate, namely Walrasian general 
equilibrium theory. Walras represented “the economy” as a set of equations that are all 
simultaneously solved by one price vector. He designed this theory as a theory of pure 
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competition. Was it possible to utilize a model of competition for socialist purposes? Could 
this inclusive conceptual framework of GET justify the design of “the economy” by statistical 
determination? Is it possible that one “fills in” the quantities in all equations, and fully 
represents “the economy”? Could the government act as a Walrasian auctioneer altering prices 
to reduce excess demand? The benchmark was whether this could also be efficient in the sense 
of equal marginal productivity of all factors – no waste. Hence, was it possible to “choose” a 
desirable distribution of income that is just as efficient as competitive markets? Roughly said, is 
it possible to replace the invisible hand with a sophisticated bookkeeper? 
The first flaring-up was in 1908 within Pareto’s Lausanne. One of Pareto’s followers, 
Enrico Barone (1859-1924), took seriously a remark of his master that relative prices are merely 
‘accounting devises’ (in Boettke 2000, II). Could a statistically sophisticated government not 
play this accountant? If so, Barone argued, government would be subjected to the same 
principles, as laid down by Pareto and Walras for the case of free competition:  
 
From what we have seen and demonstrated hitherto, it is obvious how fantastic those doctrines are 
which imagine that production in the collectivist regime would be ordered in manner substantially 
different from that of the ‘anarchist’ production. (…) [A]ll the economic categories of the old regime 
must reappear, though maybe with other name: prices, salaries, interest, rent, profit, saving, etc. (289) 
 
Thus, revolutions do not change the terms upon which one theorizes “the economy”. Socialism 
and capitalism are formally equivalent. Barone did not take this point further by asking whether 
or how a collectivist state could be as efficient as capitalist “anarchy”. Given Pareto’s 
skepticism that governments always cause inefficiency, and the provincial milieu coined by 
personal tensions between bourgeois Walras and reactionary Pareto, this little quarrel could not 
break out into a battle about the big system – the Russian reality of which was still to come.  
The actual debate took off in the intellectual milieu of Vienna after WWI. There, in a 
rather contingent way, a mixture of ideas and traditions came together in such way that 
positivism took on shades of red – which is the virulent joint of the debate (see Caldwell 2004: 
100f, and for an illustrative description from the point of view of Oskar Morgenstern, Leonard 
2008). Austromarxism was big in the “first republic” of the interwar period. Otto Bauer, Max 
Adler, and, somewhat aside, Rudolf Hilferding pushed Marxism in academia. But 
austromarxists neither participated in the hype of positivism, nor referred to Walras. Walras’s 
GET became known in Vienna, rather, through Joseph Schumpeter and his 1908 Wesen und 
Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie. Schumpeter presented Walras’ GET as a 
benchmark for scientific authority, though not because of political reasons. He knew that 
Walras did not express his political intuitions in his Pure Theory, since he also read his 
sociological writings. Schumpeter was appealed by Walras’ rigidity, and disassociated Walras 
from his political intuitions. As a result, Walras’s socialist ideas never found inroads into the 
calculation debate.  
 
(S)o far as pure theory is concerned, Walras is in my opinion the greatest of all economists. (…) 
Unfortunately, Walras himself attached as much importance to his questionable philosophies about 
social justice, his land-nationalization scheme, his projects about monetary management, and other 
things that have nothing to do with his superb achievement in pure theory (1954: 827f.).  
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The first, then, who gave positivism its fully red color was the political philosopher of science 
Otto Neurath (1882-1945). “Of all attempt at creating a strictly scientific unmetaphysical 
phsyicalist sociology, Marxism is the most complete”, he wrote about the “Scientific Content 
of History and Political Economy” (Neurath 1973 [1931]: 349). Without reference to Walras, 
the experiences of economic planning in WWI made him believe that also in peacetime 
socialist planning is the way to go (in Boettke 2000, I). Neurath actually argued for the 
replacement of money with an “economy in kind”, as also Max Weber discussed earlier. 
Instead of money, one could count in “real units”, the nature of which is statistically 
determined in accordance with the “material” needs of people – do we hear the echo of 
Aristotle’s belief of just prices “in accordance to needs”? O’Neill has made a strong case for 
reviving Neurath’s argument in that it presupposed commensurability, which is a matter of 
individual rationality (1996). But the debate did not continue on this level. For nobody else 
would touch the distribution of consumer goods, and thus consumer sovereignty, so bluntly. 
Such claims, and certainly the actual practice of socialist planning in Russia provoked 
liberal economists to draw a clear political line between economic theory and socialism. It 
particularly provoked the young Privatdozent Ludwig van Mises (1881-1973) to write in 1920 
what some call the centerpiece of the debate: “Economic Calculation in the Socialist 
Commonwealth” (in Boettke 2000, II). What later would come to be known as Mises’ 
(praxeological) apriorism, finds here its first political expression. He made a simple theoretical 
point: “Where there is no free market, there is no pricing mechanism; without a pricing 
mechanism, there is no economic calculation” (Ibid.: 111). Without a private ownership 
economy one cannot possibly speak of efficiency because there is no ground on which one 
could assess it. Even if one allows for a consumer market, money does not play the same role 
in a socialist economy. Economic planning under collective ownership is necessarily arbitrary. 
“There is only groping in dark. Socialism is the abolition of rational economy” (Ibid.: 110). 
Rationality of “the economy” is preserved to the “anarchy” of free markets.  
 
Without economic calculation there can be no economy (…) Historically, human rationality is a 
development of economic life. Could it then obtain when divorced therefrom? (…) [I]n place of the 
economy of the “anarchic” method of production [capitalism], recourse will be had to the senseless 
output of an absurd apparatus. The wheels will turn, but will run to no effect (Ibid.: 105-6). 
 
This was perhaps the only time in the history of economics that “the economy”, the market 
and liberal policies were explicitly equated – an equation that was always both operational and 
fatal for claiming scientific authority. 
Next to this aprioristic argument, Mises also referred to two auxiliary points: complexity 
and incentives. He spoke about the “longer roundabout processes of capitalistic 
production”(Ibid.: 101), which are too complex to calculate – though in a single oikos, he 
admits, it is possible. Moreover, without being paid according to productivity workers would 
not care about efficiency, that is to say, they would be lazy. These arguments are weaker in that 
they refer to the practicality, not principal possibility of calculation. For who knows what 
happens to technology? And who knows if workers in socialism are happy to work efficiently 
without being paid according to their productivity. But the main point remained: no authority 
can mimic the unique rationality of “the economy”. This rationality simply does not appear 
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without the freedom of competition. And so Mises closes by saying that he will not deter 
“culture socialists” who aim at the “dissolution of the most frightful of all barbarisms – 
capitalist rationality” (Ibid: 130).  
During the 1920s, Mises’ argument was by and large accepted in Vienna. The 
contributions during this time, however, showed great attention to the practicality as well as 
reality of socialist planning. Boris Brutzkus gave a thorough account of why the NEP, and the 
Five Year Plans were doomed to fail (Boettke 2000, III). In 1935, Hayek compiled continental 
contributions in an English edition (Boettke 2000, II). There he referred to the complexity of 
the solution of “hundreds of thousands (…) simultaneous differential equations, a task which, 
with any means known at present, could not be carried out in lifetime.” (Ibid.: 212). Hayek’s 
opponents would later continuously quote this statement as well as Lionel Robbins, who 
argued similarly in his analysis of The Great Depression. There, Robbins showed more clearly the 
politics behind his a-political 1932 Essay (in Boettke 2000, V). Attention thus moved away 
from Mises’ apriorist argument – or at least so it seemed for its opponents. 
Let me keep track of Walras’ model. Its actual revival happened in Vienna during the same 
time in the 1930s, but not in the context of the calculation debate. Mises was reading Carl 
Menger’s economics, not Walras’. The revival of Walras happened in Karl Menger’s 
mathematical colloquium (Karl was the son of Carl). There, economists like Oskar 
Morgenstern, Abraham Wald, and Karl Schlesinger were reading Cassel’s reformulation of 
Walras (1932 [1918]), and specifically the critique of Frederik Zeuthen and Hans Neisser that 
there may be negative prices. Wald presented a first proof of the existence of an equilibrium of 
Cassel’s equations, and in 1937 von Neumann’s path-breaking topological proof of an 
equilibrium in a growth model was published in Menger’s proceedings (see e.g. Punzo 1991). 
Although Walras stood in the spotlight of this group, their mathematical spirit dominated 
positivist aspirations – and thus the possible political ambitions they had. Menger’s group was 
less expressive of its politics than the rest of Vienna. The rather religious Abraham Wald hardly 
has thought of this proof as an expression of his political inclinations. With the Anschluss of 
Austria in 1938 the colloquium had to give up. On that day, Schlesinger, who brought up the 
problem of existence, committed suicide while others celebrated.  
The times on the Continent were too virulent, such that the debate could have continued 
on Viennese parquet. The quarrels continued in the 1930s on safer ground in the U.S. There, 
Mises’ argument about the lack of method to determine an efficient allocation in socialism was 
seriously challenged. In Walras’ terms, to whom reference was made more frequently, the 
tatonnement process to arrive at an equilibrium was tackled. Also the notion of “solving 
equations” moved to the fore. The contributions – this is still one of the contested points – 
took place somewhere in-between Mises’ aprioristic and empirical arguments. More important, 
the line between socialists and opponents was less clearly drawn than on the continent. Rather 
than a debate on the theoretical foundations of politics, one negotiated the political meaning of 
theory. This shift of debate was accompanied by several confusions regarding the level of 
argument. Accusations and cross-accusations of misunderstandings widened the gap between 
the theory discussed and the implications drawn. 
Already the first U.S. contribution is stunning in this respect. Frederick Taylor was a liberal 
economist, but argued in his Presidential Address of the AEA – as though a mere theoretical 
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exercise – for the possibility of socialist planning. On the base of evaluation tables of primary 
factors, government can plan production as efficient as in a free market. Moreover, 
government has the additional tool of distributing income, which it could apply freely 
according to both productivity and needs. In 1933, the socialist H.D. Dickinson provoked with 
the claim that the plans of the Superior Economic Council, as he called it, can perform “at least 
as well as, if not better than, under capitalism” (in Boettke, IV: 34). Dickinson, as later 
elaborated by Oskar Lange, argued for a trial and error procedure to arrive at equilibrium 
prices. One may even start with randomly chosen prices, he argued. Dickinson also referred to 
the issue of statistically determining demand curves, which would come to be the central theme 
around which the econometrics society was established. A reply by Maurice Dobb, and a 
rejoinder by Abba Lerner followed, discussing mainly the terms of the discussion. The nature 
and place of consumer sovereignty also became contested after Dobb’s article. He brought up 
the possibility that the equilibrium may not be unique. And, to mention another issue, the role 
of advertisement as a source of inefficiency played a role, too.  
Re-reading these early U.S. contributions one can observe a rising awareness about the 
theoretical problem alongside a rising confusion about its implications. On the one hand, the 
theoretical discussion gained sophistication, though on the other the polemic about each 
other’s positions increased equally. There was a clear gap between the sober tone of presenting 
the theory and the polemics that surrounds it. As compared to the scholarly essay of Mises in 
which theoretical argument and theoretical interest were the same, there was an increasing 
mismatch of tone and core of the debate. Although the marginalist principles that characterize 
an equilibrium (equal marginal productivity of all factors) gained sharpness, the dividing line 
between “the elements which are common to both societies from those which belong only to 
one”, as Lerner puts it in 1934, was blurred by polemics (in Boettke 2000, VI: 48). 
What was actually negotiated was less the theoretical, or practical, possibility of scientific 
planning. The very relationship of economic theory and political meaning became problematic. 
The question moved ever farther away from how to manage collective production to a 
corroboration of the marginalist principle of efficiency. Lerner, for example, argued that even if 
dictators determine consumption a market mechanism is necessary: therefore economic theory 
does apply to socialism. Along the same lines, Frank Knight in 1936 argued that marginal 
economics has the same function in socialism and competitive individualism:  
 
[T]he problem[s] of collectivism are not problems of economic theory, but political problems, and (…) 
the economic theorists, as such, has little or nothing to say about them. (…) For the principles of 
marginalism are the logical, mathematical, and hence universal, principles of economy (in Boettke 2000, 
IV: 9f.).  
 
And Lerner began writing more playful about the political issue. He wrote that the socialist 
authorities could conceive of Dickinson’s suggestion as a “subtle scheme of sabotage for 
building the socialist society on rotten foundations” (Ibid.: 48).  
Given this depolitization of the debate, the actual issue at that stage was a negotiation of 
the economists’ ethos in relation to politics. This locus of argument was most explicit in Paul 
Sweezy’s essay of 1936, “The Economist in a Socialist Economy”. He argued that the 
economist is “likely to acquire unprecedented usefulness and prestige” (422) and will “gain 
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heavily from the victory of socialism” (426), at least as compared to the invisible hand 
economist in capitalism. Sweezy pointed to precisely that problem which I have observed at 
the very initiation of economic science between nobody’s interests and special interests:  
  
This very concern with the public interest has left them [economists] to a large extent without a job. 
(…) Either the pursuit of private interests actually is made to serve the public interest through the 
working of competition, in which case is nothing left for the economist but to pronounce a solemn 
Amen, or it is not, and the economist’s advice is necessarily ignored (425). 
 
Only in socialism, therefore, economists could make a difference. For the same reason Hayek 
believed that science in its attempt at being relevant is biased toward socialism (1949). 
Socialism is more able to satisfy intellectual needs than liberalism. But Sweezy and Hayek did 
not anticipate that the spirit of social(ist) engineering was about to merge with the liberal 
doctrines of the west – the scientific engineering of liberty that was about to come.  
As convoluted as the debate was, by the time it came to Oskar Lange’s two publications in 
the Review of Economic Studies in 1936 – reprinted with Taylor’s speech as the Economic Theory of 
Socialism (1938) – confusions calmed, and the ball was on the socialist’s side. Lange’s two essays 
were perhaps the only contribution to the debate that indeed nourished the political belief in 
the feasibility, rather than merely theoretical possibility, of economic design – though he 
neither added new ideas, nor was his model ever put into practice. Yet Lange was celebrated as 
the pioneer of actual socialist planning. This may be due to his astonishing biography. After 
emigrating from Poland, taking a chair in Chicago, and being naturalized as U.S. citizen, Stalin 
invited him for economic advice (see Steele 1996: 153ff). 
Decisive for Lange’s success, methodologically speaking, was that he presented the 
Walrasian framework as an actual description of “the economy”. Lange referred to Walras as 
the father of his scheme, popularized the view that Barone has anticipated Mises on theoretical 
grounds, and believed that he himself has proven the practicality of calculation. He provided a 
scheme how the Central Planning Board can simulate the market for factor prices. Crucial for 
him was the characterization of factor prices as “terms on which alternatives are offered” (in 
Boettke 2000, IV: 116), an “index of alternatives” (117), which warrants the formal equivalence 
of prices in both political systems even under absence of competition. The only rule of the 
Central Planning Board is to alter prices like a Walrasian auctioneer without interfering in the 
choice of quantities. Then, according to Lange, the market is simulated to such extent that 
Mises’ groping in the dark comes to an end. Shortages and surpluses could be observed, and 
via the trial-and-error process equilibrated. The simulated factor market is “surrounded” by the 
consumer market, and therefore dependent of and determined by the equilibrium in this 
market. Then socialist planning can even perform better than a capitalist society because there 
would be no inefficiencies due to monopolies, and no crises due to business cycles. Both refer 
to genuine Marxian characterizations of capitalism. Monopolies and crises were associated with 
capitalism, and not, as they are today, with “market failures”. I come back to this fundamental 
change of meaning in a moment.  
After the success of Lange’s model the debate calmed in the face of WWII. Mises was of 
the days past. Lange had such success that even Schumpeter believed Mises to be defeated 
(1994: 172 ff). But on which grounds did Lange refuse Mises? On the theoretical possibility, or 
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practical feasibility? Was the problem that of complexity, or that of conceivability? A later 
remark of Lange that is often quoted suggests that he dealt with complexity since he conceived 
of the computer as a substitute for the tatonnement process: “The market process with its 
cumbersome tatonnements appears old-fashioned. Indeed, it may be considered as a 
computing device of the pre-electronic age” (in Mirowski 2001: 236). In this regard, Mirowski 
sees in the debate a crypto discussion about economics that merges with technology – cyborg 
economics. Thus, was Mises’ argument out of the game?  
This brings us to the strike of Hayek that would separate the spirits of economic science 
for decades to come. Hayek was the last to challenge the association of positive economics and 
socialism. Between 1942 and 1944 he published three essays on “Scientism and the Study of 
Society” – reprinted in 1952 as The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. 
When Hayek characterized scientism as the “mechanical and uncritical application of habits of 
thought to fields different from those which they have been formed” (1955: 16), it clearly 
echoes Mises’ point that rationalism in “the economy” is restricted to a liberal society. And 
when he compared economists’ scientism with Stalin’s “engineers of the soul”, he must have 
also had Lange, Dickinson, and others in mind (Ibid.: 94).  
Hayek revived Mises’ aprioristic argument also on the level of a different conception of the 
market, which some celebrate as his most genuine contribution. In his essay “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society” (1945), Hayek presented an informational interpretation of the market 
that materializes the apriorism of Mises in an actual alternative “paradigm” beyond the 
Walrasian equilibrium model. The market is not, as it was conceived between 1930 and 1970, 
the allocation of resources (what the Central Planning Board could simulate), but it utilizes 
“knowledge” most efficiently. And this cannot be a matter of technology because this 
knowledge, so the Austrian tenet, is subjective, and thus evasive of empirical determination. The 
knowledge utilized in markets is situational, contextual, and adaptive to new situations. With 
this argument of the informational efficiency of the market Hayek fleshed out Mises’ apriorism 
with the idea of dispersed and subjective knowledge. For the challenge of Mises was not that it 
is not possible to solve the equations, but to formulate them in the first place, as Lavoie has re-
interpreted the debate (in Boettke 2000, VI: 183). While the problem of resource-efficiency 
could still be conceived of as “objective”, the privatization of knowledge cut off modern 
scientific optimism at its source. At this juncture, Michael Polanyi, who coined the term ‘tacit 
(read: not scientific) knowledge’, joined the Mont Pelerin gang, while his brother Karl Polanyi 
had to commute between Canada and New York because of McCarthy (Mirowski 2004: 71 ff). 
Hayek’s argument implied a second fundamental critique of Lange’s model: that it was 
static – which reversed the association of socialism and history that was vital at the beginning 
of this century of high modernism. The actual virtue of the market, according to Hayek, is not 
that it brings about an efficient result, but that it brings about results efficiently – a dynamic 
process. “Competition, to Hayek, is a verb, a noun to Lange,” Boettke comments (in Boettke 
2000, I: 17). Although for Hayek competition does describe a specific behavior, his new 
conception moved economics away from the question of value that haunted modern 
economics in the century considered in this chapter. With this novel conception of the market 
Hayek set the scene for most Austrian economics after 1945. But he also set the scene for the 
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paradigm shift from resource allocation to information processing that happened after the 
formalist revolution in science.  
In the rough-and-tumble of the war, Hayek’s challenge found no soil. It did not inhibit 
scientific optimism. What happened was rather that scientific optimism was disassociated from 
political systems. WWII was the beginning of Big Science. The place where the ethos of social 
engineers that Lange represented and Hayek challenged could prosper beyond its ideological 
connotations was the Cowles Commission in Chicago. Lange was involved in this group 
together with his student Don Patinkin, and others such as Leonid Hurwicz, Trygve 
Haavelmo, Tjalling Koopmans, and Lawrence Klein. As their names suggest, many of them 
were war-émigrés from the continent. Officially, this group took over the empiricist spirit of 
their founder Alfred Cowles, and his support for econometrics – the econometrics society was 
launched in 1930. The socialist calculation debate was certainly in the back of every 
Cowlesmen’s head, though the militaries’ money in their pocket. The innovation of linear 
programming, for example, would have been inconceivable without the background of Lange’s 
model, but was then advanced in the context of the design of weaponry, above all by George 
Dantzig. This disassociation of mathematical tools and politics was certainly fostered by the 
new vision of the computer. Planning became programming, and calculation became 
computation, which both easily passed political muster. At the occasion of refereeing The Road 
to Serfdom, Marschak distinguished between good and bad planning – he doing good planning, 
and Hayek arguing correctly against bad planning (see Mirowski 2001: 245). “This interesting 
turn in the discussion”, Koopmans commented this depolitization, “shows, it seems to me, 
that the earlier discussions [Hayek, Lange] had been concerned too much with absolute 
institutional categories encompassing the entire economy” (1951: 457). 
Cowles research program was, moreover, watered down by the “neo-classical” adaptation 
of Keynes who was more presentable in the western milieu than economists who, like Lange, 
travelled up and down between Stalin and Roosevelt. Socialism was not written on the flags of 
Cowles but their motto was Science and Measurement – which, for Hayek, would amount to 
precisely the same. One could also view this group independently of the debate, for example 
along the rise of national income accounts conventions. The separation of economic science 
and politics culminates here in the spirit of technocratic engineering that appears beyond any 
philosophical quarrels that haunted the entire century of high modernism. With Cowles, the 
contestability of the ethos of economists disappears behind technical sophistication. Debreu 
later would survey the history of Cowles between 1930 and 1980 ignoring its political 
involvement altogether (1983c). 
The biography of Jacob Marschak, director of research of Cowles between 1942 and 1948 
tells the peculiar passage from economics during the war to economics after the war (Cherrier 
2008). Born in the Ukraine, he actually made the transition from post-revolutionary planning, 
to Berlin, where he contributed to the debate with a pro-socialist argument (1924), and further 
on – with stops at Kiel, Oxford, and New York – to Chicago in order to support the statistical 
branch of Cowles since 1942. After the war he was one of the first who contributed to the 
application of the same scientific rigor to the new rise of the information paradigm that Hayek 
introduced as an alternative to scientism. Hayek’s anti-scientism was forgotten when 
economists like Hurwicz launched the research program of “mechanism design” which 
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brought back the question of informational decentralization posed by Hayek, but in a highly 
scientistic fashion. After these developments, Hayek and von Neumann understood each other 
immediately when meeting at a party (in Mirowski 2001: 238). This disassociation of scientific 
authority and socialist ideologies represent the miracle of years surrounding 1945. The 
formalist revolution was operational for it. It made possible to reverse the motives that led to 
it, which will occupy great parts of the following part. 
In the immediate post-war years until the early 1950s Cowles still shimmered reddish, 
although economists like Oskar Lange already left the country by 1945. The tensions between 
Cowles and Friedman, of course, root there (Mirowski 2001: 241 ff.). Koopmans described the 
spirit of social engineering in Cowles with the following words. Cowlesmen shared 
 
a strong sense of mission and of standing together in the early postwar years of the Commission (…) 
With Klein, Hurwicz and others we battled for simultaneous equations and for the idea of 
econometrically guided policy, in the annual meetings of the professional societies and our skirmishness 
with the National Bureau, as if the future of the country depends on it! (in Mirowski 2001: 244).  
 
The young Lawrence Klein shared the feeling. Against Samuelson’s advice he moved as a post-
doc from MIT to Cowles, where he stayed from 1944 to 1947. 
 
A truly exceptional group of people was assembled in Chicago during the late 1940s. I doubt that such a 
group could ever be put together again in economics (…) In the field of postwar planning we imagined 
that we had the well-being of the economy right in the palms of our hand (in Breit, Spencer 1995: 23 f.).  
 
This strong sense of mission, however, had to fade away in the following years. When in 1948 
Koopmans took over the place of Marschak as Research Director of Cowles, he made a drastic 
turn from econometrics to theory - a point that I will pick up again in the following part. Since 
then there were no longer any real encounters of market socialism and liberal critiques. 
Cowlesmen were too busy with the new technologies. Willy-nilly, they lost their political 
expressiveness. Thus, nobody in the 1950s obeyed Hayek’s call against scientism. Science 
proliferated as never before – independent but still in the context of western capitalism. Hayek 
may have won the debate in ideological terms, but he lost in terms of science. The open 
violence that has been done in favor of freedom in the two, or three decades after the war did 
not obey the spirit of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) – at least if we think of the controlling 
apparatus that McCarthy and Macy envisioned in order to back up market freedom. 
A last publication of the debate needs to be mentioned: Abba Lerner’s Economics of Control 
(1944). Cowlesmen were reading it eagerly. Though it was a technical book at all, it 
incorporated the entire Walrasian framework. Every student of economics today is well 
equipped to read this book. Lerner opens the book by saying that “liberalism and socialism can 
be reconciled in welfare economics” (4). With Lerner, the socialist enthusiasm for scientific 
planning boils down to this sub-discipline of economics. A controlled economy is opposed to 
laissez-faire politics without implying collectivism. Lerner, as Lange, thus still associates the 
social miseries of the culture of capitalism with the “uncontrolled economy”, which shows he 
is clearly a child of the century that I have considered in this chapter. But for Lerner control is 
no longer a matter of substituting the market, but quelling the market. In Lerner “market 
socialism” inconspicuously passed over into, yes, the “social market” – that became the motto 
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of (ordo)liberalism in Europe after the war. While once the question was whether socialist 
politics could be as efficient as the market, now the question was how “social politics” could 
assure the efficiency of the market. While once socialist politics was meant to replace the 
culture of capitalism, now “social politics” means to correct market failures. Market efficiency, 
until today, is something to become. 
In this way, Lerner bequeathed to the discipline of economics the theoretical remnants of 
the socialist calculation debate: the theorems of welfare economics, as students of economics 
learn them today. The textbook versions of these theorems say that a competitive equilibrium 
is Pareto efficient, and that so-called lump-sum transfers can realize any Pareto efficient 
allocation. How far are these theorems removed from the days when Bukharin was citing 
Mises, or Lange advised Stalin! Yet they spoke about the same theory.  
In 1983, Debreu would resume Oskar Lange’s contribution to mathematical economics at 
Cowles without even alluding to its political meaning: 
 
During the first years of the Cowles Commission in Chicago [since 1939], Lange was also working on 
‘The Foundations of Welfare Economics,’ (…) Lange studied the characterization of the Pareto optima 
of an economic system by means of differential calculus, a problem that Maurice Allais was 
independently considering at about the same time in France (…) Lange’s and Allais’s contributions 
brought a long phase in the development of the two basic theorems of welfare economics close to its 
conclusions. They were to influence the reexamination of those theorems by means of convex analysis 
in the early fifties (Debreu 1983c).  
 
This “long phase” I have just surveyed. What Debreu must have meant with “conclusions” 
was that GET ceased being associated with politics, and began being associated with 
mathematical sophistication. The socialist calculation debate, as Debreu implicitly 
acknowledged, remained unresolved. Instead, it experienced a rupture – the rupture of 1945. 
The socialist calculation debate has no clear winner. Maybe the retreat was on the 
socialist’s side since it never tackled the aprioristic argument at its roots, as Lavoie argued (in 
Boettke 2000, VI). But the retreat also may have been on the liberal side, since it could not 
maintain the scientific optimism that stamped the spirit after 1945. Perhaps misunderstandings 
prevailed, as O’Neill suggested after retrieving Neurath. He concluded that it was “Lange who 
is closest to Mises, and Hayek who shared most with Neurath” (1996: 439). Mirowski, instead, 
interprets Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem of the early 1950s as the actual response to Hayek 
(2001: 302 ff.). I may conclude as follows: Considering the further passage of scientific 
optimism, socialists won; but considering the ideological setup, Mises won. The socialist side 
did push the spirit of social engineering and the idea that rationality can be learned, if not by 
agents, then at least by the central authority. But these authorities were all but socialist; they 
were rather western governments securing freedom in markets. 
More important than the resolution of the issue was thus the separation that took place 
during the debate – the separation that describes the entire century of high modernism in 
economics. Designed to give a particular theory a reddish color, it ended up corroborating that 
the color does not matter for economic theory. Designed in order to lay open the hidden 
hands that underlie the invisible hand, it ended up hiding them all the more. What remained 
after the debate was an unresolved contest about the meaning of economic theory, as well as a 
half-opened box of mathematical sophistication for the sake of econometric guesswork. Note 
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that the political associations of theory are contingent to the extent that they require 
scholarship, including the possibility of being expressive of one’s intellectual culture. But this 
was no longer possible after 1945.  
None of the contributions made to the calculation debate contributed directly to the 
scientification of economics. It was not by virtue of a solution to the battle of ideologies that 
scientification advanced between 1850 and 1950. Instead, it happened by means of going 
beyond it. In the same sense as early modern economists accomplished to arrive at a level 
beyond the imposition of mercenary motives, modern economists accomplished to arrive at a 
level beyond the issue of socialism vs. capitalism. The theoretical perception of “the economy” 
(manifest in GET) gained most scientific authority when it became independent of all its 
possible interpretations.  
I rather do not attempt to summarize this century of high modernism in economics. I 
obviously could only present some basic remarks that a thorough social history of 
scientification has to follow up. If one believes in an expressive life of economists, one surely 
finds some equivalent, precursor or some association with this period between 1848 and 1945 
– but not later. For 1945 was the end of the social history of the ethos of economists, as I 
attempt to show in the following chapter.  
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 (4) Today, since  
1945 – Late Modernism 
 
 
 
 
The year 1945 represented a radical reconfiguration of the modern triad of science, 
technology, and economic growth – in particular insofar as it was associated with the liberation 
of man: the absence of authority, the control of means, and the liberation from needs. 1945 
also represented the rise of two intellectual cultures on the continent and in the Anglo-Saxon 
world that reacted rather differently to that reconfiguration. The difference was that on the 
continent, at least for its intellectuals moving from modernism to post-modernism, 1945 meant 
the end of the belief in such triad, while in the Anglo-Saxon world moving from liberalism to 
neoliberalism it meant a success of this triad. The continent was committed to a new 
anthropodicy, which questioned how one possibly could still think humankind in light of the 
new imperative of “Never Forget!” The Anglo-Saxon world, instead, experienced a great push 
forward, a renewed belief in the promises of a scientifically engineered liberty. Most of the events 
since 1945, including 1989 and 2001, seem to confirm this authoritative claim to the meaning 
of liberty. The great puzzle from the point of view of the continent, however, is how the 
scientific optimism that stem from WWII could continue through the Cold War, and did not 
find a clear-cut end at 6th or at the latest at the 9th of August 1945. 
 
 
The Secrecy of the Engineering of Liberty and the Formalist Revolution 
 
The years after 1945 in the U.S. were the years of Big Science. With united forces, government 
and scientists from different promising disciplines – psychiatrists, mathematicians, physicians, 
information scientists, biologists, and neuroscientists, etc. – worked together at one goal, 
namely to design the new man. The military was one of the most generous departments in 
providing funds. Big Science was militarized science – the origin of corporate sponsorship of 
science, according to Mirowski (2001). Apart from the hope for new weaponry, the dream of a 
new man was to free mankind from its inclination to totalitarianism. Some scientists expected 
to find this inclination as a piece in the brain, others hidden in the causal feedback-loops of the 
social system. But most envisioned new man as the “age of communication and control” – 
Norbert Wiener’s motto of cybernetics. The name John von Neumann needs to be dropped, 
too. Google “Macy Conferences”, or “Ratio Club” to get a feeling for the scientific optimism 
222
in the postwar years. By Means of Science: Liberty! – so the new clarion call, which some 
economists sung along.  
For a German European, like me, what is most astonishing about this clarion call is the 
continuity of social engineering during and after WWII. Inconspicuously, social engineering 
switched its connotations from socialist politics to western liberty. Between the 1930s and 
1970s there was a continuous proliferation of technological innovations in economics. After 
the cultivation of real analysis waves of hope have been caused by linear programming, 
measure theory, simplex algorithms, nonstandard analysis, operations research, game theory, 
mechanism design, and simulation techniques – methods that are associated with names such 
as Tjalling Koopmans, Leonid Kantorovich, Jacob Marschak, John von Neumann, George 
Dantzig, Herbert Scarf, Leonid Hurwicz, Herbert Simon, and Kenneth Arrow. Their research 
stamped the years during the war in the same fashion as it stamped the years after the war. The 
same technocratic spirit continues today above all in complexity science associated with names 
such as Steven Durlauf, Lawrence Blume, Brian Arthur, Doyne Farmer. At the end of the cold 
war, economists only had to move a couple of miles from Los Alamos to Santa Fe in order to 
give full expression of their technological enthusiasm in a neoliberal world.  
The changing connotation of technologies in economics is one of the most intricate 
episodes of the history of economics science. The technological innovations are in a seemingly 
contingent relation with the events that determined their social meaning. The political and the 
theoretical output of technology are difficult to link. To spell out these links is to write archive 
history, while ignoring the history that came to be represented in textbooks. One needs to dig 
out the archives of RAND, look for some hints in Göttingen, go down into the cellars of the 
Institute for Advanced Studies, trace how people moved from Los Alamos to Santa Fe, or ask the 
CIA Officer who may have heard what von Neumann bubbled when guarding his door before 
the genius passed away. 
The general college teacher remained ignorant about these flights of science. Until the 
1970s, the bulk of economists were busy with soft Keynesian engineering, at most with input-
output analysis. There was only a small elite of scientists who were directly engaged in the 
mission of utilizing science for the engineering of freedom. The bulk of the profession was 
excluded from such business. Big Science was to a great extent secret science. Hence this history, 
exciting as it is, is only of limited relevance for the present social history of scientification. 
Secret history represents the underworld of the social history of scientification. Not more. 
The link between technology and politics in economics is so intricate because it is difficult 
to squeeze out an intentional link between abstract theoretical innovations and concrete 
political design. How could the military possibly believe, for example, that the mathematics of 
“saddle point existence theorems” could help in case of an atomic strike – a belief it seemed to 
show when it funded Debreu’s research for RAND (1952)? For the present plot the surprising 
fact is that such technocratic vision of science was no longer associated with the socialist 
pretension for planning as before in the 1930s. The social history of scientific engineering from 
the 1930s to the 1970s is interesting in that it describes a full turn of the political orientation, 
for which technology was used and designed for. While in the 1930s social engineering was 
associated with socialist planning, in the 1950s and 1960s it was associated with the engineering 
of market liberty.  
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Planning in the “age of communication and control” lost all totalitarian connotations. In 
some cases, this loss was not even accompanied by a change of the technical tools. The passage 
from calculation to computation partially meant not more than a change of names: linear 
programming, for example, was discussed by Jacob Marschak in the context of getting Oskar 
Lange’s model of a socialist economy going. Later Koopmans mobilized the same technique 
under the name of “activity analysis” in order to model an efficient market economy of the 
U.S. Both referred to the same mathematics. But the former was politically suspicious, and the 
latter easily passed political muster (see Mirowski 2001: 258 f.). 
This reversal was also not the result of an open renegotiation of the meaning of 
technology. In an intellectual milieu that was coined by such phenomena as the Smith Act – 
forbidding revolutions by law – and of course McCarthyism – forbidding even thinking about 
revolutions – how could debates on the political meaning of scientificity possibly be carried 
on? How could one possibly carry on any of the ideological battles that had moved economists’ 
minds the century before? As Herbert Simon commented on these years:  
 
By 1948, Communists and supposed Communists were being discovered under every rug (…) Any 
graduate of the University of Chicago, with its reputation for tolerance for campus radicals, was 
guaranteed a full field investigation before he could obtain a security clearance (in Mirowski 2001: 246).  
 
Thus, there was no eminent economist in the ideologically tense years after WWII who did not 
write science on his forehead giving the impression that all battles of ideology had been already 
decided – at least in the epistemic departments of the Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedys. No 
discussion. Those who still contributed to the political battle about science, such as Hayek, 
were expressively critical about the idea of engineering liberty (Hayek 1949). They pointed to 
the apparent contradiction of the new scientific clarion call and argued openly for the political 
irrelevance of economics for the sake of freedom.  
The decisive question for the present social history of the economists’ ethos is thus: 
Engineering liberty? Why did this not evoke open quarrels? Why did it not undermine 
economists’ scientific stance? Were both of Foucault’s two hands invisible? Mirowski 
suggested that military secrecy made it possible.  
 
The older machine dreams of a socialist like Oskar Lange were simply nowhere on the radar screen in 
the immediate postwar America, fearful as it was of a Red under every bed. However, there was one 
place where comprehensive planning was not only being put into practice on a daily basis in postwar 
America but, even better, where dark suspicions about patriotism and aspersions about foreign-
sounding surnames were kept at bay, if not altogether banished. Whatever the wider doubts about the 
intellectual coherence of ‘market socialism’, the American military was one place where unquestioned 
adherence to the virtues of the market cohabited cheerfully with the most vaunting ambitions of 
centralized command and control, without ever provoking any hand-wringing about conceptual 
consistency or soul-searching over freedom (Mirowski 2001: 255 f.).  
 
Military secrecy may have indeed institutionally enabled technological innovations in 
economics. But it does not explain what these innovations did to the profession, which is what 
this chapter will track down to today.  
The answer that I suggest is that the formal character of technological means made it 
possible to disassociate technology from political determination (see e.g. Goodwin 1998). Only 
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in a demanding, if not absorbing and at the same time unintelligible science political worries do 
not overload economists’ practices. One could practice economic science as though it was not 
a political affair. In other words, only a seemingly ideologically free science could be utilized in a 
conflict so ideologically laden as the decades of the Cold War. In an atmosphere as tense as in 
the 1950s, economic science needed to appear free from ideology, but nevertheless, if it comes 
to its “application” had to play out in support of the western front. This is the key to 
understand the efforts put into the scientification of U.S. economics in the decades after WW 
II. Precisely this need for authority beyond politics was met by the formalist efforts of the neo-
Walrasian community. The meaning of the neo in neo-Walrasian is thus clear: Walrasian 
economics beyond the discussion of its political meaning –that is, Walrasian economics 
axiomatized. I will discuss this episode in the following part extensively.  
In other words, the formalist revolution carried out by the neo-Walrasians in the 1950s 
and 1960s had an enabling, if not conditional, function for the scientific engineering of liberty. 
Formalist economics kept the tension inherent in this mission low. It kept the two Foucaultian 
hands that give and take freedom from touching each other: the axiomatic separation of 
meaning and structure did precisely that! Mirowski and Sent acknowledged this auxiliary role of 
the split between “pure” and “applied” when claiming the following:  
 
The idea that there was some necessary but unproductive form of scientific research that required state 
funding for its very existence, and that the economic growth of the nation would suffer in its absence, 
whereas applied R&D could be safely left to the corporate sector to organize (…) provided the ideal 
cover for the absence of accountability of military science planning (2002: 22) 
 
As a consequence of this separation, however, we can observe a rising gap between the 
perceptions of economics within the discipline as opposed to the perception of economics in 
public, on which I have concluded the last part. The public came to perceive economists as 
market engineers of efficiency. But for the economists themselves, who were by and large 
excluded from the secrecy in some elite institutes, the two decades after the war were like a 
traumatic sleep of suppressed discussions. Because those who occupied the core of the 
profession could barely afford having contests over the meaning of economics. 
Certainly, there were some disagreements between Friedmanians and Samuelsonians. But 
they increasingly agreed on terms, and taught the same textbooks, and enjoyably separated 
themselves from the rest of economic talk. “Where Milton Friedman and I disagree,” 
Samuelson defends the rank of economics as a science, “we are quick to be able to identify the 
source and texture of our disagreements in a way that non-economists cannot perceive” (1992: 
237). Friedman shared Samuelson’s notion of political incontestability of economics, as his 
following comment on his Chile-project makes clear: 
 
In spite of my profound disagreement with the authoritarian political system of Chile, I do not consider 
it as evil for an economist to render technical economic advice to the Chilean Government, and more 
than I would regard it as evil for a physician to give technical advice to the Chilean Government to help 
end a medical plague (in Letelier 1976: 45). 
 
Could Samuelson not have said the same? Surly, Friedman and Samuelson had contests about 
truth, but no contests about the meaning of truth in economics. The same is true regarding the 
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philosophical standards of economics. There never was an open renegotiation of such 
standards. During the 1950s and 1960s it was not necessary to sneer on the old literary style of 
economics. Only later in his age, Samuelson did so: 
 
Like Tobacco Road, the old economics was strewn with rusty monstrosities of logic inherited from the 
past, its soil generated few stalks of vigorous new science, and the correspondence between the terrain 
of the real world and the maps of economic textbooks and treatises was neither smooth nor even one-
to-one (in Breit and Spencer 1995: 59). 
 
Such explicit statements were rare after the war. For those who pushed the new economics, 
such judgment was implicit in their commitment to rigor. 
Those economists who still held strong positions about the meaning of their discipline, 
instead, left the center of the stage. Austrian economists did not claim a place in Chicago or 
MIT, but willingly moved to Mises’ seminar in New York. And the Paul Sweezys left the 
economics departments, too, but unwillingly. There remained but one huge group of 
economists who continued to claim representation in economics: the Keynesian generation. By 
Keynesian generation I mean those economists, who were born between 1900 and 1930, were 
taught in Marshallian economics, socialized via the Great depression, gained literacy with 
Keynes’ General Theory, went along the neo-Keynesian adaptations to some extent, but then 
understood when they had to teach Samuelson’s Economics that they are out of the game. But 
then it was already too late. At the end of the 1960s it came to a generational clash of these with 
the new economists who represented the new core. 
Since these new economists largely came from other disciplines (the Tinbergen-
Koopmann-Neumanns), the literacy of the Keynesian generation did not help much in 
following what was going on at the top. The skills needed for being an economist changed 
drastically in the 1950s and 1960s. Both the so-called Keynesian macro-econometrics of 
economists like Lawrence Klein, and the neo-Walrasian hunt for rigorous micro-foundations 
(both represented by the Cowles Commission) crowded out the economic literacy of an entire 
generation. The expressive opportunities for the old generation of economists diminished 
drastically. Many who perceived themselves as economists, suddenly felt inadequate within the 
new institutions of economics. All the more since these institutions flourished as never before. 
In the postwar years the “oligarchic structure of the profession” in the U.S. triad of MIT-
Chicago-Princeton, as Eagly has surveyed the discipline in 1974, came into being. Around 
1970, economics gained the institutional profile which I have described in the first part. The 
manifestation of the success of scientification was that in 1969 economics received a mimicry 
for the “Nobel Prize” – the Bank of Sweden Prize in Memory of Alfred Nobel.  
The rising gap between the profession and the core, the decreasing expressive 
opportunities, and the steady increase of the burden of responsibility to live up to the seizure 
of the institutions of economics caused evermore fret and uneasiness among economists. 
While I will deal with the two decades after the war extensively in the following chapter, in this 
chapter I take the uneasiness of the Keynesian generation as a starting point in order to argue 
that all responses to the post war situation did not affect the social ethos of economists. In this 
sense, the formalist revolution represents a preliminary end of my social history of 
scientification. The present situation of economists, I argue, can be described in terms of a 
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historical eclipse that does not exceed the horizon of the formalist revolution. No theoretical 
innovation since the 1970s affected the ethos of economists. I already described the 
institutional unity of economics since the 1970s in the last part in light of economists’ 
discursive situation. In this chapter I consider the same unity from the point of view of 
economists’ self-understanding.  
 
 
The Keynesian Uprising of the 1970s and its Phenomenological Confusions 
 
At the beginning of the 1970s, economists shared a feeling of uneasiness that something went 
wrong. All what has been gained in the decades after the war perhaps came at too high costs: 
the relevance of economics. Whatever the secret allies of economists and the cold war, the 
shared sensation was that of detachment, a detachment from what economics was once 
supposed to be. For an entire generation it became increasingly difficult to conduct a scholarly 
life in the booming institutions of economics. The Keynesian generation felt particularly 
uneasy with the prevailing idea that came to dominate the scene in the 1960s: that economics 
has been always centered around one, and only one, question: the conditions under which a 
general equilibrium holds. After the formalist revolution settled down, leaving behind this 
monist theoretical core, the sensation was that of a “turn inward”, as Heilbroner and Milberg 
put it (1995: 68). The desire for change grew evermore (for an extensive survey of the field in 
the 1960s, see Ruggles 1970).  
As early as 1973 Frank Hahn, one of the represents of the new core, acknowledged the 
general discontent, but at the same time added his discontent about these discontents.  
 
Economists do not grow bitter gracefully. Many of them came to the subject hoping to do good and to 
be useful and find that they can do far less than they had expected. Many others with a theoretical bent 
find that they cannot now understand what the best minds in their subject are saying. (…) Looking at, 
but not often studying, the pages of some learned journals or Debreu’s work, they all agree: ‘This is not 
what I meant, this is not what I meant at all’. If they are of the right age they then write a presidential 
address or a lament. What I think is disturbing about so much of this literature is that it is so bad (322).  
 
Hahn refers to the prominence of the Keynesian generation that rose up against the trends 
since 1945 in a row of Presidential Addresses of the AEA during the 1970s. Let me reread 
these speeches asking why they may have been, if not “bad”, so perhaps shortsighted.  
A Presidential Address is a unique occasion for an economist to express his or her worries 
about the state of the discipline. The speeches present to us a frank image of the self-
understanding of an economist in the attempt to speak for the entire profession. The points 
the speeches in the 1970s raised roughly resemble the complaints that the French students 
would later put forth in their post-autistic economics petition of 2000. With these speeches, I 
thus return to the standard critique about economics with which I closed the last part. It was in 
these speeches that this standard critique was instituted. As a reversal of the economic 
suspicion, now the choir goes: Economics is Irrelevant!  
Kenneth E. Boulding (1910-1993) made the beginning in 1968 with his speech Economics as 
a Moral Science. Boulding was a broad-minded economist, who in his early years first 
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contributed to the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis. Later he wanted to be known as an 
evolutionary economist with high-brown scientific ambitions, but without loosing the 
modernist faith in the moral flourishing of economic life. In his speech he pointed to just this 
lack of normativity, particularly in welfare economics that is mislead by the spirit of Pareto 
efficiency. He stood up against the belief that everything that goes beyond the consideration of 
equilibrium prizes is like ‘sermonizing’ on the ‘just prize’ – assessing correctly the historical 
scope of the changes that took place in the preceding decades. “Who, indeed,” he said, “would 
want to exchange the delicate rationality of the theory of equilibrium price, for the 
unoperational vaporings of a ‘just price’ controversy” (1). Apparently without knowing what 
was going on in the epistemic head quarters of the Air Force, Boulding indeed took it for 
granted that economics is beyond the politics of its time: “Economics is a reconciler, it brings 
together the ideologies of East and West, (…) it is corrosive of ideologies and disputes that are 
not worth their costs” (11). And so it is no surprise that Boulding concluded that economists 
should face up to the economic suspicion that has been oppressed for at least three centuries.  
 
There is a widespread feeling that trade is somehow dirty, and that merchants are somewhat undesirable 
characters, and that especially the labor market is utterly despicable as constituting the application of the 
principle of prostitution to virtually all areas of human life. This sentiment is not something which 
economists can neglect (10).  
 
Boulding presented his plea with reference to the values that are constitutive for the academic 
world of economists (2).  
Wassily Leontief (1906-1999) continued in 1971 with his speech Theoretical Assumptions and 
Nonobserved Facts. Leontief was the inventor of input-output analysis, an inclusive framework to 
statistically determine an aggregate economy. It developed somewhat aside from the socialist 
history of GET since Leontief never shared the theoretical interest of Walrasians. His interest 
stem from the issue of statistically determining demand and supply curves, an issue that 
occupied the early econometricians, and later went to Koopmans’ dogs of theory. Hence, 
Leontief complained about the imbalance between statistical techniques and the undeserved 
recognition of mathematical economics. He addressed the misleading nature of mathematical 
economics that is too easily equated with scientificity, though actually being void of any 
reference. “Uncritical enthusiasm for mathematical formulation tends often to conceal the 
ephemeral substantive content of the argument behind the formidable front of algebraic signs” 
(2). Resembling Husserl’s “garb of ideas”, he consequently stated a tendency to forget 
empirical reference when practicing mathematics: “By the time it comes to interpretation of 
the substantive conclusions, the assumptions on which the model has been based are easily 
forgotten” (2). Leontief nonetheless believed that a balance of theory and statistics represents 
science proper. But he did not react to the socialist connotations that phrases like the empirical 
‘mapping of the economy in all its many dimensions’ (7) had before the war.  
John Kenneth Galbraith (1908-2006), an economist again of another kind, added his share 
to the sensation of crisis in 1973 with his speech Power and the Useful Economist. Galbraith was 
most known for one of the most popular books in postwar social criticism, The Affluent Society 
(1958). In his speech, he pointed to the exclusion of the industrial and political power in 
neoclassical market theory (or, “neo-Keynesian”, as he called it). “The business firm is 
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subordinate to the instruction of the market and, thereby, to the individual or household. The 
state is subordinate to the instruction of the citizen” (2). Thus, nobody actually exerts power – 
a politically incorrect assumption. Galbraith thus identified the “hidden” second hand that 
takes freedom in order to support the first “invisible” hand that provides freedom. Examples 
concerning the (non)developing countries are ready at hand in his speech.  
In this way, Galbraith acknowledged the twist that happened to the invisible hand between 
Smith and Arrow. While in Smith it correlated with a particular, namely rival behavior (of 
which the pursuit of gaining market power is part of), the concept of competition later in GET 
meant the absence of market power. And so Galbraith says, “eliding power – in making 
economics a nonpolitical subject – neoclassical theory, by the same process, destroys its 
relation with the real world” (2). Note, however, that he is far from appealing to scientific 
realism. As though he was in Foucault’s lecture, he writes: “Economics, so long as it is thus 
taught, becomes (…) a part of an arrangement by which the citizen or student is kept from 
seeing how he is, or will be, governed” (6). Reality, for Galbraith, is a matter of politics, not of 
truth-seeking. And with the same move he brings us back to the economist as suspect – as in 
the times of sermonizing about just prices: “If the state is the executive committee of the great 
corporation and the planning system, it is partly because neoclassical economics is its 
instrument for neutralizing suspicion that this is so” (11). Galbraith, too, not only made a 
theoretical case, but also demanded a new disciplinary policy based on more pluralism in 
economic science. He anticipated the French movement when saying: “Perhaps there are limits 
to what the young will accept” (11).  
Robert A. Gordon (1908-1978), in 1976 (Rigor and Relevance in a Changing Institutional Setting), 
spoke out what many had already on the tip of their tongue: a direct trade-off between the 
commitment to science and the possibility of saying something of worth. Gordon was a 
Berkeley economist with a strong Keynesian sense for employment issues. He even cared for 
the quality of business education. His argument must have been a relief for many of his 
audience: “The mainstream of economic theory sacrifices far too much relevance in its 
insistent pursuit of ever increasing rigor” (10). Gordon too was explicit about the ‘garb of 
ideas’: “seduced by the siren of mathematical elegance” (12), the profession is unable to tackle 
the “really big questions about the economic aspects of society” (10). Such happens, he argued, 
when unemployment is assumed to be voluntary. Then ‘relevance is considered irrelevant’ (5). 
The train went off track since Robbins, according to Gordon, and runs clearly in the sand since 
GET. Gordon did not consider the conditions of committing oneself to the intellectual virtue 
of relevance; neither did he ask how it was possible that rigor came to substitute the concern for 
relevance. But he certainly has his point when quoting Stigler for equating relevance and 
‘relevance to economic theory’ (2). In Gordon’s view, sensibility for historical institutions 
would bring economics back on track, asking the really relevant question: “What is the future 
of capitalism”? (12) Will it break down? Or will it lead us to heaven? But these questions are 
too hot for the shrine of science. No discussion. 
I could extend the list of countless other speeches held in other societies that adopted a 
similar tone. Let me only mention some highlights. As early as 1964 James Buchanan, in the 
spirit of Hayekian scholarship, mourned the “lack of identification” of economists. However, 
the cause of this disease he discussed in terms of the scope of economic theory. In 1972 Ward 
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wrote a first full monograph on What’s Wrong with Economics, applying Kuhnean standards to 
economics, but showing that it fails to respond to anomalies. Only some, such as Heller (1975), 
attempted to balance out the pessimism, and moderately asked What is Right with Economics? 
Another direct critique of GET worth mentioning, since it became like the refrain of most 
complaints in the years to come, is Nicholas Kaldor’s Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics (1972). 
Pointing to the difference of the axiomatic and the scientific method, the exclusion of 
increasing returns (thus monopolies), cumulative change, among other points, he called for a 
“major act of demolition” of GET (1240). Another “hit” the reader may remember was 
Leijvonhofvued’s “Life Among the Econ” (1973) that ridiculed the closure of economists’ 
tribe. Since the 1970s, there is a clear genre of anti-economic monographs continuing to 
lament The Irrelevance of Conventional Economics (Balogh 1982), Debunking Economics (Keen 2002) 
basically with the same arguments as mentioned, and ceaseless questioning: What’s Wrong with 
Formalization in Economics (Woo 1986). As in the mid-19th century, there was a clear perception 
of a crisis of economics. But this time it came from within the profession. 
In this choir of laments, the profession agreed with those who came to be excluded from 
economic science for political reasons, that is, those who suffered greatly under McCarthyism, 
such as Paul Sweezy (1910-2004). Yet when the profession pled for more pluralism, 
economists like Sweezy were hardly included. Economic science, Sweezy argued in 1972, 
 
has concerned itself with smaller and decreasingly significant questions, even judging magnitude and 
significance by its own standards. To compensate for this trivialization of content, it has paid increasing 
attention to elaborating and refining its techniques. The consequence is that today we often find a truly 
stupefying gap between the questions posed and the techniques employed to answer them (1972: 63) 
 
Sweezy continues to illustrate this lost sense of intellectual propriety quoting Gerard Debreu. 
Together with his neo-Walrasian followers, Debreu indeed came to be known as the 
personification and bogeyman of mathematical economics, and thus of the irrelevance of 
economics.  
At first glance, these speeches had full success. There is hardly any economist left who 
would not accord with the plea that mathematical economics is not All There Is. Neo-
Walrasian economics is the economics of yesterday. Before I turn to assess that, let me first 
identify a crucial phenomenological confusion in these speeches concerning the locus of critique. 
Was the object of attack really a particular theory and particular methodological convictions? In 
all speeches the argument of economics being irrelevant was indeed meant to redirect theory 
and method. Then, as soon as theory and method allow for more value judgments, more 
empirical work, more consideration of power and institutions, economics will be back on track. 
This optimism that a simple change of attention could cure economic science, however, came 
with a sub-tone of pessimism when referring to the institutional context, and intellectual values 
that should enable this change of reflection.  
Leontief, for example, was aware that not only the recognition of particular aspects of 
reality would be enough for a cure of the disease. He considered the fact that economists 
already knew that their theories are easily vilified. Economists, so he acknowledged “play the 
game with professional skills but have serious doubts about its rules” (1972: 1). Also others, as 
mentioned above, included as a locus of critique not merely the scope and method of theory, but 
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also the social conditioning of science in that it may undermine insights into theoretical flaws. 
The actual problem, then, is not the wrong methodological value that informs the prevailing 
economic theory, but the absence of intellectual values that could inform these theories. Then, 
the insight in theoretical shortcomings has no effect. Only in this sense can one speak of a 
crisis of economics in the 1970s: the profession did recognize the shortcomings of its core 
theories, but also secretly had to acknowledge that there is hardly something to do about it. 
The emotions of the Keynesian uprising did not root in a contest about reality or the role of 
theory. Instead, they came from the lack of ethos of economists. 
In Galbraith’s speech, this transcendental sensibility is most apparent. Economics “offers 
no useful handle of grasping the economic problems that now beset the modern society. And 
these problems are obtrusive – they will not lie down and die as a favor to our profession” 
(1973: 2). Not reality as it is, but reality as being obtrusive is at stake in economics; not the wrong 
beliefs about reality, but the sense of reality. Galbraith thus had a clear perception – though no 
conception – of the transcendental character of the issue at hand. He did not want economics 
to be more realistic, but wanted “to urge the means by which we can re-associate ourselves 
with reality” (Ibid.: 2). And these means that could make economists sensible for the attraction 
of truth are not a matter of wrong beliefs, but a matter of the passions that inform intellectual 
activity: “[S]ince we will be in touch with real issues, and since issues that are real inspire 
passion, our life will, again, be pleasantly contentious, perhaps even usefully dangerous.” (10) 
Economists lack inspiration, passion, the joy of contests, and the willingness to risk popularity. 
Galbraith shows most clearly that the crisis in the 1970s was not primarily a matter of which 
theory economists pursue, but a matter of the affective set-up of the economists’ ethos as a 
condition for committing oneself to any theoretical virtue. Only this locus of critique granted 
the Keynesian generation its forces to rise up against the neo-Walrasian domination. 
The arguments, in the mentioned speeches, pivot in-between “reality”, “what matters”, 
“obtrusiveness”, the “inspiration” and “passion” of economists, and the wish to “be in touch 
with”. It is this conflation for which a phenomenological critique of economic science is 
needed. Within a scientific attitude – and as such the addressees speak up in front of the AEA 
– this conflation cannot be resolved. For the economist as a scientist such pivoting is 
symptomatic. A scientist in its pursuit of being scientific can do nothing other than expressing 
his sensibility for relevance in terms of a feature of a theory. The prime place where self-
critique takes place for a scientist, is the theory, not the theorist. The argument of irrelevance 
translates then straight into the terms of received philosophy of science: ‘economic theory does 
not refer to the reality of the economic world’. In scientific attitude, “reality” and “what 
matters” are one and the same.  
Although theory and method changed considerably since the 1970s, as I will argue in the 
following, the speeches remained ineffective insofar as they were formulated as a plea for a 
new particular and definite “unit of analysis”, or “theoretical paradigm”. If there is a 
phenomenology lesson 1.01 for economists, it is that relevance is not a feature of a theory in 
that it refers to the world. It is anything but a property of things lying around in the world that 
could be stated as any other property like “decreasing” or “increasing”. All speeches touched 
upon, but hardly advanced to the point where the actual motivations of doing science could be 
explicitly reflected upon. In this sense the speeches as all standard critiques of post-war 
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economic science, were phenomenologically naïve: conflating one’s appeal to reality with the 
urge of doing relevant research.  
Given this naivety, I may even call these speeches reactionary. For did they not implicitly 
confirm that economics possibly deserves the size of the institutions it gained through the 
formalist revolution? Did the speeches not confirm the uncontested belief in economic science 
as such? After all, Keynesians also profited from the scientification of economics, even if not in 
relative, but in absolute terms. 
 
 
Mapping Economic Science Today (2010) under the Spell of the Formalist Revolution 
 
Then, how about economics today? Has it changed? Were the speeches successful? Yes, 
economics has changed. Economists could partially regain the empirical grounds of their 
science by means of several theoretical innovations that since the mid 1970s took roots in the 
economics departments of Western universities. GET as the theoretical paradigm of 
microeconomics came to be replaced by game theory, econometrics is increasingly a required 
part of most core journals, and rationality is more contested than taken for granted. Even 
experimental methods became presentable again, and the profession intensified its relations to 
other disciplines such as psychology. MIT, for example, has an actual laboratory testing the 
efficiency of developmental policy. Moreover, heterodox economics has experienced a great 
revival. Associations like the Association for Evolutionary Economics (1972), or the Association for 
Institutional Thought (1976), and journals like the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (1978), or the 
Contributions to Political Economy (1982) sprung newly out of the dry ground that the formalist 
revolution left behind. Heterodox schools re-politicized economics and provided considerable 
alternatives to the “mainstream” – apart from those in the Union for Radical Political Economics, 
who had to stay out. Did Leontief’s, Galbraith’s, Gordon’s, and Boulding’s dreams come true?  
The laments of the 1970s, however, are not outmoded. To the contrary, booing economics 
has become intensified, professionalized, radicalized. The speeches of the 1970s have grown 
into an entire industry of anti-economic literature. There we continue reading the same points 
that have been made in the 1970s against mathematical economics – lack of normativity, 
modeling for its own sake, trade-off between rigor and relevance, lack of genuine empirical 
work, a-historicism etc. The need for complaining did not seem to be met by the mentioned 
theoretical innovations. One of those who provided new material for continued complaints in 
the 1980s and also 1990s was McCloskey’s Rhetoric of Economics: “the mainstream of normal 
science in economics, I’m afraid, has become a boys’ game in a sandbox. It has become silly” 
(1998 [1985]: 189). Heterodox economists, ahead of all the others, continue the tradition of 
lamenting: Wards book of 1972 (What’s Wrong with Economics?), is updated in Fullbrook (2004) 
A Guide to What’s Wrong with Economics, and Linder’s Anti-Samuelson is updated with Stanford’s 
(2008) Economics for Everyone. Also the teacher’s petition of the French post-autistic movement 
repeats precisely what Gordon said, namely “the naïve and abusive conflation that is often 
made between scientificity and the use of mathematics” (Fullbrook 2003: 17). Their slogan of 
“post-autistic economics” did address – even if in an ad-hoc and youngish way – the 
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intellectual sensibility of economist. Unfortunately, the movement has changed its motto 
recently into “real world economics” – another instance of phenomenological failure. 
The student’s movement is not the only case of this failure. There have hardly been any 
advances in terms of the phenomenological confusion in spite of the increased sensibility for 
the social reality of economics – professionalized by the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. 
Take for example Arjo Klamer (2001). The causes of the disease he mentions are standard, 
putting yet more emphasis on modernism: occupation with representation, turn inwards, 
formalism, break with history, no tradition, self-referential, professionalization, 
departmentalization (Klamer 2001: 81 f.). As many others, Klamer believes the nub is that 
economists aim to prove to be bad anthropologists, and that all there is that went wrong is the 
misleading image of the economic agent as the maximizer of utility. MaxU amounts to the 
“disappearance of the human subject”, “the loss of character” (93). MaxU is like “a man 
without qualities”, no history, devoid of moral sentiments, “oblivious to the uncertainties and 
insecurities that plague anyone who has to make choices” (Ibid), and is “caught up in lifeless 
problem-solving exercises, and cannot tell us how to live” (94). “Take it away [the metaphor of 
Max U] and the work done by economists over the last sixty years is a big heap of insignificant 
mumblings” (Ibid). If everyone already behaves rational there is no need to improve: “Voila, 
the end of any social responsibility of economic science” (98). The phenomenological 
confusion is apparent. For what is at stake? Is it the modelling of agents, or the character of 
economists? Regarding the former, there is no economist who would not agree with Klamer. 
Regarding the latter, why should it be related with economic theory?  
Heilbroner and Milberg, who I would grant to be closest to a phenomenological locus of 
critique when speaking about the ‘loss of vision’ (1995), commit this failure. Also they were 
seduced to think of this loss in terms of theories referring to realities: After Keynes, they write, 
“the mark of modern-day economics is its extraordinary indifference to this problem (…) of 
the connection between theory and reality” (1995: 3). There are only few moments in the 
commentary of economics that the phenomenological locus of critique shimmers through. 
Here for example, Eugene Meehan (1923-2002), in the first issue of Methodus, the informal 
precursor of the Journal of Economic Methodology: “An inadequacy in methods is only symptomatic 
of more fundamental disorders – confusion or error in the set of purposes taken as the basis of 
inquiry” (1989: 8). 
The phenomenological confusion is crucial for the reproduction of the crisis of 
economics. It calms the emotions of discontent down to a novel “unite of analysis”, a new 
“model”, a new “paradigm”, which may give hope, but ends up renewing the same 
dissatisfaction. Due to the phenomenological confusion, critique of economics cannot do 
anything other than create more visions of a better economic science, and therefore reinforce 
the uncontested belief in the virtual worthiness of economics. Only after this 
phenomenological confusion has been resolved can the tone of critique be advanced.  
It is thus not surprising that some of those who contributed most rigorously to the 
laments of the 1980s now make us believe that things are going better. Some deem the crisis to 
be over. Most famously David Colander, who once argued that economics systematically 
induces cynicism, now argues that the profession has taken its lesson and is back on track. 
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Complexity theory, which I consider in a moment, should give us new hope. Others, like 
Heilbroner and Milberg, instead, remain skeptical about the empirical turn Colander celebrates:  
 
The retreat from theory ultimately leaves unresolved the crisis of vision that we describe in The Crisis 
of Vision in Modern Economic Thought. If anything, as widely different tendencies in economics vie 
for the mantle of pragmatism, it is likely that the question of vision will rise to the surface instead of 
looming in the background of economic discourse (Heilbroner and Milberg 2002).  
 
With the two positions of Colander and Heilbroner in mind, let me go through the landscape 
of present-day economics as I have mapped it on the next page. What do economists believe 
makes their work relevant (second row)? What do they believe makes them epistemically more 
authoritative than the rest of economic talk (third row)? And what do they believe makes the 
work of other economists irrelevant (fourth row)? Thus, what describes the ethos of 
economists today, according to their self-understanding? 
Rather than going through each single stream and school of thought, let me cut short such 
discussion with some simple observations that suggest economists are still in the grip of what 
happened during the formalist revolution. My comments partially summarize the couple of 
centuries of history of economics that I have drawn in the preceding chapters.  
Needless to say, the inner borders as depicted are contested and crossed in all directions. 
There is a whole industry of writings that pull economic claims from one school to the other – 
who actually has the authority to talk about “uncertainty”? Austrians? Keynesians? Behavioral 
economists? Or even game theorists? Also the line between the orthodoxy and heterodoxy is 
contested. Think for example about Oliver Williamson, one of the main proponents of New 
Institutionalism, who made a career by becoming more and more orthodox, leaving the 
intuitions of old institutionalists behind. Or think of evolutionary game theorist Payton Young, 
who hardly anyone would doubt to belong to the mainstream. Or think of the experimental 
economist Vernon Smith who embraces the motto “institutions matter” (1989: 156). Should I 
thus embrace John Davis’s conclusion that the orthodoxy is about to incorporate the 
heterodoxy (2007a, 2007b)? The clearest borders with the least exchange may be drawn around 
Austrian economics, on the one hand, and feminist and Marxian economics, on the other, 
although these borders are also contested. You need to read the New Left Review in order not to 
run into reference to the economic discipline on each page.  
What then holds economics together? What identifies a theory as an economic theory? 
 
(1) Negative closure. I depicted the present streams and schools of thought in such a way that all 
establish their identity in opposition to a school of thought, of which no economist is part. 
There is nobody who represents “standard economics” or the “orthodoxy”. Insofar as this 
“standard” yet marks the borders of the discipline and the rest of economic talk, I may call this 
feature the negative closure of the discipline.  
There certainly have always been standard references in the history of economic science – 
Smith, Mill, Marshall, Samuelson. Peculiar today, however, is that the standard reference is a 
straw man. There is “standard economic theory”, “neoclassical economics”, “orthodox 
economics”, or the “mainstream” without anyone who is willing to defend it. The “standard” 
to which the orthodoxy refers, and the “orthodoxy”, to which the heterodoxy refers are 
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Economic Science (2000) 
 
Orthodox Economics 
 
Stream of thought What matters Scientificity 
“Standard 
Economics” 
irrelevant because 
Game Theory (von 
Neumann, Aumann, 
Rubinstein) 
Interdependence of 
actions, strategic 
behavior 
Rigor 
Complete 
competition, 
atomistic individual 
Behavioral 
(informational, cognitive, 
neuro-) Economics 
(Kahnemann, Camerer, 
Tirole) 
Cognitive processes, 
learning, etc. Positivism 
Perfect Information, 
perfect cognitive 
capacities, perfect 
rationality, perfect 
foresight… 
Experimental 
Economics (V. Smith) 
‘what economic agents 
really do’ Empiricism Not testable  
Complexity Theory  
(B. Arthur, S. Durlauf) 
How everything-is-
connected-with-
everything 
technocratic 
empiricism Deduction, Isolation
 
 
 
 
Heterodox Economics 
  
 
School of thought 
What “really” 
matters 
Scholarship 
“Orthodoxy” 
irrelevant because 
Institutional Economics 
(Williams, North) 
‘Institutions constrain 
and enable economic 
performance’ 
Descriptive 
propriety, 
conceptuali-
zation 
Markets not being 
an institution 
Evolutionary Economics 
(Nelson and Winter, 
Young) 
Dynamic  
development of 
economic character 
traits or genes 
Technocratic 
historicism 
a-historical, end-
state conception of 
markets 
Austrian Economics  
(L. Lachmann,  
Human action (free 
will, teleological, 
uncertain) 
literacy in 
Austrian 
tradition 
algorithmic choice, 
applicable to non-
human events P. Boettke) 
Post-Keynesian 
Economics  
(P. Davidson)  
Irrationality, short run, 
uncertainty  
literacy and 
policy relevance 
No contingent 
institutions 
(expectations, 
unemployment) 
(Post)Marxian 
Economics (P. Sweezy, 
D. Ruccio) 
class, power, 
ideologies, conflict Materialism 
Markets clear 
ideologies, power, 
conflict… 
Feminist (J. Nelson) Sex Politics Male 
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basically one and the same straw man. Since the “orthodoxy” that the heterodoxy refers to is 
somewhat non-existent, it is not surprising that some argued heterodoxy is a strategy to gain 
higher shares in the profession, as well as, that the orthodoxy is actually pluralistic (Davis 
2007a). Another ironic consequence of this negative closure is that there are anti-economics 
textbooks that criticize economics on the same grounds as those who fly the flag of economic 
science highest. Regarding the received view on utility maximization, for example, Steve Keen’s 
Debunking Economics (2002) goes well with the evaluation of what Colander would call the 
cutting-edge elite of economics (2004), such as Jean Tirole and Roland Benabou (2006). Both 
agree that MaxU is not All There Is. While the latter waits for the Nobel Prize, the former 
waits for the occasion to abolish it.  
Although merely fictive, the bogeyman of the “neoclassical economist” is vital for the 
rhetoric of significance of all schools. No economic school establishes its importance in 
opposition to general economic talk outside the academic discourse. Would an outsider not 
expect basic statements such as, ‘problematic about a globalized economy are not the greedy 
multinationals, but the information technology that allows them to be greedy’, or the like? The 
conceptions of why economics is relevant do not stem from outside the discipline, but from 
within theory. “Standard economics”, even if nobody believes in it, functions as the frame 
within which all economic theory can be presented as relevant. A specter of “neoclassicism” 
constitutes the discipline of economics today. Neoclassical economics is indeed, as Colander 
argued, dead in that this tag, whatever one associates with it, does not describe the practice of 
any economist (2000). But neoclassical economics is only half-dead since it lingers as the 
reference point for all theoretical innovations.  
Another ironic consequence is that in a seemingly pluralistic science that is vivid in 
contesting its inner borders, many complain about the monism of the discipline. In 1992, 
Hodgson, Mäki, and McCloskey published a “plea for pluralistic and rigorous economics” in the 
AER (1992, e.a.). Among others, Franco Modigliani, Robert Axelrod, Brian Arthur, and Paul 
Samuelson signed the plea – who knows if more for the former or the latter reason. Another 
wave took place after the post-autistic petition, critically surveyed and examined by Davis and 
Sent (2006). Should it not make us skeptical that such pleas proliferate all the more the 
discipline attempts to break through the “neoclassical monism”?  
At this point, I can come back to the interpretive indifference with which I closed the last part. 
Each school of thought is established as a different interpretation of what is wrong with the 
mainstream. Differences of schools, then, do not correspond with different world-views but 
with different interpretations of what the mainstream really requires. All schools thus 
presuppose that standard economics is constituted by referential truth-claims, that is, by a 
particular representation of reality. However, this is not the case. Interpretations in the so-
called mainstream, as the preceding narrative suggested and the following part will make clear, 
are a datum of economic theory without affecting it. Just because the mainstream is 
independent of an actual perception of economic reality everyone can refer to it with a 
different interpretation. Neoclassical economics came into being, as I showed at length, 
because it brought economics beyond its meaning.  
The disciplinary identity of economics is constituted by the common knowledge of what 
economic theory is not about, which nevertheless determines the frame of what economics can 
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possibly be about. “Standard economics” is the common language of economics. Thus, outside 
economic science are those who do not use this language, that is, those who are not informed 
by formal training in economics. The discipline of economics is determined by the 
commitment to a language that stems from a theory no economist actually believes in.  
Next to these ironies, the negative closure also entails a tragic moment. As every school is 
established by an interpretation of what is beyond interpretation, these schools themselves can 
be understood as an interpretation of, rather than an alternative to, standard theory. Expressive 
practices and the attempts to make a difference are therefore easily undermined. Maintain the 
theoretical “structure” and skip the pathos of the claim! – so the imperative of the 
“sophisticated mathematician” who tears away the differences of all schools of thought in a 
twinkling of an eye. Keynesian economics, historically speaking, was the first victim of this 
gesture. For each school of thought, one can read its alternative theory as a defense of 
mainstream theory. Such is the source of immunity in economics, above all to internal 
criticism. Being immune, one does not have to respond. 
There is a certain awareness of this tragic moment in discussions of the heterodoxy, as 
here for example in Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006): “There is nothing more frustrating for 
critics of neoclassical economics than the argument that neoclassical economics is a figment of 
their imagination”. The two authors explain the common rejection and simultaneous success 
of neoclassical economics in that it can “hide” its ontological foundations in technicalities. The 
tragedy, for them, is that these technicalities are socially reinforced by the profession, so that 
the foundations always evade efficacious criticism. Arnsperger and Varoufakis, however, 
suppose that there is an actual substantive foundation to hide – rationality and equilibrium. They 
perceive these foundational concepts, as most other social philosophers today, as referential 
terms. Does an epistemological reflection on the “hidden” foundations really help escaping this 
tragic situation? Were the attempts to overcome “equilibrium” and “rationality” not pervasive 
since the 1970s? According to my idea of interpretive indifference the “foundations” of 
neoclassical economics can only be “hidden” because they are not of a referential kind. 
Precisely this constitutes the tragedy: theoretical alternatives can be easily incorporated in the 
mainstream via the structure of theory beyond referential claims. Structures cannot hide! They 
only can be imposed! 
The rhetorical straw man of standard theory correlates exclusively with what is taught in 
textbooks. Let us not forget that since the postwar period, since Samuelson’s Economics, the 
teaching of economics hardly changed. As the post-autistic economics movement stressed, 
economic teaching culture is still not yet informed by the theoretical changes that took place 
since the late 1970s (Colander 2005). The main access limit into the profession, created only 
about ten years ago, still bears a neo-Walrasian name: Mas-Colell et al. 1995. There is still no 
undergraduate teaching specialized on behavioral, experimental or institutional economics. If 
this happens, what could hold the profession together? According to my map: Nothing! 
It may be this shared experience of having thirsted through Mas-Colell et al. that 
economists stick to the identity of economic science – comparable perhaps with the tradition 
of female circumcision. Thus, between the current fortress of economics and its dissolution, 
there is no more than the indoctrination most economists reject anyway – recall that I spoke of 
a light shove that is needed. Not more.  
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(2) Lack of Scope and Method, and Advanced “Inverted” Imperialism. I have argued above that the 
scope and method literature – which, recall, I pictured in the context of those who extended 
the scope of economic life to an explanation of consciousness, or at least to a mobilization of 
revolutions – ceased after the anti-philosophical interventions of Becker and Friedman. Indeed, 
the different branches of economics do not differ by different definitions of the scope of 
economics. Although, according to the “what matters” column, economists seem to hold 
different notions of economic life, there is no need to actually defend it. Economists today do 
not have to hold an expressive notion of the scope of economic science, or any concrete idea 
about the ontological properties of “the economy” in order to gain disciplinary identity. 
Economic theory is not based on the “distinctions between phenomena that are of chief 
economic importance” (Keynes 1999 [1890]: 75). Nobody will ever ask you until the press calls 
and wants to know why you got the Nobel Prize.  
First year students, of course, want to know what economics is. The most popular 
classroom definition is still Robbins’ ‘relationship between ends and scarce means which have 
alternative uses’. Whatever this means, from the second class on, students understand that one 
cannot earn much credit in the definition business. In heterodox economics, there are neither 
competitive definitions of the economic realm. Robbins’ definition functions here as a 
benchmark for considering also institutional dependency, also distributive issues, etc. – as 
though Robbins had merely narrowed the scope of economics rather than actually downplayed 
the very question of scope.  
If one thinks of the scope of economics more formally, as that through which economics 
is discursively identified, it only can be its own straw man: the constituents of neoclassical 
economics as a “paradigm” – equilibrium and rationality. The omnipresent reference to these 
two notions represent the “turn inward” in economics insofar as economics became its own 
object, or better: a misunderstood past of economics became object of economics. Also 
commentators of economics discuss disciplinary changes in terms of these categories. 
Officially, rationality and equilibrium economics have been dissolving since the 1970s. Is it, as 
the negative closure suggests, not the other way around that in this dissolution, equilibrium and 
rationality are reconstituted as a “paradigm” in exactly the Kuhnean sense that its historical 
meaning is not discussed any longer but simply assumed – even if assumed to be wrong?  
Closely related with the lacking perception of scope is the issue of economic imperialism. 
It is associated with Becker’s understanding of rational choice (1976). Economic imperialism 
refers to economic explanations of phenomena traditionally beyond its scope, or better: “the 
intrusion of virtual markets into every nook and cranny of experience” (Mirowski 2004: 380) –
utility maximization of having children, taking drugs, donating organs (Becker and Elias 2007), 
or also the utility maximization of democracy as compared to dictatorship (Acemoglu, 
Robinson 2006). Economic imperialism also refers to the framing of discussions in non-
academic economic talk when politicians and other discourse makers adapt market language of 
efficiency and rationality. Economic imperialism became part of the popular image of 
economists.  
Frey and Benz (2004) and Davis (2007a) argue that after the 1970s an inversion of this 
imperialism took place. Methods of other disciplines conquered economics. It is true that most 
methods in the orthodoxy have their origin not in economics, but are taken from other 
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disciplines – as it has always been in the entire modern history of economic science. The main 
source is certainly the psychology department, but also computer- and neurosciences. 
Measuring brain activities when making decisions – which neurotransmitter is released when 
“being trusted” or “being suspected” – gave some economists the opportunity to actually place 
economics in science journals (McClure et al. 2004). Such phenomena lead Davis to speak of a 
turn towards pluralism in mainstream economics. Neoclassical economics is not only dead as 
describing theoretical practices, but is also dead “as a characterization of how mainstream 
economics is currently evolving” (Davis 2007a: 2).  
We can, however, still observe very similar moves as Becker’s in highly esteemed and 
rigorous behavioral economics, for example in Benabou’s and Tirole’s modeling of dignity as 
an “asset” (2006). How could one possibly count this as an input from social psychology? That 
the framework of rational choice misses fundamental features such as self-worth has been one 
of the traditional arguments against rational choice (see for example Shaun-Hargreaves 2001). 
What Benabour and Tirole do with this insight is to strip off its meaning, put it in a theoretical 
structure, play with their technologies, and see how the connotations in this play change and 
perhaps appeal in a reportable behavioral account of “dignity” – like playing with a 
kaleidoscope. Whether the critique of rational choice, social psychology, or whatever is written 
in whatever magazine, serves as the meaning-dispenser of this light play hardly matters. Calling 
this an example of reversed imperialism is like saying Becker’s account of the household was an 
import from the “home economics” department that it actually has replaced (“home 
economics” department were professional schools for housewives).  
Economic imperialism, moreover, could also be seen as advanced in the cases that seem to 
reverse it. While once in the 1950s Becker spoke of rational choice theory as the method of 
economic science beyond the traditional domain of economics, now rational choice becomes 
the object of economic science. Consider, for example, the object of neuroeconomics. One of its 
main results is that emotions matter for decision making, particularly in cases of ambiguous 
choice when there is “fear of the unknown”, or in cases of strategic interactions when one feels 
“disgust” of being treated unfairly (Camerer, Loewenstein, Prelec 2004). What makes such 
claims and economic claim? Rational choice! Why should anyone ever have doubts about such 
a claim if not on the background of a particular interpretation of rational choice in that it 
excludes “emotions”? For someone who is not trained in economics and does not know of the 
centrality of rationality, he or she would not identify that as an economic claim.  
As with Becker “rational choice” became method where it was once a basic property of a 
domain – once when economists knew what it means to actually pursue wealth – rational 
choice is now the object of economic science. If there is any definition of economic science 
today, I would suggest this: the science of the limits of rational choice and equilibrium theory. 
Such one could call advanced reversed imperialism, saying that other sciences, above all behavioral 
sciences, adopt “rationality” as the very scope of their science. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 
indeed argue that neuroeconomics can serve as a ground for “unification across the social 
sciences” (2004: 573). I would even consider analytic philosophy of action as a case of this 
advanced reversed imperialism insofar as rational choice is there also the object of scrutiny. 
Note, however, that at that stage of imperialism there is no longer the need to refer to the 
discipline of economics: If economists use methods from other sciences to consider as an 
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object what was once their own method, is this not a sufficient estrangement that should 
loosen the need to identify with the discipline?  
Note also the selection bias regarding the sciences that are allowed to enter the discipline 
(Davis 2007a: 10f.). Economics, very successfully, includes those sciences that support its 
appearance of scientificity. Other disciplines find inroads into economics only with the analytic 
flavor of hard sciences – demarcationalist, exclusive sciences. Equally successfully, however, 
economists exclude economic discourses that do not support its scientificity, as great parts of 
sociology (think of Zygmunt Baumann, for example), anthropology (think of post-colonial 
studies), political science (think of Negri and Hardt), and of course the entire Marxian tradition 
(think of Slavoj Zizek). They all care about the present state of capitalism, and thus what 
Gordon has perceived as the really relevant question. At most these debates enter economics 
as a source of examples for showing, with sophisticated methods, the limits of rationality and 
equilibrium. If there was something to be called a “research program” of today’s economics, 
this is it.  
Let me only present one symptomatic statement of this research program by one of the 
leading behavioral economists, Mathew Rabin.  
 
(A)bandoning the view that hypothesis departing from rationality, self-interested, or other habitual 
assumptions are methodologically illicit can free us to evaluate these hypotheses with the same rigorous 
standards that our discipline, at its best, applies elsewhere (1998: 41).  
 
The self-understanding of this economist underlines my remarks: object is rationality, novelty lies 
in the departure from it, and the scientific pathos that stems from it is rescued.  
 
(3) Historical dumbness. Not to be able to reflect on one’s historical roots, as not only Kuhn 
taught, is a clear sign of an advanced state of scientification. The most conspicuous benchmark 
of the ongoing effect of the formalist revolution is that economics is as history-blind as it 
became half a century ago. Whatever the speeches in the 1970s achieved, they did not cause a 
reflection on whether one should reconsider, for example, the ostracizing of historicists, or to 
reconsider the socialist calculation debate. 
Economists are not only ignorant about their past, they are increasingly less interested in 
the analysis of the current state of their profession. As soon as one of the authorities I named 
in the map receives the Nobel Prize, the historical background of their work can be excusably 
skipped. References to previous work usually do not exceed the past decade. For this reason, 
even the analysis of the present streams of thought are left to historians, as shown by the 
recently established Society for the Recent History of Economic Thought. 
Economics is forward looking – and thus possibly runs in circles without knowing. If there 
are historical cycles of paradigms from crisis, innovation to normal science, in economics these 
cycles are like seasons in hell, repeating the same over and over again. Every single row of the 
orthodoxy makes its own case: What exactly happened between Game Theory I (von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 2004 [1944]) and Game Theory II (Aumann 1985)? Who still 
considers the The Theory of Games of all who quote it apart from the historians? How come 
that “perfect competition and Nash equilibrium go so well together” if the latter supposedly 
replaces the former (Rizvi 1994: 11)? If game theory officially deals with agents’ “power”, why 
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was it never clear “to what question is ‘Nash equilibrium’ the answer”? Did game theory not 
simply “rescue” the neo-Walrasian rigidity, yet run into similar formals limits (Ibid.: 6)? Second, 
behavioral economics: When announcing the cooperation of psychology and economics as for 
example Kahneman in his Nobel Lecture (2003), was it informed by any reflection of how and 
why psychology came to be excluded from economics – because, as I suggested, it was much 
too indiscreet for the weak nerves of any liberal? Third, experimental economics: Was it not 
necessary for the very theoretical abstraction of “the economy”, at least for Mill, that 
experiments are not possible in economics? Running experiments, on the base of what kind of 
intuition of “the economy” does one make economic claims? Or is it rather rational choice 
theory that is tested? Last, complexity theory, which would require the most far-reaching 
historical reconsideration: What are the conditions of perceiving “the economy” as an 
“evolving, complex system”? Was there at any time an economist who did not perceive it as 
such? No, there was not. Otherwise one cannot even think of the very object “economy”. 
Complexity is one of the oldest rhetorical moves to evade dealing with the concrete!  
 If I had to draw the line between heterodoxy and orthodoxy, it would be at this joint of 
historical contestability. The heterodoxy, and therein lies its potential, supports scholarship and 
literacy in their traditions. Some institutionalists read the classics of Veblen-Ayres-Clark. Some 
evolutionary economists read Schumpeter (but not Knies or Schmoller!). Post-Keynesians – as 
opposed to the Neo-Keynesians or New Keynesians – actually read Keynes. Austrians engage 
in extensive exegesis of the Menger-Mises-Machlups. And Marxians would cease being 
Marxians if they stopped reading Marx. For this reason heterodox economists tend to embrace 
historians. And for the same reason, historians tend to take actual positions within economics.  
The line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy also appears as an ideological difference. 
Does the orthodoxy tend toward liberal, and the heterodoxy toward socialist aspirations? The 
question of ideology ran through the entire preceding social history of scientification. What is 
the status of ideology in economics today? Are there explicit links between economic theories 
and the epistemic claims of particular politics? Thomas Mayer, for example, argued that there 
are, but that they are not significant enough to explain their disagreements (2001). Of course, in 
Austrian and in Marxian economics the ideological dedication is obvious. Without an explicit 
political motive an Austrian is not Austrian, and a Marxian is not Marxian. But for just this 
reason both are at the edge of falling off of the list of economics. The lower you get on the 
map of the discipline the more difficult to score in any of its rankings. The higher you get the 
less economists are expressive of any political motivation. Certainly, one may say that public 
choice theory was intentionally designed in order to justify certain politics (Amadae 2003). It 
models political agents as market agents and thus undermines politics in that it is supposed to 
govern the market. Yet, the same theoretical intuition could be employed for an opposite 
politics to improve and thus enhance state activity. Even in the most obvious cases the link 
between theory and politics, at least in the orthodoxy, is never trivial. Between economics and 
its applications there is a gap that is not covered by the discipline. Others apply.  
Then the question of ideology is not one of yes or no, but whether economic theories 
allow economists to reflect on the potential ideological utilization of their work and the effects 
they have on other discourses. The question of ideology today is no longer: Who Are You? – 
Arguing This! But: Do economic theories undermine the reflection on the motives that guide 
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their work? In which sense can economists be made socially responsible for the use and effects of 
their work? This question delineates the horizon in which the following part is written.  
 
(4) Technocratic empiricism. Around the turn of the millennium the commentary of economics 
began to adopt a new tone away from the critique initially set by the Keynesian generation. 
Some want to make us hope for a release in complexity studies. A new empiricism, so they claim, 
replaces the formalist revolution in that it doomed economics to the deduction from monist 
principles (rationality and equilibrium). Did economics come over the “paradigm” of formal 
equilibrium theorizing and moves toward a new theoretical identity? Above all Colander, one 
of the harshest critiques of economics in the 1990s, in recent years became supportive of 
complexity theory. It is worth quoting at length. 
 
[L]ooking at the profession today, I am convinced that it is quite different than it was in the mid-1980s, 
when Arjo and I first sat over drinks and lamented the state of the profession. The commitment to 
theorems and proofs has declined, and there is a much stronger empirical branch of economics. Natural 
experiments and instrumental variables are now central to an economist’s training. Behavioral 
economics has advanced enormously (…); advanced time-series statistics, such as cointegrated 
structural VARs and calibration, are commonplace, where they were hardly known before. What were 
taken as requirements of research in the 1980s are no longer requirements in the 2000s; the holy trinity 
of greed, equilibrium, and rationality has been replaced by a looser trilogy of purposeful behavior, 
sustainability, and enlightened self-interest. (…) economics has changed and will continue to change, 
making it impossible to call the existing profession neoclassical any longer (2007: 15). 
 
Colander is here in best society with Mas-Colell, who predicted the same twenty years earlier at 
a time when Colander booed loudest about the work of Mas-Colells:  
 
The axiomatic method is still all pervasive in economic theory but I would not venture to say that it will 
be so forever. I do not know what our subject will be like in 50 years, but I would not be astounded to 
find that the computer revolution would have changed the character of what we do and how we do it, 
or, for that matter, what the mathematicians do (Mas-Colell 1987: 323).  
 
The computer revolution that Mas-Colell and Colander envision is on its way at the latest since 
the 1987 conference in Santa Fe. This conference gathered economists, physicists, biologists 
and computer sciences. Since then, so it is said, “the economy” comes increasingly seen as an 
“evolving, complex system” (Arthur, Durlauf, Lane 1997). In complexity theory economics is 
indeed finally liberated from the meaning of its principles. One can add to the technical model 
whatever specifications of heterogeneous agents, institutions, non-linear stochastic processes 
of evolution, simultaneous competitive and cooperative mechanisms, specific closed and open 
“networks” and what have you. As opposed to the deduction of claims from rigid principles, 
now highly dynamic processes are scrutinized: “emergence of properties” (irreducibilities), 
“positive feed-back loops” (mutual causation), “path-dependence”, “lock-ins”, and other non-
linearities make some hearts beat faster. They give a fresh color to the spontaneity of “the 
economy”. But “the economy” as what? As Structure. So, what is new? Does this new 
technocratic empiricism challenge the ethos of economists? 
Colander, Holt, and Rosser seem to suggest so when speaking of a changing “face” of 
economics (2004). But do economists see others differently? And do others see economists 
differently? The new technocratic face indeed liberates economists from the chains of 
 
____________________________________
            Economic Science Today (4) 
_______________________
                                                       227 
________________________
242
economic theory. Theory becomes secondary. It merely serves next to the data as one input in 
the technical model. The model, rather than the theory, is thus the focus of attention. The 
imperative is now to operationalize the limits of representation of formal models, to use these 
limits as a tool (Mirowski forthcoming). Theoretical assumptions are heuristic inputs in the 
model, not their ordering principle. Data and theory are equal components of a model that is 
not limited by its function of representing reality. Models do not represent reality, but they 
simulate it. Theory and reality are thus not strictly separate, but intertwined (the same counts 
for the Natural and the Social).  
 
New Millennium economists do not believe that they are testing a particular model which was deduced 
from first principles; instead they are simply looking for possible exploitable patterns in the data! 
(Colander 2000: 128).  
 
Truth claims now move behind a more pragmatic practice of science. Software can randomly 
produce hypotheses, the meaning of which is up to the fantasy of the scientist. According to 
Colander, the novelty is the absence of a dominating structural principle of theorizing “the 
economy”: “In 2050”, he envisioned in 2000 “the belief of economists in derived analytical 
models has given way to a belief that the underlying reality is too complex to be understood 
with these sorts of models” (2000: 127). The practice of economics is decreasingly deductive, 
and comes closer to what scientists do in weather forecasting – von Neumann thought that 
whether forecasts are the chosen field for the use of computers.  
It is here that my argument regarding positivism and formalism in economics finds its last 
touchstone. I downplayed empiricism already at the very institution of economics as a science. 
Constitutive for the perception of an object of “the economy” was the rhetorical diversion of 
the merchants, not the technology of William Petty. But did Thomas Mun and Nicholas 
Barbon, as well as every layman who listens to economists today not also believe that “the 
economy is a complex system”? Was “complexity” not always constitutive for the very 
perception of “the economy”? Did economists ever believe that market order can be derived 
from a unique principle of rational behavior? Was rationality ever understood as an 
anthropological truth? Was complexity not always crucial for the very establishment of the 
ethos of economists? Was complexity not first of all a way to evade the question: Who Are 
You - Arguing-This!  
The questions I have to pose regarding the non-deductive technocratic empiricism in light 
of the preceding narrative are these: Do complexity studies move beyond the modern triad of 
science, technology, and growth? No. Do economists regain their literacy, that is, their capacity 
to express and to communicate? No. “Though the axiomatic method may become obsolete, 
we shall certainly not go back to literary economics” (Mas-Colell 1987: 324). Do economists 
come closer to their perception of economic life? No. Does complexity theory reverse the 
structuralist turn in economic writings? No. To the contrary.  
Complexity theory brings the structuralist turn to the point where it leads into the 
dissolution of economics. Structuralism in economics never primarily meant that theory is 
structured by a principle, but that theory is separate from meaning. And precisely this was the virulent 
feature of the formalist revolution rather than its alleged basic beliefs, assumptions or 
principles. The axiomatic method shows just the same playfulness that is celebrated as the 
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liberation from its deductive rigidity. Consider, for example, how Mas-Colell describes the 
axiomatic kaleidoscope of meaning.  
 
You have three interesting phenomena that give striking impression that something common is going 
on. You then succeed in building up a theory where the three phenomena are unified under four 
characterizing axioms (…). Now, as soon as you have four axioms this gives you 16 different 
combinations of axioms. You may not have thought of any of these 16 theories, and it may turn out 
that one or two of them are quite interesting, so that you have discovered something. But the danger is 
that the other 14 may be utterly uninteresting (…) It is an art to discern the interesting combinations of 
axioms to explore from the uninteresting one that should not be pursued (1987: 324) 
 
A playful art – is this liberation not the same in complexity theory, even if Mas Colell does not 
speak of the play of empirical patterns? Is it not the same structure of “the economy” that was 
conceived 50 year ago and all the more in complexity theory? Complexity theory is a child of 
the formalist revolution. Period.  
The positive lesson we can draw from complexity theory is the same as that of advanced 
imperialism. There is no reason to expect that complexity studies will reinforce the disciplinary 
identity of economics – as for example Davis suggested softly in association with a smooth 
historical cycle of unity and disunity of economics (2007a). Technocratic empiricism will not be 
an empowerment for economists. To the contrary, with the end of the unifying principles of 
equilibrium and rationality, the economist is less identifiable as an economist as before, less 
distinct from other sciences than before.  
Only in this respect, I approve Colander’s evocation of a turn in economics (2004). The 
chance that lies in complexity theory is that disciplinary border politics loose their grip and 
become redundant. The pretension of economics being a separate science could fall apart. And 
in this dissolution, as it will be fully comprehensible only after the next part, the empiricist turn 
stands actually in continuity with the formalist revolution. Both stand for the decreasing need of 
referring to the identity of economics when arguing something specific. The meteorologist can 
be just as good as an economist as any other person who knows the software. And the 
economy-forecast released by the MIT developmental lab will be taken just as serious as the 
weather forecast for the next weekend. In principle, one does not need any economic theory in 
order to make one’s point. A vague intuition of what others perceive as economic life and the 
knowledge of software suffices. And this is the case not since 10 years, but since 60 years – 
since the formalist revolution. 
 
*** 
 
Whatever one believes and hopes about the discipline of economics regarding theory today, 
the preceding remarks suggest that economists’ ethos is, phenomenologically speaking, in the 
same state as after the war. Just think of economics from the point of view of the entire last 
century, and compare the second half with the first half. Nothing in the second half recalls the 
weight of emotions that accompanied scientific optimism in the first half. The ethos of 
economists is no longer challenged. Even if economics heads straight beyond the neo-
Walrasian paradigm of GET, rationality and mathematical rigor, it yet moves even farer 
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beyond the ethos of political economists that still determined the professional ethos before the 
formalist revolution.  
Negatively expressed, economics today is unified by the economics of the years after the 
war: equilibrium and rationality as a negative criterion of closure. Economic theory without any 
reference to equilibrium would fall short of theory. It would return to history (literacy), to 
instruction (technology), or to preaching (moralizing). Positively, the discipline is unified by 
means of the uncontested image of scientificity and the immense institutions it earned. Issues of 
legitimacy are out of the game.  
And so I have arrived at a second preliminary formulation of my conclusion regarding the 
end of economic science. The open question to be posed is now: Why is it not possible that 
the events of the 1950s can still be reversed? What is the problem of formalism and the invisible 
hand if it is not a matter of theory? The problem of the formalist revolution, I introduce in the 
next transitional chapter, was not that it did something to economics that it does not deserve. 
Instead, it showed something of it. 
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(5) Taking Stock –  
Zooming In 
 
 
 
 
Having gone through the intervention of economic science in modern European history, it is 
time to take stock. I have presented the basics of a social history of the scientification of 
economic writings. It culminates in a present situation that is framed by the formalist 
revolution of the 1950s. This revolution, represented by the work of the neo-Walrasian 
community, made an end to the scientification in the sense that the meaning of economic 
science lost greatly in contestability. Or better: the search for scientific authority no longer 
affects the social ethos of the economist. Although what economic science remains contested 
(for it determines the share a stream of thought earns in the discipline), the very existence of 
economic science is no longer at stake in these contests. Since the post war period economists 
occupy an uncontested place in western academia. There are many differences in economic 
theories and even differences regarding the underlying concept of scientificity – allowing within 
the orthodoxy for more or less empirical reference, and allowing within the heterodoxy for 
more or less politics and history. But these differences that we can observe as an aspect of the 
factual history of economic ideas mean less to the economist. Differences matter less. They no 
longer cause the same intellectual emotions, make the same demands, and need not to be 
played out against each other. It is no wonder that for some the struggle among economic 
schools appear like a strategic game for power. What else is there to be motivated by?  
Thus, there is nothing to add to the ethos of economic scientists. Economic science came 
to be – too late to celebrate or to complain. The question now is no longer ‘Which economic 
science?’ but ‘When does it disappear?’ 
 
 
Wrapping up Economists’ Intervention in Modern History:  
Economic Suspicion, Formalism, and the Axiomatic Method, on the one Hand, 
and “the Economy”, Invisible Hand, and General Equilibrium Theory on the other 
 
In the course of the preceding narrative, one driving force of scientification appeared again and 
again: the economic suspicion. It functioned, broadly conceived, as the instituting moment and 
social engine of scientification. The main lesson is that economic science, yes, overcame this 
vulnerability. However, and this is perhaps the greatest historical arch I have made in this part, 
the tradition of suspecting economists had its draw-backs; I have drawn a reversal of the 
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suspicious ethos of economists into the lament of their insignificance – a reversal from the 
suspicion of being motivated by a particular interest into the lament of not being motivated by 
any interest. Formalism is the drawback in the attempts of economic science freeing itself from 
ideology. Formalism is the invisible hand that “harmonizes” all disagreements and interests 
among economists by means of lowering the weight of what can be said.  
Thanks to formalism, economists gained their historically awaited scientificity. 
Scientification in economics never took place by means of “discovery”, or by means of 
innovations of methods that enable the “discovery” of certain truths. None of the virtues that 
are commonly associated with scientific claims of referential truth made the economic scientist. 
For this reason, I have downplayed all attempts to establish economics as a positive, objective, 
exact, or empirical science. To some extent, I have thus arrived at a similar point as in the last 
part where economics moves at the edge of its irrelevance. But in light of the reversal of the 
economic suspicion and the formalist tendency I now can say that it has never been different. It was 
always a discreet appearance that made the economic scientist, and it was always contingent 
associations that made science exploitable for particular positions.  
Note, that I did not state a tendency to formalism in that economists took a particular 
philosophical position about their knowledge. Formalism accompanied the scientification in 
that it refers to lowering one’s voice, or lowering the expressive tones of economic claims – 
lowering claims to notes, to corollaries, to remarks. Adopting this attitude in opposition to 
those who cannot stop preaching, and call for revolutions – such attitude made the economist.  
Formalization in this phenomenological rather than philosophical sense has shown at the 
beginning, the middle, and at the end of my narrative. At the beginning, the Urstiftung of 
establishing a level of systematic knowledge came as a rhetorical gesture to appear beyond the 
imposition of mercenary motives. The first task of economists was to evade the question: Who 
Are You – Arguing This! After the ground had been prepared to avoid this question in 
mercantile times, political economists could achieve the status of scholars, though only in 
association with a specific political position: In the Name of Science: Liberty! To state socially 
beneficent results of mercenary motives disclosed academic scholarship, however, only if put 
against the protectionist interests of merchants – as if the economic suspicion was not really 
overcome. 
In light of new social miseries of the 19th century, this association became implausible, 
inadequate, and challenged by the Marxian clarion call: By the Means of Science – Revolution! 
As a result, a unifying principle of economic life – constrained maximization – though first 
linked with a foundation in psychology, accompanied the rise of the economic profession at 
the beginning of the 20th century. This went at the cost of historians’ and institutionalists’ 
concern for the concrete, and ultimately also at the cost of finding an answer to the political 
meaning of science at all. Though the formalist revolution stood in continuity with the 
mathematical formalizations since the marginal revolution it represented a rupture of the 
contests about the political meaning of such formalizations. This I have illustrated mainly by 
the course of the socialist calculation debate. The axiomatization of GET moved the political 
interpretations of this theory in the background as though there was only one scientific 
imperative: For the Sake of Science: Calm Down!  
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At the end of economists’ intervention – since the 1950s – in a time of high ideological 
pressure, the detachment of economics from its discursive environment substantiated. At last, 
economists can profit from scientific authority without making a particular claim. Today, 
economists respond to great extent to the misunderstandings they themselves have caused, or 
at most to the misunderstandings about their own history. In the formalist revolution the draw 
back of scientification became apparent: In a formal science, meaning no longer necessitates its 
explication. Meaning is ripped off its meaningfulness.  
 This formalist tendency that describes the theoretical experience, moreover, correlates with 
the cultivation of the theoretical perception of “the economy”. “The economy” – it is ripe for 
a definition – is the intentional correlate of intellectual discreetness. It is, as it were, the extract of 
economic talk that lost its verve in thinking about economic life. Again, I have observed this 
moment at the beginning, the middle, and the end: the first perception arouse from the 
attempt to avoid referring to oneself – as though there was something else than selves in 
economic lives. Surrounded by the problem of trade, merchants could claim political 
representation because they referred to truths other than those of the clergy. A “phenomenal 
republic of interests” was perceived beyond specific economic interests – and thus a separation 
of the moral and social life.  
In the century of high modernism, the separation of production and consumption as two 
elementary categories of political economy further advanced the theoretical perception of “the 
economy”. Now the theoretical riddle of how “all that” is coordinated could replace the 
remnants of moral talk. The marginalist revolution, that subsumed production and 
consumption under one principle of constrained maximization helped in keeping distance 
from the moral notions of liberty on the one hand, and the material notions of labor on the 
other. It helped in avoiding reference to the dichotomy of socialism and capitalism. Allocation 
of resources appeared as a problem that even revolutionaries in whatever system, and whatever 
culture have to face at one point. At the end, the analytic core of GET – the determination of 
the price system – made it possible to discuss economic theory independent of its possible 
bestowal with meaning – that is, as a mathematical structure. The theoretical perception of “the 
economy” is thus freed from being bestowed by a notion of economic life.  
What, then, happened from the oikonomia to “the economy”? Recall Husserl’s phrase: “It is 
through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is actually a method” (Hua VI.: 52, 
E.: 51). What was once a method that served a particular purpose – namely, to handle the 
economic suspicion – became substantiated in the theoretical perception of “the economy”. 
The belief that “the economy” is an actual object, as it became more tangible through the 
preceding narrative, is based on a misunderstanding – the misunderstanding that talking about 
“the economy” is more than avoiding talk about something else. Talk about “the economy” – 
associated with whatever perceptions of wealth, resources, production, etc. – results from 
economists’ discursive elevation – or better: diversion. This misunderstanding became 
apparent in the simultaneous success and rejection of the formalist revolution. In the formalist 
revolution the latent function of all advances in economic theorizing found their last 
manifestation: the search to go beyond economic life. 
Formalism and the invisible hand (phenomenologically understood) were the two corner 
stones of the preceding narrative. The formalist revolution happened along a theory and a 
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method in that both formalist discreetness and the perception of “the economy” merged: the 
axiomatic method as the separation of meaning and structure, and general equilibrium theory as the 
analytic core of invisible hand theorizing. The very fact that nobody today engages in such 
theory and method – although they reconfigured economics as no other theory or method 
before – shows that their influence cannot be reduced to their being a particular theory or 
method in a series of other available theories and methods. The axiomatization of GET had 
the character of a manifestation of economics rather than being an episode that has led 
economists astray for a moment by mathematicians and Walrasians. They show something 
elementary of the phenomenological constitution of modern economic science – they show 
something of the experience of economic theorizing. This manifest character will occupy us in the 
next part. In this chapter, I prepare the methodological ground for appreciating it.  
I expect most readers to have difficulties accepting this emanation-like character of the 
formalist revolution. In order to appreciate it, the first obstacle to overcome is the belief that 
the link between GET as a theory and the axiomatic method as method is contingent. Could 
one not axiomatize all theories, and apply also other methods to GET? Today, even 
neuroeconomists speak of an “axiomatic approach” to their research (Caplin, Dean 2007). I 
associate them, however, not because the axiomatic method is the “suitable” method of GET. I 
associate them because, first, there is not any theoretical interest of GET that the axiomatic 
method could serve! And, second, because there is not any theoretical interest that the 
axiomatic method could serve! It is inherent in GET that it does not require a particular claim, 
and it is inherent in the axiomatic method that it does not require particular qualities of a theory. 
In the same sense as GET is independent of a perception of economic life, axioms are not 
representations of basic properties of that life. In precisely this negative sense they are 
associated. The axiomatic method could show something of GET – namely, that it does not 
(and never did) imply a particular economic claim. The attention that the axiomatization of 
GET received, and the negative closure it provides for today’s economics showed that the 
engine of scientification of economic theory was to move economics beyond its possible 
meaning bestowal. Such is the entryway to the following part.  
When associating GET and formalism – to close the preceding Big History – I do no 
more than what was obvious in mercantilist discourse: that theory is a matter of gaining ethos. 
To introduce a gap between the individual motives and the social result meant to divert from 
oneself. If later this distinction gave space to an analytic core of economic theory, it evermore 
covered this initiating sense-accomplishment of an ethos of economists. Thinking of “the 
economy” demands formalism. The axiomatic method is thus not the method proper, as though 
there was a purpose proper of invisible hand theorizing, but it is like its symptom that shows the 
self-defeating character of the theoretical perception of “the economy”.  
In this part, I have suggested that the phenomenological problem of economic science 
culminates in the formalization of the invisible hand. In the next part, I will show that with the 
formalist revolution this self-defeating character of modern economic science as such can be 
exhibited on the level of theoretical experience. The following methodological remarks disclose this 
locus of criticism.  
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The Transcendental Notion of the Life-World and the Manifest Character  
of the Formalist Revolution – to which Historians have Never Faced Up 
 
At the present stage, the strong implications regarding the end of the social history of 
economics are not more than suggestive, based on Big (read: speculative) history. In order to 
be more expressive of the problematic of economic science, I need to make a methodological 
step regarding the notion of the life-world towards its full transcendental density. It will not 
provide conclusiveness to the fact of ‘the end of economics’, but, more important, it will 
increase the urgency to consider the possibility of such end. 
In the first part, the notion of the life-world first gave rise to a description of economists’ 
special world with the attempt to determine the actual significance of economics. Then, it gave 
rise to a (Big) social history of the scientification of economics with the attempt to keep track 
of the past significance of economics. In the following, it will give rise to the writing of a 
biography, or better: an affective history of the intellectual becoming of an economist with the 
attempt to exhibit the possible significance of economics. Now, I do not demand that 
economists are trivially situated within the world they share with others, as in the first part. I do 
not ask how economics forgot its being situated within the socio-historical world, as in the 
preceding part. But now I ask: what is the life-world of an economist in its being forgotten, that is, 
in the traces it leaves in experience. The guiding question is no longer what is the significance 
of economics, nor has it ever been, but can it possibly be significant? For after all, 
transcendentally speaking, only concrete and unique subjects can accomplish the meaning of 
economic science. Life-world is now the locus of the experiential traces after all intellectual 
efforts ceased being informed by their motives.  
While in the first part life-world referred simply to the discursive milieu of economics, in 
the preceding it referred to the social history of the interest of economists, now life-world 
refers to the actual sense-accomplishing life of an economist as the condition of any interest – 
described in its deprival. Now the life-world is that world through and from which one can 
have an interest. The oblivion of the life-world, respectively, does neither refer to the closure of 
discourse, nor to the oblivion of the interests that historically initiated the entire project. It 
refers to the oblivion of having an interest at all – an interest that is not interesting, meaning 
that is not meaningful. With the formalist revolution the very conditions of the possibility of 
any interest in economics science are challenged and thus can become manifest in a lived 
experience: a biography. The subjective accomplishment of the formalist revolution, to use 
Husserl’s methodological term proper, is the transcendental guiding threat (Leitfaden) into the 
phenomenological reduction to experience.  
The methodological challenge, at this point, is certainly how one can talk about the 
possibility of economics in concrete terms of a biography? Are biographies not contingent and 
thus opposed to the necessity I intend? But note the change of intellectual value that 
accompanies the methodological step I invite to take. The intellectual value I adhered to was 
first the familiarity of a description, then the mind stretching of a historical reflection. Now it 
concerns the concreteness of “transcendental life”. I use this somewhat dusty notion in order 
to seize upon the Husserlian twist to Kantian transcendentality. For Kant, it refers to the 
categories of cognition, which allow objects of experience to be matters of truth, at least as 
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long as this experience is accompanied by the identity of a subject – the “I think”. For Husserl, 
transcendentality is the title of the concrete accomplishing life which allows experience to be 
meaningful. Subjectivity is here not a matter of identity, but is both constituted by and 
constitutive for experience. Transcendentality concerns both the constitution of a horizon of 
experience and the constitution of subjectivity from this horizon. “I am the subject of my life, 
and the subject develops by living. (…) The Ego does not originally arise out of experience (...) 
but out of life” (Hua IV: 252, E.: 264). In my own words, experience is not, as it is in Kant, the 
faculty of conceiving and perceiving reality. It is “lived experience” that continuously evokes a 
subject of experience. What it means to be a subject of experience is itself a matter of 
experience – precisely this means to “be” a subject (see e.g. Fink 1995, Landgrebe 1982, Lee 
1993). This notion of transcendentality, I presume, disarms those critical friends who conceive 
of subjects as the effects of their relations (for a discussion regarding life-writings in 
economics, see Forget 2002: 233). 
Such a twist is commonly assigned to Husserl’s move from static to genetic 
phenomenology. It provides the philosophical ground that allows me to speak of the 
experiential possibility of economics in terms of a biographical narrative: the self-constitution 
of transcendental subjectivity as a worldly being – a person. “As transcendental ego, after all, I 
am the same ego that in the worldly sphere is a human ego” (Hua VI: 268, E.: 264). To narrate 
a biography is to narrate a transcendental history of the becoming of an economist. The 
transcendental necessity that I claim with Husserl can only mean this: being intrigued by life. 
It should not disturb, nor confuse that the style of a transcendental argument is here a 
biographical narrative, as opposed to, for example, the deduction of categories. A 
transcendental argument in phenomenology does not aim at generality. The reasoning I invite 
to is not an inference from one case to that of others. The concrete biography of an 
economist, in its concreteness, cannot be generalized. Rather, precisely in the uniqueness and 
contingency of one economist, I aim at intriguing other economists into a reflection on the 
possibility of the subjective accomplishment of economics. Generality, in other words, is void 
of transcendentality, and vice versa! The opposition of the contingency of individual lives and 
the necessity of ideas – as in the philosophy of science – or the opposition of individuals and 
the anonymity of superimposed social structures – as in science studies – does not apply to 
transcendental life. Most contributions in Forget and Weintraub (2008) discuss the 
methodology of biographies in terms of these dichotomies. The conduct of life, however, gains 
transcendental rank only in its “contingency”, and in its struggle with anonymous structures. 
Transcendental analysis, as it is so fascinating and challenging of phenomenology, does not 
have to be carried out as an abstract philosophical discussion of categories, but can be carried 
out within the concrete reality of scientific practice. 
 So much for transcendental phenomenology. But why does the writing of the formalist 
revolution require such a subtle point of view? Is it not just one event before and after other 
events, preceded in some way, and echoed in another? To start, recall the card I already played 
at the beginning of the last part: there is a factual history of economics only since the formalist 
revolution; before, the formation of the history of economic thought was an essential part of 
every economic argument, essential for the very orientation in the discipline. How else was the 
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historical erasure of the formalist revolution possible if not by virtue of its self-evasive character? 
To speak about it in factual terms is to miss the very nature of it. 
As seen in terms of factual history, speaking about the formalist revolution is to speak 
about the mathematization of economics along mostly (not only) general equilibrium theory. In my 
preceding historical narrative, I did not refer to the history of mathematical economics. Such 
history had to include economists like A.N. Isnard (1748-1803), Nicolas-François Canard, (ca 
1750-1833), Augustin Cournot (1801-1877), Arsène Dupuit (1804-66), Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth (1845-1926), and all the other Walrasians hand in hand with the Paretians who 
were in dialogue with mathematical scientists like Poincare and Volterra (see e.g. Ingrao and 
Israel 1990: 31-87, Weintraub 2002: 9ff). In this history, one could even trace a notion of 
axiomatic mathematization. Cournot showed such interest when distinguishing algebraic 
representations from arbitrary functions: 
 
I propose to show in this essay that the solution of the general questions which arise from the theory of 
wealth, depends essentially no on elementary algebra, but on that branch of analysis which comprises 
arbitrary functions, which are merely restricted to satisfying certain conditions (1963 [1838]: 4).  
 
Being interested in ‘certain conditions’ rather than algebraic representations, mathematical 
economists never relied heavily on referential truth claims. Until the formalist revolution, 
however, they could not set the tone of the discipline, in which most economists continued to 
believe in the referential truth of their abstractions.  
Mathematization as a feature of theory is thus not the same as formalization as a feature of 
theoretical practice. Unique to the mathematics applied in the formalist revolution was not its 
degree of sophistication, but that it was incontestable. For this reason only do I call the formalist 
revolution a revolution. An account of the formalist revolution that assesses it in light of this 
preceding mathematization too easily loses sight of the accompanying loss of contestability. 
Formalism, rather than a philosophical program, neutralizes all those instances through which 
economists can respond to their motives. The actual virulence of formalism is not a matter of a 
feature of theory. Instead, it affects the responsivity of theoretical practices.  
With the formalist revolution I can illustrate the phenomenological problem of various 
modes of formalism that one could distinguish on the level of theory – such as logical 
formalism of derivations, statistical formalism of error functions, geometric formalism of 
graphs, computational formalism of algorithms, moral formalism of utilitarianism, formalism 
of natural laws, of (national) accounting, etc. There are mathematical formalisms again of many 
kind, while the axiomatic method somewhat stands out not only for its sophistication, but for 
its suggestive force to transmit incontestability (which I describe in a moment). To the extent that 
the axiomatic method requires remaining inexpressive of meaning, it indeed cannot be called a 
“method” at all. Along the “axiomatic method” the latent problematic of all formalisms for the 
economist can be best illustrated. Although in the philosophy of science these formalisms are 
by far not the same, phenomenologically speaking, the problematic for the theorist distils in one 
tension: Formalism is the title of the difficulties of taking a stance or an attitude as an economist.  
For the sake of clarity, let me compare my approach to the formalist revolution with some 
other prominent approaches of historians of economics. One of the most versed historians of 
mathematical economics, Roy Weintraub, warned the economist not to confuse the differences 
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between “mathematization”, “formalism”, “axiomatization”, “abstract”, and “rigor” (2002: 72 
ff.). He does so in order to disclose the space within which the historically contingent transfers 
from mathematics to economics (and back again) can be discussed (for the ‘back again’, see 
Kjeldsen 2007). Weintraub thus employs historical scrutiny in order to debunk the conflations 
caused by economists’ belief “that mathematics is somehow there, and will always be there in 
but one shape and form” (2002: 3).  
Historical scrutiny, according to my approach, means to account for the formalist 
revolution in that it necessitated this image of mathematics and thus its historical conflations. The 
little awareness among economists about the historical reality of the rise of mathematical 
economics is inherent to mathematical expressions as such. A historically and philosophically 
informed mathematician would soon loose the feeling for mathematics – for which the 
biography of Weintraub is the best example. For this reason Leibniz, for example, is known as 
a philosopher rather than as a scientist, and Newton as a scientist rather than as a philosopher.  
When committing to historical scrutiny, Weintraub and others thus forgot that inherent to 
the mathematical experience is to remain inexpressive of its historical or philosophical 
meaning. It was necessary that economists remained ignorant about the history of 
mathematical economics if it was to be influential at all. Mathematical economics, as I already 
have suggested, was influential because economics could forget its historical past and philo-
sophical contests. The history of mathematical economics, in particular its success, cannot be 
understood without considering how effectively it numbed economists’ historical and philo-
sophical awareness. In this sense, mathematical economics was manifest of the economists’ 
need for scientificity. A factual history of the mathematization of economics that Weintraub 
has presented in his yet path-breaking work, possibly reinforces the disease it aims to cure.  
Historians of economics never internalized that the history of the formalist revolution is a 
history suppressed by its very events. If there was a formalist revolution, it did not take place – 
or, less paradoxically, its history of sense is to hide its history of factual events. Even if in the 
last decades historians have shown a growing interest in the formalist revolution, the question 
of why this period is both fascinating and frightening at the same time was not seriously 
tackled. As a result, the most common strategy is to show how little mathematical economics 
contributed to the questions that moved economics before (Blaug 2003). This nostalgic move 
goes hand in hand with the rhetoric of most economists today when they ask: What is wrong 
with the axiomatization of GET? Why is it worthless? Hardly ever does one ask: How could it 
possibly happen? What made it attractive? What made it necessary? Such an account would 
also show to historians why the great bunch of their profession are still concerned with what is 
already “history” and thus officially “irrelevant” for present economics (Marcuzzo 2008).  
For the same reason that the debunking of common historical conflations is not the target 
of my narrative, neither, then, is the exposing of what could be called the non-neutrality of 
mathematical tools. Historical scrutiny in the formalist revolution is often invested in order to 
show that its image of neutrality did not correspond with its practice. Mathematics was 
certainly not “merely a language” that says the same in a different or better way, as Samuelson 
proudly announced (1947). The informative account, for example, of Giocoli on how 
mathematical proof techniques affected the notion of equilibrium in economic theory, 
convincingly shows the non-neutrality of mathematical tools (2003). Yes, mathematical 
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expressions did something to economics. But they did something to economics as that which 
appears beyond economics. If the neutral appearance was part of the motivation of the 
formalist revolution, then what does it account for to debunk it historically? 
The same can be said about exposing hidden intentions surrounding the formalist 
revolution: What appears being solely for the purpose of mathematical rigor, was actually 
motivated by specific, mostly politically suspicious, interests in the context of WWII and later 
the Cold War. Exposing historians take over the role of those who asked: Who Are You – 
Claiming Scientific Authority! But if the economist, precisely due to the self-evasive character 
of the formalist revolution, is no longer sensible to this question, then exposing hidden 
interests appears to be no more than the writing of subplots. 
Mirowski’s narrative that tells the history of that period as the rise of the new paradigm of 
“information” is surely the paradigmatic case (2001). Although Mirowski does give an account 
under which social conditions economic science gained discursive power before and after 
1945, in order to do so he had to downplay the impact of the formalist efforts – “Bourbaki 
would become a charm to ward off cyborgs” (2001: 394). But the neutrality of the formalist 
efforts, as I have suggested in the preceding part and will confirm in the next, was operational 
for how the new paradigm could sneak into economics, and thus crucial for what difference this 
new paradigm made for the economist. Exposing hidden interests may account for new theoretical 
paradigms. But it does not account for the meaning of this paradigm for the economist. Here 
lies the challenge for “another” history of the formalist revolution: it affected what economics 
possibly could mean for the economist. 
When applying historical scrutiny to the formalist revolution we need to keep clearly in 
mind the rupture it represents in the historicity of economics, on the one hand, and its possible 
philosophical meaning, on the other. A mathematization of economics is not simply one event 
in the sequence of events that could constitute a tradition. It does not bestow economics with 
any historical meaning. The mathematization changes not only the relation of economics to its 
history, but the very possibility of relating to its history. “After” the formalist revolution, the 
practice of economics excludes the basic questions of history such as whether economics is 
coined by one and the same question from its beginning until today, or is an scattered field of 
different world-views. To put it in the words that Husserl reserved as the basic question of 
meaning: How did I get there? What brought me to it? What made me interested? What am I 
actually up to? In this sense, the formalist revolution touched at the coordinates of what 
economics possibly could mean.  
 
 
Toward a Transcendental Phenomenology of the Mathematical Experience: 
The Rupture and Suggestive Force of Mathematics 
 
My phenomenological discussion of the formalist revolution thus begin with the intuitively 
intelligible point of the a-historicity of formal expressions. After the two preceding expository 
parts, the reader should have a notion that “history” is not only a matter of a particular interest, 
a particular purpose, or even a particular method. A-historicism lies at the very bottom of the 
constitution of modern science.  
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The phenomenological problem of formal sciences can be described in terms of forgetting – 
literally, that is, not merely to ‘neglect for particular reasons’. What is commonly conceived in 
the philosophy of science as an abstraction or generalization is actually an oblivion. While 
generalizations are only general as long as one retains in the impression of the particular, and is 
so able to “return” to it, in formalizations one neglects and unlearns to care for the particular, 
and at last also loses the very sense for it. What lets us forget is of a different 
phenomenological nature than the reasons that make us abstract from something. What lets us 
forget are “affective reasons”, as Husserl would have said with a smile. Forgetting is being 
drawn into something without retaining in grasp what led to it. This is how economics became 
a mathematical science. 
It is vital for the phenomenological character of the following part that forgetting is 
inherent in the mathematical experience. Formalism does not refer to a philosophical position. 
Accordingly, it is possible to actually defend a philosophy of formalism phenomenologically. 
Hilbert and Husserl went well along in Göttingen. The phenomenological problem of the 
mathematical experience is that it exerts a suggestive force, in particular to equate the intellectual 
virtue of rigor with the virtues of science. Regarding their affect, the passivity of mathematical 
cogency and scientific evidence are associated. This is to say that the equation of mathematics 
with science was never made by anyone (certainly not by Hilbert). Instead, it was always a felt 
coinciding. A coinciding (Deckung) in Husserl is a passive identification. There is an affective 
alliance of mathematics and science, which fades away as soon as it is defended philosophically.  
The suggestive force of formalism says that formalization suffices the needs of science. 
Only when being in the impression of this force, only within the experience of mathematics, 
could the formalist revolution be successful in shaping the economist’s mind: forgetting history 
as though it was fully represented in presence, and forgetting philosophy, as though all 
epistemic authority is incorporated in the cogency of a mathematical proof. This is indeed 
sufficient for a science, the intellectual need of which is merely to appear beyond suspicion. In 
this sense, the success of the formalist revolution was telling from economists’ scientific needs.  
While in the philosophy of science one can only cry out the difference of mathematics and 
science, a phenomenology of the mathematical experience can make understood what affects 
give rise to this misunderstanding. Only because there is first an affective association between 
mathematics and science, there is the possible misunderstanding of that mathematics is All 
There Is about science. Claiming mathematical science is just fine as long as it is accompanied 
by a philosophical awareness is question begging. It is true, as for example Backhouse argued, 
that the problem of mathematical economics is not formalism per se (1998). But what does it 
amount to requiring that “economists put sufficient effort into empirical work” (Ibid.: 1856), if 
it lies in the experience of formalist expressions per se not to do so. How come that there is the 
need to emphasize the preliminary character of mathematics all over again if there was no 
inherent appeal of the mathematical experience to clink off the rest of our intellectual life? 
Only for the reason of its suggestive force has the critique of mathematical sciences cried out 
for centuries: Life Cannot be Reduced to Numbers! And for just the same reason all 
mathematical scientists have warned, with no softer voice: Never Forget! Mathematics is 
merely preliminary – precisely as the never-ending warnings of the economic suspicion say: Do 
not forget, economic life is not All There Is!  
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Let me quote three of the figureheads in mathematical economics of the first half of the 
20th century who accorded to that warning. First, Arthur Pigou, in 1941. He referred to the 
ballistics that mathematical economics cannot provide.  
 
We must indeed, when engaged in this type of investigation [mathematical] remember always that it is a 
second-rate affair, prolegomena to economics, not economics itself, not real ballistics. But, if we 
remember this, we are safeguarded against the danger Marshall feared (Pigou 1941: 278). 
 
The ballistics points nicely to my notion of the weight of meaning that will be the actual object 
of critique in the next part. The success of the mathematization of economics shows that only 
the prolegomena to economics is capable of providing scientific authority.  
 Also Paul Samuelson acknowledged in his peculiarly eloquent fashion the suggestive 
power of mathematics, though he did profit from it greatly: 
 
The danger is (…) that you will overrate the method’s power for good or evil. You may even become 
the prey of charlatans who say to you what Euler said to Diderot to get him to leave Catherine the 
Great’s court: ‘Sir, (a + bV)/n = x, hence God exists; reply!’ And, like Diderot, you may slink away in 
shame. Or reacting against the episode, you may disbelieve the next mathematician who later comes 
along and gives you a true proof of the existence of the Deity (Samuelson 1952: 67). 
 
Another instructive example is John von Neumann, one of the most forceful activists of 
mathematical economics in the decades surrounding 1945. When speaking in 1947 about the 
“nature of intellectual efforts in mathematics”, he appealed to the empirical origin of 
mathematical practices though acknowledged their tendency to clink off this origin. He warned 
of “taking the immovable rigor of mathematics too much for granted (1961 [1947]: 6), and 
concluded his speech with the following words. 
 
As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical source, or still more, if it is a second and third 
generation only indirectly inspired by ideas coming from “reality”, it is beset with very grave dangers. It 
becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, more and more purely l’art pour l’art. (…) there is a grave 
danger (…) that the stream, so far from its source, will separate into a multitude of insignificant 
branches (…). In other words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after much “abstract” 
inbreeding, a mathematical subject is in danger of degeneration (Ibid.: 9). 
 
We know how von Neumann has saved mathematics from its degeneration in Los Alamos. 
Therefore, neither could I write the affective history of the formalist revolution following von 
Neumann. About his affective life you rather consult the archive of the CIA.  
Let me clarify my notion of the phenomenology of mathematical experience with 
reference to Husserl’s account of Galileo’s “mathematization of nature” (Hua VI: 18-59, E.: 
21-59). The a-historicity of mathematics was central for Husserl’s image of the sense-history of 
the scientific revolution. Mathematics, first of all, is a-historical in a trivial sense. Mathematical 
truths are independent of their “before” and “after”. If someone doubts whether the sides of a 
right triangle have always been or will always relate like a²=b²+c², we have to doubt whether he 
or she understood it. Euclidean mathematics was “virtually” true even before Euclid 
formulated it. This virtuality of mathematics gave rise to the Platonic dream that mathematics 
is reaped off directly from the heavenly tree of eternal ideas rather than designed in light of a 
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particular purpose. Those who hold a more pragmatic image of mathematics, instead, simply 
do not have the right feeling for it.  
Hence the history of mathematics is of no interest for the mathematician. The incident of 
mathematical practice in the world is annihilated by this very practice. Every formulation of a 
mathematical statement proves that its very formulation does not add something to its validity. 
Outdated mathematics textbooks – which nevertheless exist – are the first you throw out of 
your shelf. For such reason mathematics can work as a suggestive image of the progress of 
science to the extent as progress, too, enables forgetting the problems of yesterday – because 
they are solved. Hence the rise and fall of modern scientific optimism is nothing but the rise 
and fall of the belief in a “mathematical science”. While during high modernism of science this 
equation with mathematics prospered and nourished scientific optimism, today mathematics – 
which historians of mathematics oddly call “modern” – moved to its own department. Since 
WWII mathematicians deal with structures (later with categories), while scientists deal with objects 
(later with models). Mathematicians and scientists have shared the same feeling for most of 
their modern times. The question of the modernity of science comes down to the question 
whether they still share this feeling today.  
It was this self-annihilating character of the mathematical experience, that fascinated 
Husserl. It represents one of the benchmarks of his phenomenological philosophy. Husserl, a 
trained mathematician, taught philosophy between 1901 and 1916 in Göttingen door to door 
with his colleague David Hilbert. He continued to be occupied with mathematics for his entire 
life. Mathematics was for him the last hallmark of a phenomenology of science that tries to 
overcome the positions of, and opposition of, psychologism and objectivism (see exegetically 
Lohmar 1991). He wanted to exhibit the nature of ideal objects (such as numbers) within an 
intentional analysis. While in his early years such effort supposedly provided a foundation for 
the formal sciences, in his later work, which informs the phenomenology at hand, he discussed 
mathematics along Galileo’s hybris of the mathesis universalis – that is, the belief that 
mathematics is All There Is in the natural sciences.  
Mathematics fascinated Husserl because the mathematical experience challenges the 
transcendental status of experience as such. The notion of experience itself was at stake 
because its constitutive role seems to be annihilated. Precisely as “death” in Heidegger or “the 
other” in Lévinas, the mathematical experience is of transcendental significance for the very 
notion of experience. How? In the Ideas I Husserl writes:  
 
There are pure eidetic sciences, such as pure logic, pure mathematics, and the pure theories of time, space, 
motion, and so forth. Throughout, in every step of their thinking, they are pure of all positings of 
matters of fact; or, equivalently: in them no experience as experience, that is, as a consciousness that seizes 
upon, or posits actuality, factual existence, can assume the function of grounding. Where experience 
functions in them, it does not as experience (Husserl 1988 (Hua III/1): 16). 
 
The mathematical experience does not function as experience. It does not constitute, and is 
not “present” in, its theories. This is the phenomenological challenge of the “mathematical 
experience”: it seems an oxymoron. Mathematics cannot be constituted as a proper “region” 
with a typical style of meaning, its own sense-modifications, and sense-sedimentations. Rather, 
mathematics describes an “emptying of meaning” (Sinnentleerung) (Hua VI: 49 ff., E.: 46 ff.). 
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There is no history of sense, but only a history of the deprivation of sense. The mathematical 
experience annihilates itself in its being accomplished. It takes place in its own blind spot. The 
mathematical experience is not manifest in its correlating object of experience, but withdraws 
from it – as though a feeling was of a different order than the feeling of it. Eric Livingston has 
put this self-evasive character of mathematics in the center of his anthropology of 
mathematics: “a proof is cultivated so as to realize the material proof as a disengaged version, 
or account, of that proof’s lived work” (1986: 177). In his (slightly improvised) 
phenomenology of the mathematical proof, Rota has put the same gap in little harsher words:  
 
Every mathematical proof is a form of pretending. Nowhere in the sciences does one find as wide a gap 
as that between the written version of a mathematical result and the discourse that is required in order 
to understand the same result (Rota 1997: 189). 
 
This self-evasive character of mathematics makes it phenomenologically risky. It risks a rupture 
of life in that its experience is absolutely singled out, and does not demand to be lived through, 
so that it could “flow into” (einströmen) the stream of consciousness. The mathematical 
experience does not bestow its object with the weight of meaningfulness. Mathematics 
interrupts the demand of meaning that makes all experiences lived experiences. “After” a 
mathematical result is stated, nothing needs to be added: QED. One can enjoy mathematics 
without being committed to an actual claim, without doing something in epistemic terms – 
precisely as the trader did not do anything in oikonomic terms.  
So what do mathematicians? How does mathematical experience bring about a subject of a 
mathematician? How is an intellectual act experienced if it constitutes only in absence? Or, in 
terms of my principle notion: To what is the mathematical experience responsive? The gap 
between the mathematical experience and the nature of its correlate – mathematics – 
challenges the transcendental concern of phenomenology for the sensibility of intellectual life. 
To bridge this gap, and thus to make understood mathematics from its practices, is the task of 
a phenomenology of the mathematical experience. It positively exhibits the experiential 
constitution of mathematics in its deprivation. Such I will do in the following part, to write a 
history of the absent, but nevertheless constitutive experience of mathematics: the history of 
the affective traces of the silence of meaning in mathematics. The phenomenological riddle to be 
answered is this: being beyond the demand of meaning, mathematics liberates intellectual life 
from sensible life – and yet liberates to an experience that is capable of nourishing scientific 
optimism? How? And at what costs? 
Husserl sketched a similar history in his famous supplement to The Crisis on the origin of 
geometry (Hua VI.: 378 ff., E.: 353 ff.). He was interested in the miracle of the institution of 
geometry (Urstiftung), an event that initiated a tradition by means of anticipating what possibly 
could follow. Geometry could only institute a tradition by hiding itself as an origin. The 
tradition of geometry is thus the supplement of its validity. This twist of a constitution that 
constitutes by means of the evasion of its origin also fascinated Derrida when reading Husserl 
with and against himself (1989). In a nutshell, Derrida showed how Husserl’s project of 
historizing transcendentality remains equally in what he calls the metaphysics of presence. 
Derrida, like me, was skeptical about digging out an origin of science that could renew the 
project of European reason. My notion of the history of the affective traces is informed by his 
 
____________________________________
            Taking Stock - Zooming In (5) 
_______________________
                                                       243 
________________________
258
critique, but nevertheless does not give up the claim of a phenomenological “exhibition” 
(Ausweis) for the sake of a critical account of modern economic science.  
I thus adopt Husserl’s problem of the mathematical experience for the case of the 
mathematization of economics as follows: Since the theoretical experience of the formalization 
of economics is not expressive of its motives, the history of mathematical economics can only 
be written within the trace it leaves for the character of the mathematician. The experience of 
mathematical economics does not enter, nor does it flow into the intentional correlate of 
economic theory. Theory does not tell from its sense-history through which it can be 
understood. The mathematical act remains in itself – that is, in its affective weight before it 
could bestow its correlate with meaning, and before it could become part of the hermeneutic 
play of meaning. The mathematization of GET is thus no history made up by events, but it is 
the history that leaves traces, an affective history.  
There is thus “another”, a secret history of the formalist revolution. Only through this 
history the success of this revolution beyond the theories it informed and beyond the theories 
that came as an alternative to it can be assessed. With this history I respond to the standard 
critique of the irrelevance of formalism. I advance this critique by a genealogy of the 
mathematical experience in economics that circles around a besetting, or infestation: the scientific 
motive in economics turns against the economist. The intuition of this infestation is simply 
that economists become incapable of making sense of themselves, and cannot grow into a 
fully-fledged self-perception as an economist. In more “therapeutic” terms, I write, as it were, 
the history of the symptoms of a science that forgot its possible meaning – the life-world. 
To sum up these preliminary remarks about the phenomenology of the mathematical 
experience, the problem is that a formal theory qua being formal cannot reflect the motivation that gives rise 
to it. In other words, theoretical experiences do no longer bring a subject of theorizing into 
play. If the affective weight of an act does no longer enter the meaning of the objects of 
experience, there remains an affective history that turns against the object of experience. The 
subject that is evoked by mathematical economics is not one that conducts an intellectual life, 
but relates like a parasite to its own work. This estrangement describes the affective 
constitution of economic science. It starts with the loss of weight of an economic claim, a 
liberation from the economic suspicion, a liberation from being blamed to be responsible, and 
ends in the feeling of elevation above messy economic life, which is actually a protective 
gesture that demands disinterest, resulting in nothing but the loss of the belief in saying 
something of worth – in cynicism. Such is the genetic code of economic science.  
I will tell this affective genealogy in terms of the intellectual biography of one character 
that appears entirely uninteresting in terms of the history of hidden motives: Gerard Debreu. 
With Gerard Debreu the phenomenological contradiction of economic science can be 
exhibited – with Debreu, against Debreu, as well as by protecting Debreu.  
 
 
Zooming In: Gerard Debreu 
 
Why Gerard Debreu? Among economists he is known as somewhat illusive and double. He 
cast a “bright shadow” on post-war economics. Debreu is known by all who had to learn his 
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proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium at graduate school, cursed by all who want 
to say more than , yet he is crowned with the Nobel Prize for economics. Although 
economists are trained in Debreu’s proof, they hardly read the 1954 article, nor his book of 
1959: Theory of Value – noteworthy, the last book in economics until today crowned with such 
title. Some economists may associate Debreu’s work on GET with the initiating metaphor of 
economic science – the invisible hand – although the study of the actual text of Smith is not 
conceived as part of economic theory. Even if full-heartedly rejected or belittled as outmoded, 
economists profited from Debreu since he pushed the belief in, and fostered the reputation of 
economics as an incontestable science. Economics today can be sold for a higher price than 
before Debreu, although economic battles seem less heated than in the days of, for example, 
the socialist calculation debate. Last, although the entire effort of Debreu is motivated and 
becomes intelligible only by his teaching in a particular and rather obscure school in 
mathematics – “Bourbaki” – there are but a few economists who ever heard of that name, and 
even less who have read it. Debreu did, word for word, and everything he said about his work 
we find word for word in Bourbaki. Debreu is like an anti-hero of contemporary economics, 
an icon of its closure. 
Xx∈
Debreu may be an icon, but he is certainly not a representative of a typical economist. To 
the contrary, he is an outstanding character in many senses; outstanding for he regarded the 
period of the formalist revolution as a phase that “had no precedent, and it will have no 
successor” (1991b: 1); outstanding because he thought of his work as having “freed researchers 
from the necessity of questioning the work of their predecessors” (1983: 99); outstanding 
because there is, compared to his work, little interest in his person among economists; 
outstanding for being often quoted but hardly read; outstanding because he was the only who 
actually defended a methodology that derives all its value from the rigorous distinction of 
mathematical “form” and economic “content” – thus the only actual formalist in economics; 
and ultimately outstanding because he is the unique person who received the Bank of Sweden 
Prize for economics without ever perceiving himself as an economist! This is the scandal that I 
will trace in the following part. In the person of Gerard Debreu the phenomenological 
contradiction of economic science became apparent.  
Debreu’s illusive status is reflected by the way others have assessed his influence. 
“Although there had been quantum leaps of mathematical sophistication before in the history 
of economics, there had never been anything like this” (2002: 114), as Weintraub emphasized 
his role as compared to mathematical economics between Cournot and Hicks. Hildenbrand 
called his work “scientific contributions in the most honest way possible”, and Samuelson “a 
unpretentious no-nonsense approach” (in Weintraub 2002: 113). His colleague at Berkeley 
Oliver Williamson, the ambitious neo-institutionalist said, “I always marveled at Gerard’s quiet, 
kind and inclusive ways – an example being his insistence on referring to me as an ‘economic 
theorist’, my protests to the contrary not withstanding” (in Anderson 2005). Debreu was right 
to insist, since as Varian wrote after the Nobel Prize, “not only have Debreu’s works 
contributed to mathematical economics; they have contributed to the science of economics as 
a whole” (1984: 4).  
Debreu’s illusive status is also reflected by the way others have discussed his work. Roy 
Weintraub, who until today presented the most complete image of Debreu’s contribution to 
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the formalist revolution, relied on a distinction of the historian of mathematics Leo Corry 
between the “body” and the “image” of mathematics (2002). Debreu’s influence on the body 
of economics, from the point of view of today, could be called zero. But it is easy to 
underestimate his influence on the image of economics including all “secondary” features like 
method, style, standards, institutions, and professional ethos of economists. The broader the 
view the greater, yet more subtle is his influence.  
Concerning the body of economic theory, on the one hand, Debreu can be identified with 
the end of GET – the full articulation of the theoretical perception of “the economy”. This 
“theory” has mirrored most analytic advancements in economic theory before Debreu, while 
after Debreu most theoretical innovations came as alternatives to GET. In this search for 
alternatives, Debreu became the straw man of orthodox and chiefly heterodox market theorists 
when speaking about the insignificance of economic theory. Concerning the “image” of 
economics, on the other hand, I need to include Debreu in the row of those economists who 
coined the post-war institutions of economics. Did Debreu, in whatever murky fashion, not 
contribute to the immense growth and social status of the economic profession, its epistemic 
dominance in other economic discourses, and its participation in the ongoing hype of (Big) 
science? In short, concerning the body of economics, Debreu’s influence can be easily belittled. 
But concerning the image easily undervalued.  
This ambiguity of Debreu’s status is my starting point for writing his biography. Only 
within this tension can the manifest character of his intellectual life for economics as such be 
exhibited. The master key to this ambiguity, how could it be different, is a separation: the 
separation of structure and meaning of economic theory. It represents the core of the axiomatic 
method that Debreu inherited from Nicolas Bourbaki (rather than from David Hilbert). This 
separation is vital for the suggestive force of mathematics that motivated all of Debreu’s 
writings. Meaning ceases to be a source for the intellectual practices of economic theory. The 
axiomatic method transforms theory into something that is detached from its motives. 
The suggestive force of Debreu’s work accounts for the philosophical miracle of the 
formalist revolution: the identification of mathematics and scientificity. In a broader 
perspective, it also provides hints for the understanding of the political miracle of the formalist 
revolution: the changing connotations of economic theory from socialism to neoliberalism. 
This took place roughly in the two decades of the 1950s and 1960s. I repeat, both riddles can 
only be solved on an affective level. There was never any economist who actually defended 
mathematics as the philosophy of (neoliberal) economics – certainly not Debreu! In other 
words, the formalist revolution could only take place without a real revolutionist. It happened to 
the profession – as if guided by an invisible hand. During the formalist revolution scientific 
authority in economics gained an affective monument that is beyond the possible interests that 
motivate economists. In this sense, Debreu’s success shows something of the affective 
constitution of the scientificity of economics: Economics earned the glory of science by feeling 
scientific, without anyone ever achieving it! 
The following phenomenology of the intellectual life of Gerard Debreu is an affective history 
of the axiomatic separation of meaning and structure. Even if meaning and structure are 
separate, and theoretical acts no longer constitute economic meaning, there are affective traces 
of this separation. With the life of Debreu I am going to write the history of the phenomeno-
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logical traces of the formalist revolution. It describes the affective labour involved in making 
the transition from Debreu’s fascination with mathematics, to his struggle in deciding to leave 
it and enter economics, to the discreet posture that kept him working in economics. It 
culminates in the festive mood surrounding the Noble Prize in 1983 that meant nothing but a 
disaster to Debreu. The affective biography of Debreu thus runs from “Nicolas Bourbaki” to 
“Adam Smith” – from his youth at the Ecole Normale in Paris in the last years of WW II, where 
he was taught by Henri Cartan alias “Nicolas Bourbaki”, to 1983 when he received the Bank of 
Sweden Prize in economics roughly for ‘having proven the invisible hand of Adam Smith’.  
Allow a last methodological remark in the attempt to connect to those still skeptical about 
my phenomenological approach. I am not interested in Gerard Debreu’s person and life for its 
own sake. Debreu’s intellectual life tells something about economic science as such. How? Do 
not other economists of the post-war decades tell more about the profession? Why should we 
be interested in a seemingly uninteresting person such as Debreu? Should I not rather look at 
the life of other, much more revealing economists of the postwar period who really invested 
great passions and great ideas into economics, and who tried to make global politics with it? 
Do not the Arrow-Neumann-Friedmans represent the high culture of the theoretical 
perception of “the economy”? How could the person who proved the existence of a general 
equilibrium possibly be important? Is it not irrelevant for this proof to know who made it?  
Debreu indeed never made any politics with his proof. He made it precisely for this 
reason: being beyond politics. After he slipped into economics without really having decided 
on it, mathematical rigor was a way to avoid economists’ high culture that surrounded him in 
Chicago of the 1950s. If he nevertheless affected this culture it is not because Debreu wanted 
to deceive the profession. Debreu has always been protective when being made responsible for 
particular economic claims. Formalism meant to him something he could hide behind. He did 
not want to make a statement about the scientificity of economics. His success thus happened 
against his own self-understanding. It happened to him. All meaning that became assigned to 
Debreu, therefore, does not stem from himself, but can count as a disciplinary reflex to his 
work. While other economists only tell about themselves, the discreet Debreu, who always 
avoided making an economic claim, shows something of economic science.  
Nevertheless, I am not interested in debunking the misperceptions of his work that 
happened in the course of its reception. The experiential contradictions of “economic science” 
can be exhibited only in Debreu’s life itself, in that he experienced the misunderstanding of 
“economic science” in an intimidating way. The profession’s need for scientificity fell back on 
Debreu. Debreu has nothing to reveal about himself. But he reveals the existential problem of 
becoming an economic scientist. I am thus far from criticizing Debreu by showing the dirt 
under his clean dress shirt. I am rather making a case for protecting Debreu against the 
offences he had to face.  
The biography of Gerard Debreu can be entitled the literary rank of a transcendental parable 
for economists. Παραβολη means to “walk aside”, like Debreu. His life is an apologue in 
order to transmit a moral question, in an indirect, but nevertheless concrete way. Debreu’s life 
consists of precisely the elements of a parable: a moral dilemma, a questionable decision, and 
the suffering of the consequences of this decision. Debreu’s biography is a transcendental 
parable of the moral end of the ethos of the economic scientist. 
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Nicolas Bourbaki perhaps at their first summer meeting in Besse-en-Chandesse in July 1935.  
Note the short trousers.  
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Gerard Debreu with his long year friend Edmond Malinvaud  
after being informed to receive the “Nobel” for economics. Note the housecoat. 
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Gerard Debreu died on New Year’s Eve 2004 at the age of 83. Some months later, in March 
2005, Chantal Debreu de Soto, the daughter of Gerard Debreu, gave a Memorial talk for her 
father’s colleagues at the University of Berkeley. For her, as a non-academic, it was probably 
not an easy task. She was speaking from a different perspective than her audience was used to. 
 
As I prepared the statements I wanted to make to you today I was acutely aware that each of us, myself 
included, only knew a very small part of the whole, complex, and intensely private man that my father 
was. So I speak to you now from the perspective of a daughter and what I knew of my father (2005).  
 
The surprising thing about his daughter’s speech was not that there was a different Debreu, a 
“father” Debreu. What was surprising, rather, was that Debreu, the father, was just the same as 
Debreu the colleague – namely, “private” even in his private life. In the same sense as Debreu 
kept his lives in family and academia apart, he remained discreet in both of them. 
 And so the image Chantal Debreu presented of her father was all too familiar to Debreu’s 
colleagues at Berkeley. Debreu was an inconspicuous, introverted, quiet, soft-spoken, and 
protective person. He set high standards for himself, but never got preachy about them. His 
daughter described him as pedantic, “orderly, predictable”, “aesthetically austere”, and a 
“perfectionist”, somewhat like “Phileas Fogg” (de Soto 2005). He liked to travel and liked 
good food, if only things were in order – like an “economic man”.  
 
He would have calculated every probability beforehand and acted only if he figured the odds as 
favorable to his goals. Any travel or vacation with my dad were planned like expeditions to the top of 
Everest. Well ahead of time he had researched every historical and geographical point of interest, had 
booked the hotel for each night, and planned the days’ activities in order to stop at the restaurants of 
interest along the way (Ibid.). 
 
Debreu’s home office seemed to his daughter like the ivory tower of a “mathematical Don 
Quixote”, or of Professor Cosinus and his dog Spheroid, who were the heroes of the bedtime 
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stories he used to read after coming home from Cowles. When she grew up, she found out to 
her surprise that her father did just the same as that droll Professor Cosinus: filling pages from 
upper left to bottom right, closing with QED. Her father did not at all appear to do things 
other than this, let alone what other fathers did.  
 
He seemed either to not have the needs other humans had or he managed never to show that he had 
those needs. Other people, other fathers got tired, got hungry, got thirsty, had a sweet tooth, sweat 
when it was hot, shivered when it was cold, got distracted when they worked on a difficult task. Other 
father’s clothes got wrinkled or got food stains on them. Other fathers got sad, discouraged or angry. 
For the longest time I believed that my father never did any of these things. I believed he slept fully 
clothed in his dress shirt and the bow tie that was his trademark for so long, with his dress slacks, his 
leather belt, his watch and his dress socks (Ibid.). 
 
As formal as Debreu’s work was, as inconspicuous and discreet was his own person. Chantal 
Debreu could never be as close to her father as she may have wished to be. And this distance 
applies not only to his relationship with his environment, but even to his relationship with 
himself. As an anti-hero of economics, he was hardly the hero of his own life. Life happened 
to Debreu, as he showed by calling his autobiographical essay for The American Economist 
(1991b), “Random Walk and Life Philosophy”. Here are his opening lines: 
 
As a particle performs a random walk in a high-dimensional space, an observer may discover a subspace 
in which the projection of its path approximates a straight line. The observer may then be tempted to 
anthropomorphize the particle, and to believe that it has a ‘system which a person forms for the 
conduct of life’ [Debreu quotes the “philosophy” entrance of a 1909 dictionary]. In an inversion of 
roles, a scientist or humanist who is asked to expound his life philosophy must feel inclined to identi[f]y 
with that particle if he is aware of the many chance events that shaped his career, and of the inchoate 
system that he formed for its conduct as it began (1991b: 3). 
 
Thinking about his life, Debreu identifies with a particle in a high-dimensional space. I would 
like to take this metaphor seriously and relate it to the overall present project.  
With the metaphor of a random walk, Debreu brings together three themes that I will 
consider simultaneously in his biography. First, Debreu shows his skepticism about the 
possibility of (empirical) sciences. Science tends to overstate as truth what is merely a 
theoretical projection of what is actually utterly random. Science cannot unravel an actual order 
of the world – which, in any case, may not exist. Second, this epistemic skepticism applies 
equally to the imperative of invisible hand theorizing: never “anthropomorphize” the market. 
This would amount to an imposed order on our individual economic lives which is not 
inherently ordered. About individuals one cannot say more than about particles, or, better, 
atoms – as the dominant metaphor for economists’ “individualism” goes. Third, he himself 
identifies with this particle! He could not say any more about his life than what one could say 
about a random sequence of events. In other words, he did not live up to being the subject of 
his own life. Debreu did not develop a “narrative identity”, and never lived up to a 
hermeneutic integrity of an author (Eakin 2008). Debreu could not be made responsible for 
what happened during the course of his life. Using the metaphor of a particle, it is as though 
Debreu wanted to apologize, to avoid responsibility for what happened to him. 
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In these three themes the general concerns of the Phenomenology of Economics 
reappear: formalism, the invisible hand, and the life-world of economists. The general motif 
that runs through these three themes and through the following biography of Debreu’s 
intellectual life is that of the suspicion of meaning. Inadmissible in science, economics, and in the 
life of the economist is the very weight of meaning: transcendental discreetness.  
Around the same time as Debreu’s daughter held her memorial speech, I began to go 
deeper into Debreu’s biography, since I understood his unique role in economics as compared 
to, for example, Kenneth Arrow. In these days I was reading about “Bourbaki”. I thus never 
met Gerard Debreu in person. Tackling his intellectual biography nonetheless, I invite the 
reader to adopt a perspective that sees his work through his person – as his daughter did – as 
well as his person through his work – as his colleagues and other economists did.  
The evidence I present about the life of Debreu that was rendered “invisible” in his work 
is based on the account of his daughter, who somehow in his place expressed the tensions of 
the encounter of a mathematician with economics. Much of the following reconstruction of his 
life depends on the last words of her speech, in which she speaks about the personal 
consequences of the Bank of Sweden Prize. In this Prize, the misunderstanding of Debreu’s 
intellectual life culminates. For him the Prize was nothing but a disaster. It is this 
misunderstanding that reflects and concretizes the misunderstanding of economics as a 
science. My phenomenological account of the intellectual biography of Gerard Debreu is 
designed to make sense of the disaster of the Prize of 1983, which came for him and his family 
like a “thunderbolt out of the blue” (de Soto 2004):  
 
I don’t think any of us in the family at the time recognized it [the Nobel Prize] for the disaster that it 
was to be. (…) It was from that time onward that I saw my father withdraw from us. He was unwilling 
for any of us to see him as less than he had been judged in that brief shining moment in Stockholm. He 
could not live up to the myth that had been created around him. We deprived him and he deprived 
himself of his humanity, of his right to be flawed (Ibid.). 
 
An intellectual life, at the end of which Debreu “deprived himself of his humanity”? How? 
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(1) Debreu’s Intellectual Initiation:  
Nicolas Bourbaki 
 
 
 
 
Gerard Debreu was born 1921 in Calais as a son of an industrialist. In his youth he was mainly 
a good student. He quickly grew up into the rather strict and elitist educational system of 
France and headed straight toward an academic career. In high school he had already 
experienced the “austere beauty of mathematics” (1991b: 3). He participated in the Concours 
General, and won. The prize was a trip to French West Africa (Debreu 1983a, Bini and Bruni 
1998).  
During his time at Grand Ecole (1939-1941), France fell to the German occupation. The 
students were sent into the so-called Free Zone in order to save them from the tumult of the 
North. Debreu spent this time in the small town of Ambert. “The isolation of the Ambert 
novitiate often made it possible to forget that France was at war” (Debreu 1991b: 3). The 
young Gerard was good in math, interested in geometry, the sciences, and astrophysics in 
particular. In 1941 he entered Ecole Normale Superior in Paris run by the Nazis. He was 20 years 
old. Here my narrative begins. In the “superheated intellectual atmosphere” of this elitist 
school, Debreu’s intellectual identity gained the shape it would maintain for the rest of his life. 
 
Entering the Ecole Normale Superior in the fall of 1941 meant another initiation. The three years 
during which I studied and lived at the Ecole Normale were rich in revelations. Nicolas Bourbaki was 
beginning to publish his Eléments de Mathématique, and his grandiose plan to reconstruct the entire 
edifice of mathematics commanded instant and total adhesion. Henri Cartan, who represented him at 
the Ecole Normale, influenced me as no other faculty member did. The new levels of abstraction and 
of purity to which the work of Bourbaki was raising mathematics had won a respect that was not to be 
withdrawn (Debreu 1991b: 3). 
 
The encounter with Henri Cartan alias Bourbaki shaped Debreu’s image of mathematics and 
impressed his intellectual ethos for the years to come, in particular insofar as Bourbaki 
‘commanded instant and total adhesion’. The influence goes so far that everything one could 
say about Bourbaki, as Weintraub correctly argued and I will strongly confirm, “applies with 
equal force to Gerard Debreu” (2002: 113).  
Apart from these lines, curiously, Debreu for most parts of his life never promoted or 
even referred to a particular school of mathematics. He was never an outspoken “Bourbakist” 
in economics. This silence was crucial for both Debreu’s self-image in economics and the 
creepy influence he had on the discipline. For Debreu there was no declaration of belief in a 
school to be made. For Debreu Bourbaki is mathematics. In his Theory of Value, the Bourbakian 
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document in economics, he refers to his method merely with “the contemporary formalist 
school of mathematics” (1959: x, e.a.). And so the very name of Bourbaki did not enter 
economists’ consciousness as the word “axiomatic” did, although economists were in full 
impact of Bourbakian values for at least 20 years. Economists, like Debreu, hardly discuss what 
kind of mathematics they use. With Debreu, economics became mathematized, not 
bourbakized. For economists, without knowing, mathematics is Bourbaki.  
All the more is it urgent to ask what of Bourbaki was so fascinating for Debreu. The 
identification of Bourbaki with mathematics and the anonymity of “Bourbaki” as a collective, 
we shall see, were vital for the very program of Bourbaki. Even for Bourbaki, Bourbaki is 
mathematics. Although for them this identification meant to stand beyond science, it prepared 
the affective ground on which mathematics and scientificity could later be associated in 
economics. Commenting on Bourbaki will disclose these virulent intricacies of being a 
Bourbakian economist, which would otherwise be disguised by a cloud of sheer mathematical 
authority. Thus, what kind of image of mathematics did the young Debreu inherit from his 
teacher Henri Cartan? What kind of mathematical experience let him speak of his teacher in such 
lofty tones? Who was Bourbaki and what is it like Being Bourbaki? 
 
 
The Liberation of Being Bourbaki – Listening to the Music of Reason 
 
As Debreu cast a bright shadow on economics, so did Nicolas Bourbaki in the history of 
mathematics. In fact, he did not exist. Charles Denis Sauter Bourbaki (1816-1897), instead, was 
a French general of Greek ancestry fighting in the French-Prussian War of 1870. The virtual 
son of the general was used by a group of enthusiastic young French mathematicians as a 
pseudonym for their no-longer-so-secret society, founded in 1935 and beginning to publish 
their joint work since 1939, The Elements of Mathematics (1968 [1939]).  
The founding members came all from Ecole Normale in Paris. Some would later become the 
most influential mathematicians of the 20th century: Jean Dieudonné (the dogmatic spokesman 
of Bourbaki), Claude Chevalley (anarchist and teacher of Alexander Grothendieck), Szolem 
Mandelbrojt (the uncle of the Mandelbrot Set fractal), Rene de Possel (who left shortly after 
and wrote a book on game theory as early as 1936), Jean Delsarte (also celebrated), Andre Weil 
(perhaps the most well-known founding member, who, after the war, held a chair in Chicago 
and during the war was fiercely criticized for the apolitical project by his sister and philosopher 
Simone Weil), and Henri Cartan, Debreu’s teacher and oldest member of the collective. 
Membership could be transferred to succeeding generations. Among later members, other 
great mathematicians have been Alexander Grothendieck and Samuel Eilenberg who both 
were involved in the foundation of category theory. While there are still some leftovers of the 
group at the Ecole Normale today (you can send “him” an e-mail: bourbaki@dma.ens.fr), they 
were influential in mathematics primarily from the 1940’s until the 1960’s, the period of 
Debreu’s active intellectual life. 
At their beginnings, the group tried to keep the list of members secret. Neither did they 
give an account of their name, so that “Bourbaki” was soon surrounded by mysticism. We only 
know from later interviews and the minutes of their meetings about the rather peculiar social 
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Charles Denis Sautier Bourbaki and Nicolas Bourbaki 
Nicolas Bourbaki was meant to be Nicolas Bourbaki. The collective did not give an account of their
name. When in a review of their work it was explained that Bourbaki was a collective, “Bourbaki” replied
denouncing the deprivation of “his” right to exist. There are yet several myths surrounding the origin of
their name. One that Claude Chevalley later blabbed was the following (in Guedj 1985: 19). As an
initiation of first year mathematics students at the Ecole Normale a fake famous mathematician delivers a
lecture in which the theorems, all wrong, have the names of famous generals. Since Bourbaki was a
general of the French German war, other commentators have associated the name with the competition
that the group may have perceived with Germany. Germany was ahead in the formal sciences in those
days – though the general Bourbaki was not that successful. Furthermore, the Greek ancestry of Bourbaki
might be associated with the Euclidean initiation of mathematics that the group wanted to succeed, or
even supersede (see also Dieudonné 1970: 134).  
There exists a relatively developed body of literature commenting on the history of the group. One
finds first-hand information about the beginnings of the group in an interview with Chevalley in Guedj
(1985). Dieudonné (1970) presents some accounts of the motivations and social dynamics of the group
that may only apply to his perspective. Regarding the proto-meetings of the group in the Parisian milieu
see Beaulieu (1993). Standard reference regarding their place in the history of mathematics goes to Leo
Corry (1992, 1997). There is also a growing literature on Bourbaki in popular history, such as Aczel (2006).
Aubin (1997) provides a fascinating account of how the notion of “structure” in Bourbaki “was in the air”
in France during the 1930’s and 1940’s. In particular, he associates Bourbaki with the structuralism of
Saussure and Levi-Strauss, and even with the concept of structure in Althusser (!). He also refers to the so-
called “potential literature” of a poetry group called “Oulipo” that wrote Bourbakian poems. Also for
Michel Serres, who worked in his youth on Bourbaki, there is a close link of the structuralism of Bourbaki
and Saussure (1995: 35).  
Bourbaki’s influence on the discipline of mathematics was to dissolve the old classification of
mathematics (analysis, differential calculus, geometry…), replaced with algebra, order, and topology as the
basic mathematical structures. They thereby contributed to the separation of mathematics from the
sciences. Like Debreu, the group won respect in the U.S. mainly after the war. Its influence lies, like in
economics, less in research than in the teaching of mathematics. In research, Bourbakism soon was
replaced by category theory, a slightly less hierarchical approach to mathematics. Some of their spirit was
taken over by the Bonner Arbeitstagung. In other sciences like physics, it lost its appeal soon after the war.
For the influence of Bourbaki on mathematics, see Corry 1992, 1997. 
Despite the abundant literature on mathematics in economics, there is comparatively little work on
Bourbaki in economics – which may be symptomatic of the commentary of economics. While Bourbaki is
mentioned by many historians (as in Blaug 2003, Hands 1985, Ingrao and Israel 1990, and Giocoli 2003),
there is only one article explicitly dedicated to Bourbaki in economics (Mirowski and Weintraub 1994).
Mirowski (2001, 2008) mentions Bourbaki notably as a reference for an alternative narrative of
contemporary economics than the one he told in terms of von Neumann. 
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life of the collective. The reasons why the group had chosen the name “Nicolas Bourbaki” are 
merely suggestive, but the very fact is programmatic. Just as one rhetorical strategy within the 
mercantile discourse was to present one’s argument with a different name, Bourbaki has 
chosen a pseudonym in order not to let the search for personal fame defile their work. At least 
so Dieudonné said about the noble motives of the members (1970). Doing so, as we know, 
can also hide a base social identity that may conflict with the appearance of their work. Some 
commentators are quick in denouncing Bourbaki in such fashion: “The myth has the effect of 
bolstering Bourbaki’s scientific authority and hiding arguments among the group” (Aubin 
1937. 304). Such arguments took place for example between Rene de Possel and Andre Weil 
that made Possel leave Bourbaki early after it was founded. Yet for Bourbaki the choice of 
using a pseudonym was a symbol of their very program. As a first, but ultimately sufficient 
characterization of Bourbaki, I can say: Bourbaki is mathematics to the extent that mathematics 
does not need an author. Bourbaki is mathematics without a mathematician. 
Despite or just thanks to the anonymity of the members, being part of the group meant a 
great deal to their intellectual life. They all showed an uncompromised commitment to the 
project. The group was held together by very close relationships and a “profound faith” in their 
mission, as Chevalley commented:  
 
[S]trong bonds of friendship existed between us, and when the problem of recruiting new members was 
raised we were all in agreement that this should be as such for their social manner as their mathematical 
ability (in Guidj 1985: 20). 
 
Their meetings, certainly their annual summer meetings in the countryside at Besse-en-
Chandesse have been repeatedly described as very vivacious and even anarchic (Dieudonné 
1970, Beaulieau 1998). In order to arrive at an unanimously approved text (which took 
considerably longer than expected), such bonds were a condition of, and also reinforced by the 
harsh practice of criticism of the circulating drafts. The anonymity of their work helped to 
create a social atmosphere that was liberated from the usual norms of (academic) conduct. “We 
often disagreed, we often had big arguments – but we remained good friends”, as Cartan 
remembered that time (in Beaulieau 1998). 
All that, the “process of working out”, to use Gadamer’s expression, and thus all the 
“extremely animated arguments” (Dieudonné 1970) that were so important for the members’ 
commitment to the project was not supposed to be present in the publication itself. Neither 
was the process of arriving at a result, nor any other commentary on style or other heuristics. 
The program of Bourbaki required a secret life of its members, which, in turn, fascinated them 
with this program. The anthropologist of mathematics Eric Livingston has made this gap 
between the appearance and the “embeddedness of mathematics within a surrounding culture” 
a principle of his writings (1999, 1986). It is the first striking aspect of Bourbaki I too want to 
take stock of: there was a huge gap between the dense social and affective circumstances under 
which their work was produced, on the one hand, and the appearance of their work being 
entirely free of this density, on the other. The most vivid experience of mathematics combined 
with the most rigid appearance of their work? How come? 
The experience that drew the members into Bourbaki was a liberation from – first of all a 
liberation from being an mathematical author. Rather than each single member speaking out in 
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his own name, they could let mathematics speak for itself. This absence of an author in mathematics 
is imperative insofar as one pursues the old Platonic dream of mathematics not being created 
for particular purposes, but discovered as forms in themselves. That there could be someone 
who first has to conceive these mathematical forms, or perhaps even has to interpret them, 
amounts to the same as a failure of their program. Let me quote another mathematician who 
shared this dream, Bertram Russel. He spoke of mathematics having “a supreme beauty cold 
and austere (…) without any appeal to our weaker nature (…) yet sublimely pure” (Russel 
1981: 49). In this sublime reality of mathematics there is no place for an author who, in all of 
his or her intellectual weaknesses, has to stand for the work. Mathematics, if it stands at all, has 
to stand on its own feet. Every reference to an author, as well as any heuristics for the reader, 
would be an illegitimate anthropomorphism, and ought to be suppressed for the sake of the 
aloofness of the mathematical experience. A “bible in mathematics”, as Chevalley called their 
writings, has no mundane author (Guedj 1085: 20). Bourbaki is mathematics without author, 
that is, mathematics that writes itself. The name “Bourbaki” is the formal representation, the 
placeholder of all possible contexts within which their work could have evolved. In the same 
sense that Bourbaki left authorship aside, Debreu would later silence his provenance from this 
mathematical shrine.  
Mathematics in this Platonic vision is mathematics not by means of being achieved by 
someone in particular, but by means of the absence and impossibility of someone who could 
object. “That mathematicians come together and, in each other’s presence, prove theorems, 
not simply to their own satisfaction, but for all provers for all time, provides the sustaining 
grounds of mathematical activity” (Livingston 1999: 885). Mathematics hides its social 
constitution and becomes the primordial manifestation of the force of intellectual compliance. 
For this reason, mathematics was located in Plato’s ontological universe just one level below 
the ideas – like angels. The passivity of cogency made Bourbaki believe in the sublime reality of 
mathematics, or, better, “the internal life of mathematics” (Bourbaki 1950: 230). Mathematics 
is of a higher dignity than the rest of the world. Such is the experiential ground of the master 
trope of the axiomatic method: separation. To experience the force of intellectual cogency 
without being forced to a particular position describes the sublimity of following a proof step 
by step. Let me dwell upon this mathematical experience more thoroughly. 
The fascination of Bourbaki lies in their pathos, in the literary sense of “suffering”. Being 
Bourbaki is to suffer intellectual necessity. It is to experience intellectual forces before, and free 
from the evocation of an ethos. As long as ethos refers to the kind of problems one is 
responsive to, Bourbaki was indeed prior to an ethos. Bourbaki separated pathos from ethos in 
that their intellectual experience did not determine by any means their relation to an audience. 
The pathos of cogency is thus not a disposedness, or state of mind (Befindlichkeit) in 
Heidegger’s sense, in that it would disclose a world in which one “finds” oneself. The affective 
force of necessity (rather than the active practices of discourse) was the exclusive source from 
which Bourbaki’s work gained its dignity and which made its members believe in its gravity. 
This gravity weighs heavily on the biography that I am about to present.  
The separation of pathos and ethos make the mathematical experience not of a discursive, 
but of an aesthetic kind – not only in the sense of beauty, but also in Kant’s sense of sensibility. 
This aesthetic character resonates strongly in Dieudonné’s description of mathematics as the 
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“music of reason” (an expression that was first used by the English mathematician James 
Sylvester, 1814-1897). Not that Bourbaki wrote, but they listened fully immersed to the “music 
of reason”. Reason is thus no longer a principle, a faculty, or activity of judgement, but 
becomes an object of experience. Reason is what the mathematician listens to, rhythm in 
which he thinks, and thus that which is sound and binding for the mathematician. The 
mathematical experience, or better: what is fascinating in its result, the proof, can be described 
in terms of the duration of time following a proof step by step. With this duration, one could 
depict the impressive consciousness of the mathematician that informs Bourbaki’s (and Debreu’s) 
belief in their project – a complementary description of the “lived-work of proving” which is 
the object of Livingston’s anthropology of mathematics (1986). Let me thus exploit this 
metaphor of ‘the music of reason’ a little further and compare it with Husserl’s remarks on 
listening to a melody. 
When Husserl speaks about the constitution of the inner-temporal consciousness, he 
refers repeatedly to the example of the constitution of the object “melody”. A melody, as 
opposed to a spatial object, is not something that is constituted as the identity, or better, the 
“coinciding” (Deckung) of several varying experiences – that is, in “adumbration” (Abschattung). 
A melody has no sides, no “shadows”, around which we could “identify” an object as “the 
same”. A melody is itself a temporal object, and only in time comes to a coinciding experience 
as “this melody”. Husserl uses this perception of a temporal object as an example of the 
intuitable “temporal fringe” of consciousness. He speaks of an “animation of the moment” 
(Hua. X: 386), which is the “field” of passive synthesis: the tone we hear is the tone that 
follows the other. Without actively remembering all preceding tones at all moments, we still 
listen to “the melody”. We do not hear tone (pause) for tone, as though the tone represented 
the score, but we hear “tone-for-tone”, as though the entire melody were the same as the single 
tones we hear.  
 
I perceive a measure, a melody. I perceive it step by step, tone by tone. I hear and perceive 
continuously. Accordingly, there exists an enduring, temporally extended act of perceiving. What do I 
perceive? The first tone sounds. I hear this tone. But I do not hear merely its quality in a timeless point. 
The tone endures and in the course of its duration swells in intensity in this way or that, and so on. And 
then the second tone follows. I continue to hear, and now I heat it. The consciousness of the preceding 
tone is not erased, however. I can surely observe, “see,” that I still keep my intention directed towards 
the first tone while the second is “actually sounding”, is “actually” being perceived. And so it continues. 
(Hua X: 167, E.: 171).  
 
Listening to a melody, we can “see” it tone by tone. There is an affective, or better hyletic 
extension (a retension and protension, as Husserl said) that lets us “identify” a melody. We are 
able to remember and anticipate a melody, “know” it, as it were, only by means of this hyletic, 
impressional field. After the last tone has faded away, we continue listening to the melody as 
we happily go home with an earworm.  
A mathematical proof, too, takes time. Both, a piece of music and a proof (as well as a 
narrative) are objects of experience only as temporal objects of duration. A proof cannot be 
constituted as an object. Rather, one needs to follow it step by step. One line follows another 
like its own echo, and yet adds another slightly modified line, like an accord of reason. A 
mathematical proof, if it manifests something of intellectual life, shows this fundamental 
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Bourbaki, having lunch, pleased by the sun, free from the
burden of meaning 
 
The photograph shows Bourbaki at one of their intensive summer meetings in the countryside on a lunch
break. These meetings have not been marked by the silence of proofs that call for “total adhesion”. Their
meetings have been described as extremely animated, without any formal rules of procedure, harsh
criticism, and passionate participation. As Dieudonné (1970) wrote that anyone who attend for the first
time would 
 
... always come out with the impression that it is a gathering of madmen. They could not imagine
how these people, shouting – sometimes three or four at the same time – could ever come up with
something intelligent. It is perhaps a mystery but everything calms down in the end. 
 
Youngsters, who did not speak up were not invited again to their meetings. They should contribute as
anyone else, since nobody should have been dismissed on personal grounds. Academic politics, at least at
the beginning, was never topic of discussion. Mathematics is incorruptible.  
Yet this anarchic clamour was held together by the aesthetic appeal of mathematical rigor as
described above. We now can understand better the necessary tension between the silence of a proof and
the affective set up of the group. The cogency of a proof liberates intellectual experience from the
demand of meaning to be explicated and articulated. Speaking figuratively, Bourbaki was the neutralization
of the world. Rather than horizon, the world becomes “primitive”, like mathematical concepts. One can
leap over from here to there, without the effort of actually going through. Michel Serres, who worked in
his young years on the difference of Bourbaki and classical mathematics, characterized the axiomatic
method in terms of “speed” that he inherited when leaping over from poetry to science and back again:  
 
Speed is the elegance of thought, which mocks stupidity, heavy and slow. (…) mathematics teaches
rapid thought. (…) When you reproach me with ‘structure isn’t enough; you’ve got to add all the
intermediate steps,’ this is not mathematical thought (Serres 1995: 67f.). 
 
With this freedom – as present in Andre Weil’s smile – I arrive at the genetically lowest point of my
transcendental narrative, at the limit of the phenomenology of intellectual life: the liberation from the
burden of meaning. The liberation from meaning made possible a new kind of joy, a joy beyond any costs of
epistemic trade-offs between the general and the particular, beyond compromises between induction and
deduction, beyond the ups and down of appearance and concealment. In the moment that structure and
meaning are separate (as it describes Bourbaki’s programme), and structures are the only object of the
intellectual practice, below this object, meaning is set free from its need of being articulated.  
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 In other words, now intellectual life merges into that life, by which it otherwise is evoked. In just this
moment, the life world (here: the sun shining on Andre Weil’s smile) is not the world as I introduced it in
the Preliminaries: the world that interrogates, that puts us into question, that we need to stand, and that
requires that we ask further – that is, the correlate of intellectual life. Instead, now the life world is the
world we live from, to use Lévinas notion for our sensual life. What otherwise demands intellectual life is
now its nourishment, as Lévinas wrote. 
 
We live from “good soup”, air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, etc…. These are not objects of
representations.  We live from them. Nor is what we live from a “means of life”, as a pen is a means
with respect to the letter it permits us to write – not a goal of life, as communication is the goal of the
letter. The things we live from are not tools. (...) They are always in a certain measure – and even the
hammer, the needles, and the machines [add: a mathematical proof] – are objects of enjoyment,
presenting themselves to taste, already adorned, embellished. Moreover, whereas the recourse to the
instrument implies finality and indicates a dependence (…), living from… delineates independence
itself, the independence of enjoyment, and of its happiness, which is the original pattern of all
independence (1979: 110). 
 
Although speaking of economic life, Lévinas describes as accurately as only he can the joy of Being
Bourbaki, the joy of being free from the provenance of intellectual life. The shining sun on Andre Weil’s
smile is the same sun that let Bourbaki’s work shine. Intellectual life returns to the sensual intensity from
which it stems.  
However, this joy of the mathematical liberation of the burden of meaning needs to remain secret joy.
When thinking about the pragmatic context of Bourbaki’s work, they had to refuse in order to keep this
constitutive experience going, as Dieudonné was opposed to any sort of applied mathematics: “This is
living mathematics and Bourbaki does not touch living mathematics” (145). Indeed, they would loose
their feeling for mathematics. Thus, in the name of non-living mathematics, they could secretly enjoy the
most vivid intellectual experience at a moment when it merged with sensible life!  
In this ambiguity, the axiomatic separation of meaning and structure is diametrically opposed to
phenomenology: While phenomenology is concerned with meaning before there is structure – the hyle of
sense, here: the sun shining on Andre Weil’s smile – in mathematics there is content only as reference after
structure, and experiential hyle only in form of the secrecy of a joy. And so, Michel Henry phrased the
separation of the reality “of” and of science that I interpreted in the photograph above with the following
words:  
 
(The life world) is his (the scientists) There, where he lives and where he engages in his occupations,
where he takes his meals and his holidays, where he has family and friends. As a living being he
experiences his pleasure and his suffer, his worries and ambitions, also if they concern science (…).
The scientist is a twofold human being, since on the one hand he asserts that life as the subjective
individual life, in short his own life, is nothing, or in any case but an appearance without truth and
value. On the other hand does he nevertheless continue living thanks to this life by way of drinking,
eating, laughing and singing“ (Henry 1994: 206*). 
 
Although intellectual life shows in the mathematical experience its inner most sensibility, this intellectual
affection of life is constituted by nothing but the exclusion of this sensibility: mathematics itself speaks.
And so science is a “way to sense oneself and to experience oneself that turns against the fact to sense
oneself and to experience oneself“ (Ibid: 210*). At this point of argument I would like to recall again the
lines of Chantal Debreu with which I begun this project.  
 
He (my father) seemed either to not have the needs other humans had or he managed never to show
that he had those needs. Other people, other fathers got tired, got hungry, got thirsty, had a sweet
tooth, sweat when it was hot, shivered when it was cold, got distracted when they worked on a
difficult task. Other father’s clothes got wrinkled or got food stains on them. Other fathers got sad,
discouraged or angry. For the longest time I believed that my father never did any of these things. I
believed he slept fully clothed in his dress shirt and the bow tie that was his trademark for so long,
with his dress slacks, his leather belt, his watch and his dress socks.
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temporal constitution of intellectual cogency. Understanding is following. Reason, which is 
elsewhere only an abstract principle of the intellectual efforts to grasp the intricacies of one’s 
problem, is here able to be experienced in its own intensity of conclusiveness. And thus the 
cogency of a proof can have an appeal similar to a Bach sonata. McCloskey, when speaking of 
mathematical aesthetics, prefers Mozart (2002: 44), and Arrow prefers Wagner (1992: 50). 
Debreu, instead, exclusively listened to Bourbaki’s music of reason – “the pink radio in the 
kitchen (…) was turned off as soon as my father got home” (de Soto 2005). 
What makes this mathematical experience of a proof so appealing, just as in music, is its 
finiteness. After a proof and after a piece of music, there is nothing to add – silence. When the 
last tone of a piece passes away, when writing QED at the right lower corner of the 
blackboard, the entire piece of music and the entire proof is condensed into a single moment. 
The moment of closure. Having followed the proof, there is nothing to add. Mathematicians 
are thus the only intellectuals who can really go home happily. Others carry their problems 
with them.  
Note, however, that there is a crucial difference between the closure of melodies and of 
proofs. A proof is conclusive and appealing in that it is made once and for all. Melodies can be 
listened to again and again (at least those of Bach). As Henri Cartan wrote in the obituary of 
Andre Weil about the initiating moment of Bourbaki:  
 
One fine day he said to me: ‘Now that’s enough: Let’s meet with some other people to discuss these 
questions. Let’s finalize the answers, and then we will not have to speak of them again.’ Thus was born 
the Bourbaki group” (Cartan 1999a: 634). 
 
The appeal of following mathematical proofs is that they do not have to be proven again. 
Nothing to add. Once achieved one can forget about them by simply assuming them. Although 
the manifestation of intellectual necessity, a proof thus also reflects the “teleology” of 
intellectual life, the wish to cut short the efforts to grasp the intricacies of one’s problem. The 
notion of certain judgements comes from this impression of necessity. I do not know whether 
Bourbaki, or any other mathematicians, write down their proofs several times. Some certainly 
do, but the pleasure of doing so adds nothing to its validity. A piece of music can become 
better or worse after several listens. And a proof? 
Such closure of mathematics let Bourbaki believe in the timelessness of their work. Bourbaki 
was beyond the rest of mathematics, and thus also beyond science. Yet the same affect nourishes 
the belief in blackboard science: to arrive at conclusions by reasoning only. The secrecy of the 
experiential constitution of mathematics allows for the conflation of mathematics and science. 
The closure of the mathematical experience endows it with a typical affective density that in 
modern science often came to be the material through which scientific optimism was expressed. 
Also in science, so the Galilean dream goes, there should be nothing to add.  
Here lies the nub of the mathematical experience, in that it suggests a conflation with science, 
a conflation of the value of mathematical rigour and scientific truth. Both aim at a passivity of 
being guided: the former, to cut it short, by “validity”, the other by “evidence”. The decisive 
question is this: The urge of reality and the urge of cogency – how different do they feel? 
Affectively, as my description illustrates, there is only a light shadow between being forced to 
endorse by a valid proof or by scientific evidence.  
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The great danger of this conflation is the loss of intellectual responsivity. In a responsive 
science, there is always the possibility of reacting to a result, and adjusting or confirming prior 
beliefs and expectations. Scientific evidence, just in its responsive character, affects something 
else. Scientific evidence is never closed as proofs are. When a piece of music closes, and after a 
proof is made, nothing remains to be said. After Galileo showed the clergy the telescope, 
however, clamour followed rather than silence. What grants science its gravity is not the same 
as the gravity of the last tone of a piece of music. A conclusion in science is not a moment of 
breathing out, but a moment of exhalation, of stammering: What Does This Mean? For most 
of the history of economic thought, the reactions to invisible hand arguments were of the latter 
kind. But since Debreu, they are indeed of the former kind.  
 
 
Bourbaki beyond the Hermeneutic Play of Meaning – Virtual and Symbolic 
 
This description of the mathematical experience serves as the prima materia of my narrative 
from Bourbaki to Smith. The modifications of this affect describe the intellectual biography of 
Gerard Debreu. It was this fascination with the mathematical experience that led him to speak 
in high tones of Bourbaki, and later at his Banquet speech of mathematics “satisfy[ing] deep 
personal intellectual needs” and giving “unsurpassed, addictive intellectual pleasure” (Debreu 
1983b). Acknowledging this phenomenological intensity of mathematics as the manifestation 
of intellectual necessity is not to grant it Platonic integrity. I am also far from presenting a 
phenomenological underpinning of, say, the analytic-empirical divide. Instead, this aesthetic 
aspect makes intelligible the problematic encounter of mathematics with the possible 
responsivity of the scientific experience in economics. This problem, as we now see more 
clearly, concerns the rupture of the mathematical experience in an intellectual life. It cuts off 
the experiential pathos from its intellectual ethos.  
This loss of ethos was never fully acknowledged by economists when speaking of the 
aesthetic aspect of mathematics. Robert Aumann, for example, played down the rupture 
mathematics represents for the economists’ ethos by distinguishing expressive and abstract art:  
 
If one thinks of mathematics as art, then one can think of pure mathematics as abstract art, like a Bach 
fugue or a Pollock canvas (…); whereas game theory and mathematical economics would be expressive 
art, like a cubist painting or Tolstoy’s War and Peace. We strive to make statements that, while perhaps 
not falsifiable, do have some universality, do express some insight of a general nature; (…) and at their 
best, our disciplines do have beauty, simplicity, force and relevance (1985: 42). 
 
Beauty and relevance, so we can learn from Bourbaki, are phenomenologically two experiences 
between which only a misunderstanding can mediate – namely, precisely that misunderstanding 
which let mathematical economics and game theory appear to be a matter of War and Peace.  
Let me put the fascination of Being Bourbaki into a formula: What drew them into their 
project was the possibility of being whole-heartedly engaged and immersed in their project, without being 
committed to anything in particular. Bourbaki is the intellectual liberation from the weight and burden of 
meaning, meaning as it loses its bond with a past, to which one had to be responsive, and 
through which one’s efforts could become intelligible to others. There was nobody Bourbaki 
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had to be responsive to or responsible for, nobody who could question or engage in dialogue 
about their work. Bourbaki was self-speaking, self-contained, self-affected, and untouchable. 
No discussion. Bourbaki is the liberation from the necessity that epistemic life is manifest in 
claims, but nevertheless, or just because of that, the possibility of absolute cogency. In 
Bourbaki’s words, mathematics is free from being “freighted with special intuitive references” 
(Bourbaki 1950: 227) or, as we will read later in Debreu’s, without being “marred by a 
substantial margin of ambiguity” (Debreu 1986: 1266). With Bourbaki, meaning loses its 
weight and liberates an absolute cogency on its own. Bourbaki is thus beyond any 
hermeneutical play of meaning, and yet their experience is phenomenologically as dense as the 
most dignified regions of intellectual life. 
This phenomenological conception of Bourbaki can be delineated from a hermeneutical 
one. To describe what Bourbaki did in hermeneutical terms of the play of meaning between 
prior preconceptions and a present project is insufficient. The absence of a mathematician in 
mathematics does not liberate a process of understanding, as some may be reminded to the 
catch word “death of the author”, which says that the meaning of a piece of work is entirely 
subjected to readings of others. When the Nobel committee later would say, roughly, that 
‘Debreu proved Smith’, such a “death” took place – namely, to erase Bourbakism from 
Debreu’s intellectual work. However, no hermeneutical path whatsoever could lead us from 
Bourbaki to Smith via an author. The displacement of the author in our case goes further. It 
implies also a death of the reader, in that Bourbaki’s work is independent of its interpretations. 
Bourbaki’s text was not there to be read by someone, and thus beyond the discursive 
dimensions of the hermeneutical play of meaning. “It seemed very clear that no one was 
obliged to read Bourbaki (…) [A] bible in mathematics is not like a bible in other subjects. It’s 
a very well-arranged cemetery with a beautiful array of tombstones (Guidj 1985: 20). If there is 
a history of sense of Bourbaki, it is not a discursive history, but a history of the secret joy that 
constituted their feeling of community. Bourbaki was held together not by what they wrote, 
but by how it felt Being Bourbaki.  
Since Bourbaki’s mathematics is discursively not situated, neither does it result in 
something discursive. In the absence of an author and a reader, their efforts only can result in a 
thing: a proof that is there once and forever. Such things one also finds in economic textbooks 
that are full of Marshallian and Hicksean demand functions, Coase theorems, the Edgeworth-
boxes, Slutsky-equations, or Tobin’s qs, etc. Intellectual achievements turn into facts that are 
deprived of the context from which they arouse. They are beyond the logic of meaning in a 
discursive situation. As soon as structure and meaning are separate, the hermeneutical play of 
meaning is suspended. The problem of economic science, as it is one of the arguments of The 
Phenomenology of Economics, is not the tension of pre-understanding and epistemic claims 
in economics, and it is not a matter of playing dirty in the hermeneutic play of meaning. 
Instead, the problem is the phenomenological tension between the claimed reality and the 
reality of this claim. 
This dissociation of a phenomenological and hermeneutical reading helps me to clarify the 
label of “structuralism”, which is applied to Bourbaki’s mathematics as well as in the human 
sciences to the hermeneutics of structural aprioris (historical, discursive, linguistic etc.). What 
Bourbaki deals with are not symbolic structures but imaginary structures, to use a distinction of 
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Gilles Deleuze. Symbolic structures, just as in the hermeneutic play of meaning, Deleuze 
argues, determine each other reciprocally.  
 
Sometimes the origins of structuralism are sought in the area of axiomatics, and it is true that Bourbaki, 
for example, uses the word “structure”. But this use, it seems to me, is in a very different sense, that of 
the relations between non-specified elements, not even qualitatively specified, whereas in structuralism 
elements specify each other reciprocally in relations. In this sense, axiomatics would still be imaginary, 
not symbolic, properly speaking (Deleuze 1998: 265).  
 
Bourbaki is liberated from the symbolic play of meaning. The imaginary object of structure 
allows for the intellectual experience, after being put to the limits of intellectual life, to show its 
ancestry in sensible life.  
So much for Bourbaki as “mathematics without mathematician”. Apart from the 
pseudonym, a second feature of the intellectual policy of the group is worth mentioning briefly. 
An age limit of 50 years was imposed on membership. Upon reaching the age of 50, one had 
to retire from Bourbaki. This was the only formal rule of the group, and until this day there 
have been no exceptions. Although the members did not present their work as authors, there 
seems to be a biographical condition of the project in terms of an intellectual aging. The 
Bourbakians were apparently troubled that turning older disqualifies the mathematician. Their 
project requires a distinction between an early and a late intellectual life. Why did they set such 
a rule, since it does not, as compared to the pseudonym, seem to be inherent to mathematics 
proper? A proof cannot turn out to be wrong only because the author ages. Did the 
Bourbakians have doubts about the sustainability of their reflection, fears of waking up one day 
in one’s age and seeing things differently? The longer one engages in their venture, the higher 
the risk to become critical of it?  
As a pseudonym can be used both to stand beyond the search for personal fame and to 
hide one’s personal interest, this feature could also be interpreted in two ways. The first was 
supported by Dieudonné, arguing that in order to contribute to Bourbaki one had to be on the 
top of the art of mathematics. The older one is, the less informed one is likely to be about new 
developments in mathematics.  
 
(A) man of over 50 can still be a very good and extremely productive mathematician but it is rare for 
him to adapt to the new ideas, to the ideas of people 25 and 30 years younger than he. Now, an 
enterprise like Bourbaki seeks to be permanent (Dieudonné 1970: 142). 
 
How come one needed to be up to date for a project that is actually designed to be timeless? 
Could Bourbaki become out of date? Was there after all a discursive judge of their work?  
Yes, Dieudonné supported in his speeches a pragmatic image of Bourbaki. The Elements 
were supposed to be designed for the “working mathematician”, which I discuss below. 
Dieudonné presented their work as being continuously updated to the newest developments in 
mathematics, mirroring them like an encyclopedia of mathematics. Bourbaki reflects the 
present state of mathematics in a language encompassing all others. In this image, Bourbaki 
follows the history of mathematics but does not contribute to it, similar to what textbooks are 
supposed to do. Bourbaki indeed started out as the attempt to write a new textbook in analysis. 
It was never finished, however, and Bourbaki never reflected new developments in 
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mathematics. After the rise of category theory, which went beyond the limits of set theory, 
Bourbaki was simply outdated.  
According to the more Platonic image, however, Bourbaki should not reflect the 
developments in mathematics (which one may realize in one’s age), but anticipate all changes once 
and for all. With an age limit set at 50, Bourbaki ensured that the initial frame of their project 
was sustainable throughout various generations, without being endangered by the skepticism of 
older men. This image is supported by the commentator Leo Corry: “Unlike anyone else, 
Bourbaki actively put forward the view that their conception of mathematics was (...) in fact 
the ultimate stage in the evolution of mathematics.” (Corry 1997: 253). Bourbaki is forever. 
Not to change one’s intellectual orientation is part of the “total adhesion” that Bourbaki 
requires. Even the slightest change of their project within the process of “working out” 
amounts to the same as the failure of the entire project. This is the meaning of the intellectual 
value of rigour that represents the heart of the program of Bourbaki, to which I turn now: 
Never Change Mind! 
As I will show in more detail, the pragmatic image of Bourbaki functions as an excuse for 
the apparent hyperbolic character of their Platonic image of mathematics. It allowed them to 
maintain the secrecy of the mathematical experience without bothering about the philosophical 
quarrels surrounding mathematics.  
 
 
Bourbaki’s Program and its Aversions to Philosophy and Science –  
Their Odd Pragmatism, and, of course, the Ideology of Rigor Including its Victims 
 
The exclusive intellectual value that represented all the density of the mathematical experience 
in Bourbaki was rigour, or better: ‘rigour, rigour and nothing but rigour’. This line will become 
later the “Cowles-song” of the students of Debreu: “We must be rigorous, we must be 
rigorous/We must fulfil our role/If we hesitate or equivocate/We won’t achieve our goal” 
(quoted in Christ 1994: 34). Also in Bourbaki, the value of rigor “was never attacked in serious 
discussions” (Mandelbrot 1989: 11). To be rigorously rigorous meant first of all to hide 
rigorously that there could be intellectual virtues other than rigor. Bourbaki is an attempt at 
really getting serious about rigor insofar it is exclusive – that is, opposed to intuition and 
application. Rigor does not mean, as formerly, to “base argumentation on the physical problem 
situation” (Weintraub 2002: 103). To the contrary, it amounts to an emancipation of a problem 
situation. Bourbakism is the emancipation of mathematics from all possible guidance by a field 
of application, and thus from all its intuitions. No prior intuition, no “pre-understanding”, as the 
hermeneutist would say, is needed. In other words, mathematics frees itself from philosophy 
and science.  
And so Bourbaki’s credo in the introduction to the Elements of Mathematics reads as follows: 
“thus, written in accordance with the axiomatic method and keeping always in view, as it were 
on the horizon, the possibility of a complete formalization, our series lays claim to perfect 
rigour” (Bourbaki 1968: 12). This match of the axiomatic method with complete formalization 
and with the ‘claim to perfect rigor’ describes the core of the program of Bourbaki. It aimed at 
nothing but the “solid foundation for the whole of modern mathematics” (Bourbaki 1968: v). 
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Bourbaki is the mathematical foundation of mathematics. The axiomatic method for Bourbaki 
is the only method providing such foundation because it is the manifestation of the “profound 
intelligibility” of mathematics itself (Bourbaki 1950: 223). In the axiomatic method, 
mathematics speaks for itself. Bourbaki, in other words, mathematized mathematics. They 
freed mathematics from being an auxiliary element of the sciences, and thus granted it the 
height of self-referential closure.  
Bourbaki’s programme is driven by an old dream of mathematics to emancipate itself from 
the two sources of confusion in mathematics: science and philosophy. While in a non-
axiomatic mathematics – say, from Galileo to Gauss – the engine of innovation and 
development are the problems faced by modern science, an axiomatic mathematics is free of 
that tie. With Bourbaki’s axioms, the different, formerly disconnected branches of mathematics 
that developed out of different contexts of science (analysis, differential calculus, geometry, 
etc.) are re-organized in a self-contained body. While in Euclidean geometry the intuition of 
“space” (side by side, upon and after the other, as Kant emphasized the pre-perceptions of 
geometry in his transcendental aesthetics), or in Newtonian mechanics the intuition of “mass 
and energy” (pulling and pressing) was the intuition that guided the formulation of a 
mathematical framework, Bourbaki’s “axioms” are the forms of mathematics itself.  
The key to that conception of the axiomatic method was that mathematics was thought of 
as a hierarchy of structures which can all be described in terms of set theory – the traditionally 
preferred axiomatic “language”: “inside-outside”, “containing-excluding”, “identity-difference”, 
“belonging”, or, in words of Debreu’s first remark about “sets” in his Theory of Value, 
“collecting-spreading”, “element-class” (1959: 2). For this reason the advanced textbooks as 
well as a handful of high-ranked journals in economics are full of Xx∈ . In Bourbaki’s oeuvre, 
the set-theoretical framework is developed in the first volume, Théorie des ensembles (1968 
[1939]), and all following volumes virtually entail nothing but “ Xx∈ ” (Vol. II “algebra”, Vol. 
III “topology”, Vol. IV “functions of one real variable”, Vol. V “topological vector spaces”, 
Vol. VI “integration” – at least so the initial, but never achieved plan). Also in Debreu’s Theory 
of Value all chapters entail nothing but the set theoretical framework developed in the first 
chapter, titled “mathematics”. Debreu’s second remark on “sets” is thus not surprisingly, “the 
sets which constitute the universe of discourse must always be explicitly listed at the outset” 
(1959: 3). 
Such starting point supposedly guarantees that the discourse is “virtually self-contained” 
(Ibid: x). The promise of such self-containment is that the discourse will be self-speaking and 
self-comprehensible. There should be nothing to add, and no need to explicate. Thus writes 
Debreu at the beginning of his first chapter: “This chapter presents all the mathematical 
concepts and results, which will be used later (…) Its reading requires, in principle, no 
knowledge of mathematics” (1959: 1). The same line in Bourbaki: “In principle, it requires no 
particular knowledge of mathematics on the reader’s part” (Bourbaki 1968: v). The economic 
reader of 1959, still not trained in mathematics, uninformed about anything like a mathematical 
school, must indeed have no question when reading these lines – not because it is self-
speaking, but because of the bewilderment of what such a perplexing chapter has to do with 
economics. 
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Technically speaking, we know that set theory is haunted by unresolved problems that 
have been around since Georg Cantor (1845-1918). These flaws have subsequently been 
superseded by category theory that went beyond the limits of Bourbakian structures. To argue, 
however, that the problem of axiomatic method in economics could be sorted out by reflecting 
on the limits of its set-theoretical foundation, as Arnis Vilks for example does (2007), is to 
ignore the historical paths and phenomenological confusions through which the axiomatic 
method entered economics. When economists write Xx∈ at the blackboard, do they in any 
reasonable sense hold a position of an outmoded philosophy of mathematics?  
Set theory aside, Bourbaki perceived mathematics as a hierarchy of structures. Within this 
hierarchy, the first three “mother-structures”, as Bourbaki called them, are topology, order, and 
algebra. Bourbaki wanted to bring order into a mathematics that was diffused in various fields, 
out of which mathematical problems arouse. They wanted to avoid mathematics “becoming a 
tower of babel” (Bourbaki 1950: 221), so that mathematics again could speak with one voice. 
As Mandelbrot explained Bourbaki’s “top-down” approach in opposition to more “bottom-
up” approaches to mathematics: the “former tend to be built around one key principle or 
structure (…) the latter tend to organize themselves around a class of problems” (Mandelbrot 
1989: 11). Because of this commitment to a top-down approach, a fact that will be important 
for Debreu’s attitude, computational methods that are less rigid in their image of mathematics 
were excluded from Bourbaki’s program. “(A)nything that was purely the result of calculation 
was not considered by us to be a good proof”, as Chevalley said and Debreu believed for his 
entire life (in Guedj 1985: 22).  
Such an image of mathematics fostered Bourbaki’s general aversion to science and its 
methods. It came from the fact that science does not allow for the practice of rigour, or at least 
not for rigorous rigour and nothing but rigour. Science has to rely on “meaning”, let alone 
reference. The search for justified reason, as might be the scientific motive, develops a life of its 
own as the search for rigour. One can conceive the intellectual value of rigour as a value that 
stems from science only to the extent that rigour is rooted in an interest in being consistent – 
that is, not to forget what one has said before, thus to be responsive to one’s past. Once the urge of 
evidence as that which we should keep in mind when making claims is experientially equated 
with the urge of cogency, the search for rigour turns against the scientific interest. What is 
forgotten after this equation is nothing but the source of the problems of mathematics. 
Bourbaki is the liberation from being an author, liberation from the burden of meaning, 
liberation from science, and liberation from what could possibly be problematic and 
bothersome.  
How, then, about Bourbaki’s philosophy of mathematics? Their program comes down to a 
single claim: that “mathematical structures become, properly speaking, the only ‘objects’ of 
mathematics” (Bourbaki 1950: 225-6). So what is a structure, the philosopher asks? The only 
meaning of structure I could find in Bourbaki is independence from the meaning of its 
elements – the “primitives”. According to Bourbaki, mathematicians are indeed most 
mathematicians as long as they are able to successfully avoid the question: What Does That 
Mean? If I want to comment further on this main programmatic claim and look for some sort 
of justification or verbal defence of their program, I will not find much. Every attempt to 
formulate the philosophy of mathematics of Bourbaki is rendered speculative, since there is no 
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such thing as an outspoken philosophy of mathematics of Bourbaki. The mathematical 
experience as described above made them silent about philosophy. All we know stems from 
secondary material and mainly from two speeches Dieudonné held, unauthorized, under the 
name of Bourbaki (1949, 1950). In fact, there have been considerable differences regarding the 
“image” of Bourbaki among its members (for example between Weil and Possel, between 
Chevalley and Dieudonné, Guedj 1985). It was Dieudonné who stamped the image that some 
philosophers discuss in their accounts.  
Recall what such an expressive philosophy of Bourbaki should have had entailed. It had to 
react to the preceding discussions about the axiomatic method, which encompasses at least half 
of the century before Bourbaki, from Gauss, Cantor, Zermelo and Fraenkel, and also the 
monumental oeuvre of Russel and Whitehead. The most prominent attempt to invest the 
axiomatic method in the sciences was certainly Hilbert’s. The difference between Bourbaki and 
Hilbert, as Corry has convincingly shown (1997, 2004) and Weintraub, too, considers central 
for the history of mathematical economics (2002), is of particular importance for my narrative. 
It frames the field of tension between mathematics and economics in which Debreu moved. It 
also explains the crucial difference between Debreu and von Neumann, who was once, during 
his period in Göttingen, a close affiliate of Hilbert and well-informed and moreover responsive 
to the state of the art of mathematics in the 1930s. The difference is that Hilbert’s interest in 
mathematics was not dissociated from his interest in the sciences, but in Bourbaki’s case it was. 
All modern mathematicians since the mid-19th century from Gauss, Poincare, and Hilbert, to 
von Neumann would have, or indeed had, all difficulties relating to Bourbaki’s Platonic verve – 
although they all contributed to the unhappy separation of the pure and the applied.  
Hilbert had an outspoken philosophical interest in the foundational role of mathematics 
regarding the sciences. For Hilbert, as for the most mathematicians before WWII, mathematics 
was bound by mathematical science. As opposed to the equation of the axiomatic method with 
the intellectual virtue of rigour, Hilbert associated various intellectual virtues with axiomatics 
that do not imply an adversity to science. The requirements for an axiomatic system for Hilbert 
have been the independence, consistency, completeness, and simplicity of axioms (see Corry 
2004: 154 ff). In particular the last, simplicity – how could it make sense in a solely 
mathematical context, beyond the notion of mathematics as a language? Is this not a virtue that 
could only apply to the sciences? While in Bourbaki the practice of the axiomatic method is 
reduced to that of proofs of consistency, Hilbert considered mathematical proofs only a minor 
part of the axiomatic method.  
Hilbert aimed with the axiomatic method at the “deepening of the foundations of the 
individual scientific disciplines” (quoted in Corry 1997: 262). He held the basic belief that there 
is a structural interdependence of a plurality of problems, which are all expressible in a set of basic 
axioms. He himself dealt, for example, with a wide range of problems in thermodynamics, 
probability calculus, kinetic theories of gases, insurance mathematics, electrodynamics, 
radiation, and even psychophysics. Axioms represent basic structural features of an entire field 
of research, be they thought of as epistemological categories (implicit definitions or ‘atoms of 
knowledge’), or even basic ontological properties, as economists usually perceive them (agents 
can actually hold rational preferences). Only regarding such a basic belief in the structural 
interdependence of scientific problems can I speak of an interest of expression. More specifically, 
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only regarding such a basic belief can there be feedbacks from science to mathematics, as 
Kjeldsen has shown for the case of economics concerning nonlinear programming and the 
Kuhn-Tucker theorem (2007). 
Therefore, only in Hilbert can we speak of an axiomatic method as it includes a device for 
the scientist to do something in particular. Hilbert’s axioms should have let scientists see more 
clearly when lost in a problem. In the moment when things appear too complex, when the 
scientist is confused by the fuzziness of his object, one may step back for a second, and do so as 
though one deals merely with “chairs”, “tables” and “beer-mugs” – a comparison assigned to 
Hilbert when speaking of the foundations of geometry. For a moment, one takes the 
connotations and thus emotions out of meaning, and sees the problem regarding its supposed 
structure. Then one may see which relations can be reduced to each other, and which are 
crucial for the entire discourse. In the words of the physicist Max Born, who reparaphrased 
Hilbert’s methodological demand: “[S]pecify the assumptions at the beginning of your 
deliberation, stop for a moment and investigate whether or not these assumptions are partly 
superfluous or contradict each other” (quoted in Corry 2007). Whether or not there is such a 
structural interdependency is still open to science to consider after the structure has been stated. 
The difference between Bourbaki and Hilbert is ultimately this role of the before and after of the 
axiomatization. Not that Bourbaki contradicts Hilbert explicitly on this image, but the before and 
after does not inform their practice. Absorbed by the aesthetic appeal of the mathematical 
experience, they forgot the before and after of their intellectual efforts.  
Seen as a position in the philosophy of mathematics, Hilbert’s axiomatic method was 
opposed to intuitionism as propagated by Hilbert’s ex-affiliate Brouwer. The actual challenge, 
however, for which Bourbaki’s philosophy should have given an account, was Gödel’s 
incompleteness results of 1931, saying roughly, that ‘the consistency of mathematics cannot be 
proved mathematically’, though it only applied to the axiomatic of arithmetic (see extensively 
Livingston 1986). Gödel’s results indeed triggered a foundational crisis of mathematics in the 
1930’s that made von Neumann – if I believe Mirowski’s account (2001: 118 ff.) – switch from 
axiomatic to computational mathematics. Von Neumann was one of those who  
 
revelled in turning logical paradoxes into effective algorithms and computational architectures; and 
subsequently, computation itself became a metaphor to be extended to fields outside of mathematics 
proper (Mirowski 2001: 23).  
 
And Bourbaki? Beginning their program in the mid 1930’s, did Bourbaki thus have an answer 
to the foundational crisis in mathematics? No, and it is perhaps the distinguishing feature of 
Bourbaki that they did not. They simply ignored issues of foundations with a great youthful 
enthusiasm combined with a great deal of philosophical naivety. When addressing the 
“philosophical systems” of “Plato, of Descartes or of Leibnitz, of arithmetization, or of 
logistics of the 19th century (…) concerning the relations of mathematics with the twofold 
universe of the external world and the world of thought”, Dieudonné, alias Bourbaki, pretends 
to be modest:  
 
Our task is a more modest and less extensive one; we shall not undertake to examine the relations of 
mathematics to reality or to the great categories of thought; we intend to remain within the field of 
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mathematics and we shall look for an answer to the question which we have raised [the unity of 
mathematics], by analysing the procedures of mathematics themselves (Bourbaki 1950: 222). 
 
Eschewing a philosophical notion of mathematics and being ignorant about the present crisis 
in the foundation of mathematics was even necessary for the founding fathers of Bourbaki. In 
Dieudonné’s words: “(T)he collaborators of Bourbaki were young at the time and doubtless 
would never have started this job had they been older and better informed” (1970: 136). They 
would have taken the foundational crisis more seriously. The lack of an entire generation of 
mathematicians due to WWI may have allowed Bourbaki not to feel committed to respond to 
the foundational crisis, let alone Hilbert’s 23 problems. Bourbaki was in this respect the result 
more of institutional contingencies than historical necessity of mathematics, as Mandelbrot 
confirmed: “[T]he main reason why Bourbaki arose was not internal to mathematics but 
externally motivated by a few brilliant persons and by their responses to various aspects of 
France after World War I and then after World War II” (1989: 11).  
Thus, with a good deal of youthful naivety, Bourbaki could take up the axiomatization of 
mathematics in the late 1930’s without referring to the debates that surrounded axiomatizations 
in the decade before. Listen to a response of Dieudonnè as the self-appointed spokesman of 
Bourbaki when addressed about the philosophical foundation of Bourbaki, in particular 
whether their axioms could correlate with something “real”.  
 
On foundations we believe in the reality of mathematics, but of course when philosophers attack us 
with their paradoxes we rush to hide behind formalism: ‘Mathematics is just a combination of 
meaningless symbols’, and then we bring out Chapters 1) and 2) on set theory (Dieudonné 1970: 145).  
 
We know the famous lines when it came to the point that Bourbaki, alias Dieudonné, had to 
“bring out” those chapters:  
 
From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears thus as a storehouse of abstract forms – the 
mathematical structures; and so it happens – without our knowing why – that certain aspects of 
empirical reality fit themselves into these forms, as if through a kind of preadaptation (1950: 231). 
 
Such philosophical naivety or ignorance is the distinguishing characteristic of Bourbakism as 
compared with other schools in mathematics. Bourbaki could not have exerted a hold as 
strong as Debreu felt it if the group had been philosophically more aware. Let me anticipate 
one of the lines in which Debreu shows a similar attitude: “In proving existence one is not 
trying to make a statement about the real world, one is trying to evaluate the model” (in Feiwel 
1987: 243). Mathematics functions thus as a surrogate of philosophical reflection, rather than 
being informed by it. As Corry summarized this attitude: “Bourbaki did not adopt formalism 
with full philosophical commitment, but rather as a façade to avoid philosophical difficulties” 
(Corry, quoted in Weintraub 2002: 112). The conditions to discuss Bourbaki’s position within 
the history of the philosophy of mathematics are not met.  
Note that Bourbaki’s evasion of foundational issues does not only express a reluctance to 
deal with the history of mathematics, but has the obscure implication that the basic belief in the 
worthiness of their project, the “reality of mathematics” (the ontic or epistemic structural 
interdependence of problems) was indisputable and thus not at stake in their work. Bourbaki’s 
program inherently excludes to reflect upon the belief and motives that give rise to it. Otherwise they would 
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have had to tackle “the philosopher’s paradoxes”, and take an explicit position within the 
philosophy of mathematics, which would have to take place outside the frame of “Chapters 1) 
and 2) on set theory”, and in any case outside the ‘universe of discourse explicitly listed at the 
outset’. Bourbaki was thus held together by a taboo. No discussion.  
When Debreu spoke about the “total adhesion” his teacher Henri Cartan demanded, the 
full impact of this taboo of philosophy is apparent. In this effect Bourbaki can justly be called 
‘the ideology of rigour’, as the historian of science Gorgio Israel observed as early as 1977. 
Mandelbrot confirmed that behind the virtue of rigour there stood (rather than the altruistic 
dispense of personal fame) a clear political agenda to exert power in the institutions of 
mathematics. 
 
Bourbaki showed extraordinarily wide-reaching concern with political influence across the age groups 
and across the disciplines. Power to school the children [of which Debreu was one, T.D.], to educate 
the young to have the ‘correct’ taste (…) and ‘export’ of their standards of rigour and taste they do not 
belong to has done untold harm (1989: 12). 
 
Then, being free from philosophy and the sciences, was there, apart from the strong appeal of 
the mathematical experience, any other discursive warrant for their program? Did Bourbaki at all 
engage in explicit self-reflective appraisal? How did they make sense of themselves? Until late 
in the 1950’s I hardly find more utterances than what they wrote in the introduction to their 
Théorie de Ensemble. Only after their success had settled in, did Dieudonné begin to present an 
image of their mathematics. Here I can come back to their odd pragmatic image mentioned 
above. I read it as an excuse for their philosophical naivety. Their mathematical bible should 
have been sold as an instructive “handbook” for the working mathematician (Dieudonné 1970). 
How so?  
Listen again to Dieudonné’s apology that the idea of the “mother structures” was 
historically not well informed. “I do not say it was an original idea of Bourbaki – there is no 
question of Bourbaki containing anything original. Bourbaki does not attempt to innovate 
mathematics” (1970: 138). Dieudonné sells their historical indifference as intellectual 
moderation. Instead of innovating mathematics, Bourbaki alias Dieudonné believed that their 
work could be a tool for the working mathematician. Responding to the objection that 
Bourbaki is sterile – which is in fact one of the meanings of the Latin word rigere as well as the 
predicate that defined money in all pre-modern economic writings – Dieudonné distinguishes 
two notions of tools.  
 
Bourbaki is accused of sterilized mathematical research. I must say that I completely fail to comprehend 
this, since Bourbaki has no pretension of being a work stimulating to research. (…) The aim is, I repeat, 
to provide work tools, not to give stimulating speeches on the open problems of the new mathematics, 
(…). This is living mathematics and Bourbaki does not touch living mathematics (1970: 144-5). 
 
Mind the difference of tools and stimulation. A tool for Bourbaki is not a tool in the sense of 
being good for some particular task, designed in light of and somewhat evoking its end, but in 
the sense of being independent of any end. Do we hear the echo of the difference of the 
phronetic and the instrumental relation of means and ends that constituted the change from 
the oikonomia to the “the economy”?  
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From this point of view we can understand better the affect that underlies the fascination 
of Being Bourbaki: An absolute commitment, on the one hand, combined with an extreme 
modesty on the other, is the affective underground of what constitutes “instrumental 
rationality”: on one hand extreme modesty, because one deals “merely” with tools, but on the 
other hand, utmost importance, because one deals with a “universal” tool. Bourbaki’s work is 
of utmost importance for it provides the tool for whatever purpose. But at the same time it can 
only be belittled since it provides “merely” a tool. In this fashion, Bourbaki’s implicit Platonic 
image of mathematics was supplemented by a truncated pragmatism.  
If Bourbaki does not aim at a stimulation of mathematics, was their work then not 
discouraging for the mathematics profession? According to Mandelbrot, yes: “For Bourbaki, 
the fields to encourage were few in numbers, and the fields to discourage or suppress were 
many” (Mandelbrot 1989: 11). How then could Bourbaki sell the advantage of the axiomatic 
method as a method for the applied mathematician? In the moment that Bourbaki refers to the 
before and after of the axiomatic method, we see how the mathematician falls out of the picture:  
 
The ‘structures’ are tools for the mathematician; as soon as he recognized among the elements, which 
he is studying, relations which satisfy the axioms of a known type, he has at his disposal immediately the 
entire arsenal of general theorems which belongs to the structures of that type. Previously, on the other 
hand, he was obliged to forge for himself the means of attack on his problems; their power depended on his 
personal talents (Bourbaki 1950: 227, emphasis added). 
 
What is the advantage of Bourbaki according to these lines? If there is a problem in 
mathematics, one is able to immediately solve it – without forging oneself – thanks to a tool 
independent of a particular problem. Therefore, problems lose their character of being bothersome. As 
long as a mathematician has a problem, he has not read Bourbaki’s bible – which answers all 
questions by undermining their meaning. Only by means of being bothered, however, could 
there be a weight of meaning through which a subject of a “working mathematician”. Hence – 
and this is the crucial consequence of this quote – having a universal tool, the mathematician as 
the subject of mathematics becomes secondary, if not redundant. In this quote, Bourbaki 
expressed the problem of all formalisms: to make oneself redundant. 
Bourbaki alias Dieudonné acknowledges this risk and tries to respond to it. He replies with 
a strong metaphor of the axiomatic method being the Taylor system of mathematics. The 
mathematician appears like a Taylor worker who puts elements in sets without knowing any 
more what the elements actually are. This is scientific management of mathematics.  
 
One could say that the axiomatic method is nothing but the ‘Taylor system’ for mathematics. This is 
however, a very poor analogy; the mathematician does not work like a machine, nor as the workingman 
on a moving belt; we cannot over-emphasize the fundamental role played in his research by a special 
intuition* (…) 
*Like all intuitions this one also is frequently wrong” (Bourbaki 1950: 227) 
 
The naivety, arrogance, and ideology of Bourbaki that I have traced in this chapter are all too 
apparent in this little footnote. Bourbaki recognised the risk they represent for intellectual 
practices. But they could not actually face the ambiguity of their Platonic-pragmatic image of 
mathematics – since then, their feeling for mathematics would fade away. The working 
mathematician of Bourbaki, even if he refused to admit, is a Taylor worker.  
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Bourbaki was thus an inherently ambiguous project. Their program could not be defended 
openly. As a result, the gaps between their sublime image of mathematics that was evoked by 
the mathematical experience, and the actual body of their work grew evermore. Although 
intuitions of science should not play a role in the choice of which proofs to include in their 
“encyclopedia”, as Cartan admitted, theories “built upon different axiomatic systems have 
varying degrees of interest” (quoted in Corry 1997: 279). Dieudonné spoke of theories that are 
treated axiomatically, but that he did not consider important as “axiomatic trash”. And he 
spoke of structures that are artificially constructed as “monster-structures” instead of “mother-
structures” (Ibid.). Perhaps Cartan should have told Debreu something of that kind when 
entering economics with The Elements in his bag. But for such warnings there was no place in 
their “universe of discourse”. 
Bourbaki did not develop guidance for the working mathematician through which they 
could be made responsible about the possible side effects of their program on the profession 
of mathematics. They did not consider what their work does to the working mathematician. 
“(W)e had absolutely no idea that one day power could become Bourbakised”, Chevalley 
admitted (in Guidij 1985: 20). And so neither did Debreu think about the side effects his work 
could have on economics. After the Bourbakian teaching, he has not learned to carry out such 
a reflection. Debreu, like Bourbaki, felt beyond questions of responsibility. 
 One of the Bourbaki members, Chevalley, felt this ambiguity down to his bones. He later 
regretted what he had done in his youth, as the following confession shows. Chevalley was 
asked the question, which was impossible to even consider within the Bourbakian experience:  
 
Guedj: Do you think that one can give birth to such an undertaking without being transformed 
unavoidably into a tool of power, a tool of the dominant ideology? Isn’t there a logic inherent in 
projects of this type that transforms people who participate in them into ‘masters’? You, for example, 
didn’t you try to oppose this deviation?  
Chevalley: If I had been sure it would happen, if I had the perspicacity, if I had not been so weak as not 
to ask myself that question, I think that could have been… (…) I have a sense of remorse at not having 
tried to point it in a direction that wouldn’t lead to power. But I didn’t try. (Guedj 1985: 21). 
 
This sense of remorse came from the fact that Chevalley had another life, a political life 
detached from the life he had with Bourbaki. He thus felt the rupture the mathematical 
experience represents for intellectual life in person. Chevalley was politically active in the 
anarchist group Le Ordre Nouveau Libertaire. Due to the ideology of rigour, he was not able to 
express his political concerns about the war. Not to be able to express one’s political interest in 
economics is indeed the Bourbakian symptom in economics.  
 
Guedj: Politics seem to have been excluded from Bourbaki. How did you live this dichotomy between 
your political involvement outside, and your almost complete investment in Bourbaki, above all at a 
time when in Germany the Nazis were beginning to enjoy themselves to their hearts content?  
Chevalley: I don’t know what to say. It’s a mistake. What I wrote in the political arena never satisfied me 
completely. It was only in Bourbaki that I was truly satisfied in what I wrote (Guedj 1985). 
 
*** 
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The ambiguities that will surround Debreu’s further intellectual life can be summarized in two 
words: “Applying Bourbaki” – an oxymoron, as Weintraub said (2002: 103), and as I have 
explicated in various ways in this chapter. While a Hilbertian axiomatization of economics is at 
least conceivable, a Bourbakian axiomatization is absurd. Bourbakism was never designed for 
and even hostile against science. When Debreu “applied Bourbaki” the ambiguity of Being 
Bourbaki – toggling between an elevated Platonism and a truncated pragmatism, hiding the 
one behind the other – must in some way become apparent. One thing is already clear at this 
point: The problem of Debreu’s Bourbakism was not a particular philosophical belief about the 
role of mathematics in economics, nor any specific economic belief. It rather represents a 
riddle: What in economics made the profession sensitive for the Bourbakian experience, in 
which economists can do nothing but forget their motives of doing economics. How thus, in 
other words, could Debreu make a career in economics with such mathematical background – 
a career that even ended in front of the Swedish King? 
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(2) Debreu’s Existential Dilemma, 1943 
 
 
 
 
In 1943, Gerard Debreu entered his last year at Ecole Normale, and Paris entered the last year 
of the German occupation. Since then he began to feel that the ‘grandiose edifice’ of Bourbaki 
was somewhat misplaced. As all students, he could not avoid the question that defines critique 
according to Husserl – What Am I Up To? Seeing the approaching end of his studies as well as 
the approaching end of the war, Debreu could no longer see himself as a mathematician. In the 
turbulences of Paris of 1943-44, just like Chevalley, Debreu would have liked to claim 
something particular. Bourbaki’s liberation from meaning is as fascinating as the commitment 
to it is frightening – particularly at a time when the forces of meaning were globe-spanning 
military forces.  
 
 
Between War and Peace, Debreu in the Nowhere between Mathematics and 
Economics: How it Happened to Debreu that he Went into Economics. 
 
How could we, and how could Debreu not see these years in light of the occupied Paris and the 
war? The end of the war and the prospect of a new society could have been (and indeed was 
for other economists) a motive for developing an interest in the social sciences, in particular in 
the question of what holds society together in the absence of a leader. Was this not the 
question that more or less openly exerted a strong gravity on all economic claims in the 1950s 
and 1960s, in the West and the East? And to Debreu? 
Obviously Debreu was affected by the German occupation. He speaks of the “unique 
experience (…) of living in a totalitarian state that does not concede any right to its subjects 
(1991b: 4). Nonetheless, Ecole Normale provided a certain protection against this Paris. It 
represented another world for the young Debreu. Until D-Day, courses were never inter-
rupted. In the academic year of 1943, though, Debreu risked being caught participating in 
classes instead of doing forced labor for the German army as a terrassier (see Bini and Bruni 
1998). “The dark outside world of Paris under German occupation”, as he puts the relation of 
the two worlds, “exerted a strong containing pressure on the microcosm in the rue d’Ulm” 
(1984a). And here in this pressed microcosm Debreu had to think about what would be next in 
his life. 
Crucial at this point was whether he was able to realize that only a slight move away from 
Bourbaki would require an intellectual reorientation no less radical than Bourbaki’s program 
itself. Was he able to see that Bourbaki’s ‘music of reason’ did not make him an authority in 
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science? Debreu did face the gap when he read his first French economic textbook full of 
institutional facts and little “theory”. In those days, economic teaching in France was rather 
historical and institutional in nature. Academic economics, as it has been for centuries in 
France, was an education for public administrators and thus institutionally specific and not at 
all oriented at the ethos of the “scientist”: “pour pouvoir étudier l’économie il aurait fallu que je 
fasse du Droit Constitutionnel, du Droit Criminel et que sais-je encore. Je n’avais aucune envie 
d’étudier ces matières. C’était donc très décourageant pour moi” (in Bini and Bruni 1998).  
But then, what? Trying to leave mathematics, Debreu faced a real existential dilemma 
between his intellectual past and his impulse to move on. He was attracted by claiming 
something particular, but at the same time repelled by it. That ‘economics is not mere 
mathematics’, as the standard critique of economics laments, correlates at this point of 
Debreu’s life with an actual experienced dilemma. Here the telling lines in which Debreu 
described how it happened that he entered economics:  
 
(B)y the end of 1942, I began to question whether I was ready for a total commitment to an activity so 
detached from the real world, and during the following year I explored several alternatives. Economics 
was one of them. [He considered astrophysics, too, but his teacher, Jewish, had to flee from France, 
T.D.]. In 1943-44 the teaching of the subject in French universities paid little attention to theory, and 
the first textbook that I undertook to read reflected this neglect. The distance between the pedestrian 
approach I was invited to follow, and the ever-higher flight I had been riding for several years looked 
immense, perhaps irreducible. Reason counseled retreat to a safe source. What kept me on an 
unreasonable heading? The formless feeling that the intellectual gap could be bridged? The wishful 
thought that the end of the war was near, and the perception that economists had a contribution to 
make to the task of reconstruction that would follow? An improbable event brought my search to a 
close. Maurice Allais, whose A la Recherché d’une Discipline Economique had appeared in 1943, sent copies 
of his book to several class presidents at the Ecole Normale (Debreu 1991b: 3-4).  
 
It is telling that Debreu made his decision to enter economics in light of, but also against the 
political concerns he had for the social world around him – as though he could not trust his 
own perception. On the one hand, Debreu did associate his choice with the political situation 
of the end of the war: “Things were too chaotic in France and it was then I think that I became 
serious about economics” (in Weintraub 2002: 137). He could not, however, mobilize this 
association, since he did not know how to respond to, how to express or translate this political 
impression in an academic choice. He felt ‘detached from the real world’ because of the 
pressing political situation, in which Bourbaki’s project seemed inappropriate, to say the least. 
Given his intellectual values, however, he could experience this uneasiness merely as a 
“formless feeling”, a “wishful thought”, a “perception” which could not be taken seriously. 
Vague impressions or intuitions cannot justify a theoretical interest that could possibly have 
gratified his intellectual needs. Debreu did not learn from Bourbaki how to reflect on 
intellectual concerns. Their very existence made him suspicious of being driven by “wishful 
thought”. 
What Bourbaki once experienced as an infinite source to insist on rigor – namely the 
separation of mathematical structure and scientific meaning – now constituted for Debreu an 
existential dilemma between two kinds of reason: say, mundane and pure reason. The first, 
mundane reason, lets Debreu dither over a “detachment from the world” and “counseled 
retreat to safe course.” For this reason he went into economics. The other, pure reason, 
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requires “total adhesion”, and promises a “grandiose edifice.” For this reason he did not enter 
“pedestrian” economics, about which he did not feel at ease talking about. In light of pure 
reason, Debreu experienced the pursuit of mundane reason as an “unreasonable heading” or 
even “wishful thought”. In light of mundane reason, the pursuit of pure reason seems an 
“ever-higher flight” in “irreducibly” upper fields of intellectual life.  
The dilemma was that both reasons excluded each other. Debreu was repelled by 
mathematics, but was not able to enter economics. He wished to overcome the Bourbakian 
detachment in light of the economic task of reconstructing society, but he could not in light of 
the economic profession being so “pedestrian”. He sensed the need for doing intellectual work 
of less purity and more substance. Yet, he could not realize nor mobilize this need. He gave up 
his career as a mathematician with a sense for economic problems, and started his career as an 
economist with a commitment to mathematics. Between war and peace, Debreu moved 
between mathematics and economics – neither really here nor there: half-hearted. 
In light of the ending war and his Bourbakian training, Debreu could neither go back nor 
forth. What once for Bourbaki meant the liberation from the burden of meaning now hindered 
Debreu from mobilizing an impression to an actual decision. Debreu’s past fascination with 
Bourbaki, and his intellectual pathos worked against the possibility of taking the impressions of 
the ending war and his political concerns seriously – like a self-repulsive affect. His Bourbakian 
past made him distrust in his own experience, and suspicious of his concerns.  
What then did Debreu do? Did he solve the dilemma? As the lines suggest, he did not. 
Instead, he entered economics by a chance of the encounter with an authority, Maurice Allais. 
Entering economics was one step in the “random walk” of his life, as he describes his choice as 
though it merely happened to him. Debreu did not decide to enter economics. He simply did 
not have the intellectual ethos of really facing the dilemma. If ethos refers to the kind of 
problems one is responsive to, Debreu (and Bourbaki) did not acquire any ethos, as I argued 
above. The pathos of axioms does not help at a point where the problem consists of a mere 
impression. Hence the urge to leave mathematics remained unarticulated in Debreu’s young 
years. He had simply not learned to do that. 
And later in his life? Did he ever reflect on his reasons for entering economics? In his last 
interview, we hear a slight tone of doubt, perhaps even regret, that he did not face the dilemma 
straight on. At age of 75 he said: 
 
Alors j’ai cherché à sortir de là, j’ai passé une agrégation de mathématiques et je me suis placé premier. 
Donc, j’ai cessé de faire des mathématiques non pas parce que j’en étais incapable mais parce que cela ne 
me plaisait pas. C’est comme ça que j’ai vu la question à ce moment-là (in Bini and Bruni 1998). 
 
Not “liking” something is a reason so cheap that it works too easily as an excuse for not having 
thought about a choice at all, as Debreu seems to admit softly at the end of his life. For at this 
moment he saw it like that, as though he later saw it differently. Debreu shows that he may 
have felt the failure to ask himself why he wanted to leave mathematics. But his swollish 
answer shows also that he never really learned how to reflect on his intellectual motives.  
Whatever reading one may pursue further on these moments of Debreu’s life, one thing 
becomes clear: As long as Debreu does not face the dilemma of being a mathematical 
economist, he will always have a reason to hide his Bourbakism, and he will always have a 
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reason not to get too deeply into economic talk – half-hearted. What had to happen, that such 
half-heartedness could later be celebrated so heartily with the Bank of Sweden Prize?  
 
 
The Meeting with Maurice Allais and the Time when He was at His Most Economist 
 
The path was set. After D-Day, Debreu served the French army for a year. He was first in 
officer school in Algeria, and, after May 1945, briefly in Germany. This year at the army, he 
said, was the only “opportunity” of his life “to experience a life outside the academic cocoon” 
(1991b: 4). Although he was far away from his Bourbakian monk cell in rue d’ulm, he 
nevertheless had to prepare in the evenings for exams at Ecole Normale, the “agrégation de 
mathématiques”. In summer 1945 he married, and in the fall he graduated.  
Between 1946 and 1948 Debreu then worked in close association with Maurice Allais at 
the Centre Nationale de la Recherché Scientifique, where he read what he called “the classics” – some 
Marx, and some Keynes, but mainly Hicks’ Value and Capital, and also Frisch, Pareto, Walras, 
and also Charles Gide. These two years are noteworthy because they probably were the years 
when Debreu was at his most economist. In cooperation with Allais, who was not Bourbakian 
but a scientist of many-layered interests, he partially refrained from the commitment to rigour.  
Here he also met his life-long friend Edmond Malinvaud. With him and other colleagues, 
Debreu came together in a “lunch time group” that was “moved by the spirit of research”, as 
Malinvaud remembered (Kruger 2003: 184). Lunchtime was often extended long in the 
afternoon. Malinvaud was already by then intellectually differently oriented. He came to 
economics because he was fascinated by the idea of “intelligent management” (Ibid.: 182). 
With this group, Debreu read Samuelson’s Foundations (1961 [1947]), but also Abba Lerner’s 
Economics of Control (1944), which carries the spirit of the socialist calculation debate.  
At this time Debreu also wrote his first economic article, in French (Debreu 1949). This 
article, which reads like a summary of Allais’ adaptation of Hicks GET, is the least formal 
article he ever wrote. He shows considerable respect to the interpretive sensibility of economic 
claims. At the end of the article we find one of the rare cases in which Debreu makes some 
effort to interpret economic terms. Here, perhaps for the only time of his life, he did what all 
mathematical economists before him did, but which after him became somewhat redundant. 
He tried to make the reader aware of a “certain danger” to believe that mathematical 
endeavour is All There Is about economic theory. Regarding the welfare interpretation of a 
Pareto-optimum, which was part the crucial question of the socialist calculation debate, he 
concludes:  
 
La théorie que nous avons exposée présente, par l’apparente évidence de ses points fondamentaux, un 
danger certain: elle risqué de faire passer pur un absolu ce qui est éminemment relatif. Et tout d’abord 
rien n’oblige a admettre qu’une situation ou toutes les satisfactions sont plus grandes que dans une autre 
lui supérieure. On peut penser, par exemple, que les individus, en général, ne sont par les meilleurs juges 
de leurs besoins, que la satisfaction économique ne représente qu’un aspect de l’individu, que leur 
agrégat n’est qu’un aspect de la vie de leur société; on peut même soutenir que le « bonheur » d’un 
individu est dans une très large mesure indépendant de ce qu’il consomme (Debreu 1949: 614). 
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While Debreu at that date still warned the economist not to take mathematics too seriously, 
and thus showed respect for the efforts of economic interpretations, later as we will see, the 
same interpretive indifference will make him suspicious whether economic interpretations 
deserve any serious treatment. In his time with Allais, Debreu learned the fundamental 
economic concepts of GET, but not how to embody them intellectually, not how to carry their 
weight. Perhaps for this reason the collaboration with Allais was not meant to hold longer (see 
Bini and Bruni 1998). 
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 (3) Debreu’s Discreet Life  
at Cowles, 1949-1974 
 
 
 
 
In 1949, the 28-year-old Debreu crossed the ocean with a two-year-old daughter and his 
pregnant wife, Francoise Bled. There he encountered a vastly growing and powerful 
infrastructure of the U.S. institutions of economic science. At a seminar in Salzburg he 
acquired a first taste of it when meeting Leontief and Solow, started reading the Theory of Games 
(von Neumann, Morgenstern 1944 – encountering thus the use of Bourbaki-proof use of 
mathematics, particularly the fix point theorem that made him overlook the anti-Walrasian 
impulse of this lustrous book), won a Rockefeller fellowship, and then ran into the open arms 
of Tjalling Koopmans, who had just become the Director of Research at the Cowles Commission 
in Chicago. The Cowles Commission had already won the respect of a leading center for 
scientific social engineering in and of the U.S. post-war world.  
Debreu was welcome because he helped the ex-physician Koopmans to push “Cowles 
Mark II” – that is, to push from Cowles I with the empiricist motto Science is Measurement (recall 
Hotelling, and also Lange) – to Cowles II with the motto Theory and Measurement. Since 1950, 
Cowles advanced mathematical economics of a rather ‘theoretical’ type, the label under which 
Bourbaki now was discussed. Debreu arrived just at the moment when Koopmans made this 
drastic turn from econometrics to economic theory (Mirowski 2001: 249ff). Debreu recalls: 
 
When I joined the group in 1950, it seemed to me to be a very theoretical group. In particular, the 
Cowles Commission monograph on estimation [that is, empirical Cowles I] had by then written and 
published. But Koopmans himself made a fairly drastic change because in the days this book was 
developed he was deeply involved in econometrics. But from the time when I knew him, he was never, 
I believe, working actively on estimation methods, and he had become an economic theorist (…). In 
those days the Cowles Commission monograph on activity analysis [that is, theoretical Cowles II] was 
not yet published though it was published I believe shortly after I arrived (in Weintraub 2002: 143).  
 
The conference on Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation in June 1949 marks the 
breakthrough of mathematical economics at Cowles (Koopmans 1951). It marks the beginning 
of the formalist revolution as well as the proliferation of the Cowles-RAND collaboration. The 
list of participants is impressive: Mathematicians such as David Gale, Albert Tucker, and 
Harold Kuhn, economists as Kenneth Arrow, Herbert Simon, Oskar Morgenstern, Paul 
Samuelson, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, and mathematical economists from RAND such as 
George Brown and from the Air Force such as George Dantzig and Murray Geisler. Only one 
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name was missing, but all contributors referred to him: John von Neumann. In the aftermath 
of the excitements of this conference, Debreu was welcome. 
The details of the events of the years before and after this conference – say, from 1944 to 
1954 – are highly intricate. In the last part, I gave some hints at these intricacies. The 
discontinuities and mutual ways in which mathematics and economics interacted, Weintraub 
emphasized, are due to the very nature of the early formalist revolution: a split between 
mathematical structures and economic expressions. When writing Debreu’s role in this 
episode, however, I can easily avoid all institutional ramifications. For Debreu remained 
discreet in all respects. Since he, moreover, never changed this attitude in the two decades at 
Cowles, I can pass smoothly through his intellectual life as a mathematical economist. 
Bourbaki prepared Debreu a convenient life. 
Let me lay out two lines of research that met when Debreu arrived at Cowles. The 
merging of the two historical lines allowed Debreu to be a most rigorous and at the same time 
a most passive “maker” of the formalist revolution. The first concerns the mitigation of the 
connotations of mathematical techniques, which I emphasized in the last part. “Activity 
analysis” was basically another name for linear programming, which in turn was associated with 
both the efforts put in ‘market socialism’ as well as the war planning that some participants of 
the conference had done in the Pentagon. How clean this technique now appeared is apparent 
when Debreu emphasized George Dantzig’s first use of a simplex algorithm without knowing 
from what context Dantzig’s innovations stemmed – namely, from the Air Force quest for 
efficiency of weaponry (in Feiwel 1987). 
The second threat concerns the crowding out of game theory, and its disassociation from 
topology (see Leonard 1995, Giocoli 2003). The formalist revolution took off in the 1940s with 
game theory, but only could gain ground in the 1950s in GET. The conference in June 1949 
meant the breakthrough of von Neumann’s (and Morgenstern’s) topological proofs of the 
minimax theorem. However, this happened in a context beyond the intuitions that initially 
drove game theory: in the context of allocation.  
 
What was important about game theory was not necessarily all the verbiage, which Koopmans would 
have found indigestible in any event, about indeterminacy and strategic problems of information 
processing, but rather that it provided the paradigm for a rather more sophisticated type of 
maximization procedure employing a different set of mathematical tools (Mirowski 2001: 255).  
 
The crowding out of game theory and the changed connotations of mathematical techniques 
were the two conditions under which the junction of rigor and GET could take off at Cowles. 
And this junction came to be personified by Gerard Debreu. At his arrival, he could not feel 
much of the spirit of Cowles I, as though the preference for rigor had always been there. Now 
he felt liberated from the suspicion that lay on the mathematician in the circles of Allais. He 
recalls:  
 
Whereas before I was in a group which felt mathematics went too far and points of rigor were not 
terribly important, at Cowles I came to think, very quickly, that full understanding of a problem 
required no compromise whatsoever with rigor (in Weintraub 2002: 153). 
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Chicago was welcoming to Debreu’s Bourbakism. He did not have to first bourbakize his 
director Tjalling Koopmans. Koopmans had acquired his Bourbakian taste from Marshall 
Stone (1903-1998), chairman of the mathematics department at Chicago in those years. Stone 
called on Andre Weil for a chair at Chicago in 1947, who then became one of the most famous 
mathematicians of the immediate post-war years. Andre Weil, again, invited Samuel Eilenberg, 
then in Michigan, to the Bourbaki shrine in 1949. Andre Weil, moreover, could cultivate 
Bourbaki in the U.S. on the seedbed of an already established mathematical school that was 
driven by a Platonic verve similar to the Bourbaki group – the school of Postulational Analysis 
around Robert Moore (1882-1974) and Edward Huntington (1874-1952) (Corry 2004: 172 ff.). 
Since these years in the 1950s mathematicians grow up with axiomatic rigor rather than the 
belief in a world of mathematical dignity. 
The 1950s were the years when Bourbaki published most frequently and won evermore 
authority in U.S. mathematics departments. Debreu must have followed these publications. He 
had been in direct contact with Andre Weil, whom he consulted and thanked in his first paper 
at Cowles for his help with Eilenberg’s account of fixed-point theorems (Debreu 1952). 
Debreu also wrote jointly with his colleagues next door at the mathematics department, such as 
Israel Herstein (Debreu and Herstein 1952). He recalls:  
 
A Chicago il y a un excellent département de mathématiques, très rigoureux, qui a été profondément 
influencé par l’école de Bourbaki dont l’un des représentants principaux était le grand mathématicien 
André Weil. (…) En ce qui me concerne, dès que je suis arrivé à Chicago, j’ai senti cette influence. (in 
Bieri and Bini 1998). 
 
Since Cowles was located independently, the other door to the economics department 
remained closed for Debreu. There, and also at Cowles itself, he could have met those 
“economists [who] had a contribution to make to the task of reconstruction” (1991b: 4); there 
he could have argued with those economists who not only claimed but actually made “the 
economy”. But Debreu entered none of these debates.  
 
I never attended a meeting of the Department of Economics of which I was not a member. I was left 
alone to do my work during the five years from 1950 to 1955, a marvellous opportunity that I tried to 
use fully (in Feiwel 1987: 256).  
 
Left alone, Cowles meant for Debreu another microcosm that provided shelter from the dark 
outside world of Chicago-school ideologies. For Debreu, arriving at Cowles had the taste of 
both entering an overwhelmingly powerful institution of economics as well as returning to 
Bourbaki.  
 
 
Discreet in all Respects –  
in the Internal and External Affairs of Cowles, in his Methodology… 
 
How then did Debreu understand himself in his role at Cowles? How did he understand 
himself as a mathematical (pause) economist? How did he deal with the unresolved tension of 
“applying Bourbaki”? Did he face it? Could he avoid it? Or did he even adapt his intellectual 
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values? Debreu was evidently not trained in dealing with topics commonly perceived as 
economic issues as identified in institutional, legal or political terms. He knew from Allais not 
much more than the fundamental concepts of the Walrasian world, but hardly their historical 
and institutional meaning as they were discussed by his colleagues at Cowles, and moreover as 
they entered the political arena in a surprisingly direct but still mysterious way. To say the least, 
Debreu did not have the intellectual ethos of an economist who could stand the political 
virulence of the economic claims made.  
Debreu thus had something to avoid. He had to avoid being asked about his particular 
position in economics. Debreu was in need of an ethos beyond, prior, preliminary to any 
economic expression. Let me discuss the distance he had to adopt as the discreteness of Debreu in 
economics. It represents the next step in my affective history of the axiomatic method. After 
the axiomatic separation of structure and meaning first correlated with the fascination of an 
aesthetic void, then put a spell on the young student Debreu, and then meant a dilemma 
between mathematical and mundane reason, it now resulted in the discreetness of Debreu as an 
economist. To be a mathematical economist for Debreu meant to be discreet.  
Debreu, to begin with, was discreet in his political role at Cowles. He could hardly be 
called an activist of either Cowles’ internal affairs concerning theory versus measurement or its 
external affairs regarding the explosive political relations Cowles undertook in the Cold War. 
Before 1983, Debreu never actively pushed or even took a stance regarding the axiomatic 
method in economics. He simply embodied it. For Debreu there was no need to be explicit, let 
alone to defend his mathematical taste – just as Bourbaki never propagated a philosophy of 
mathematics. There were other people who build up the bulwark of mathematical rigor as the 
value of economic science.  
Koopmans was ahead of all the others. The Measurement Without Theory (or vice versa) 
debate Koopmans had with the remaining institutionalists (here, Mitchell) must have still been 
in the air upon Debreu’s arrival (Koopmans 1947). It was perhaps the last echo of the old 
Methodenstreit, in that Koopmans argued for microfounded estimation techniques of demand 
and supply curves. A decade later, Koopmans wrote the methodological pamphlet that came 
closest to a formalist position, namely his Three Essays on the State of Economic Science (1957). 
There he defended the “separation (…) of reasoning and recognition of facts” (1957: viii) 
under the title of “postulational analysis” (which he, rather than from Robbins, took from the 
mathematical school with the same name). In spite of this separation, he supported a realist 
image of his method in opposition to Friedman, with supporting reference to both Hutchison 
and Robbins. Postulates, he emphasized repeatedly, represent well-established beliefs with 
distinct (refutable) reference. As a reason for engaging in methodology, Koopmans quoted 
Roy Harrod: “My substantial excuse for choosing methodology today is that I feel a strong 
inner urge to say something” (130).  
Debreu, under the wing of Koopmans, did not share this urge by any means. He did not 
perceive himself to play an active role in cultivating the taste for rigor, although he knew that 
his mathematical skills were ahead of the others, including Koopmans:  
 
I do remember that he [Koopmans] was not familiar with the definition of a Banach space, because 
somebody had used the concept of a Banach space, and he asked for a definition, so I imagine that he 
was not familiar with infinite dimensional spaces (in Weintraub 2002: 148).  
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Debreu merely imagined. He apparently did not even talk about his or Koopmans’ 
mathematical backgrounds. How then could he have written Koopmans’ essays, even if he 
may have agreed with them word for word?  
Debreu had quite some occasions to take a position as a mathematical economist. An area 
of tension that Debreu must have been aware of was clearly that between the Cowles 
Commission and Friedman’s economics department. Friedman was the gatekeeper between 
Cowles and what is known as the Chicago school. Making a methodological statement in this 
context, however, one could hardly suppress the old political connotations of mathematics that 
Friedman clearly remembered (Hammond 1993).  
But also within Cowles, where one could silence these connotations, the debate was 
carried on, at least via the platform of the Econometric Society in 1953 (see Mirowski 2001: 
394 ff.). Notably, Morgenstern demanded as a condition of membership in the society that one 
“must have been in one way or another in actual contact with data” (Ibid.: 395). Neumann had 
certainly applauded but, curiously, was used by Jacob Marschak as a defense shield against 
Morgenstern. Von Neumann, Marschak argued, had to be excluded from the society if the 
proposal passed. The confusion of whom stood for what, politically and scientifically, was 
perfect.  
Another open debate was caused by David Novick in the Review of Economics and 
Statistics in 1954. Samuelson, Tinbergen, Klein, Koopmans, and Solow, among others, 
participated. It was held on merely philosophical grounds, though the discussion had as a clear 
backdrop, if I follow Mirowski’s account, the question of whether mathematical economics 
could hold its political promises for RAND (Ibid.). Regarding the philosophical justification, at 
least, the discussion seemed to have been decided beforehand. Let me merely quote the tone 
with which Samuelson opened the symposium:  
 
Editor Harris has given me the fun of acting as Master of Ceremonies for the slugfest set off by David 
Novick’s blast against mathematical economics. Seven economists have replied to Novick and 
according to my reckoning the score stands: For Novick, 7 epsilons; against him, 8 minus 7 epsilons. 
(Only Solow refuses to concede even an epsilon). Of course, the scores refer to those who struck at 
Seymour Harris’s lure: one of the two nonrespondents to his invitation might in vehemence have 
overpowered the seven defenders of mathematics (Samuelson 1954: 359). 
 
Discussion Futile. Mathematical economics, just as Bourbakism, could not be successful after a 
debate. If it could find inroads in economics at all, then it was because it was incontestable. As 
Bourbaki did not engage actively in disciplinary politics, and was influential just because of this 
neutral appearance, Debreu could be influential just because he never pushed too hard. He, 
‘left alone to do his work’, kept distance to all these debates. Some things in life need to remain 
unspoken – namely, those things that we better treat discreetly, be they somewhat elevated or 
simply embarrassing.  
The same holds for Debreu and the external affairs of Cowles, above all in its relationship 
to RAND, operations research, and all the fictions of scientific cold-war solutions. Debreu, as 
opposed to his affiliate Kenneth Arrow, never engaged in the actual design of the Cowles 
research program as a supplier of political ideas. Between Cowles and RAND there stood 
Bourbaki in the person of the unknowing Debreu, who was ignorant as to what his colleagues 
did “during the summer at RAND”. At least so he asserts later, somewhat ambiguously.  
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Some of the mathematical economists I knew spent a significant part of the summer at RAND. I did 
not do that and that may be due to some extent, but not entirely, because I was not a U.S. citizen, and 
RAND was doing a number of things for the army. (…) I do not know who from Cowles went to 
RAND in the summer (in Weintraub 2002: 143/145).  
 
Some went, Debreu knew. But he preferred not ask who went. Who knows what they do 
there? So better not.  
With such an attitude, it is a sheer impossibility to imagine Debreu sitting next to von 
Neumann in a row with Norbert Wiener and Margaret Mead in the Macy conferences, 
designing the new man. He would have been deeply embarrassed by the insipidity with which 
the political clamor defiled the music of reason, if one could hear it there at all. Debreu 
restrained himself from Cowles’ politics, and must have been glad that there was always a 
mediator between him and the economic profession, like Allais, Koopmans, and so later 
Arrow. Debreu felt safer in the shadow of economists.  
Not only in his role at Cowles, but also as an economist Debreu showed utmost 
discreetness. He was aloof, careful, and restrained in making economic claims. He may even 
have felt an obstacle to do so, slightly scared of saying something particular, being associated 
with a particular position for which he could be held responsible. He would not feel at ease 
when being addressed about an economic contest, anxious of saying something wrong in light 
of the omnipresent threat of being blamed for the consequences. Within the high ideological 
density of the 1950s – Smith Act still held, McCarthyism rose, Truman doctrine was signed – 
Debreu was not in control of the channels that lead from theoretical to political claims. Even if 
he still would have liked to say something particular, he perceived an invisible force that too 
easily leads a theoretical claim against the political respectability of the author. So better not 
claim too much. As a colleague at Berkeley said later about him: “Although he was friendly and 
had interesting things to say on just about any subject, he was also rather shy, and extremely 
protective of his personal thoughts and feelings” (Anderson 2005).  
I thus propose to see Debreu’s Bourbakism as a convenient way to handle the high 
ideological pressure that lasted on each theoretical claim in economics in the 1950s. As the last 
years of the war made Debreu feel like saying more than Xx∈ , the environment of Cowles 
made him feel rather like staying silent. And what is a more natural way to say nothing in 
academia than to hide behind the silence of Xx∈ ? At Cowles Debreu’s Bourbakism was 
reinforced, since it was an effective means to avoid making economic claims for which he 
would later be taken responsible. To be rigorous, rigorous, and nothing but rigorous, now 
meant not to be suspicious. Avoiding the question ‘What does that mean?’ (which defines the 
good mathematician according to Bourbaki) now meant at least not being a bad economist – 
whatever that means.  
This protective attitude, however, had another aspect I already touched on above: to show 
respect for economics. In his time at Cowles, Debreu held an implicit belief he never found 
worth expressing: that the actual work in economics had to be done by others. Debreu had 
never perceived a mathematical economics without economics around. To the contrary, the 
strict separation of “mathematical form” and “economic content” for which Debreu came to 
be known, expresses his methodological discreetness; it says nothing but that it is impossible to 
substitute economics with mathematical economics. By keeping economics out, Debreu 
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wanted to avoid the misunderstanding that economic reasoning is no longer necessary. This 
image of his self-understanding is at least suggested by some of his later statements on 
methodology (see below, chapter 5).  
Debreu may have held this belief implicitly. But his first French publication that I cited 
above was the last time he explicitly warned the economist of the inherent misunderstanding in 
mathematics. Regarding the crucial question of the economic interpretation of “assumptions”, 
he no longer warned the economist, but “he refused”, one of his students said, “to comment 
on the reasonableness of assumptions, believing that his job was to make the assumptions 
clear, and it was the reader’s job to assess them” (Anderson 2005). Assumptions are something 
to be made clear, not something to be discussed. This had to be done by others. No Discussion.  
Even though Debreu did not hold an expressive methodology, he may have had the trust, 
just as Bourbaki, that he could help the economist to be more explicit, precise, concise, simple, 
and to see contradictions more easily, untangle redundant assumptions, etc. He may never have 
believed that this sense of consistency could meet the full need of scientificity in economics, 
yet it certainly should have added something valuable. In other words, the non-scientific 
attitude of Bourbaki never occurred to Debreu. Stamped by Bourbaki’s philosophical naivety, 
he never considered it worth pointing out the role of economists. Is this attitude not more than 
plausible since the need for economists in economics should be obvious, at least for someone 
who was ‘left alone to do his work’? As it was not obvious, does this show the success of a 
philosophy of mathematical economics that Debreu during his active intellectual never openly 
promoted? Or does it show the susceptibility of economics to the liberation from meaning? 
 
 
…and, of course, Concerning Uniqueness and Stability of an Equilibrium.  
Why Arrow and Debreu Understood Each Other so Easily 
 
Only such an image of Debreu’s discreet ethos makes understandable his well-known 
theoretical stance on economics. Debreu was discreet in that he rigorously excluded those 
issues others discussed on the basis of his work, mainly the uniqueness and stability of an 
equilibrium. Let me quickly recall the theoretical infrastructure of his work between the 
glorious proof of the existence of a general equilibrium (1954) and the devastating proof of the 
indeterminacy of a general equilibrium (1974). What did Debreu do as an economist?  
Debreu’s 1954 article, “The Existence of an Equilibrium in an Competitive Economy”, 
written jointly with Kenneth Arrow, was worth a Nobel prize for each author, two and three 
decades later, respectively. The key insight that Arrow and Debreu first had independently 
from each other (both acknowledging Lionel McKenzie, too) was that a general competitive 
equilibrium could be described as a fixed-point problem. This “insight” brought together two 
historical lines of literature that historians have researched substantially (Weintraub 2002, 
Giocoli 2003, Punzo 1991). The first line goes back to Karl Menger’s Vienna colloquium, in 
particular Karl Schlesinger and Abraham Wald, who were reading Cassel’s reformulation of 
Walras and tackled the logical possibility of equilibrium solutions. Although Wald stayed 
shortly at Cowles, he showed no further interest in the problem. All three names (Wald, 
Walras, Cassel) are mentioned on the first page of the article.  
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The second line goes back to von Neumann’s 1928 article on “Gesellschaftspiele” with its 
minimax theorem (1959 [1928]), as well as his 1932 talk at Princeton, published in 1937 in 
Menger’s Ergebnisse, where he used a fixed-point proof in the context of a growth equilibrium 
model (1968 [1937]) (see Mirowski 2001: 94 ff). The line continues with the mathematician 
Kakutani, who in 1941 generalized the fixed-point technique in topological terms. Perhaps the 
most crucial contribution has been Nash’s 1950 one-page article, in which he used this 
topological proof technique for the solution of an n-players game. Debreu was reading 
precisely these articles during his first time at Cowles, which gave him the feeling that no 
‘compromise whatsoever’ needed to be made regarding rigor. When saying so, he apparently 
glossed over the underlying economic intuitions regarding strategic behavior that were still so 
obvious in Neumann’s minimax-theorem (see next page).  
Note that the only cross point of these two historical lines is von Neumann’s talk of 1932, 
in that it was discussed in Vienna. Von Neumann, ironically, neither pursued further the first 
“Walrasian” line, nor the line of non-constructive topological fixed points proofs. This has 
caused an entire chain of historical confusions. For Debreu, instead, it brought back the warm 
feeling of Bourbakian rigor. Note, furthermore, that in both lines everything that could be 
sensibly called Walrasian economics – including those economists between Pareto and Hicks 
who officially advanced GET – did not play any positive role at all. Their absence underlines 
the fact that the ‘modeling of the individual’ was by no means a motivation for writing the 
article. Debreu refers to this Walrasian tradition mostly in relation to his charge that differential 
analysis is non-rigorous mathematics.  
Considering the actual writing of the article, one could roughly associate Arrow’s 
theoretical interest with the first line from Vienna, and Debreu’s interest with the second line 
via topology. In his Nobel lecture, Debreu will later comment with the following words.  
 
Kenneth Arrow has told in his Nobel lecture about the path that he followed to the point where it 
joined mine. The route that led me to our collaboration was somewhat different. After having been 
influenced at the Ecole Normale Superieure in the early forties by the axiomatic approach of N. 
Bourbaki (…) (Debreu 1984: 88). 
 
The process of writing the article was indeed rather a sharing of labor than a collaboration. 
Perhaps Arrow and Debreu, who hardly knew one another before 1951, never really discussed 
their theoretical interest. They did not have many occasions for doing so, as Arrow was 
traveling around Europe during most of the writing process (see Feiwel 1987: 194 f). There 
was not much debate, Arrow suggested about the collaboration: “It was a wonderful 
experience, he was just so brilliant to work with. One of us would say a single word, and the 
other would just understand immediately” (in Gallagher 2005). No discussion, yes, but 
immediate understanding? Arrow and Debreu understood immediately because it was difficult 
to object to Debreu, who did not have a strong position or interest in the Walrasian problem 
of representing “the economy”. Debreu was not taken by the encounter with Wald’s article, 
but with von Neumann’s:  
 
The paper by Wald that gave the first proof of existence in the early 1930s did not happen to be 
important for me. The work of von Neumann on growth turned out to be much more significant since, 
in particular, it led to Kakutani’s theorem (in Feiwel 1987: 249).  
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(…) 
 
Nash, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36: 48-9
Nash’s one-page article has been crucial for both Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, for their
insight of proving the existence of a general equilibrium with the fixed-point theorem. Nash’s page
marks one of the miracles of the formalist revolution, in that it took off from game theory and
settled in general equilibrium theory. More precisely, topological fixed point proofs were first used in
order to indirectly prove the minimax theorem in a game, while it was later used beyond strategic
behaviour in the context of GET. GET is not descriptive of strategies, learning processes of agents,
or similar. GET fostered indirect proofs and the separation of rigour and reference, which game
theory only could in part. The historical line I have drawn as that preceding Debreu was a gradual
movement into the background of the economic implications of mathematical proofs. Let me dwell a
little more on that passage, for it maps the split between “Bourbaki” and “Hilbert” in economics. 
Angle point of this passage is the (in)sufficiency of indirect as opposed to constructive proofs
for economic theory. In 1928, von Neumann had explicitly pointed to the need for a constructive
proof that begins and ends with the intuition of ‘minimizing one’s losses’ (see also section 17.8 of the
Theory of Games). What von Neumann found appealing in the minimax theorem and his proof should
have reflected was the same as what was appealing for Thomas Mun and Nicolas Barbon when
beginning with economic theory – going beyond economic suspicion: “(…) it makes no difference
which of the two players is the better psychologists, the game is so insensitive that the result is always
the same” (von Neumann 1959 [1928]: 23). 
Why then did later economists lose interest in a constructive (read: economically expressive)
proof? The footnotes of John Nash are telling in this respect. Although he does acknowledge The
Theory of Games as the background of the problem of an N-person game, he does not acknowledge
von Neumann as a source of the use of fixed-point proofs. Instead it was the mathematician David
Gale, who had just earned his PhD at Princeton, who pointed Nash to the article of Kakutani, who,
in turn, had never perceived any use of it for economic purposes. Thus, the two references to von
Neumann and Kakutani show how far the separation of mathematical structure and economic
problems had already advanced by 1949.  
But there was another step to take. Nash did not believe that his article would be influential in
economics. He presented his proof to mathematicians, and skipped reference to a constructive proof
and the economic problem. A constructive proof would involve algorithms relating the theory to
data. Such was simply not interesting for the mathematician. Nash in fact had a positive
interpretation of the equilibrium, about which Binmore argued characteristically that if the profession
had known it, it would not have been successful (Giocoli 2003: 27). Indeed, precisely for this reason
was Debreu so inspired by the article. At the time when he was engaged in the existence proof in
GET, the genesis of the technique and its economic problems no longer played a role. This is most
apparent in his 1959 monograph, in which he skipped all reference to game theory.  
The formalist revolution got off the ground from game theory onward, but settled down in
GET because the normative and descriptive connotations were too dominant in early game theory.
Mathematical rigour could not play out its full affective force as long as it was biased towards the
purposes von Neumann has associated with it. Thinking of strategic behaviour did not meet the
needs for an aloof ethos in the postwar years (although it did meet the needs of the military in its use
of economics). 
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The 1932 talk of von Neumann was, I just mentioned, the only time von Neumann used a 
general equilibrium framework. But it was not even that which made Debreu interested in it.  
If there was anything that made the 1954 article Walrasian, then it was the problem it left 
unresolved: the actual tatonnement, that is to say, learning-process by which an equilibrium is 
achieved. In the 1954 article, this appeared as the problem of the virtual subject of the 
Walrasian auctioneer who needs to set a price system. This problem arose in particular because 
Arrow and Debreu presented the equilibrium as the generalization of von Neumann’s notion 
of a game that was clearly grounded in an intuition of economic behavior. Arrow was moved 
by that problem:  
 
the competitive equilibrium could be described as the equilibrium point of a suitably defined game by 
adding some artificial players who choose prices and others who choose marginal utilities of the income 
for the individuals (quoted in Weintraub 2002: 191).  
 
The ‘artificial player’ infused the entire analytical effort of the 1954 paper, at least for Arrow. 
He must have felt uneasy about it, for he was still sensitive to the subtle connotation of such an 
“administrative subject” that could perhaps even replace government. These connotations that 
refer back to the political battle about the meaning of Walras’ model should have been obvious 
to any economist in the years preceding 1954. Only in relation to the Walrasian claim of 
representing the “the economy” within a mathematical system, and in relation to the analytical 
challenges of relating competitive and strategic equilibria with one other, the Arrow-Debreu 
model was economically contestable (note, not because of any assumptions about the 
individual). And it was this contest that let Arrow continue research in other directions such as 
social choice theory and issues of uncertainty (Mirowski 2001: 295 ff). In his age, his research 
brought him to the point of co-organizing the first conference on complexity in Santa Fe. 
Arrow was exceptional in the history of economics, in that he did not have inhibitions in 
crossing theoretical boundaries.  
For Debreu, instead, the analytic problems of the artificial player sprung from a point 
beyond his theoretical interest. Theoretically crucial for Debreu when reading von Neumann 
was not the notion of a game in its relation to an equilibrium, but the encounter of topological 
proof techniques. Since topology was one of the “mother-structures” of Bourbaki, this 
disclosed the way to a Bourbaki-proof analysis. Later, in his Theory of Value (1959), Debreu no 
longer referred to the generalization of the notion of a game, nor did he refer to von Neumann 
as the pioneer of fixed-point proofs in economics. His neo-Walrasian bible – the end of almost 
a century of economic theories of values – was of no interest for those who actually questioned 
Walras’s model on the grounds of its economic assumptions. It was only of interest for those 
who were already indoctrinated in the neo-Walrasian community, who rarely cared about other 
theoretical developments towards game theory and other analytic standards than rigor. In this 
“neo-Walrasian”, or better: Debreuvian community enrolled people like Roy Radner, Abraham 
Robinson, Hugo Sonnenschein and more clearly the second generation such as Mas-Colell, 
David Schmeidler, David Kreps, and my teacher Egbert Dierker (see for a sober survey 
Debreu 1983, 1983c).  
Given this context, neither the 1954 paper nor the 1959 book could attract the common 
interest of economists. No economist may have perceived it as a real advance in GET. The 
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1954 paper was rather an internal success at Cowles. How difficult it was to get the paper 
accepted by then, the objection of the first referee shows who rejected the paper because it was 
not rigorous! (Weintraub 2002: 195 ff.) The existence proof was mentioned in an economic 
textbook for the first time in 1958 by Henderson and Quandt, and partially presented not 
before 1971 (Ibid.: 188). Clearly, the paper and the monograph could not strike immediately, 
since its economic meaning was a matter of the projections of its reception. The recognition 
that the conditions under which a general equilibrium holds is the discursive benchmark of 
economic theory, needed at least until the 1970s to settle down in the profession. 
 The 1954 paper could be said to have reached the profession’s interest by means of the 
two questions it left open. Beyond merely conceiving of a consistent equilibrium, the Walrasian 
question of the process of how to get there was rendered blank. Two questions remained 
open: first, the uniqueness, that is, the logical determinability (Is there one equilibrium, or could 
all states be an equilibrium?), and second stability (Does an equilibrium hold more than one 
moment at a time, or are we every moment in another equilibrium?). For an economist, the 
latter two questions are essential regarding the intuition of GET. Stability is such a pressing issue 
because only then does the market “bring about” something, make a difference, and play out in 
a context in which there are other (political) alternatives to the market. Only then does the 
market matter. The stability question could even be conceived of as the East-West question: is 
the market stabilizing “the economy” and all politics disturbing it, or is the market 
destabilizing, and only politics brings about proper social order?  
But these were yesterday’s questions. In the 1960s, people like Herbert Scarf, Kenneth 
Arrow, Leonid Hurwicz, Lionel McKenzie, Franco Modigliani, and also Herbert Simon were 
tackling these questions with the same analytical verve as Debreu without disturbing political 
undertones. Fixed-point techniques were utilized for designing algorithms with which one 
could calculate a general equilibrium (see e.g. Scarf 1982). This research came to be discussed 
as “applied” or also “computational” GET (Scarf in Arrow and Intriligator 1982: 1007-63). 
Rather than success stories of mathematical proofs, however, one can observe decreasing trust 
in the rigorous treatment of stability and a crumbling of Bourbakian-proof mathematics along 
the rise of more bottom-up approaches to mathematics. Simulation techniques that picked up 
estimation techniques of the 1940s again came to fill the theoretical structures. Many hoped 
that one could operationalize economic theory without losing its rigor simply by “adding on” 
more structure (see for example the letter of Alain Lewis to Debreu in Mirowski 2001: 432). 
Concerning this research that Debreu had prompted, he himself showed utmost 
discreetness. As Ingrao and Israel emphasized in their classical study, Debreu did not invest 
any efforts in the question of stability (1990: 329 ff.). He consistently rejected the use of 
dynamic equations for computational purposes. He only went as far as “regular economies” 
with which he has shown, similarly to the indirect proof of the existence, that the amount of 
equilibria is at least finite (Debreu 1970). Others, like Dierker, were inspired and have shown 
that the amount of equilibria must be an odd number (Dierker 1974, Dierker in Arrow and 
Intriligator 1982: 79 ff., see also Ingrao and Israel 319 ff). 
Most of the contributors to the neo-Walrasian community followed Debreu in ignoring 
computation. Topics of discussion have been the conditions for uniqueness, for which Dierker 
laid down the conditions of absolute uniqueness by distinguishing between local and global 
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solutions – topologically, of course (Dierker and Dierker 1972). Radner further scrutinized 
uncertainty of future markets – a matter of indexing the commodity market (Radner in Arrow 
and Intriligator 1982: 923 ff.). Another hot topic for Aumann, Hildenbrand, Scarf, and Debreu 
was the relation of Edgeworth’s core and a GE that brought forward measure theory and non-
standard analysis. It could hardly be called a contribution to Pareto’s original program. More 
orthodox highlights were, for example, when Mas-Colell presented an existence proof without 
transitivity and completeness conditions (Mas-Colell 1974). All in all, however, this research 
proceeded by way of a dialectic between proof and counter proof with the latter finally 
dominant (Rizvi 2003). If economic meaning entered in this research, then it was only in 
domination by analytic structures. “The result was a theory that became increasingly abstruse 
and rarified, such that the average practitioner increasingly became disenchanted with and 
unable to understand or use general equilibrium theory,” as Rizvi commented (Ibid.: 382).  
The research of the neo-Walrasian community represents the coma of modern economics. 
No economist needs to remember it in detail. No economist does not want to go beyond it. 
The following statement by Debreu pointedly summarizes the ambivalent role of this research 
in the history of economic theory. Debreu was asked why he remained absent from “dynamic 
analysis”. He replied he had reservations.  
 
I had my own reservations about dynamics in spite of the fact that I had studied classical mechanics (…) I 
thought that the whole question was very facile, and that in economics one did not specify, then test, 
the dynamic equations that we so easily taken up because of the analogy to classical mechanics. So I was 
very, always very, suspicious of dynamics and that is a view I have held very consistently (…) I thought 
about those questions of course as every economist must, but it seemed to me that the contributions made 
were not important (in Weintraub 2002: 146, e.a.). 
 
The ambiguity of these lines is all too apparent. Debreu discreetly did not participate in 
discussions about stability, although he thought about them “as an economist must”. As an 
economist, he apparently considered them important, but as a mathematician he could not. As 
a mathematician he could not because dynamic equations implied computational methods, 
which as a Bourbakian he could not consider rigorous. We clearly hear in these lines the echo 
of the dilemma he faced in his early years. Again he is torn between his mathematical values 
and his interest in making an economic claim. Debreu consistently and rigorously avoided 
facing the dilemma of “applying Bourbaki”.  
To explicate the economic theory addressed in the quoted reply is an intricate matter. The 
reply is dense in the history of economics, in which Debreu intervened. It shows how subtle 
his influence was on the discipline and how unique his position in the history of economic 
thought. Nobody else could have replied in that way. The association of ‘dynamics’ with 
‘classical mechanics’ and the possibility of ‘empirical testing’ must be surprising for both 
economists before and after Debreu. Empirical testing, Scarf would say, sure. But why does 
this require the analogy with mechanics?  
Neither before Debreu, even at Cowles, nor later even in the research he himself triggered, 
were issues of dynamics and time in general so consistently rejected. Although nobody before 
or after Debreu would have given such an answer, the theoretical status of economic time 
changed rapidly in Debreu’s days. In fact, it is perhaps the most common objection against 
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Debreu’s theorizing that markets are only pictured in their end-state, but not regarding the 
temporal passage that brings about such an end-state. 
 
What is little understood about the Formalist Revolution of the 1950s is precisely that the process-
conception of equilibrium was so effectively buried in that period that what is now called neoclassical 
orthodoxy, mainstream economics, consist entirely of static end-state equilibrium theorizing with little 
attention to the stability of equilibrium. (…) That everything depends on everything else is no reason to 
think that it depends on everything else simultaneously and instantly without the passage of real time 
(Blaug 2003: 146/154). 
 
The key to this burying of the process-conception of the market is to understand why Debreu 
associated dynamics with classical mechanics. For those who engaged in dynamic analysis, this 
association must have been odd. Nevertheless, Debreu justified his reservation with the 
rejection of that analogy. Debreu speaks here as a Bourbakian against the dependency of 
mathematics on specific intuitions, particularly physical intuitions. Bourbaki did not permit 
analogies as a source of meaning in mathematics – above all, not from physics. 
For most economists before and after the marginal revolution, to say that the market 
brings about a stable equilibrium was to say that markets necessitate actions as if these actions 
were subjected to physical laws (note, the “as if” indicates the philosophical disinterest!). 
Natural necessity was the main reference in order to spell out the metaphor of the “invisible 
hand”. Although the metaphor was, of course, never spelled out entirely – for, as I argued, 
physical metaphors were only a sufficient, but not a necessary condition of the appearance of 
epistemic authority – the metaphor was nevertheless important for the belief in the expressiveness 
of economic theory. Physical analogies granted the invisible hand imaginative appeal. Such 
imagination served both the classical liberals as well as later more socialist-inclined economists. 
The analogy with “mechanics” suggested that the market really brings about something, really 
makes things happen. Even if market forces are beyond their historical contingencies, the time 
of the market mechanism should still be the same time that people are living through: historical 
time. This belief we still find in later general equilibrium theorists such as in John Hicks’ notion 
of the week-equilibrium (1965).  
Weintraub states correctly that Debreu’s “Bourbaki program marked a definitive break 
with physical metaphors” (2002: 122). The formation of the neo-Walrasian core of economics 
during the formalist revolution was entirely free from an intervention of the physical sciences, 
or anything other than mathematics. Debreu’s influence as Bourbakian lays therefore in the 
fact that one could discuss stability without the analogy of mechanics, and, moreover without 
associations with the East-West question. Stability became a theoretical issue that did not touch 
the expressiveness of the theory. More concretely, if one speaks about “mechanism” today – 
which is still the dominant concept when referring to the ontological status of the market – 
economists do no longer sense that there is a metaphor that needs to be interpreted.  
The influence of Debreu on the profession of economics was thus that the intuitive 
grounds of market theorizing lost importance. Debreu had a neutralizing effect on economics. 
And just that lightening of meaning granted Debreu’s work its authority. But just that 
happened contrary to Debreu’s own self-understanding as a mathematical economist – discreet 
and aloof, rather the economist’s midwife of cogency than himself an economist. In other 
words, Debreu had “unintended consequences”, beyond his own rather unarticulated, perhaps 
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even respectful, but certainly weak and discreet intentions; he reconfigured the core of the 
profession as if led by an invisible hand.  
Debreu’s discreetness, to which this chapter is dedicated, finds its last expression in his 
excuse for why he did not consider questions of dynamics important, although he thought 
about them ‘as an economist must’? His reply echoes the implicit Platonic vision of 
mathematics that he should have made explicit in his 20 years in economics. “(W)hen you are 
out of equilibrium, in economics you cannot assume that every commodity has a unique price 
because that is already an equilibrium determination” (in Weintraub 2002: 146).  
This statement is as unique as it is striking. The concept of disequilibrium is for Debreu a 
contradiction in itself! If we talk about markets, we talk necessarily always already about an 
equilibrium, since in disequilibria prices have no conceivable identity whatsoever! Equilibrium is thus 
tantamount to consistency, while consistency is the condition of a scientific market theory. 
Debreu thus does not avoid speaking about disequilibria in opposition to the possible fact that 
we are most of the time in such a state (as the canon goes today), but because it is beyond what 
could be consistently said in economic science. The existence of an equilibrium is the condition 
of the possibility of economic science. Debreu was concerned with the possibility of speaking 
about the market scientifically, not with a particular economic theory. “In proving existence 
one is not trying to make a statement about the real world, one is trying to evaluate the model,” 
Debreu said much too late in his life (in Feiwel 1987: 243).  
If economists today still have to prove the equilibrium solution of their model and thus 
show its internal consistency, they are Debreuvian even in a straightforward theoretical sense. 
One does not need to assume perfect and symmetric information, perfect knowledge, perfect 
cognitive capacities, or the like in order to be Debreuvian. Debreu never did so! To equate 
equilibrium with consistency as a condition of scientific theorizing is the point where 
mathematics and scientificity in economics fall together even on a theoretical level. As long as 
economics cannot conceive of economic theory without any reference to equilibrium, it is 
Debreuvian-Bourbakian.  
 
 
Debreu’s Apology of the Indeterminacy of an Equilibrium  
and Retreat to Astronomy 
 
In accordance with what I said about Debreu’s professional life, it is tempting to read the so-
called Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result of the early 1970s as a further confirmation of 
Debreu’s discreetness (Sonnenschein 1972, Debreu 1974, Arrow and Hahn 1971: ch. XII). It 
reads like an apology by Debreu, having promised too much since it proved that one really has 
nothing to say with the axiomatic method. Market excess demand functions (with which an 
equilibrium can be characterized) are structurally undetermined, so that for every price vector 
and arbitrary agent characteristics, there is an economy for which the price vector constitutes an 
equilibrium price – all terms defined set-theoretically, of course. “[O]bservations on market 
prices alone do not restrict in any meaningful way the sort of economy that could have 
generated them” (Rizvi 2006: 231, see also Rizvi 2003: 383 f., for an early discussion see 
Kirman 1989). There are thus no sufficient conditions on the input level (the individual) that 
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would guarantee a unique equilibrium. Or, as Arrow commented: “In the aggregate, the 
hypotheses of rational behavior has in general no implications” (in Rizvi 2006: 233). The 
project of micro-foundation fell. We neither know whether the market is an equilibrating 
system, as Smith led us to think, or a dis-equilibrating system, as Marxists claim. Debreu’s 
mathematization could not unravel or visualize the invisible hand. What, then, remains to be 
said for an economist? “(W)e can hardly hope to understand special features [of the 
economy]”, as Dierker comments brightly on these results, “due to the economic nature of the 
world.” (1974: 15) We cannot understand “the economy” because of its economic nature? 
Was the result surprising for Debreu? Is the existence proof and the structural 
indeterminacy proof not the same result reversed? The existence proof showed that one could 
only prove existence, and this, the result of 1974 showed, is indeed woefully little – at least not 
enough for an actual economic claim. The structural indeterminacy result can be understood as 
an apology for a misunderstanding. It merely underlined what was already shown implicitly with 
the existence proof: that the Bourbakian value of rigor does not lead to an economic claim.  
There was one neo-Walrasian economist who seemed to know that all along: Frank Hahn. 
Once a great pusher of neo-Walrasian research, he later said about a theory that answers the 
big questions of the invisible hand and also suffices for the intellectual needs of this literature, 
that “in some intrinsic sense such a theory is impossible” (quoted in Ingrao and Israel 1990: 
361). I will come back to his famous “ju-jitsu” defense of GET in that it helps in clarifying the 
misunderstanding this theory itself has caused: “In attempting to answer the question ‘Could it 
be true’?, we learn a good deal about why it might not be true” (Arrow and Hahn 1991: vii).  
The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result potentially could have triggered a foundational 
crisis in economics comparable with Gödel’s theorem. For economists like Werner 
Hildenbrand it did (Rizvi 2003: 384). But was the rest of the profession of economists in the 
position to respond to this result adequately? How could this result trigger its deserved 
historical and methodological reflection back to the time before the axiomatic method? As the 
profession could not fully understand the article of 1954, it hardly even noticed the results of 
1974. It needed historians to show its importance, the first being Ingrao and Israel (1990). 
Weintraub explains:  
 
(T)he set of practices had by that late date gathered its own momentum, to such an extent that both 
Bourbakist and Debreuvian formalism had come to represent a style of mathematical expression long 
after they had dropped the role of providing philosophical grounding for their respective disciplinary 
programs (Weintraub 2002: 123). 
 
Thus, again, No Discussion! All the theoretical developments in economics since the early 
1970s, I argued above, could indeed be understood as responses to the inner problems of the 
axiomatized GET. None of them, however, were informed by it. Advances like the so-called 
applied GET, new econometric methods, and above all game theory – all developments that 
actually required an absolute split with Bourbaki – were represented as a continuation or even a 
“rescue” of the same standards (Rizvi 1994). Even if we can observe paradigmatic changes 
from pure to applied mathematics in economics, from Bourbaki to von Neumann, from 
axiomatic to computation, from competition to strategy, from theory to models, from 
deduction to simulation, etc., how can those differences become effective for the economist as 
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long as there was never any reflection on the Bourbakian character of the theories they attempt 
to replace? As long as the official narrative is that game theory ‘drops the assumption of 
complete competition’, that behavioral economics ‘drops the assumption of complete 
information’ etc., but there still remains a bitter aftertaste of Bourbaki (think of Ken Binmore), 
to what do these changes amount? I have mentioned already the aesthetic value Aumann 
emphasized when speaking about ‘mathematical economics and game theory’ as though they 
were one in the same (1985).  
Consider once more the peculiar history of game theory, in particular regarding the 
neutralization of the non-Walrasian intuitions that drove game theory I (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern) in game theory II (Aumann, Shubik). According to my narrative, crucial for the 
historical gap was the philosophical naivety of Bourbaki (as against the internal challenges of 
axiomatizations), and their preference for topology as rigorous practice. Debreu comments on 
the miracle that led from game theory I to II, but without referring to himself as one of its 
agents.  
 
I have said that the publication of the Theory of Game and Economic Behaviour was a symbol of the 
beginning of a golden age. I must be more precise. I did not mean that the framework and all of the 
central concepts of game theory had to be taken literally. I meant that there was in the book of von 
Neumann and Morgenstern a reformulation of economic theory, that new mathematical tools, in 
particular convex analysis, were introduced (…). The influence of their work has been great, but in 
many cases it has been indirect and was felt in ways that were unanticipated by the two authors (in 
Feiwel 1987: 252).  
 
…unanticipated because the non-Walrasian impetus of game theory got lost during Debreu’s 
Bourbakian intermezzo. The foundational problems of game theory, not surprisingly, are not 
of a very different kind than those of Debreu, as Rizvi (1994) has shown thoroughly. Think, 
for example, of the problem of multiple equilibria. The point of Debreu’s neutralizing effect is 
this: If someone who has no training in economics shares with a game theorist the intuition 
that markets are about interdependent, strategic behavior, perhaps combined with an intuition 
of power, the conversation with the game theorist will likely fail because the game theorist does 
not seem to be very expressive of that intuition. Because of Debreu, theoretical intuitions 
(from strategic behavior to asymmetric information) have less of an effect on the contests of 
economics, and thus the ethos of economists. Economics is not more scientific because it 
considers things like incomplete information, but it considers incomplete information because it 
is already scientific. If economists speak about the individual today, then, because there is no 
longer any risk to do so.  
While game theory seemingly brings economics closer to the people, the second post-
Walrasian development worth mentioning is the revival of econometrics that allegedly brought 
economics closer to the world. About econometrics that merges presently with complexity 
theory a very similar argument could be made. With complexity theory, if I follow the 
suggestion of Mirowski (2001, forthcoming), we face an even longer delay in von Neumann’s 
vision of the practice of science. Thus, did Debreu’s Bourbakism ‘ward off cyborgs’ until 
today? 
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While neoclassical economists seemed to enjoy a warm glow from their existence proofs, cyborg 
scientists needed to get out and calculate. Subsequent generations of economists seemed unable to 
appreciate the theory of computation as a liberating doctrine (…) (T)he Bourbakist feint of behaving 
for all the world as though the nastier implications of the theorems of Gödel and Turing had 
effortlessly been circumvented through redoubled axiomatizations would shape Cowles’s attitudes 
toward computation for decades to come. In practice, Bourbaki would come a charm to ward off 
cyborgs” (Mirowski 2001: 23/394).  
 
Even if these decades are now past, and today’s economists ‘get out and calculate’, the 
liberation they draw from it is the same liberation they experienced with Bourbaki: the 
liberation from the burden of meaning. The chimerical character of the economist today is not 
that of a “cyborg”; it is not the mixture of realities previously perceived as irreducible, of the 
social and the natural, or, for that matter, of representation and the represented. The chimerical 
character of the economist is that between the reality that gives rise to their practices, and the 
reality that stems from it, the reality “of” science and the reality of science.  
Let me quickly sum up Debreu’s intervention in economic theory. Although the 
theoretical history of the axiomatic method finds a preliminary end in the result of 1974, the 
influence of the axiomatic method goes beyond the history of theories it informed, and beyond 
the methodological device it was associated with. Rejection of GET combined with the 
affirmation of its standards of scientificity are still today common practice among economists. 
Economics today still can be mapped along the different interpretations of why GET is 
insufficient (as I attempted above). This is why since the beginning of the 1980s economics 
seems to head straight beyond the paradigm of GET as well as rational choice, yet moves even 
further beyond their contestable ethos as scientists. Even though economists do not share 
anything with Debreu’s theoretical intuitions – he did not have any! –, they share his intellectual 
ethos more than that of any other economist before him – namely no ethos! 
So much for economic theory. What happened to Debreu after 1974? For Sonnenschein, 
the indeterminacy result was reason enough to turn cynical about the discipline. “This work 
was great fun. I often find myself beginning with the hypothesis that the king has no clothes”, 
he said later (in Feiwel 1987: 331). Mantel, instead, plead for a turn to game theory (see Rizvi 
1994). All in all, neo-Walrasian enthusiasm softened. Debreu, when asked about the 1974 
results, tried to squeeze out a positive message so that it may lead economists to other topics 
without yet embracing Hahn’s conclusion (see Feiwel 1987). In practice, nonetheless, now 
already in his mid-50s, he backed away from the stage of economics. After 1974, Debreu 
published less than before. The work he did on regular differentiable economies and the like 
was, knowingly, more something for devotees than “the working economist”.  
In 1975 he received an appointment as a 
mathematics professor at Berkeley. It must have 
been like coming home. In 1976 he became 
“officer” of the French Legion of Honour and 
the “coach” of the football team of Berkley 
(Anderson 2005). His team played against 
Arrow’s at Stanford – all things one does after 
the rest has been done – things one does in 
one’s age.  
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Remember that Debreu, back in 1944, considered going into astrophysics instead of 
economics. He did not forget his passion:  
 
By 1982 it seemed that time was softening the edges a bit. (…). My father seemed warmer and less 
formal; he hiked at Roy Reyes, played bridges with his grandchildren, and loved to get out his telescope 
on starry summer nights and for special events like solar and lunar eclipse (de Soto 2005). 
 
Watching the stars must indeed be a closer experience to the aesthetic appeal of Bourbaki than 
doing economic theory: a safe distance from the world – elements and sets, stars and clear 
nights. In the early 1980s, Debreu must have believed his days in economics were numbered. 
He implemented a sense of rigor in economics, and may have appreciated how the profession 
continued in other directions. There was no longer any question of being an economist or not. 
Gerard Debreu made it. No Discussion.  
 
Then in October 1983 came the thunderbolt out of the blue: the Nobel in Economics. I don’t think any 
of us in the family at the time recognized it for the disaster that it was to be. The world, of course, was 
doing him a great honor and the trip to Stockholm which we all took together was magical in many 
ways. We attended the ceremonies, shook hands with the king and queen, were interviewed on 
television, had banquets at the royal palace and the embassies, and danced at the ball. My sister’s 8 year 
old son, Jeremy, lost a baby tooth in the middle of the banquet with the king and queen and brought his 
bloody tooth wrapped in a white linen napkin for the his grandfather and the queen to see. I danced 
Swedish folk dances in a dress with a 5-inch train in a ballroom whose walls were covered in gold (de 
Sotot 2005).  
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 (4) The Disaster of the  
Bank of Sweden Prize, 1983 
 
 
 
 
10th of December 1983, Stockholm, Royal Academy of Science. Gerard Debreu receives the 
Bank of Sweden Prize. Into this festive mood the affective history of the biography of Gerard 
Debreu culminates. After Bourbaki’s enthusiasm, Debreu’s youthful fascination and 
unresolved existential dilemma, after years of professional discreetness, the mathematical 
experience of separating structure and meaning is now celebrated with the greatest honour of 
economic science. Now we are prepared to answer the question I have posed several times: 
How was that possible? How was it possible to announce in front of the entire world that 
Debreu’s work is of “vital importance for the understanding of the market” (Press Release). 
How could one grant weight to Debreu’s work? And at which expense? And what does this 
tell us about economists’ intellectual needs?  
The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel (translation varies from 
year to year) is not to be mixed up with the Nobel Prize given for other disciplines like physics, 
chemistry or peace. The Prize was “bought” by the Bank of Sweden in 1968. It does not have 
the same name, but the formal rules are equivalent with the actual Nobel Prize, including their 
common ceremony on the 10th of December each year. The Prize was one of the 
manifestations of the great success of economics in shaping post-war institutions of science. 
More than that, the prize could be seen as the last manifestation of the scientification of 
economics in the sense that it stands for the possibility of assigning symbolic value to economics. 
Only uncontested values can be symbolic, and only symbolic values make up a festive 
celebration. Economists are celebrated shoulder to shoulder with physics and peace without 
evoking suspicion of not being worth Nobel ideals. Since I argued that Debreu was central to 
the symbolic value of economics as a science, it is not surprising that he, too, had to receive the 
prize sooner or later. He contributed to the rising belief that economics needs a Nobel Prize.  
Ever since the Nobel for economics was launched, however, some resistance 
overshadowed the celebrations. Most notably the nephew of Alfred Nobel, Peter Nobel, 
argued outspokenly that the prize was against the spirit of its founder. The Prize, he wrote in 
2001, is “a PR coup by economists to improve their reputation” (in Brittan 2003). Cassidy in 
1996 argues for the abolition of the prize for the sake of more pragmatism: “Deprived of the 
publicity surrounding the annual Stockholm ceremony, economists would actually have to do 
something useful to get noticed.” (1996: 50) Even the head of the Bank of Sweden, Kjell Olof 
Feldt, has advocated abolishing the prize (in Brittan 2003). For the Marxists Resnick and Wolff 
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the prize “sits in a clear cause-and-effect relationship to the predominance of capitalist 
institutions in society” (1984: 31).  
In 1974, there was a characteristic confusion when the prize was given to the socialist 
Myrdal and the liberal Hayek. Did the committee worry about appearing politically biased? 
Myrdal said that he would abolish the Prize because it is given to people like Hayek (but he, 
too, accepted the honor). Hayek has always been skeptical about the scientification of 
economics for it plays into the hands of the left. In his Nobel lecture, The Pretence of Knowledge 
(1989 [1974]), he expressed his doubts whether there ever has been any progress in discovering 
economic laws, as one should expect from a science. When he received the prize he “toasted 
the King and Queen of Sweden during the Nobel banquet by saying that, had he been 
consulted, he would have ‘decidedly advised’ against creating the prize in the first place” (in 
Nasar 2001). Perhaps, after his toast, he also whispered into the ears of King and Queen a 
more friendly invitation to Mont Pelerin. For the chair of the Nobel committee, Erik 
Lundberg, has already been a member of this society. 
If there is an unambiguous bias of the prize, it is that it supports, reinforces, or perhaps 
even represents the social hierarchies of economic institutions of Stanford-Yale-Chicago. Of 
the 58 Laureates between 1969 and 2008, more than 80% are based in U.S. departments. 
Practically all of them come from one of the five or six Chicago-MIT-Stanford universities. No 
economist has ever rejected the prize, and the profession fully absorbed it as a monument to its 
importance. Would it not be the first moment of critique of post-war economics when a 
Laureate would ask: ‘Is this what I am truly seeking?’, stand up, and reject the prize?  
At the evening of the 10th December 1983 Gerard Debreu was 62 years old. The prize was 
handed over “for having incorporated new analytical methods into economic theory and for 
his rigorous reformulation of the theory of general equilibrium” (Press Release). Sounds 
harmless. But if I unfold these words in light of the preceding narrative, as I will do in this 
chapter, its virulence will become clear. To begin with, the anachronism of the prize is obvious. 
The 1970s were a time of strong antipathy against Debreu’s work; yet, it was also a time when 
the influence of his research could actually be recognized. In the early 1980s, all economists 
have understood that in the preceding decades a “formalist revolution” has taken place. The 
first to name it was Ward (1972), and I have already gone through the intensive mourning in 
1970s AEA speeches about the insignificance of work that applied the standards set by 
Debreu. In the early 1980s, the discontent about the old and the desire for a new theoretical 
paradigm grew among the entire profession, be it in the heterodoxy or orthodoxy, as well as in 
the commentary of economics. The inner voices of economists began to revoke from exactly 
the achievement celebrated at 10th of December 1983.  
In order to dip into the paradox of celebrating Debreu, and to see what it tells us about 
economic science, a close reading of the speeches held that evening suggests itself. The 
Presentation Speech of one of the Swedish professors of the committee – in this case it was 
Karl Göran Mäler - had to solemnly justify Debreu’s outstanding achievement supposedly “of 
vital importance for understanding of the market” (Press Release). Debreu himself had to 
explicate his work in his Nobel Lecture and Banquet Speech in front of a well-disposed and 
interested, but not necessarily well-trained audience. The reasoning of the Nobel Committee 
reveals at least two things: first, how one had to receive, or better: what one had to make of 
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Debreu’s work in order to celebrate it in economics. And second, at which expense such could 
be done for both Debreu and the profession. What had to be solemnly silenced when 
announcing the “vital importance” of Debreu? Thus, why did Debreu receive the Nobel Prize, 
and, no less obvious, why did Debreu accept it? 
 
 
The Rhetoric of Significance – (a) The Inconspicuousness of the Wide-Ranging 
Consequences: The Existential Meaning of the Existence of an Equilibrium?  
 
Let me lay out three rhetorical strategies of evoking an impression of ‘important research’ and 
thus evoking the solemnity of the evening. The distinction roughly resembles the first 
distinction in Aristotle’s rhetoric between three kinds of speech: an epideictic, juridical, and 
political speech (1984).  
The importance of a scientific work can, first, be established by means of an epideictic 
tone that evokes impressions of importance by means of relating the work to other instances 
that are already perceived as important. Standing in front of a general audience, one may relate 
the work to issues that currently move social life. Here the committee has to rely on the sensus 
comunis, on topoi of importance. Considering 1983, one could think among other issues of the 
latest oil crisis, of the East-West question, of course, or also of the tumults of terror of the 
1970s that Europeans, at least, still felt in their bones. Could the committee rely on this 
rhetoric of the “wide-ranging” consequences of Debreu’s work for the world-for-everyone?  
Second, importance can be established with a juridical tone in which one judges the past. A 
piece of work is related to a specific tradition that tackled a common research question, or 
applied the same method, or had the same theoretical interest. The judgement of the 
committee in this respect can be taken as an active writing of the history of economic thought. 
They give shape, manifest, and authorize the incontestable importance of the work. Since the 
judgement is positive, such a history is necessarily linear to some degree, constituted by some 
failures following the final success of the honoured person. How did the committee celebrate 
Debreu’s “long-awaited solution”?  
Third, importance certainly has a political character in that one looks ahead and praises the 
future possibilities disclosed by a piece of research. Here the speeches function as an active 
disciplinary policy. They include some kinds and exclude other kinds of research that are worth 
pursuing in future. Here we would expect the rhetoric of “path-breaking”, promising research 
that envisions new fictions of science.  
Path-breaking, long-awaited, and wide-ranging – by means of such rhetoric of significance 
the moment of the Noble festivities can emerge as a milestone in the development of a 
discipline. A piece of science resolves a past, plays out in a present, and evokes a future, so that 
the ceremony is granted the importance of an “historical event”. This is how history proceeds 
in science. Talking about the importance of science is talking about the affective marks of the 
passage of the time of scientific institutions. Such marks allow for an intellectual orientation of 
the scientists’ community, as well as the solemnity of the moment of handing over the prize – a 
value-laden moment of real weight in the life of a scientist, which amounts in this case to 
precisely 1.5 Million Swedish Kronor.  
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Actually, it had been three Million Kronor, since the Bank of Sweden paid twice for the 
same article. Kenneth J. Arrow already received the Nobel Prize jointly with John Hicks eleven 
years earlier. Karl Göran Mäler seemed to have read Arrow’s Nobel lecture when he tried to 
address the relevance of Debreu’s work regarding present social issues. The existence of an 
equilibrium is a “phenomenon”, Mäler said, that is “so much part of everyday life, that one 
generally does not stop to consider it” (1983). Since that first strategy of celebrating Debreu 
remained rather underexposed through the rest of the evening, it is worth wandering off for a 
moment in order to get a feeling for the wild range of discussions one had to enter at that 
point. How did Arrow justify the relevance of the existence proof?  
General equilibrium theory, as Arrow opened his Nobel lecture, enhances the trust in 
markets which is at stake at moments of uncertainty. 
 
In everyday, normal experience, there is something of a balance between the amounts of goods and 
services that some individuals want to supply and the amounts that other, different individuals want to 
sell. Would-be buyers ordinarily count correctly on being able to carry out their intentions, and would-
be sellers do not ordinarily find themselves producing great amounts of goods that they cannot sell. 
This experience of balance is indeed so widespread that it raises no intellectual disquiet among laymen. 
They take it so much for granted that they are not disposed to understand the mechanism by which it 
occurs. The paradoxical result is that they have no idea of the system’s strength and are unwilling to 
trust it in any considerable departure from normal conditions (Arrow 1972: 253). 
 
Arrow showed in these lines a conception of market equilibrium as the consistency of 
expectations and plans, which Hayek made popular. With some interpretive imagination, we 
can still hear the echo of Smith’s baker man, who we expect to bake our bread not because he 
feels committed to, but because he does so for himself. Going to the bakery, we do not trust 
the baker, but the market. When we enter a store and expect to find the products we seek, 
Arrow suggests, we implicitly assume or show belief in the existence of an equilibrium. The 
belief in an equilibrium is, in Husserl’s terms, the Urdoxa of economic life in capitalism. First of 
all, and for most of our life in markets, the “phenomenon” of the (actual) existence of market 
equilibrium does not cause intellectual disquiet, since all our market practices already 
presuppose a basic belief in the existence of an equilibrium. For this reason we do not expect 
the shopkeeper to cheat us, do not negotiate, and thus take prices as “given”. Is the existence 
of an equilibrium the transcendental condition of life in capitalism?  
Arrow poses the existence question in a similar fashion as Heidegger poses the question of 
‘worldliness’. The logic of the market is so familiar to us that it is too close for being visible and 
graspable. We see through the market but not the market itself. The invisibility of the market’s 
“hand” that guides our practices is the same invisibility, in terms of Heidegger’s example, as 
that of our glasses ‘sitting on our nose’. 
 
When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles, which are so close to him distantially that they are 
‘sitting on his nose’, they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite 
wall. Such equipment has so little closeness that often it is proximally quite impossible to find. 
Equipment for seeing – and likewise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver – has what we have 
designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand. So too, for instance, does the 
street, as equipment for walking (1962 [1927]: 141). 
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Does the market ‘sit on our nose’, inconspicuous always there? Is the existence of an 
equilibrium an Heideggerian ‘Existenzial’ of life in capitalism? Is the economist’s abstraction the 
abstraction from the familiar, the distancing from what is too near to be close? Is this what 
Arrow meant? He did not elaborate. But he did at least claim that the feeling of safety in 
markets should have been somehow exposed and even reinforced with the existence proof. The 
belief in markets, according to Arrow, needs to be strengthened because in some exceptional 
cases we lose trust in markets. Just as the existence of our glasses pops up in the moment they 
break, as Arrow thought about the importance of GET, the basic belief in capitalism can be 
shaken in moments of “war” and “catastrophes” (1972: 253).  
What could Arrow have meant? If we think of the decades around 1972, did this mean 
that people would less likely by out stores, bunker food and water in case they have to hide in 
their cellars while Air Force One circles around the earth? Hardly. Would that mean that 
stockbrokers gamble away less money when hearing someone whispering about the plans of 
some sheiks? Perhaps. Would that mean that people are less likely to suspect those who 
pretend to go to war for freedom but actually do so for oil? I doubt it. Important at this point 
is that Arrow believed that there are “considerable departures” of market order. Arrow believed 
that there are indeed cases that general equilibrium theory could put at stake since his intuition 
of this theory does correlate with an actual practical belief. And this belief is in some sense or 
another concrete, for it must be shared more among the people in the west than in the east. 
Arrow believes that his article expressed an episteme that correlates with a particular doxa. On 
the basis of this belief, Arrow could have enough motivation to mobilize his theoretical interest 
in a vivacious political life between cold war and the war on terror. He even was a founding 
member (together with Malinvaud) of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. How could I 
possibly downplay the efforts he put into his expressive life? 
With such a belief, Arrow is certainly a child of 1945. Having experienced an exceptional 
situation could be called a typical motive for an invisible hand theorist. Being in a world of 
threatened social order, of anxiety, and turmoil could make one ask: what keeps society 
together if there is nobody who takes care of it? In an interview, Hayek mentioned the days in 
Vienna following WWI, after the army left the social stage, as the fledgling moment of his 
interest in the social sciences. Other moments would have included the Great Depression of 
1929 that was crucial for an entire generation of economists, including Hicks, Samuelson, 
Friedman, or also Lawrence Klein, who called it “psychologically difficult to grow up during 
the depression. It was easy to become discouraged about economic life” (in Breit and Spencer 
1995: 21). As long as one reminds such an event and all the past intellectual efforts to which it 
gave rise, and rearticulates one’s understanding of it in light of present social life, intellectual life 
is responsive to the critical question: ‘What does this mean?’, ‘What am I up to?’.  
A quick look at the 1954 article justifies the doubt that Arrow’s motivation, even if he 
could hold onto it his entire life, informed his engagement in GET. His interpretation might 
have served as a rationalization of GET, particularly at evenings such as the Nobel lecture. But 
nowhere in this elusive text do we find the basic market belief even mentioned, let alone an 
account of how it orders the experiences of dealing with prices. We would expect an answer to 
questions like: what kind of consistency is required for the belief in the market, given that first of 
all and foremost it is unproblematic, but sometimes ineffective? Arrow also would have to enter a 
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debate with market theories that start with the opposite intuition: namely, that people only act 
in markets insofar as they perceive a disequilibrium, as in more institutional theories. He had to 
encounter those speaking of the “violence the idea of a general equilibrium does to our sense 
of reality”, as Weintraub’s father Sidney did (in Weintruab 2002: 186).  
Arrow could have also entered in an argument with McCloskey, to add another association 
with the inconspicuousness of market equilibria in economic life. She compares the price 
system with a language, through which in some sense or another our economic life becomes 
manifest in a social reality. Like Saussure’s structure of languages, we cannot change prizes, so 
that their genesis slips into the unconscious of economic life – inconspicuous, invisible.  
 
The situation in markets is identical to that of language. No prudent person will initiate conversations 
with strangers on the bus about the definition of “givenness” in economic theory. (…) We use the 
French word amour or the English word love without stopping to quarrel about their meanings, or 
insisting that love actually means “hate,” or “light bulb,” or “the train will arrive in six minutes.” That is, 
the on-going conversation of language – I note that Walras’ colleague Saussure made this point a 
century ago - gives to us mere ordinary speakers of it a set of distinctions serving to define what’s on 
offer in French or English by way of sheep/mutton as against mouton (McCloskey 2006: 49). 
 
Would Walras agree? I doubt it, for he was much too bourgeois for such wild analogies. 
Consider, I may add, how effective is the language of prices. It does not only save us from 
negotiating with endless rows of people involved in baking our bread, but it saves us from 
speaking to anyone at all – a mouse click is enough. Bourbaki could leap over from “love” to 
“hate”, on to “light bulbs” and “beer-mugs”, as Hilbert would add, without resistance – just like 
those who trade “love” for “kidneys” for “blinking pocket lighters” in silence. The social reality 
of the market is absolutely discreet – precisely as Debreu. If one learns one thing from The 
Phenomenology of Economics, then it is that structures don’t tell! 
These short remarks show that Arrow actually opened a can of worms in commenting on 
the meaning of the inconspicuousness of market equilibrium. He had to seriously ask himself: 
Can there possibly be a meaning of the structure of the market? How could the structure of the 
market be endowed with meaning? A satisfying account of how a theoretical interest arises 
from the basic belief in markets would have to answer this question. Even if Arrow did not do 
so, his understanding shows that for him this question could at least be posed meaningfully. 
And in exactly this sense he differs from Debreu. The very fact that the text was written by 
Arrow and Debreu, yet associated with a different basic understanding of GET shows that no 
theoretical interest, let alone a ‘basic belief in the market’, was at stake while working on the 
article.  
 
 
(b) The Long-Awaited Historical Dumbness: ‘Debreu Proved Smith’.  
And how Close Discreetness and Cynicism can be. 
 
At the evening of Debreu’s Nobel Prize, apart from the short reminder of Mäler, there was no 
further reflection on this first type of relevance for everyday life. The adopted tone was rather 
that of “penetrating basic research” (Press Release) that appeals to the layman’s understanding 
of his own inability to understand. Yet, we find much about the second strategy of establishing 
304 
____________________________________
                  Part III: Biography 
______________________
 
______________________
319
the relevance of research, namely regarding the tradition of market theories. Here my narrative 
arrives and also returns to “Smith”, but in a very different sense than ‘moving beyond the 
intellectual milieu of the mercantile discourse’. Now we move beyond any intellectual milieu – 
Smith’s in particular.  
The main reasoning for the Prize resembles a historical link that is symptomatic for the 
neo-Walrasian community as well as for the historical mind of all post-Debreuvian economics. 
This reasoning shows that one needs to embrace the scope of the whole of modern economic 
science in order to celebrate Debreu. Mäler made a direct link to the initiating ignition of 
economic science – the invisible hand. Debreu and Smith had the same in mind, Mäler 
suggests, but Smith had only a vague intuition and a metaphor rooted in political science. 
Debreu, instead, had the scientific proof. Debreu proved Smith:  
 
In a decentralized market system, individual consumers and firms make decisions on the purchase and 
sale of goods and services solely on the basis of self-interest. Adam Smith had already raised the 
question of how these decisions apparently independent of one another, are coordinated (…) Smith’s 
answer was that (…) prize systems automatically bring about the desired coordination of individual plans. 
Toward the end of the 19th century, Leon Walras formulated this idea in mathematical terms as a system 
of equations (…). But it was not until long afterwards that this system of equations was scrutinized to 
ascertain whether it had an economically meaningful solution, i.e. whether this theoretical structure of vital 
importance for understanding the market system was logically consistent (…). Arrow and Debreu managed 
to prove the existence of equilibrium prizes, i.e., they confirmed the internal logical consistency of 
Smith’s and Walras’ model of the market economy (Press Release, e.a.). 
 
In these lines, the identification of mathematics and economic scientificity that underlies my 
affective history of Debreu has been made explicitly. The committee’s argument says roughly 
that ‘Debreu proved Smith, that is, that markets work automatically, by showing that 
equilibrium has an economic meaning, that is, that it is logically consistent.’ The easiest reaction 
to such lines would be to quash them as bad journalism. Note, however, that they do resemble 
a rough version of most openings of myriad neo-Walrasian articles, which liturgically repeat 
(freely reparaphrased): ‘(i) One of the fundamental features of an economic system is that 
independent actions are mutually consistent with each other (…). (ii) Arrow and Debreu have 
shown that (…). (iii) However, the assumption of x can be relaxed under condition y, specified 
in topological terms z. (…).  
The historical the committee’s judgment establishes is exclusive: it says nothing but that 
only since Debreu has there been a genuine economic science, because only since then one can 
speak of a generic market of inner-consistency, and thus a proper object to study. Only since 
Debreu, markets have gained an “economic meaning”. All history of economic thought before 
Debreu is wiped out to the extent that it appears preliminary to economic science. Popular 
science press repeats Mäler, such as here Eugene Garfield:  
 
Smith’s assertion was suggestive on an intuitive level. In fact (…) it provided the justification for 
antitrust regulation and underlies policies that rest on faith in the operation of a free market. But 
Smith’s exposition on the invisible hand occupies barely a page in his landmark work (…) Smith’s 
propositions are vague and ambiguous, and did not even constitute a proof that there exists a 
competitive market equilibrium. (…) [I]n 1954, Debreu and Arrow co-authored a brief paper (…) [It] 
established realistic conditions under which equilibrium could be achieved (1985: 69f.).  
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One does not need much knowledge in the history of economic thought to debunk the hair-
raising link of Debreu and Smith – hair-raising for the equation of “economically meaningful” 
and “logically consistent”. The historian Mark Blaug, for example, calls the article of Arrow 
and Debreu one that “exhibits the worst features of formalism”, namely, that “the equilibrium 
solution of the mathematically formulated economic model” was taken to be “the final answer 
to the question that prompted the investigation in the first place” (2003: 146). Sure, but what if 
it is inherent to their work that one forgets the question that informed the “investigation”? 
What if this little bit of historical knowledge that is necessary to debunk the reasoning of the 
committee is no longer obvious, precisely because of the success of this article?  
Commenting on this reasoning, then, means less to debunk it as obviously wrong, but 
rather to take it seriously in what it shows of economics. The historical link of Smith and 
Debreu shows what had to happen to economics in order to grant weight to Debreu’s work. It 
reflects less the motivation of Debreu and what was important for him, but it shows how 
Debreu, unwillingly, has altered the conditions under which a contribution in economics can 
appear significant. I need to read the reasoning of the committee as a symptom rather than a 
reflection of Debreu’s work. Debreu altered the values of economics to such extent that his 
work could appear as important, although, ironically, he himself did not perceive his work as 
particularly relevant for economics at all.  
In order to give a full sense of the historical dumbness the Debreu-Smith link reveals, let 
me recall some of its intermediate historical elements. Those in the audience who have ever 
heard anything of the history of economics could pose the following or countless other 
questions, each of which proves the committee’s reasoning to be sheer farce.  
 
Debreu proved the existence of a general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Did he 
therefore prove that Hicks attempts in Value and Capital to take general equilibrium as a 
framework of growth, money, stability, and capital makes sense? Did he therefore prove 
that the efforts of the 1930s of estimating statistically Walrasian demand and supply is 
possible? Did he therefore prove that the Walrasian framework is indeed a justified 
generalization of Marshal’s humble partial equilibrium? Did he therefore prove that the 
production and consumption of wealth could be subsumed under the same logic although 
the one concerns nature, the other ethics as Mill once thought? Did he therefore prove 
that Cournot’s notion of perfect competition is the holistic approach proper to capture 
how everything is connected with everything in the economy? Did he therefore prove that 
rivalry between people is really beneficiary for society as liberals before 1850 believed? Did 
he therefore prove that Smith’s invisible hand is scientifically grounded? Did he therefore 
prove that the market works automatically?  
 
Did Debreu bring an end to this history of contests of rather diverse theoretical interests? Did 
he bring an end to a long tradition of “making the invisible hand visible”, explicating its 
political and social consequences and conditions? Did he bring an end to the riddle of how the 
invisible hand brings about social harmony ex nihilo, or at least out of something that by no 
means predetermines such a harmony?  
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Since Debreu, economists have the “proven” permission not to think about the market on 
the basis of slippery intuitions of what the market is all about. Debreu proved that the market 
is a generic object of science, and beyond messy economic talk. Now the market can be 
investigated “economically meaningful”. Speaking about the market economy is scientifically 
approved talk. Or, more vital for the self-understanding of the economist, economists do not 
have to rely on already socialized beings borrowed from other sciences. Economics is a 
separate science. Economics genuinely achieves something. Since 1954 (or 1983?), economics 
makes sense.  
The crucial question is this: Under which conditions could any economist possibly laud 
this hair-raising historical reasoning that subsumes contradictory theoretical interests under one 
generic object? Apparently, only if the problematic of the tradition of market theorizing is 
downplayed. What is neglected in those lines, in particular in the equation of “logically 
consistent” and “economically meaningful”, are the interpretive gulfs that separated and motivated 
all market theorizing. These interpretive gulfs, to mention only the most salient examples, are 
those between competition and rivalry, efficiency and growth, utilitarian and naturalistic 
foundations, historic versus mechanistic conceptions of time, empiricism versus apriorism, 
normative versus positive interpretations, and, of course, socialism versus capitalism. To say 
that Debreu and Smith had the same thing in mind but Debreu the scientific proof is to show 
that one has lost a sense of these gulfs. The condition of granting weight to Debreu was to 
discredit the possible weight economic theory can have. The first condition of celebrating 
Debreu is thus that economists are insensitive to the problematic of market theories. Since I 
characterized the life-world as the locus from which problems come, this reasoning manifests 
nothing but the oblivion of the life-world. Only by means of a problematic, of something 
bothersome, of an issue to be resolved, are economists responsive, and might possibly claim 
something of weight or relevance. Economists are liberated from the burden of meaning. 
Applause to Debreu.  
Recall once more one of these interpretive markers of GET: the socialist calculation 
debate. After Hayek’s last contributions following the war, the debate calmed down. In light of 
my narrative, it was not Hayek who closed the debate, but Debreu because after Debreu this 
debate could not be meaningfully continued in science. Economists, in harsher terms, became 
discreet about their own concerns. Or if I reverse this statement, economists became cynical 
about the very possibility of being concerned with an economic claim. Between the discreetness 
of Debreu and the suspicion that economic meaning is beyond science, there is but one small 
step, as the following reply of Debreu shows. In one of his last interviews, Debreu was again 
asked about the interpretive indifference of the Pareto optimum, which in his first article he 
still referred to as a “certain danger”.  
 
J’espère que la dimension normative est très réduite. Si je considère par exemple l’étude de l’optime de 
Pareto, elle a donné lieu à des discussions conceptuelles par des économistes libéraux qui ont dit: ‘Ah! 
Voilà! C’est démontré!’, et d’autres économistes de tendance marxiste ont dit: ‘Ah! Voilà! Les 
hypothèses précises qu’il faut faire sont inacceptables pour avoir l’optime de Pareto’. Moi, j’adopte 
simplement l’attitude suivante: que les hypothèses qui portent à des conclusions on peut en faire ce 
qu’on veut: si cela satisfait les économistes libéraux et les marxisants, parfait! Je ne peux rien demander 
de mieux. Intellectuellement vous êtes emporté par le courant des idées et vous allez dans la direction 
où il vous porte (in Bini and Bruni 1998). 
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Marxian? Liberal? Both? Parfait!  
When it comes to the economic meaning of Debreu’s work, Debreu withdraws. He could 
no longer believe that economic claims mean more than what is presently the “current of 
ideas”, such as the liberal currents of the early modern period, the socialist current in high 
modern economics, and the neoliberal currents since the 1970s. While in his young years with 
Allais, he still warned of the risk of underestimating the need of interpretive labour, he himself 
became suspicious about the very possibility of a scientific economic claim. While his 
discreetness could still count as a way of showing respect to economic meaning, now it leads to 
the cynicism of letting economic meaning flow into the current of ideas – into the stream of 
ideology. Everything one can claim economically beyond mathematical form is beyond the 
control of science. The intellectual life of an economist is like a drop in the current of ideas, a 
“particle in a high-dimensional space”. What else is this, phenomenologically speaking, than the 
thorough degeneration of economic theorizing?  
We slowly get a full image of the affective becoming of Debreu, the mathematical (pause) 
economist. His career begins with the secret attraction of making an economic claim in 1944, 
continues with being deterred from an economic claim in 1949, avoiding it until 1974, 
forgetting it until 1983, and then, after being celebrated as an economist, becoming cynical 
about the very possibility of any economic claim.  
 
 
The Path-Breaking Degradation of Economists to Taylor Workers:  
‘Debreu Proved Smith with Bourbaki’ 
 
The oblivion of what could be problematic in economics is even more apparent when it 
comes to the remaining rhetorical strategy of importance: the political strategy regarding the 
future research enabled by Debreu. How did the commission appraise Debreu’s influence on 
economics? The effect of Debreu, as the committee had to notice in the early 1980s, did not 
concern GET. Although Debreu was praised for having solved the oldest problem of 
economic science, this, ironically, did not explain his importance because hardly any economist 
still cared about this old problem in 1983. Debreu’s influence was more of an “indirect” kind, 
the committee had to admit. Debreu’s actual importance has nothing to do with economic 
theory, but with the “choice of methods”. The “unsurpassed effect” of Debreu’s Bourbakism 
had to be acknowledged indirectly. An explicit reflection on Bourbaki had shown the non-
scientific character of this “method” – which is not a method at all but a lived experience on its 
own. If there was an influence of Debreu, it was the bright shadow he cast on the discipline – 
sheltering, threatening and difficult to identify.  
Recall Bourbaki’s ambivalent relationship with the future of mathematics. Bourbaki 
wanted to anticipate all possible mathematics by means of indifference to the contexts from 
which mathematics stems. Bourbaki is the “end” of mathematics since mathematicians merely 
refill structures – like “Taylor workers”. The same the committee celebrated with Debreu. 
 
Debreu’s foremost contribution is perhaps of a more indirect nature, however. His clarity, analytical 
stringency, and insistence on always making a clear cut distinction between a theory and its interpretation have 
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had a profound and unsurpassed effect on the choice of methods and analytical techniques in 
economics (Press Release, e.a.). 
 
What is meant by the clear-cut distinction between interpretation and theory, without naming, 
is nothing but Bourbakism: structure and meaning, theory and interpretation, form and content 
are separate. The unsurpassed and profound effect Debreu had on the methodology of 
economics is, in other words, that interpretations of the market cannot possibly affect the 
scientificity of economics. The condition of celebrating Debreu despite the fact that neo-
Walrasian economics has already lost appeal was to arrive at a level of scientificity beyond the 
intellectual interest of economists – just as scientification of economics meant to arrive at a 
level of reflection beyond economic suspicion! 
 It would be interesting to consider the committee’s philosophical naivety and historical 
ignorance in the context of the rise of the field of history and methodology of economics in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Just as it was necessary for celebrating the Debreu-Smith link not to 
reflect on it (resembling the historical indifference), it was necessary not to reflect on the 
Debreu-Bourbaki link (resembling the philosophical naivety). Indeed, in the same sense as it 
became the predominant attitude that there is not much to gain from reading Smith and going 
back in history, it became the predominant attitude that there is not much to gain from 
discussing Bourbaki and the sort of mathematics one “applies”. In the same sense as the 
historical indifference of economists allows for a separate interest in the history of economic 
thought, the philosophical naivety allows for a separate interest in the philosophy of economics. 
Only since Debreu are “method” and “history” separate concerns in economics. Their 
separation from the discipline shows that they neither contribute any longer to the ethos of 
economists as scientists (Düppe 2009). 
 Let me thus bring the threats of this chapter together. The irony was that although Debreu 
was the only one who strictly separated mathematical structure and economic meaning, and 
who thus separated the Smith link from the Bourbaki link, he could be celebrated only in 
combination of both. Reasoning only with “Smith” was not sufficient since GET was 
outmoded; reasoning only with “Bourbaki” was beyond economic theory. Moreover, only as 
long as neither is reflected upon, it was possible that Debreu could be celebrated with the prize 
for economic (pause) science, hiding the inner tension between a theoretical interest (Smith) 
and the claim to epistemic authority (Bourbaki). 
At the evening of the Nobel festivities, there remained two blind spots of the rationale of 
handing over the Prize: Smith and Bourbaki. Only because one did not ask what Smith and 
Bourbaki were actually up to, could one celebrate Debreu’s long-awaited and path-breaking 
contribution. Otherwise one would have seen that “applying Bourbaki to Smith” is a self-
defeating intellectual program, and that the reasoning of the committee was rather a symptom 
than the rationale of that program. Reflecting on the clear-cut distinction between theory and 
interpretation would have undermined all of the three mentioned strategies of establishing the 
economic significance of Debreu’s work. Debreu proved Smith with Bourbaki: to neutralize 
the past and undermine the future of economics are the two expensive conditions necessary to 
celebrate Debreu’s importance for economics. 
The most virulent moment of the evening was thus when both Smith and Bourbaki 
together but invisibly were used to celebrate Debreu’s achievement. According to my narrative 
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it says that the condition of the significance of market theory – the Smith line – is its insignificance for the 
economist – the Bourbaki line. Such virulence constituted the most value-laden moment of the 
evening at the 10th of December 1983: Debreu proved Smith with Bourbaki.  
 
Professor Debreu, (…) More than anyone else, you are symbol of a new approach to economic 
analysis, an approach that, while highly abstract, yields a better intuitive understanding of the basic 
economics. Your influence on methods, standards, and analytical techniques used by economists has 
been outstanding. On behalf of the Royal Academy of sciences I wish to convey to you our warmest 
congratulations and now I ask you to receive your prize from the hands of His Majesty the King (Mäler 
1983) 
 
Applause, tingling under the skin, shaking hands, 1.5 Million Kronor.  
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(5) Debreu’s Methodological Apologies 
after 1983: Defense or Excuse? 
 
 
 
 
At the evening of the Nobel festivities, after Mäler’s speech, Debreu also had to explain in his 
Nobel Lecture his contribution to economics – in reality Nobel lectures are held two days 
before at the 8th December at Stockholm University. He titled his speech Economic Theory in the 
Mathematical Mode. This was one of the first occasions when Debreu had to speak out about his 
work – in front of the entire world. What must have been striking for the audience is that 
Debreu’s account of his contribution to economics hardly overlapped with the account of the 
committee. The link between Debreu and Smith should have reflected Debreu’s own personal 
engagement if it was a credible account of his ‘vital importance’. After Debreu’s speech, 
however, one could have reasonable doubts whether he ever had read Smith. He mentioned 
the invisible hand only in passing, let alone the other economists in that line. Although at the 
end of his speech he calls a “profound insight” of Smith that “the many agents of an economy, 
making independent decisions, do not create utter chaos”, yet he does not elaborate the 
“central importance” of that insight at all (1983: 98).  
The body of his speech consists of mainly technical issues in mathematical economics, 
which are introduced with some historical remarks, and close with some notes on the virtues 
of mathematical economics. Roughly said, Debreu spelled out what remained implicit in the 
committee’s judgement concerning his influence on “method”, namely his link with Bourbaki. 
Yet he mentioned Bourbaki like Smith only in passing when pointing to his different 
intellectual socialization as compared to Arrow. The body of research he mentions include, 
freely summarized, the following.  
 
I have proven the existence of a general equilibrium in a competitive economy. Therefore 
I have proven that Wald was right to question Cassel’s sloppy reformulation of the even 
more sloppy formulation of Walras’ market as n equations with n-1 unknowns as the 
mathematical proof of existence. Therefore I have proven that the scientific accidents of 
Cournot in 1838, and Thünen in 1826 were path breaking in freeing economics from 
calculation altogether. Therefore I have proven that differential analysis as applied from 
Pareto to Hicks can be dismissed for the sake of convexity analysis as utilized with 
Minkowski’s hyperplane theorem, Lyapunov’s and Hahn-Banach’s theorem. Therefore I 
have proven that Kakatuni’s fixed point technique describes an equilibrium rigorously in 
topological terms just as Nash did for games with n-players. Therefore I have proven that 
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von Neumann’s notion of a game can be generalized as an equilibrium. Therefore I have 
proven that Koopmanns did well in changing the outlook of the Cowles Commission 
from empiricism to theory. Therefore I have proven that Bourbaki meets economists’ 
intellectual needs.  
 
His speech must have been surprising for the audience. Apart from the mentioned names and 
some of Debreu’s students, there have only been a few economists, not to speak of the layman, 
who are versed in the history of that research. What is most striking is that his position in this 
“tradition” is intelligible only on the basis of the last link to Bourbaki.  
The very fact that Debreu held a speech on his work, reflecting on his own tradition of 
mathematical economics, was already a novelty for him. After the many years when others next 
to Debreu mediated between him and the profession, he now had to give his own account of 
his “methodology”. Only after 1983, Debreu felt the need to set things right and spoke openly 
about the virtues of the axiomatic method. Only after 1983, he felt the need to defend the 
axiomatic method as a methodology of economics. Only then he became aware of the possible 
misuses, side effects, unintended consequences, and lacking “social benefits” of rigor that has 
“satisfie[d] [his] deep personal intellectual needs” for so many years (Debreu 1984b). The 
speeches he held after 1983 were an ex-post justification after he already ceased publishing, and 
after the profession already moved away from the theoretical paradigm of neo-Walrasian 
economics. Thus, after 1983, how was it possible to defend mathematical reasoning in 
economics? 
At three quite prominent places Debreu had the chance to defend mathematical 
economics as a method. The first was his mentioned Nobel Lecture, “Economic Theory in the 
Mathematical Mode”, second in his Frisch lecture at the Econometric Society in 1986, “Theoretic 
Models: Mathematical Form and Economic Content”, and third in his Presidential Address of 
the American Economic Association in 1990, “The Mathematization of Economic Theory”.  
In this chapter, before closing the affective history of Gerard Debreu, I discuss these 
methodological speeches. They do not add to the affective history of Debreu’s intellectual 
biography. My discussion puts the ambiguity that runs through his life in methodological 
terms: Applying Bourbaki to Smith. I show how Debreu methodologically toggled between 
Platonism and pragmatism of the axiomatic method, between Bourbakian and Hilbertian 
intellectual values, between mathematical form and economic content, and thus between 
addressing and undermining the economist in economics. I show, similar to Weintraub, “how 
the pure and impure were constantly intermingled in mathematical practice” which represents 
both “the attractions and dangers that fertilized the transplant [of Bourbaki to economics]” 
(2002: 104). In a wider perspective, this discussion will bring us back to the second threat of 
The Phenomenology of Economics next to intellectual responsivity: social responsibility. The 
social responsibility of economists, rather than any ontological or epistemological concerns, is 
where the actual problem of the axiomatic method in economics occurs.  
The two questions to which Debreu’s speeches reply, are first what is the axiomatic 
method, and second what is it worth for the economist? According to how I have pictured 
Gerard Debreu, the exposition of his methodology must show the following: When explicating 
the axiomatic method along the radical Bourbakian separation of meaning and structure, it 
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must be impossible to speak of a theoretical practice and thus of a positive role of the economist. 
The self-defeating character of mathematical economics, which has often been stated 
(regarding the axiomatic method e.g. Clower 1995, and regarding GET e.g. Kirman 1989), is a 
matter of the redundancy of theoretical practices: practices of abstracting, simplifying, 
explaining, or any other kind of reasoning given a particular theoretical interest. As soon as 
mathematical form and economic content are separate no theoretical act is possible.  
Second, as a consequence, when defending the axiomatic method in its advantages for the 
economist, Debreu must continuously back away from the radical separation of mathematical 
form and economic content. Advantages for the economist can only be established by 
smuggling other intellectual values than axiomatic rigor into economic theory. Conversely, only 
as long as there is no separation of theory and interpretation can economic theory be relevant 
for the economist. Debreu’s speeches have thus been “apologies” in two senses: they did not 
only defend it, but actually also excused the false promises mathematical economics may have 
evoked.  
 
 
The Four Steps of the Axiomatic Method, and its Fifth Wheel: Interpretation 
 
The creed of Debreu’s methodological conception is the separation of meaning and structure, 
or as he translates, the separation of mathematical form and economic content, or as he also 
says, the separation of interpretation and theory, which results in a separation of matters of 
science and matters of meaning. This credo in Debreu’s words: “Allegiance to rigor dictates the 
axiomatic form of the analysis where the theory, in the strict sense, is logically entirely 
disconnected from its interpretations” (1959: x). What then is Debreu’s “philosophy of 
economic analysis” (1991b: 7)?  
Debreu’s three speeches strongly resemble each other and closely resemble Bourbaki’s 
methodological speeches (1949, 1950). There is only one formulation Debreu repeatedly 
describes as a “scheme” of the axiomatic method (1984: 275, 1986: 1256-8, 1991: 4-5). This 
scheme follows step-by-step what Bourbaki said about the concept of a mathematical 
structure.  
 
It now can be made clear what is to be understood, in general, by a mathematical structure. The 
common character of the different concepts designated by this generic name, is that they can be applied 
to sets of elements whose nature has not been specified; to define a structure, one takes as given one or 
several relations, which these elements enter (…); then one postulates that the given relation, or 
relations, satisfy certain conditions (which are explicitly stated and which are the axioms of the structure under 
consideration). To set up the axiomatic theory of a given structure, amounts to the deduction of logical 
consequences of the axioms of the structure (Bourbaki 1950: 225-6, e.a.) 
 
The only objects of mathematics according to Bourbaki are structures, since only structures, 
not the meaning of the elements can be the playground of mathematical rigour. In Debreu 
these lines read as follows: 
 
An axiomatized theory first selects its primitive concepts and represents each one of them by a 
mathematical object. […] Next assumptions on the objects representing the primitive concepts are 
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specified, and consequences are mathematically derived from them. The economic interpretation of the 
theorems obtained is the last step of the analysis. According to this schema an axiomatized theory has a 
mathematical form that is completely separated from its economic content (1986: 1265). 
 
In order to axiomatize a theory, one has to follow a scheme consisting of five steps: selecting, 
representing, specifying, deriving, and interpreting. Let me discuss each of them.  
 
(1) Selecting. The subject of the sentence, “an axiomatized theory selects its primitive concepts”, 
is apparently ill-expressed, yet as I suggest, is symptomatic for Debreu’s methodology. An 
axiomatized theory does not “do” anything. Debreu does. He axiomatizes GET. He first 
selects. And this selection, like the beginning of all intellectual activity, is crucial for the 
assessment of the entire work. Or at least so one says in the philosophy of science. An 
axiomatic analysis is an analysis of a theory that is already in place. There must be something 
prior to the axiomatization through which its “universe of discourse” gains shape. This would 
include among other things the purpose under which a theory is developed, the intellectual 
space in which one operates, and the limits of the entire enterprise – thus, some reference to a 
theoretical interest. This prior theoretical interest, I emphasised above, was crucial for Hilbert to 
speak of a proper moment, a particular stage of theorizing when the axiomatic method is suitable. 
When talking about consistency of theoretical practices one usually considers a theory in 
light of such theoretical interest. Intellectual acts are consistent in that they refer back to their 
interest. One either applies an internal criticism by taking the theoretical interest as given and 
asks if the theory carries out what it purports; or one examines further that interest and 
questions the legitimacy, origin, or the presuppositions implicit in the basic concepts and 
framework (which defines the intellectual wit of the philosopher of science). Could I criticize 
Debreu’s axiomatization of GET on such grounds? Was Debreu committed to a particular 
theoretical interest when “selecting primitive concepts”?  
At this point, I want to come back once more to Debreu’s alleged “Walrasianism”. The 
received understanding of Debreu, not only of the Nobel committee, is that Debreu shares a 
theoretical interest with Walras and transformed it into what came to be called neo-Walrasian 
economics. In this case, Walras formulated the theory (“the economy” as a system of n-
equations), missed the rigorous proof (n-equations with n-1 unknowns, thus solvable), which 
Debreu delivered 80 years later (using a rigorous topological theorem). Such reading seems to 
be suggested in the first sentence of the 1954 paper:  
 
L. Walras first formulated the state of the economic system at any point of time as the solution of a 
system of simultaneous equations representing the demand for goods by consumers, the supply of 
goods by producers, and the equilibrium condition that supply equal demand on every market (265). 
 
Walras was in fact not the first who did so. For the sake of historical accuracy, one should 
mention the 18th century mathematical economist Isnard who did a very similar thing (see Berg 
2006). But important here is whether Debreu, when referring to Walras, was committed to a 
real choice. Did he share a theoretical interest with Walras?  
There are apparent reasons to doubt that he did not. How could he believe that he finds in 
Walras the “mother-structure for the elaboration of mathematical economic theory” 
(Weintraub 2002: 125)? Historically speaking, such a belief would be at least surprising because 
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“to believe that the structure of all analytical economics lay half-obscured in the relatively 
dormant Walrasian/Paretian variant in 1950 was a bold leap of faith” (Weintraub 2002: 122). 
Clower agrees, for “no later than 1939, any but inspirational connection with Walras is absent” 
(1995: 307). Walras’s Elements (1874) were almost forgotten in the early 1950s and the 
economist of those days rather would have associated Marshall as the market theory. “It is 
doubtful that there were more than a half-dozen economists in the world that have ever read 
Walras, much less understood him” in the 1950s (Blaug 2003: 150). Not only historically, but 
also mathematically Debreu, at least we have learned by now, was not committed to Walras. 
Debreu refers to the Walras-Cassel representation and particularly the differential analysis from 
Pareto to Hicks only in that he rejects its mathematics.  
What then was the theoretical interest of Walras’s Elements of Pure Economics (1874)? One 
common way to delineate Walras from Debreu is to point to Walras’s supplementary use of 
pure economics as a framework for applied economics. In the neo-Walrasian community, 
however, GET is treated as an actual theory, which amounts to a “category mistake”, 
according to Blaug (1980: 162 ff). This answer leaves open the question how pure economics 
for Walras could give form to its applications. Regarding this relation let me suggest a Platonist 
image of Walras – if only for the sake of the concept. It departs less from his official 
Newtonian depiction of his work, but from his enduring motivation to carry out this project.  
Walras’s mission was a scientific social science. During his lifetime, he could hardly 
convince his French colleagues of that mission – neither in economics, nor in mathematics. He 
tried to find support for his project from French economists as well from foreign economists 
such as Jevons, and from mathematicians like Poincare and Volterra (see Ingrao and Israel 
1990: 154 ff). Both economists and mathematicians, however, warned Walras and reminded 
him that the actual theoretical labour requires the consideration of real human beings – the 
measurability of utility functioned prominently. But Walras never gave up his mission. After a 
speech in 1873 at the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, where he earned devastating 
critiques, he wrote in a letter to Joseph Garnier.  
 
These gentlemen imagine that the sole object of the application of mathematics to political economy is 
the substitution in certain given cases of calculus for the market’s mechanism of competition (…). A 
mathematical theory of exchange (mine at any rate) is something altogether different. It is purely and 
simply the search for a mathematical expression of this mechanism (…) Do you perhaps believe that I consider 
the intensity of utility as being measurable? Not in the least. I am perfectly aware that it is not. However, 
this circumstance (…) is not opposed to its algebraic or geometric expression” (in Ingrao and Israel 1990: 
147, e.a.).  
 
Being accused of descriptive inaccurateness, Walras did neither react, as it is common today, by 
adopting a watered down notion of “utility”, nor by stating that market forces are imposed to 
human will, nor did he swerve pragmatically. But he replied that his model is in the immediate 
sense an expression of the market. Walras believed, as it were, in the metaphysics of “the 
economy”. Pure and applied did not relate like abstract and concrete, general and particular, 
simple and complex etc. Walras associated his system of equations with “the economy” on the 
base of a metaphysical belief in the dignity of the world in that it is capable and worthy a 
mathematical truth. Reality can be expressed, rather than represented, in the beauty, consistency, 
and simplicity of mathematics. Walras associated mathematics with “the economy” because in 
 
____________________________________
    Debreu's Methodological Apologies (5) 
_______________________
                                                      315 
________________________
330
both ‘everything depends on everything’. Rather than an impression of complexity, as it usually 
evokes, Walras had the idea of a μετεξισ – the ‘participation’ of the world in the closure of 
mathematics. The reality of “the economy” participates and is embedded in its idea.  
At the heart of Walras’s mathematical economics was not the belief that the analogy of 
Newtonian mechanics and market forces really holds in reality, as he officially frames his 
theory. His model was instead an immediate expression of the idea of “the economy”. His 
mathematics expressed “the economy” in that it is worth its reality! Walras was moved by a 
Platonist meaning of structure of mathematics, which supposedly is, metaphysically speaking, 
the same as the meaning of the structure of “the economy”. Not the representational, but the 
expressive value of Walras’s model made him believe in his mission.  
Debreu, instead, had no interest in expressive efforts. If structure and meaning are 
separate, how could the world possibly show a rigorous order? Instead, Debreu thought 
mathematical economics is the condition of the possibility of expression. Also Weintraub, without 
making the difference of representation and expression, argued that Debreu’s take on GET 
meant to abstract from the theoretical interest of Walras: “The objective was no longer to 
represent the economy whatever that might mean, but rather to codify the very essence of that 
elusive entity, the Walrasian system” (Weintraub 2002: 121). Considering Walras’s theory itself 
as the object of economic reflection beyond its theoretical interest, Debreu did something 
similar with Walras than Mill, Marshal, and Samuelson with their predecessors. Debreu did not 
connect to but cut the tie with Walras. Debreu and Walras did not share a theoretical interest, 
but Debreu used Walras as a jumping board for an enterprise that was motivated differently. 
Walras, in the first sentence of the 1954 paper, was nothing but window dressing, a placeholder 
for economic theory.  
The neo-Walrasian use of Walras is apparent in the use of the name “Walras” in the 
following quote by Dierker: 
 
In the last section [The Economic Framework] we saw that Walrasian economics leads to a study of 
singularities of a tangent field ζ on S, an open piece of a sphere. To get a feeling of what statements one 
might hope for, it is useful to forget the economic origin of the problem for a while (1974: 15). 
 
Not only would no reader of Walras recognize the tangent field ζ on S as Walras’s economics, 
but also would hope in vain that this “while” ends at one point of Dierker’s text. 
Walras aside, what Debreu actually did select was not a present or past market theory, but 
he selected “primitive concepts”. The first and only primitive concept is “commodity”. To 
choose “commodity” as a primitive concept is to choose it as a category of all possible market 
theories. As Kant said that truth is a matter of statements (is it?), Debreu said, markets are a 
matter of commodities (are they?). Commodities are indeed the objects of markets, that is, what 
the market brings about. Markets constitute commodities. They are the things of economic 
theory because they are the things of value. Did Debreu make a real choice when selecting 
“commodity” as a primitive concept? What did he rule out? 
The meaning of the word “commodity” is not only vague, but also essentially contested. It 
ranges from what assuages our hunger to what bears ‘metaphysical subtleties and theological 
niceties’. It is just this question of how commodities “have” value that an economic theory of 
value, and furthermore of price-determination has to pose. But Debreu’s Theory of Value does 
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not even touch that question. Debreu did not select a particular meaning of “commodity”. 
Primitive concepts remain undefined, and undetermined. With the word “commodity” Debreu 
only points to a possible theoretical interest but does not address it. He merely makes his 
axiomatization appear to be of interest for economists. The possible meanings of 
“commodity” are not the irreducible rest of meaning that ultimately has to determine Debreu’s 
contribution to economics. It is not a notion in economic theory next to others, but the notion 
of economic theory. Debreu selected virtual, not symbolic meaning, to remind Deleuze’s 
distinction mentioned above. When Debreu introduces the concept in chapter two of the 
Theory of Value also heuristically as one that is completely determined in physical terms regarding 
place, time, quantity, and quality (close to Aristotle’s categories), then he does not select a 
particular meaning, but simply makes the concept appear to be capable of concreteness. 
Primitive concepts do not represent content, but are “abstract schemata of possible contents” (Ingrao 
and Israel 1990: 182). And so Debreu concludes the chapter that introduces the primitive 
concept of commodity, including “price”, “action”, and “value of action”, as defined by 
commodities. (1959: 35):  
 
 
 
… possible interpretations, not actual! The word commodity is for the economists like the 
carrot on the stick in front of the donkey’s eyes that it never will reach.  
What then could have been the crucial choice Debreu made? Since I suggested that with 
Debreu something of economics as such shows, Debreu must have shared this choice with all 
economists before him, including Thomas Mun. In order to locate his choice, I thus need to 
refer back to the structuralist turn from the oikonomia to “the economy”, the former referring 
to a particular conception of economic life, the latter referring to a social structure. If there was 
any real problematic choice, hidden behind Walras and the seemingly unproblematic concept 
of commodity, then that economic theory has a structure – as opposed to a literary, instructive, 
or preaching character. If this was the choice then what does Debreu, Smith, and Mun have in 
common? Could I say that Debreu does not need to be interested in the meaning of 
commodities in the same sense as the Smithean baker man does not need to be interested in 
moral codes but merely in his own interest? Is meaning and structure of economic theory 
separated in the same sense that the constitution of commodities in markets is separated from 
the constitution of the value of goods? Such analogy is not mere hair splitting if we remember 
that the theoretical interest of the first structuralist move in invisible hand theorizing was to 
deal with the economic suspicion of the motives of economists themselves. Then the formalism of 
market theories (the use of formal language), and the formalism in market theories (no 
substantive requirements regarding agents) have the same roots.  
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Debreu certainly did not choose structuralism in this sense. The analogy of the separation 
of meaning and structure in and of economic theory – with which I come back to the horizon 
from which The Phenomenology of Economics is written – is not Debreu’s interest. For 
Debreu “structure” was a feature of market theories, not of the market. He does not discuss in 
what sense “the economy” could be perceived as a “structure” in the first place. Hence 
Debreu’s formalism substantiated the belief that the problem of economic theory is a matter of 
dealing with a structure. And this is true today as it was 50 years ago when the question of an 
economic theory of value disappeared in the structuralist verve of The Theory of Value.  
 
(2) Representing. Whatever Debreu has selected as a primitive concept, the choice is diluted 
when this concept is represented as a mathematical object. After the primitive concept is 
selected it is not discussed in light of the interpretations that have been discarded, but they are 
represented as something else: a mathematical object – x. With the first move of writing an x at 
the blackboard and saying “consider a set of commodities Xx∈ ” – the words with which 
every Mas-Colell class begins – the discussion of any hermeneutical prior can no longer be 
discussed. Hence, I should read the first two steps within one breathe: selecting-and-representing. 
Primitive concepts are not objects of selection, but first of all subjected to a representation, a 
replacement, displacement, and taken “out of context”. Their meaning, let alone their 
reference, does not find inroads into the formal analysis.  
The notion of representation nevertheless suggests a common feature or similarity 
between the represented and what represents. Is there anything by virtue of which a 
mathematical object can represent a primitive concept? No, the very question of the conditions 
of representing cannot be posed in Debreu’s scheme. Instead of representation, Debreu also 
speaks more accurately of the substitution of primitive concepts by mathematical objects. Then 
the substituted concepts are not the represented, but function as the identifier of the 
mathematical objects – their nicknames. Did the same happen when Hilbert said one could 
substitute in geometry notions like “line” and “point” with “tables”, “chairs”, or “beer bugs”? 
Does the same happen when in GET one poses a “numeraire”?  
Clearly, the act of representation in Debreu is an act of positing. It is by no means an act of 
abstraction, idealization, comparison, simplification, inference, deduction or induction, and 
neither abduction into another context, as Khan interprets the first two steps of as a choice of 
metaphor (1993). The difference of Bourbakian mathematical objects and metaphors is crucial 
for the understanding of the role of formalism in economics. Metaphors need to be interpreted. 
Mathematical objects could be interpreted.  
The primitive concept “commodity” is thus represented as a mathematical object, an 
“element” in the “commodity space” Xx∈ . The rest of the primitive concepts are not 
selected, so that their meaning is not even substituted. In order to settle the structure of GET, 
one needs at least two different relations defined on the commodity space: “preferences” and 
“prices”. Only then one can speak of a question of consistency. Defined by the commodity 
space, the two relations do not even resemble the question of a theory of economic value how 
prizes “represent” value. Instead, they are structural requirements in order to formulate the 
mathematical problem of consistency. 
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[T]he action of an agent is represented by a point in the commodity space, a finite-dimensional real 
vector space. Similarly the prices in the economy are represented by a point in the price space, the real 
vector space dual of the commodity space (Debreu 1986: 1265). 
 
Thus, Debreu’s “universe of discourse” of GET (commodity, consumer and prices) is 
‘explicitly listed at the outset’. There are, of course, other concepts defined by those primitive 
concepts. “Producers” are recognizable by their minus signs in front of their commodity sets – 
rather than by, say, “social class”. “The economy”, to quote also these lines, is defined as 
follows (1959: 75): 
 
 
 
Where then could a discussion on “consumer choice” take place? Whether the binary relations 
with the nickname “preferences” or “action” are, for example, reflections or determinants of 
the choices we make (do we?) cannot even be addressed. The young Amartya Sen made this 
distinction as a condition of rational choice being more than an “elaborate pun” (Sen 1973: 
243). Yet Debreu did contribute to this research of modeling the individual, in particular to the 
so-called “integrability problem” that haunted the theories of values during the decades before 
the war, but for very different reasons as after the war (see thoroughly Hands 2006). Debreu, 
as many before and after him, investigated the conditions under which preference relations can 
be represented as “utility functions” in terms of differential analysis (1972, 1976). Why? 
Because preferences “in reality” are usually not expressed in terms of Cartesian products of 
commodity spaces? No, he did not engage in the issue of integrability for reasons of empirical 
utilization. He rather answers the question: What is missing in economic theory if one treats it 
as mathematics? When he showed that the assumptions of differential analysis are redundant, 
he moved away from economics having its methodological Urmotif in the numerical character 
of (observable) economic phenomena.  
Again, I can put these remarks in a broader horizon of the theoretical perception of “the 
economy”, specifically in that it is supposed to represent economic life. Was the question of 
price determination not initially how prices represent or express our acts of valuations? Only 
then all fuss made about the GDP, economic performance, growth and wealth means 
something. If the consistency of the theoretical perception of “the economy” can be 
formulated independently of this question, what then does Debreu show of the very idea of 
prices representing values, and of “the economy” representing economic life? Did Debreu 
indirectly show something of the market if its theory is independent of its meaning? Do the 
formalism of market theory and the formalism in market theory have the same root? Did 
Bourbaki liberate the mathematician from the burden of meaning, and Debreu the economist 
from the burden of interpreting in the same sense as the economic agent in markets is liberated 
from the social articulation of value?  
 
(3) Specifying. The next step is to specify “assumptions”. Those who remember their micro course 
know that the commodity space representing “commodities” must be (i) finite, (ii) convex, and 
(iii) has a lower bound. The binary relations representing “preferences” must be (j) continuous, 
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“Structure” in John Cage 
The first two steps of the axiomatic method can be illustrated with one of the composing methods of
John Cage. He put a piece of transparent paper onto a piece of notation paper and used the wrinkles
of the paper as the pattern for his composition. Cage’s attempt was to ease the burden of choice in
order to grant full space for the creative listening of his audience, their “interpretations”.  
Another example in art, closer to Bourbaki, is the poetry group “Oulipo”, which wrote
Bourbakian poems: “each line of a poem could be replaced by its homologue from any of the nine
others, while preserving the rhythms, rhyme, and grammatical structure of the newly obtained poem”
(Aubin 1997: 321). The following sonnet can be reordered randomly such that one can generate a set
of 1014 perfectly legitimate sonnets! 
 
Le roi de la pampa retourne sa chemise 
La mettre à sécher aux cornes des taureaux 
Le cornédbîf en boîte empeste et la remise 
Et fermentent de méme et les cuirs et les peaux 
(The king of the pampas turns his shirt 
To let it dry on the horns of the bulls 
The canned corned beef makes the shed stink 
And so are fermenting leathers and skins) 
 
The same sense of play evident in these poems, as well as in John Cage, stamps the axiomatic method
in economics to the same extent that it stamps the technocratic empiricism of today’s economists.  
Without going deeper into these parallels in art and mathematics, let me clarify the relationship
between the structuralist reduction and the phenomenological reduction. Bourbaki’s method and the
phenomenological method overlap in that they both “reduce being”. Neither aims at a judgment. As
the phenomenologist brackets all ontological references that are given in “natural attitude”, so does
the mathematician. But Bourbaki reduces being to structure beyond the meaning of being. They
liberate being from its meaning. In the phenomenological reduction, instead, one reduces being to
meaning beyond the structure of being (remember: sense is prior to being!). The big difference,
philosophically speaking, is that the phenomenological reduction allows for the question of
constitution: What is the meaning “of” structure, what is the content “of” form, and what is meaning
“before” it came to be attached to being? For this reason Bourbaki is, as opposed to
phenomenology, transcendentally naive. While phenomenology traces meaning insofar as it allows us
to be a subject, Bourbaki reduces being in order to come closer to a structure as the “meaning for
nobody”. Instead of transcendental inquiry, that is always an inquiry into one’s own possibilities,
Bourbaki is the liberation from a subject or a self for the sake of a secret experience of the beauty of
mathematical structures. Both methods are thus intimidating. While this intimidation was fatal for
Bourbaki, it was the genuine accomplishment of phenomenology. 
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(jj) strictly monotonously increasing, and (jjj) strictly quasi concave and (k) the technology 
space strictly convex. In a textbook of 1958, (j) to (k) are mentioned for the first time as 
follows: no increasing returns to scale (producing more does not reduce average costs), at least 
one factor for production (things are not like “air”), and consumer wants cannot be saturated 
(we are all excessive if we can) (see Weintraub 2002: 188).  
After the first two steps, these two specifications of assumptions must be two different 
things. The confusion is that between “assumption” and “axiom”. Assumptions are not 
specified on primitive concepts, let alone their referential meaning, but on the mathematical 
objects that substitute these primitive concepts. To speak about “assumptions” is misleading in 
the sense that Debreu does not assume something of the object under consideration like in the 
case of a hypothesis, a supposition, a basic belief or a mere hunch, as it is discussed in the 
philosophy of science. The “assumptions” are, to the contrary, the result of Debreu’s efforts. 
The assumptions are actually the axioms: “then one postulates that the given relation, or 
relations, satisfy certain conditions (which are explicitly stated and which are the axioms of the 
structure under consideration)” (Bourbaki 1950: 226, e.a.). An axiomatization results in axioms 
saying what are the minimal requirements of mathematical objects that allow speaking of a 
consistent structure. The neo-Walrasian research programme, as it were, was then to show the 
weakest conditions of an equilibrium – “weak” in terms of the Bourbakian hierarchy of 
mathematical structures, the weakest of all assumptions being Xx∈ .  
 The neo-Walrasian discussion about “assumptions” did therefore not take place in terms 
of the (primitive) concepts as in the textbook, but in mathematical terms. One great result at 
which Mas-Colell arrived was for example “An Equilibrium Existence Theorem without 
Complete or Transitive Preferences” (1974). Or, as an early work of Princeton Schmeidler 
asked whether “Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders and 
Incomplete Preferences” (1969) is possible. Axioms are not like “hypothesis” or prior beliefs 
that are at stake when theorizing. Recall again Debreu’s student: “He [Debreu] refused to 
comment on the reasonableness of assumptions, believing that his job was to make the 
assumptions clear, and it was the reader’s job to assess them” (Anderson 2005). Debreu did 
not theorize in the face of the world, but in the face of a structure.  
Sheer irony is how in the neo-Walrasian community Debreu’s discreetness toward 
economic content could reproduce, as here in Dierker: “Economic knowledge is not required, 
but especially a reader without economic background will gain much by reading Debreu’s 
classic ‘Theory of Value’” (Dierker 1974: iii). 
 Nevertheless, some of Debreu’s axioms could have an economic interpretation. One 
mathematical economist was brave enough to announce: “the behaviour of market economies 
depends on how convex the world is” (in Ramrattan, Szenberg 2005). While most other 
economists may have difficulties to imagine what a ‘convex world’ would look like, axioms like 
that of transitivity are indeed commonly understood as demanding something of the actual 
holding of preferences (do we?). Here the interpretive labour of the economics instructors 
begins. They literally invent narratives for mathematical objects. By virtue of their stories, the 
impression of concrete reference of mathematical objects is produced. In a similar fashion, 
textbooks undermine a historical reflection by means of interpreting mathematical structures in 
digestible terms. If textbooks put emphasis on intelligibility and keep the mathematics low, 
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they, ironically, even reinforce the mathematical bulwark against a critical historical reflection. 
This, I am afraid, is also the case in the recent textbook of McCloskey, Klamer, and Ziliak 
(2008). There can be no such thing as axiomatic intuitions of economic theory that students 
could acquire without mathematics (“opportunity costs” being one of them). Such intuitions 
hide the formalism they want to avoid. The only alternative for the teaching of economics is 
teaching on the base of the history of economics. Only then students will spontaneously think 
beyond the disciplinary borders of economics.  
The same irony applies of course to those economists who took their undergraduate 
narratives literally as descriptive truths and went into behavioural economics. I am afraid that 
such research is based on the confusion of assumptions and axioms and actually reinforces the 
underlying structure that is independent of any interpretation. It happened mostly by virtue of 
these “secondary” interpretations of axioms that the neo-Walrasian community could have the 
success as a benchmark of post-war economics. Axioms of choice, like that of independence, 
completeness, did not express the basic beliefs of the neo-Walrasian research program. There 
were none.  
Again, I can speculate further on the more indirect effect of the confusion of axioms and 
assumptions on the discursive environment of economics. If the mathematical void of axioms 
is confused as the philosophical weakness of assumptions this confusion can take on in the 
political arena very different connotations – namely that of (cling on) freedom. If assumptions 
and axioms are confused in GET it does not demand a particular behaviour from economic 
agents. The mathematicians’ search for “weak assumptions” confused with the scientific virtue 
of explaining much by little translates in the political discourse to the ideology of negative 
freedom. As Debreu only spoke about structures, others do not have to demand that 
economic agents need to have a preference for particular goods. The x of Debreu and the 
whatever you want of the liberals – is it the same? Do weaker assumptions make for a freer 
society? The question comes slowly to the tip of our tongue: is Bourbakism the last hallmark of 
“bourgeois economics”?  
It is possible to go further with this association of Debreu’s rigor with neoliberal politics. 
In order to provide an alternative interpretation of Debreu, the Marxian commentators of 
economics Ruccio and Amariglio pointed to the post-modern aspect of Debreu’s axiomatic 
method. They suggest that the absence of a “body” of economic agents allows capturing the 
fragmented subject of our days, which is torn between Sushi and other pop drugs, like the “man 
without qualities”. Debreu allowed for new “re-evaluations of the experiences and distributions 
of pleasure and pain, work and desire, base and refined instincts, emotions and reasons, 
passions and interests, sex, race, and class” (2003: 101).  
 
There is a refreshing quality to recent neoclassical thinking in that it mostly displaces the question of the 
body as origin. It proliferates, instead, a differentiated, fragmented body according to various functions, 
which do not necessarily impinge on one another. To say this differently, we are interested and regard 
with some cautious degree of approval the appearance of a body in high-neoclassical theory (as, for 
example in Debreu’s Theory of Value or in Arrow and Hahn’s General Competitive Analysis) in which bodily 
functions of consumption, production, distribution, choice and so forth only obliquely relate to a 
central, unifying dimension (2003: 110). 
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Thus, no “bodily unity and depth” is required, but “bodily disunity and ‘flatness’.” Debreu, so 
Ruccio and Amariglio suggest, allows for an “infinitely fragmented, ‘no-self’ conception of the 
body” (119). Clearly, Debreu would immediately turn red of shame when reading such lines. 
He never even changed his tie! How could he have endorsed such a liberated subject? It was 
discreetness, not a sense for a plural society that made him withdraw from a “unified body” of 
classical economics. Debreu does not touch any body, neither at its surface, nor at its origin.  
Ruccio and Amariglio thus turn the argument of the insignificance of Debreu’s work on its 
head: precisely because there is no reference to bodily agents, Debreu and neoclassical 
economics in general allow for a cluttered, fragmented world that is free for a post-modern play 
of meaning. Is Bourbaki’s refreshing liberation from meaning – Xx∈  – the virtue of the post-
modern society that is only “obliquely” unified by the market? Whatever one may reply, Ruccio 
and Amariglio resemble, rather than replace, the neoliberal fascination of avoiding talk about 
people. Then, post-modernism works as the new hermeneutics of capitalism. Politically 
speaking, moreover, a post-modern pluralism based on discreet ignorance is not very different 
from a totalitarian world in which bodies are discreetly covered by burkas.  
 
(4) Deriving. The fourth step – “deriving consequences” – concerns the kind of consistency the 
axiomatic method requires. Here we enter the playground of rigor, and nothing but rigor: to 
proceed from “fully specified” assumptions to conclusions, step by step, in full cogency. While 
the first three steps did not correlate with an intellectual effort, here all the labour and affective 
weight of mathematical reasoning comes into play. The philosophical question at this step is 
how formal logic and mathematical logic relate. Does mathematical logic adds something to 
formal logic, or the other way around, is the language of logic proper. This question once 
moved the generation of Frege, Whitehead and Russell. Debreu and Bourbaki are reluctant to 
enter such debates.  
 
Whether mathematical thought is logical in its essence is partly psychological and partly metaphysical 
question which I am quite incompetent to discuss. (…) It serves little purpose to argue that logic exists 
outside mathematics (…) Logical or (what I believe to be the same) mathematical reasoning (…) 
(Bourbaki 1949: 2).  
 
Also for Debreu the intellectual value of rigor is simply identified with valid reasoning. “The 
theory of value is treated here with the standards of rigor of the formalist school of 
mathematics. The effort towards rigor substitutes correct reasoning and results for incorrect 
ones” (1959: 1).  
Note that “deriving consequences” does not describe the actual practice of axiomatic 
theorizing, but rather its result. Only when the mathematical proof is presented in its final shape 
one “derives consequences”. But actually writing of a proof is rather a process of trial and error 
that requires an experienced mathematician. Writing a proof is like groping one’s way in the 
dark, playing with ever-weaker “assumptions”, and trying to grasp through a forest of 
tautologies. While the reading of a proof might have a great aesthetic appeal, the writing is 
rather dirty, lengthy and uncertain. Here I may report an anecdote of one of his students in 
Chicago, Mark Blaug. During a summer course in 1955 at Michigan University, a doubt arouse 
whether a line in the proof is correct. Instead of thinking through in class, Debreu left the 
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room. After some time he returned with the words ‘of course, it is correct’. The actual 
mathematical labour, as it were, does not take place in class or in any other show room.  
Obviously, the term “consequences” does not mean “effect” or the like. There is no 
deriving from something out of something different. Deriving consequences is to deal with 
logical implications and reformulations with the aim to prove the consistency of the axioms. 
Debreu’s existence proof did precisely that: it showed that the mathematical relations 
(“assumptions”) specified as the axioms do not contradict each other. Debreu’s proof was an 
indirect as opposed to constructive proof, showing that a disequilibrium leads to a violation of 
the axioms.  
That reasoning in economic theory and rigorous rigour are two different things is clear 
when I consider the concept of GET in which reason culminates: equilibrium. Along this 
concept, invisible hand theorizing has been contested, in particular regarding what describes a 
state of equilibrium. Backhouse (2004) discusses four different meanings; Giocoli (2003) shows 
their genesis. For Debreu equilibrium simply means consistent structure of axioms. It is not an 
economic concept. “In proving existence one is not trying to make a statement about the real 
world, one is trying to evaluate the model” (in Feiwel 1987: 243). How could it be different 
after the first three steps?  
Recall that Debreu believed that speaking about disequilibria is a contradiction since in 
such state there could be no conceivable price system whatsoever (in Weintraub 2002: 146). 
Consistency and equilibrium are equated. This brings me to the crucial point where the 
equation of mathematics and science happened, which represents the bottom of Debreu’s 
“applied Bourbakism”, as well as the confusion of existence and consistency. As long as one of 
the core devises of economic modelling is to first show the equilibrium conditions, this 
equation takes place. “The necessity of proving the existence of equilibrium is now 
recognized”, Debreu said in the mid 1980s, “and authors who propose an equilibrium concept 
either in economic theory or in game theory feel compelled to specify assumptions 
guaranteeing existence” (in Feiwel 1987: 244). A model is only worth as much as it shows to 
have a logically consistent solution – that is, as long as it is an equilibrium model. And this 
applies to models of growth, innovation, or uncertainty to the same extent. And so Debreu 
said about those who engaged in the  
 
theory of temporary equilibrium, a so-called theory of disequilibrium (a misnomer since it is a theory of 
equilibrium under new constraints). They show, if it were needed, that the concept of equilibrium is an 
organizing intellectual concept of great generality with which it is difficult to dispense in the social 
sciences (in Feiwel 1987: 253).  
 
(5) Interpreting. Debreu mentions interpreting as the fifth and last step of the axiomatization, 
although the separation of interpretations is the result of the axiomatization. Thus, is 
interpreting a required part of the axiomatization? Or is it rather like the fifth wheel that one does 
not need, crams into a corner and forgets? Regarding the interpretations themselves, what 
difference does it make if they are subjected to such separation?  
 Separation is the great gesture of analysis. The Greek word αναλυσισ means to “dissolve”, 
“liberate”, “dissect”, “get rid of”, “abolish”, and “finish”. Analytic thought is in this sense that 
thought which silences. Recall the words with which Henry Cartan and Andre Weil launched 
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Bourbaki: “Now that’s enough: Let’s meet with some other people to discuss these questions. 
Let’s finalize the answers, and then we will not have to speak of them again” (Cartan 1999a: 
634). Analytic thought seeks to come to rest in the differences it draws. Separating science 
from history, episteme from doxa, justification from discovery, reality “of” and of science, etc. 
makes intellectual life redundant. It rips intellectual life out of the ground from which it gains 
its force: forgetting and thus calming down. Analytical thought is the (final) judgement that 
ossifies past: juridical thought, and thus indeed, as the Greek used the term in a transferred 
sense, the thought of death. The task of analytic thought is to make itself redundant.  
Debreu may not have known about this meaning of the word analysis, but he indeed 
illustrates the separation of mathematical form and economic content with a strong image of a 
theory having blood, flesh and bones. He talks about an “acid test” that economic theories 
have to pass in order to be called rigorous – an “acid test of removing all their economic 
interpretations and letting their mathematical infrastructure stand on its own” (Debreu 1991: 
3). Acid is put on the body of theory, corroding all the flesh and leaving the skeleton behind. 
Our flesh is what makes us sensible beings, responsive to touch, and thus vulnerable to 
offence. Accordingly, an axiomatized theory might have a strong backbone, yet has nothing to 
carry, is insensitive to its surrounding, and immune to criticism. And so, Debreu says: “As a 
formal model of an economy acquires a mathematical life of its own, it becomes the object of an 
inexorable process in which rigor, generality, and simplicity are relentlessly pursued” (1265, 
e.a.). There may be a life of an axiomatized theory, but it is a life without affection, not our life 
– like a skeleton haunting economic science since 1959. 
 Debreu’s corrosion of interpretation is in fact radical. By using “content” and 
“interpretation” of theories interchangeably he acknowledges that interpretations are not 
interpretations of things that are independently given without, or before being interpreted, as 
most scientists believe since Bacon. Economic content is nothing but interpretation. This 
sounds like a hermeneutical claim. Debreu, however, equates content and interpretation not in 
order to highlight how the theorist is enmeshed in the material he attempts to grasp, but rather 
to let interpretations appear as things. In light of an axiomatization, interpretations do not 
correlate with an activity. They are no intentional acts, but they are themselves things to be 
discovered: “(…) whenever a novel interpretation of primitive concepts is discovered (…)” (Debreu 
1986: 1265, e.a.) The act of interpreting simply disappears from the stage of rigor. Interpretations 
do not describe an activity of someone, but lie around in the world waiting to be discovered. 
The task of economists is then to pick them up and to fill them into the mother structures in 
order to give them a consistent shape, much like a Taylor-designed worker, as Bourbaki 
refused to admit.  
Within the textual hierarchy of the axiomatic method one never arrives at interpretations, 
but as Bourbaki said, at “remarks”: “definitions, axioms, theorems, propositions, lemmas, 
corollaries, remarks” (Bourbaki 1968: v). More cannot be said. Explications are excluded from 
intellectual practices. A “rigorous interpretation” or “rigorous reformulation”, as the Nobel 
committee said, is inconceivable. Interpretations are not more or less suited, more or less 
accurate, but only vague. There cannot be any consistency regarding interpretations. In order to 
be rigorous, one needs to be indifferent to all expressive, descriptive, normative, and 
explicative practices. To be rigorous is to rigorously avoid the question ‘what does this mean’? 
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All sources of meaning of practicing economics, therefore, cannot be confronted in 
mathematical economics. This indifference to everything one usually associates with theoretical 
activity is the core of the interpretive indifference of economic theories that I have encountered 
various times: Interpretations are not made. They are there.  
What, then, remains for philosophers of science in terms of theory appraisal? How did 
Debreu ‘evaluate’ the model? Note that since there is no act of abstraction, and no actual act of 
representation all interpretations have the right of being economic theories. Debreu doubtlessly 
thinks implicitly of the interpretations of economists. However, there is nothing that excludes 
the interpretations of others. Since the act of interpretation renders redundant, all possible 
interpretations waiting for being discovered fit into the form of GET, like all institutional, 
Marxian, Austrian, cultural, sociological, psychological, and all non-academic interpretations. 
Marxian? Liberal? Both? Parfait! QED! 
Weintraub is moderate when speaking of a “take-no-prisoner attitude when it came to 
specifying the ‘economic’ content of the exercise” (2002: 116). But Debreu not only takes no 
prisoners, as though he acts like a diplomat of economic science, but he indirectly undermines 
and discourages interpretations. Not only that all interpretations are potential economic 
theories, but also that all interpretations are equivalent regarding their scientificity. Interpretations 
and their underlying intuitions do not affect the scientificity of economic theory. Rather than a 
democratic, pluralist diplomat, Debreu wipes out the need of valuating economic theories. And 
only by means of such valuations something of worth could be at risk for the economist. Just 
as Bourbaki thought to be the final stage of the development of mathematics, the traumatizing 
moment of Debreu was that everything that possibly could be said about markets has implicitly 
already been said.  
 
 
The Four Virtues of the Axiomatic Method and their Supplement: the Economist 
 
According to this image of the axiomatic method, it must seem like a miracle that Debreu is 
able to justify the advantages of the virtue of rigor and his axiomatic method to the economist. 
There is nothing left of what one naturally would associate with an act of economic theorizing. 
In fact when it comes to sell these advantages, Debreu continuously backed away from the 
radical separation of mathematical form and economic content just described. All advantages 
can only be established by smuggling other intellectual values as axiomatic rigor back into the 
analysis – thus, only as long as there is no separation of meaning and structure. There are four 
advantages Debreu repeatedly refers to: generality, weakness of assumptions, clarity of 
expression, and, yes, being free of ideology.  
 
(1) Generality. “The pursuit of generality in a formalized theory is no less imperative than the 
pursuit of rigor” (Debreu 1986: 1267). How are rigor and generality of GET related?  
GET is usually called general because it is not restricted to a particular market as the 
market for apples, oil, kidneys or the market for 4WD-Gran-Vitara-AWD-metallic-blue’S. 
GET is general in that it encompasses all markets since only children, politicians, moralists, and 
marketing experts believe that one market is independent from another market. In “the 
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economy” everything depends on everything else. Generality as a virtue of the philosophy of 
science, moreover, refers to the scope of explanation, and follows the old devise of explaining 
much by little. Methods and theories are as general as their explanatory scope.  
Debreu gives us the feeling that generality is a quality of the axiomatized GET in this sense 
of explanatory scope, that is, that GET extends the limits of other theories and is applicable to 
a greater range of phenomena. “A newly discovered interpretation can then increase 
considerably the range of applicability of the theory without requiring any change in its 
structure” (1991: 5). With the same use of terms, he even presents the axiomatic method as 
appropriate to the ontic properties of the market.  
 
A global view of an economy that wants to take into account the large number of its commodities, the 
equally large number of its prices, the multitude of its agents, and their interactions requires a 
mathematical model (1991: 3).  
 
Debreu thus evokes the methodological Urmotif of economic abstraction that I have traced 
since the first chapter: the complexity of “the economy”. Complexity functions as the most 
common excuse to remain in a formal theoretical context. Perhaps Debreu, like all other 
modern men really believed that “the economy” is complex. But the question is whether this 
belief informed his work.  
Debreu tops this assertion of the theoretical propriety of mathematics when claiming that 
mathematics is “neutral” because commodities and prices are numerical things: “Since 
economics gives a central role to quantities of commodities and prices, the use of mathematics 
seems entirely neutral” (in Feiwel 1987: 253). Whence the “reality”? Whence the basic belief in 
“the economy”? Do we now enter a discussion of the “ontology of commodities”? Why is it 
now necessary to point out, as Mirowski did, that  
 
there is no firm evidence that prices, commodity units and money were ever constituted as numbers in 
some pristine ontological sense: they were (and still are) contingent upon a whole range of other social 
practices, might be reorganized in a myriad of ways, and exhibit no ‘natural’ or stable mathematical 
character (forthcoming).  
 
Did Debreu really believe that commodities could be convex in any sensible way? Thus, does 
he really speak of generality as a theoretical virtue of explaining the totality of markets? He 
does not enter this discussion. 
 The actual meaning of generality is not that of standard philosophy of science. The 
axiomatized GET does not encompass several market theories of particular markets, but is 
independent of them. How could a theory with a structure that is independent of its 
(referential) meaning be called general? Debreu relies here on the confusion of generality as the 
encompassment of content, and formality as the absence of content. Abstraction and 
formalization, as I repeatedly argued, are two different practices. Forms are not more or less 
general. There is no trouble of a “trade-off” between empty forms and particular content. 
What Debreu praises as generality is to be free of the logic of the general and particular.  
By “general” Debreu means that one can generate a market theory out of any 
interpretation of the primitive concept “commodity” immediately and effortlessly, or as Bourbaki 
said, ‘without forging ones means personally’ (1950: 227). “The divorce of form and content 
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immediately yields a new theory whenever a novel interpretation of primitive concepts is 
discovered” (Debreu 1986: 1265, e.a.). In his Nobel Lecture we read, “[t]he axiomatization may 
also give ready answers to new questions when a novel interpretation of primitive concepts is 
discovered” (Debreu 1983: 98, e.a.). The economist is able to immediately leap over from an 
interpretation to a fully developed “theory” without the effort of actual theorizing. Debreu 
thus admits that his formalism makes the effort of theorizing redundant. With the axiomatic 
method the theorist can be substituted just as the primitive concepts, and its possible 
interpretations are substituted with mathematical objects. The practice of economic theory 
demands less intellectual effort.  
 The example Debreu repeatedly refers to in order to illustrate, and celebrate the virtue of 
generality is markets with uncertainty developed in chapter 6 of his Theory of Value. The 
difference of certainty and uncertainty makes the world for a group of economists (Austrians, 
institutionalists, evolutionary, and also some behavioral) who all start their essays with ‘Knight 
and Shackle emphasized the role of uncertainty for economic analysis’. In these cases, 
uncertainty amounts to a challenge for economic theorizing since the market cannot be fully 
determined let alone be listed in advance within a unique “universe of discourse”. In Debreu, 
however, whether commodities are certain in the sense that we know everything about them, 
or uncertain because there is time is a matter of the interpretation of the primitive concept 
“commodity”: ‘commodity today’ or ‘commodity tomorrow’: xt. Uncertainty does not affect 
the axioms themselves. Debreu does acknowledge the importance of the difference between 
certainty and uncertainty, but cannot reflect it within the axiomatic scheme: “Several important 
questions left unanswered are emphasized below. One may stress the certainty assumption 
made, at the level of interpretations (…).” (1959: x). On that level, however, nothing really 
happens: “by simply reinterpreting the primitive concept” “one immediately leads to a new 
theory”. The problem of uncertainty is solved by moving it outside of theoretical concern. The 
value of such re-interpretations Weintraub assessed critically:  
 
Debreu’s evident enthusiasm (...) over his capacity to incorporate ‘uncertainty’ into the axiomatized 
model by keeping the identical mathematical formalism but redefining the ‘interpretation’ of the 
commodity thus should not be regarded as a new contribution to the economic theory of risk or 
ignorance; rather, in this reading, Debreu developed it as a ratification of the structural character of his 
axioms (Weintraub 2002: 121).  
 
Debreu used uncertainty as a ratification of his method. But was there a question, or the need 
of ratification as long as theory and interpretation are separate? Then it should have been 
possible that the problem of uncertainty touches Debreu’s “mother structures”. How could it? 
The application of uncertainty was rather a way to show that in fact nothing happens if one 
reinterprets, and that a reinterpretation is actually not needed for GET to stand. Debreu did not 
show the value of a reinterpretation. Rather, he showed that reinterpretations do not make a 
difference – disillusioning, to say the least, for those who want to attack, and who want to 
defend GET on the base of its supposed economic meaning. Debreu showed with his 
application to uncertainty that there is nothing to be said about uncertainty.  
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(2) Weakness of assumptions. Close to the virtue of generality is the weakness of assumptions. 
Recall that assumptions in Debreu are not weak in relation to a basic belief of the theory – its 
“ontology”, as it is discussed in the philosophy of science. In Debreu, the weakness of 
assumptions is expressed in terms of the Bourbakian hierarchy of mathematical structures, the 
weakest of all assumptions being Xx∈ . To say that the assumption of transitivity is weaker 
than that of continuity is to say that transitivity is implied by continuity but not vice versa – as 
Mas-Colell et al. let their students prove along lexicographic preferences in micro 1.02. In 
terms of cognitive capacities, for example, it could be the other way around. Such Bourbakian 
weakness of assumptions Debreu actually meant when speaking of “generality”:  
 
Look at the study of consumer behaviour by means of the differential calculus where you find a 
complex formulation in terms of decreasing marginal rates of substitution. In contrast, the convexity 
analysis is not only simpler, it is also more general since the boundary of a convex set does not have to 
be smooth [differentiable in all orders] (in Feiwel: 247).  
 
Though clearly a matter of mathematical structures, Debreu gives his audience the feeling that 
the these structures are related with the domain of applicability: “The mathematician’s 
compulsive search for ever weaker assumptions is reinforced by the economist’s awareness of 
the limitations of his postulates”, as he describes the interaction of mathematicians and 
economists (1986: 267). But what is the effect on the ‘domain of applicability’ if the 
mathematician “expurgated superfluous differentiability assumptions from economic theory” 
(Ibid)? The confusion Debreu relies on here is the philosopher’s virtue of ‘explaining much by 
little’ with that of logical implication.  
The issue in the background of this confusion is what came to be known as economic 
imperialism – the infusion of economic ideas in other social sciences and economic talk in 
general. Economic imperialism is problematic, and different from a fruitful interdisciplinary 
effort because economists loose their sense of the domain of applicability, and enter other 
domains without caring about their characteristics – without sensing resistance when passing 
limits. Ironically, on the ground of the confusion of assumptions and axioms Debreu could 
argue that the axiomatic method was an effective regulative tool against economic imperialism:  
 
The exact formulation of assumptions and of conclusions turned out, moreover, to be an effective 
guide against the ever-present temptation to apply an economic theory beyond its domain of validity 
(Debreu 1986: 1266).  
 
Debreu repeats here the same enthusiasm that Koopmans in 1957 already has shown about the 
‘sobering effect’ of rigor: making assumptions explicit.  
 
The best safeguard against overestimation of the range of applicability of economic propositions is a 
careful spelling out of the premises on which they rest. Precision and rigor in the statement of premises 
and proofs can be expected to have a sobering effect on our beliefs about the reach of the propositions 
we have developed (Koopmans 1957: 147). 
 
Sobering yes, but a ‘safeguard against overestimation’? Do we sense the irony in these lines? 
Debreu turned perhaps the greatest vice of post-war economics into a virtue of his method 
having restricted it. How could he possibly believe that his axiomatized GET ever functioned as 
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such regulative device to remain close at a particular domain of social life? My entire argument 
has suggested the opposite. The development of the theoretical perception of “the economy” 
is the dissolution of the intuition of economic life constituting a particular domain.  
Becker, despite the conflict between Friedman and Cowles, could be said to have received 
the Nobel Prize for showing that Arrow and Debreu not only proved that the logic of the 
market is independent of its interpretation, but that market theory is not even restricted to a 
phenomenon called market – in the words of the Swedish professors, ‘for having extended the 
domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behavior and interaction, 
including nonmarket behavior’. Becker goes indeed further than Arrow and Debreu, since he 
uses the lack of interpretation of the market as a vehicle to turn market theory into a method. 
Without Debreu, however, this step would have been impossible. The link between the 
axiomatic method and imperialism here in the words of Mirowski:  
 
The practical effect of the Cowles program was to toughen up the mathematical training of economists 
and thus repel anyone trying to trespass from another social science (…) What Cowles ultimately 
sought to do was to shore up the boundaries between neoclassical economics and the other social 
sciences. Pending that, transcendental urge was re-conceptualised as the periodic forays of the 
economic imperialists, bringing back home raw materials wrest forcibly from the natives as fuel for their 
stationary engine of analysis (Mirowski 2001: 266).  
 
If Debreu set a benchmark for post-war economics, then contrary to his assertion, because 
economists tried to regain a sense of their domain by relaxing rather strong and unrealistic 
assumptions that came to be assigned to his “model”, such as perfect knowledge, perfect 
rationality, symmetric information, etc. Ironically, these attempts of escaping the narrowness of 
his theorizing Debreu could present as evidence for his method serving as a benchmark of 
theory – perfectly in line with my notion of the negative closure of economics today.  
 
Its role as a benchmark was also perceived clearly, a role which prompted extensions to incomplete markets 
for contingent commodities, externalities, indivisibilities, increasing returns, public goods, temporary 
equilibrium … (1986: 1268, e.a.) 
 
The economists’ sensibility for an economic domain, which they try to regain when they 
engage in such theories, Debreu can still read as an “extension” of his axiomatic GET – quasi 
an application. Since the weakness of assumptions is not measured in ontic terms but in 
mathematical terms, relaxing the assumptions of GET does not change the mode of 
theorizing. Therefore, even if market theories start with an intuition of the (ontic) domain of 
the market they could turn out analytically equivalent with Debreu’s GET. The more 
economists struggle to be “realistic”, the more they “extend” Debreu’s model.  
 
(3) Clarity of expression. The third advantage Debreu lists is clarity of expression. Whence, out of the 
blue, the expressiveness of the theory? How can Debreu make us believe that the economist 
can use his axiomatization as an alternative expression of their economic theories? How could 
one still believe at this point in the 1980s that mathematics is a language that claims to say the 
same thing, just more clearly by taking the “noise” out of the conversations of economists? 
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Still another consequence of the axiomatization of economic theory has been a greater clarity of expression, 
one of the most significant gains that it has achieved. To that effect, axiomatization does more than 
making assumptions and conclusions explicit and exposing the deductions linking them. The very 
definition of an economic concept is usually marred by a substantial margin of ambiguity. An axiomatized 
theory substitutes for that ambiguous concept a mathematical object that is subjected to definite rules of 
reasoning. Thus an axiomatic theorist succeeds in communicating the meaning he intends to give a primitive 
concept because of the completely specified formal context in which he operates (1986: 1266, e.a.) 
  
How could one possibly communicate intended meaning with a language that is separated 
from any meaning? Primitive concepts are not conceptualized at all, but substituted with a 
mathematical object. The only thing clear in Debreu is the separation of mathematical form 
and economic content where meaning falls together with ambiguity. Debreu of course knew 
that axioms are not expressive. He made the separation of mathematical form and economic 
content even typographically visible in his Theory of Value.  
 
Allegiance to rigour dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis, where the theory, the strict sense, is 
logically entirely disconnected from its interpretations. In order to bring out fully this disconnectedness, 
all the hypotheses, and the main results of the theory, in the strict sense, are distinguished by italics; 
moreover, the transition from the informal discussion of interpretations to the formal construction of 
the theory is often marked by one of the expressions ‘in the language of the theory’, ‘for the sake of the 
theory’, ‘formally’ (1959: x).  
 
Debreu separated passages of form from those of content with italics, Bourbaki with an 
asterisk, the “omission” of which “of course, have no disadvantage, from a purely logical point 
of view” (Bourbaki 1968: v). Only in the “(s)mall type passages”, which are “irrelevant for the 
logical developments of the text proper”, is it “permissible to draw upon an intuitive 
knowledge of the physical world” (Debreu 1959: 2) – note the subtlety: like a Bourbakian slip, 
Debreu notoriously speaks of the “physical world” when it comes to referential meaning, as 
though he never even considered that economic theory refers to the economic world.  
How could there be an expression of something in terms of something else? If there are two 
“contexts” in Debreu, then a context of structure/form and another of expression. Intellectual 
effort only takes place within the former. The latter cannot be higher in the textual hierarchy 
than “remarks,” or at most “corollaries”. The point is that Debreu not only substitutes the 
‘substantial margin of ambiguity’, but renders meaning unexpressed. Structures may feel good, 
but they don’t tell anything! When using such expressive words such as “marred with a 
substantial margin of ambiguity” Debreu expressed nothing but the suspicion of meaning into 
which his intellectual life merged.  
Nevertheless, Debreu was very successful in making the economist believe that his 
axiomatization implies “clarity of expression”. The margins of economic theories are still today 
narrative, while the analytical core of models is still formal. Intellectual effort in economic 
science does not take place in literary passages. But did this enhance the communication 
among economists? To some extent yes. The more mathematics, the less one needs literary 
skills. It became easier to communicate beyond the cultural noise of languages. Bourbakian 
economics is free from the risk of becoming a ‘tower of Babel’. On the other hand, what is the 
Bourbakian Esperanto of good for if it is free from expressiveness? What is the clarity of 
language good for if disagreements become impossible? Heilbroner and Milberg, for example, 
Xx∈
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argued that one symptom of the loss of vision is that economists are evermore indifferent to 
the views of others. The economic “discipline appears to be less and less (…) a matter of 
general agreement” (1995: 15). If everything one could say scientifically in market theory has 
already been said implicitly, how reluctant must an economist be listening to someone else? 
The drawback of the clarity of expression is the reluctance to engage in debates.  
 For the sake of clarity, let me oppose this argument against the superiority of mathematics 
as a language against another objection that is common in the philosophical commentary of 
economics.  
 
The desire to derive arguments rigorously means that they [economists] are confining themselves to 
saying what these theoretical tools allow them to say. Given the state of the techniques available to 
economists, pursuing this form of rigour has severely constrained what economists have been able to 
say – the models and theories they have been able to work with (Backhouse 2005: 383).  
 
Although Backhouse’s argument arrives at the same effect as mine, namely that rigour makes 
one forget about previously important questions, Backhouse does grant the theoretical tools of 
rigour expressiveness in some domain. By virtue of the narratives that have been assigned to 
these tools, rigour appears to be applicable to a constrained range of problems (we know the song: 
allocation instead of distribution, competition instead of industries etc.). Also Debreu has 
acknowledged this risk in his all-embracing philosophical naivety: “The very choice of 
questions to which he [the economist] tries to find answers is influenced by his mathematical 
background” (1991: 5). But the actual problem was not that rigour “constrained” the range of 
problems, but that it made the economist forget the problems.  
Recall that in Bourbaki the axiomatic method meant less to enhance communication, but 
rather to stop the conversation in critical moments such as when ‘philosophers attack them 
with their paradoxes’ and Bourbaki ‘brings out Chapters 1) and 2) on set theory’. Debreu does 
the same. The interview with George Feiwel begins with the question: “Why is the question of 
existence of general economic equilibrium so profoundly important?” Such was the question I 
posed to him in this chapter. Debreu had no sense for it. The question is too vague and marred 
with ambiguity: “Since I have not seen your question discussed in the terms I would like to use, 
I will not give you a concise answer” (Feiwel 1987: 243). The commitment to rigor, in fact, 
makes the economist insensible to the question of significance. 
 
(4) Free from Ideology. Little by little the guiding threads of The Phenomenology of Economics 
begin to cross. The suspicion of meaning as it describes the formalism of Debreu is the draw 
back of the attempts to deal with the economic suspicion. In such way I have designed my 
narrative of economic science. Thus, is it not plausible that Debreu rounds up his speeches by 
celebrating his formalism as having freed economics from ideology? Did I not argue the same?  
In which sense then, as he asserts, was “economic analysis sometimes brought closer to its 
ideology-free ideal” (Debreu 1986: 1266)? Debreu illustrates with (what else?) the interpretation 
of the two welfare-theorems:  
 
Foes of state intervention read in those two theorems a mathematical demonstration of the unqualified 
superiority of market economies, while advocates of state intervention welcome the same theorems 
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because the explicitness of their assumptions emphasizes discrepancies between the theoretic model 
and the economies that they observe (Ibid). 
 
Until the formalist revolution the political meaning of the welfare implications of GET have 
been debated in such terms. Since then, by and large, the discussion has calmed. But has the 
issue been resolved? Is economics free from ideology issues because it has resolved them 
“scientifically”? Did it establish an authority that all political parties agree on? Have economists 
ever been the political judges? Certainly not Debreu, although in his philosophical naivety he, 
too, displayed his dream of rigorous blackboard politics:  
 
The theory that we are discussing tries to be ideologically neutral. It deals with problems that are basic 
and common to all economic systems, for instance the efficient allocation of resources through 
decentralized procedures (…) Mathematical models of the economy help to analyse the optimal extent 
of this decentralization. The risk of misinterpretation (…) is lessened by the uncompromising exactness 
of the modelization” (in Feiwel 1987: 246).  
 
The ideologically neutral ‘decentralization of the allocation of resources’? What then is the 
‘optimal extent of this decentralization’? 65%? And is the optimization function “smooth”?  
Matter is different. Recall that the interpretive indifference of the welfare implications of 
GET, which Debreu presents as the liberation from ideology, once in his youth was reason 
enough to warn the economist of the insufficiency of mathematical reasoning. Later, however, 
the same issue let him later speak cynically about the very possibility of such interpretations 
within economics. Economists are “carried by the current of ideas”. Let me quote again the 
telling lines:  
 
[S]i cela satisfait les économistes libéraux et les marxisants, parfait! Je ne peux rien demander de mieux. 
Intellectuellement vous êtes emporté par le courant des idées et vous allez dans la direction où il vous porte 
(in Bini and Bruni 1998, e.a.). 
 
‘Marxian? Liberal? Both? Parfait! Economists can argue in favour of or against capitalism ‘by 
simply reinterpreting the primitive concepts’. QED, economics is a science!  
The confusion Debreu relies on is clear. Debreu did not solve a political problem by any 
epistemic means. He rather de-politicized economic science. What Debreu celebrates with the 
liberation from ideology is to be free from political relevance. Only in this sense economics is a 
science, and not in accordance with any standard of the philosophy of science, as I have 
suggested in this and all preceding chapters. Economics is systematic, yes, but not systematic 
knowledge in any positive sense. Debreu proved rigorously that the authority of rigour supports 
neither interpretation. GET is systematically beyond politics. What Debreu hurrahs – that 
economics is not (politically) biased – others such as Boulding began to hoot at – the fact that 
economics is (politically) irrelevant. The suspicion of ideology turned into the lament of 
insignificance. 
But what then about the ‘the risk of (political) misinterpretation’ Debreu mentioned? Did 
he lower it? Was Debreu’s discreet intervention really so sobering that it disillusioned all 
political associations of GET? There is at least one economist of the neo-Walrasian 
community who thought so: Frank Hahn. He was little more consequential in turning the 
formalist void of GET into a positive result. We are now prepared to understand the full irony 
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of his “ju-jitsu” defence of GET, as Mark Blaug has characterized his move (2003: 152, 1992 
[1980]: 164 ff.). Although Blaug agrees that “the best way not to learn how markets function 
(…) is to study general equilibrium theory” (2003: 154), he was not able to appreciate that this 
negative role can actually be critical.  
 
...this negative role of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium I consider to be almost sufficient justification for it, 
since practical men and ill trained theorists everywhere in the world who do not understand what they 
are claiming to be the case when they claim a beneficent and coherent role for the invisible hand (Hahn 
1974: 52).  
 
GET according to Hahn, precisely in its axiomatized, and thus void form proves rigorously 
what one cannot argue with it. GET is critical about political misunderstandings. But the 
political misunderstanding of what? Of GET itself! With Debreu, GET clears up the 
misunderstandings that happened during its own tradition, and thus to a great extent the 
misunderstanding of this very tradition, namely that there is a positive claim to be made about 
the invisible hand, and furthermore that “the economy” can be an object of epistemic concern. 
Debreu showed, if I push Hahn’s argument little further, that if GET ever was bestowed with 
meaning, this meaning did not stem from an epistemic concern, but from ideological motives. 
Debreu showed that GET as an economic theory can only be ideological.  
 Thus, was Debreu successful in the sense Hahn envisioned? Are all misunderstandings 
cleared up? After Nicolas Bourbaki, are economists back at the time of Nicolas Barbon? Not 
quite. It is true that the association of mathematical rigour with full determinability, and thus 
planned economy – that scientific socialism is outmoded. This happened, to say the least, no 
less due to McCarthy’s violent politics than due to Debreu’s sobering Bourbakism. But how 
about the other misunderstanding that was actually the initiating misunderstanding of invisible 
hand theorizing, namely to associate the intellectual elevation of economic theory with the 
political virtue of freedom? Is it not the riddle of post-war economics that despite of its inner 
critique to be politically irrelevant it came to be associated with a neoliberal advocacy of the 
market?  
Thus is the suspicion of ideology really past? In the previous pages I came along such 
ideological infestation of formalism in economics at several points. The formalism of GET is 
only one slight step away from supporting a particular politics. This was the same basic 
misunderstanding I have located at the times of the rise of epistemic liberalism: scientific 
aloofness and discreetness – the distance one takes to politics – plays out in politics as a 
particular political program for freedom. What Poovey, Foucault and I said about 18th century 
liberalism could be said similarly about 20th century neoliberalism, as Mirowski, too, incites his 
readers to consider seriously:  
 
A mathematized world – say, a mathematized economy – by extension then also seems capable of 
policing itself, since it is being portrayed as existing independently of the way any analyst might 
characterize it, puttering along on its own terms (forthcoming).  
 
This “by extension” is not a hair-splitting analogy of the relation of economists and economics, 
on the one hand, and politicians and “the economy”, on the other – an analogy for which 
nothing but literary fantasy could speak. The key to this analogy is the insight in the historical 
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initiation of an epistemic concern for “the economy” that the economist avoids being subjected to 
the economic suspicion. Only since Smith’s scholarship epistemic arguments and economists’ 
ethos are disassociated. The association of formalism and liberalism is as old as economics 
itself.  
Again, for the sake of clarity, let me oppose this argument against that of Backhouse, who 
recently tackled the “neglected agenda” to inquire the secret alliance of scientific practices and 
neoliberal politics of the last decades.  
 
The conventional view is that the use of mathematics protects economists from ideology, as well as 
from being accused of being driven by ideology. However, there is another case that can be made. This 
is the intellectual value judgments that underlie technical economics, as it currently exists, bias one toward 
conservative conclusions. (…) Individual optimisation and perfect competition have been, for the most 
part, adopted not because economists believe them to be correct but because they permit rigorous 
analysis (Backhouse 2005: 382 f.). 
 
Rigor biases neoliberalism? Why? Because, according to Backhouse, theories easily utilizable 
for neoliberal politics are by chance just the same as those that are easily amenable to the 
intellectual value of rigour. Other values and other technologies (for example simulation as 
opposed to axiomatics) could bias in another political direction. Are economists neoliberal by 
virtue of analytic convenience? Are they irresponsible enough to take the costs of supporting 
whatever politics for the sake of rigour? For the Sake of Science: Left or Right – Who cares? 
No! At least this charge cannot be directed to Debreu. Debreu is not irresponsible in this 
sense. Backhouse does not consider that the same intellectual virtue of rigour can also evoke 
associations of transparency of GET, and indeed has biased for most of the time of the 20th 
century towards socialism. Rigour does not support a particular political ideology for reasons 
of philosophical taste. If Backhouse were right, I would have to charge Debreu with the 
following Marxian critique: 
 
Most of the orthodox modelling of the effects of NAFTA has been based on either some or all of the 
assumptions relevant in the construction of a proof of the existence of general equilibrium under 
perfectly competitive (Walrasian) conditions. (…) In the briefest from, this construct assumes that all 
markets clear (therefore, by assumption there is no unemployment), all products are divisible, there are 
rational maximizers of independent utility functions, all firms face competitive factor and product 
markets, all participants are endowed with perfect knowledge (costly attained), banking and finance 
operate seamlessly thanks to perfect knowledge of the future … (Cypher 1993: 153). 
 
“Assuming the mantle of scientific objectivity”, economists “introduce only those assumptions 
which enable modellers to ‘prove’ that Free Trade Agreements are mutually beneficial” (Ibid.: 
146). But since all the assumptions are either wrong, or at least distortions, NAFTA is ill-
founded. The Marxists Resnick and Wolff argued on the same grounds of assumptions that “in 
the award to Professor Debreu, the Nobel committee made a choice between the two 
traditions [class and non-class theories]” (1984: 30). Assumptions of “neoclassical” GET 
exclude the consideration of class. After the preceding chapter it should not be difficult to see 
that none of these “assumptions” Debreu ever considered, let alone spoke about. In short, the 
alliance between science and politics is not a matter of the philosophy that informs science. 
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Given Cypher’s, Resnick’s and Wolff’s as well as the Nobel Committee’s conception of 
Debreu’s work, how could we share Hahn’s hope that Debreu’s formalism helped in clearing 
up the political misunderstandings of GET? According to what I argued in this chapter about 
his philosophical ambiguities, Debreu did both. He supported such misunderstandings in that 
he played with the confusions such as that of axioms and assumptions. But he also worked 
against them by insisting on the separation of mathematical form and economic content. The 
former is the result of little philosophical care, but the latter is the result of the anti-
philosophical appeal of mathematical practices. Only there one can associate the separation of 
form and content with the separation of politics from “the economy”. After mathematical 
form and economic content are separated economic content sneaks into economic theory 
through the backdoor without Debreu knowing. Is Bourbakism thus the last affective hallmark 
of the alliance between scientific monism and neoliberal hegemony? 
The answer, of course, is not a matter of yes or no. The question is whether the 
Debreuvian economist could possibly take social responsibility for such association. Does 
economic theory allow economists to reflect on the ideological use of their work? As long as 
the self-understanding of the “Bourbakian economist” is to be prior, beyond, aloof, or in any 
case separate from political concerns, political meaning will be assigned to economists against 
their self-understanding. And therein lies the tragic aspect of Debreu’s assertion that 
economics became ideology-free: precisely because Debreu felt to be free from it, others could 
freely find some murky ways to mobilize the aloofness of rigour as a symbol of the superiority 
of markets.  
The phenomenological critique of Debreu’s “oblivion” does not result in the charge of 
ideology! By not making any economic claim Debreu did not claim a truncated version of 
liberalism. He separated mathematical form and economic content as a way to avoid this 
association. Only in this way could he be successful! If one asks Debreu: Who are You – 
Arguing This! What could he answer? Would Debreu understand the question at all? Would it 
not simply be indiscreet? The critique of Debreu results rather in the charge that he is not 
responsive to such a question. The problem of economic (pause) science is not a particular 
ethos of economists, but the diminishing of their ethos. 
The tragedy is that Debreu, after he received the Nobel Prize, was indeed confronted with 
the misunderstandings he caused. Debreu knew exactly that the ideology issue was not closed. 
He felt it under his own skin after receiving his honour. He was addressed as an authority of 
meaning, not as an authority of structures. For nobody in economic talk was ever interested in 
structures! Here is where the infestation of “applying Bourbaki” ultimately took place. In the 
embarrassment of not being able to live up to the ethos of a Nobel economist my affective 
history of his intellectual life ends.  
After 1983, Debreu was held responsible for the misunderstandings the Nobel committee 
revealed, and which Debreu, as opposed to Hahn’s hope, could not clear up. The economic 
suspicion – this makes Gerard Debreu a tragic character – was thus not made silent, but in the 
opposite, was reinforced by the appearance of being free from it. Are the cultures of economic 
suspicion, after all, not reinforced by the presence of those who pretend to be beyond them? 
After Debreu had avoided political questions for his entire life, following 1983, they befell him 
with the unbearable weight of the Nobel ethos: Mister Debreu, so he was asked by the entire 
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world: What does that mean? What does it mean that you have proven that “the market works 
automatically”? Should we position more or less rockets toward East? With such penetrating 
questions I close the affective biography of Gerard Debreu in the next chapter.  
 
*** 
 
Let me close the preceding methodological considerations with a disturbing quote from 
Bourbaki. The problem of the axiomatic method, I argued in length, is not of a philosophical 
nature. The problem is rather that it downplays, if not excludes, intellectual ethos. The problem 
is ethical. When Dieudonné alias Bourbaki replied to the question how the “application of 
mathematics to something of a different nature [reality]” is possible – which is the 
philosophical riddle of the axiomatic method – he replied:  
 
Why do such applications ever succeed? Why is a certain amount of logical reasoning occasionally 
helpful in practical life? Why have some of the most intricate theories in mathematics become an 
indispensable tool to the modern physicist, to the engineer, and to the manufacturer of atom bombs? 
Fortunately for us, the mathematician does not fell called upon to answer such questions, nor should he 
be held responsible for such use or misuse of his work (Bourbaki 1949: 2f.).  
 
At least we know that Bourbaki alias Claude Chevalley would not have agreed with Bourbaki 
alias Jean Dieudonné. 
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 (6) Debreu’s Retreat after 1983 
 
 
 
 
In the speeches Debreu held after his Nobel Prize, there are some slight signs that he felt 
uneasy about the indirect effects, the unintended consequences, and the misunderstandings 
surrounding his work. After he passed his 50s, he showed some awareness of the ambiguity 
that accompanied his life – in two words, “applying Bourbaki”.  
 
 
Debreu’s Last Corollaries about the Surprise, Regret, and Encumbrance 
Wrought by the Invisible Hand of Formalism.  
 
Notably, he showed this awareness already in his Banquet speech. After he had shaken hands 
with the King of Sweden, and expressed his gratitude to the Bank of Sweden for the Million 
Crowns, in the few words he had chosen for his banquet speech he reflected on his peculiar 
position in post-war economics. In order to explain the success of mathematical economics, he 
used the metaphor of the invisible hand. He himself thus draws the analogy of the relations 
between economists and their theories on the one hand, and between those conducting an 
economic life and “the economy” on the other – as though now the economist came to feel 
the character of his own theories on his skin.  
 
(A) scientist knows that his motivations are often weakly related to the distant consequences of his 
work. The logical rigor, the generality, and the simplicity of his theories satisfy deep personal intellectual 
needs, and he frequently seeks them for their own sake. But here, as in Adam Smith’s famous sentence, 
he seems to be ‘led by and invisible hand to promote an end which was not part of his intention’, for 
his personal intellectual fulfilment contributes to promoting the social interest of the scientific 
community. (…) It was my great fortune to begin my career at a time when economic theory was 
entering a phase of intensive mathematization and when, as a result, the strength of that invisible hand 
had become irresistible (Debreu 1983b: banquet speech).  
 
Debreu’s use of the metaphor of the invisible hand has subtle connotations. They sum up the 
terms with which I have discussed the role of mathematical reasoning in post-war economics. 
With the metaphor of the invisible hand, Debreu, first, admitted that the primary concern 
of his intellectual life was less the “social interest of the scientific community” (whatever that 
may be). Instead, he was engaged with mathematical economics for its own sake, lost in the 
aesthetic appeal of rigor, rigor, and nothing but rigor. Like the baker man in the Smithean 
market, the economist pursues rigor only for his own interest – for the intrinsic appeal and 
pleasure of the mathematical experience. Although the mathematical economist is irresponsive 
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to the social task of the economic profession, he, mysteriously, ‘led by an invisible hand’, turns 
out to promote it. Debreu therewith reacts to the common critique of post-war economics, to 
the mourning that mathematics has become an end in itself, is overused excessively, and leads 
economics to the edge of irrelevance – just as once the clergy lamented about the use of 
money, to which economists replied with the invisible hand. 
What could Debreu have meant by the “social interest of the scientific community” other 
than the domination of economic talk by epistemic concerns on the one hand, and the 
participation of economics in the hype of Big Science on the other? Did he ever ask himself 
during his intellectual life whether such domination is socially desirable? No, he was only 
concerned with his deep personal intellectual need for logical rigor. Debreu was always rather 
shy in claiming for himself the institutional power of economic science. At this evening, in a 
moment of celebration in front of the Swedish King, how could he not show trust in the 
beneficiary results of the epistemic culture in economic talk?  
With the metaphor of the invisible hand, Debreu acknowledged, moreover, the 
“irresistible” influence mathematical economics had on post-war economics. Since his 
intervention, the profession has moved ever further away from being able to connect to a pre-
Debreuvian way of intellectual life. Whatever the intellectual motivation, the economist ends 
up reinforcing the current state, as if one engages in economics only for the sake of the 
mathematical value of rigor. Debreu thus acknowledged the tragic aspect of the influence of 
mathematical economics: that attempts to provide a theoretical alternative only reinforce the 
incontestable social status, and the discursive closure of economists.  
With the use of the metaphor of the invisible hand, Debreu, thus, admitted that his 
influence went far beyond his own intentions when entering economics. Debreu was surprised 
by his success. Hence, I could interpret the use of this metaphor also as an “apology” not in 
the sense of a defence of mathematical economics, but as an excuse for having caused a 
misunderstanding about mathematical economics. Did his Banquet Speech not have an 
undertone of, in Hahn’s words, ‘Sorry – ‘This is not what I meant, this is not what I meant at 
all’. His methodological defences of the axiomatic separation of mathematical form and 
economic content could likewise be understood as such an excuse for having caused a 
misunderstanding: Sorry, dear economist, mathematical reasoning does not suffice in 
economics. Mathematics is not All There Is.  
With the metaphor of the invisible hand, Debreu did both: He defended the importance 
of mathematical economics because it has beneficiary results for the profession beyond the 
theories it is applied to; and he excused it, showing that it is insufficient for any economic 
theory. With his defence, he thus acknowledged the pervasiveness of mathematics in post-war 
economics, while with his excuse he acknowledged its irrelevance. It was in this sense that 
Debreu cast a “bright shadow” on post-war economics. It is not trivial to know whether one 
stands under his sheltering and threatening influence or not. Debreu acknowledged with the 
invisible hand of formalism both the success and the unpopularity of mathematical economics. 
Between guilt and defence, he felt the ambivalence of “applying Bourbaki”.  
 Most other economists in the early 1980s would agree that something happened to the 
profession, which nobody ever really wanted. Recall the AEA presidential addresses held in the 
1970s (Leontief, Gordon, among others). Obviously, Debreu knew about them and could not 
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avoid referring to them when he, already in his 70s, came to hold his own presidential address 
in 1991. He acknowledged that the critique of the 1970s was and still is important, yet that he 
did not believe such critique could be effective. Leontief’s and Gordon’s speeches were  
 
relevant when they are made in 1970 and in 1975. They still are today, for, in spite of their authorities, 
enhanced by the platform from which they were speaking, and in spite of the wide diffusion of their 
critiques, neither Leontief nor Gordon altered the course of the development they were assessing 
(Debreu 1991: 6). 
 
Why could Gordon and Leontief not change the course of economics, according to Debreu? 
Debreu referred to the intellectual values of the profession, and acknowledged the conflict with 
the intellectual values of the mathematics department. In his presidential address, Debreu 
showed considerable doubts about the beneficiary results of the invisible hand of formalism. 
Now he acknowledged that mathematics pursued for its own sake also has undesirable 
consequences.  
 
(e)ssential to an attempt at a fuller explanation [of the success of mathematical economics although 
nobody really wanted it, T.D.] are the values imprinted on an economist by his study of mathematics. 
When a theorist who has been so typed judges his scholarly work, those values do not play a silent role; 
they may play a decisive role. The very choice of the question to which he tries to find answers is 
influenced by his mathematical background. Thus the danger is ever present that the part of economics 
will become secondary, if not marginal, in that judgment (Debreu 1991: 5). 
 
That the questions tackled by the neo-Walrasian community stem from mathematical 
structures rather than from economic intuitions, I have shown sufficiently in the previous 
section. Mathematical values are not only silent, they are exclusive: rigor, rigor and nothing but 
rigor – economic meaning is marginalized. While engaging in the practice of rigor, other 
intellectual values are absent. The economist has to forget them in order to be rigorous.  
 Debreu acknowledged this oblivion in his later years. He even shows some soft signs of 
guilt. Guilt is one of the connotations an invisible hand argument can have: If social reality is 
the result but not the design of human action, we can be guilty for all the misery of all world 
without even being able to take responsibility – terrible. In age, Debreu developed a soft sense 
of having made a mistake, perhaps even a sense of remorse. It was as if a conformist realized 
he had unwittingly caused a revolution. He was most explicit in the last lines of his Frisch 
Memorial lecture in front of the Econometric Society in 1986. 
 
In its pursuit [of mathematical economics], research may be tempted to forget economic content and to 
shun economic problems that are not readily amenable to mathematization. I do not intend, however, 
to draw a balance sheet, to the debit side of which I would not do justice. Economic theory is fated for 
a long mathematical future, and at other World Congresses of our Society Frisch Lectures will have the 
opportunity, and possibly the inclination, to choose a theme ‘Mathematical Form vs. Economic Content’ 
(Debreu 1986: 1268/9, e.a.). 
 
Debreu may have felt sorry. For he could not do justice to what others forgot because of him. 
Speaking of the ‘temptation to forget’ and ‘inclination’ to lament, Debreu came close to what I 
explicated along the oblivion of the life-world. There is a temptation to forget, which lies in the 
very nature of the mathematical experience and its suggestive force – rather than in a 
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philosophical position about mathematics. Just as Debreu was tempted to make an economic 
claim when entering economics, but could not, the economist is tempted to forget economics 
in light of mathematics but cannot, as economist. This uneasiness of one’s project in light of 
one’s experience is the last affective trace of the intellectual responsivity of economists after all 
philosophical awareness, historical consciousness, and theoretical expressiveness faded away.  
 
 
And What in God’s Name Did The Pope Want from Debreu? 
 
Something must have happened to Debreu after 1983. Did he at last face the dilemma of 
“applying Bourbaki”? In his public speeches, he does not display any more signs of self-critique 
than those quoted. According to my phenomenology of his intellectual life, however, we 
should not be surprised if Debreu had greater difficulties than those visible in public. After he 
already half-heartedly withdrew from the stage of economics, how could he live up to the 
Nobel ethos? How did he deal with the publicity he earned? From one day to the next, he 
stood in the spotlight of the world as an economist. How did he deal with the misunderstandings 
that lines like ‘Debreu proved that the market works automatically’ necessarily must have 
evoked? What should the layman, the journalist, the politician, and other ‘second-hand dealers 
of ideas’ think of Debreu? The unease Debreu must have felt when being addressed with the 
penetrating questions of such people concludes my affective biography of Debreu.  
Clearly, Debreu received the prize contrary to his own self-understanding. The irony of the 
Prize was that although he himself discreetly separated mathematical form and economic 
content, he could only enter economics by causing an equivocation of mathematics and 
economic scientificity. Thus, again, after 40 years of being half-heartedly economist, he had to 
clarify the misunderstanding he had always avoided facing. Now there was no authority to help 
defend him against the rest of the world. Now he himself was addressed as an economist. 
Debreu was confronted. He was confronted by those people who he would never thought 
could possibly be interested in his work, who have not the slightest concern about the 
scientificity of economics, but exclusively about the question that Debreu always carefully and 
rigorously avoided: What Does That Mean?  
 
The world’s expectations didn’t help either. Suddenly because he had done some remarkable work in 
Economics my father was contacted by politicians, political activists, physicists and scientists in other 
disciplines and even by the Pope (de Soto 2005). 
 
Political activists? The Pope? What did they want from Debreu? Without knowing the answer 
– John Paul’s letter may be explained by the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences that he has 
launched with Arrow – we can imagine that Debreu’s answer was a string of excuses: No, 
sorry, I did nothing that could help you in your mission, John Paul! We hear the slight 
nerviness of being addressed in that way in his opening words at the press conference at 
Berkeley University following the announcement of his Noble Prize. ‘I do not want to discuss 
my views on the Reagan Administration’s economic policies’ (in Hayes 1983).  
Debreu was in the spotlight of that world, in which he always tried to keep a low profile. 
The world that granted him the prize was the same world he knew only from primitive 
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concepts that he immediately substituted with mathematical objects. How then did he deal 
with this sudden honour? How was it possible to meet the expectations that now rested on 
him? 
  
But from that day forward I believe he never felt he could live up to the honor that had been done to 
him. His esteem for his own work did not match the high esteem that others had put upon it (…). So 
he examined everything from then on through the lens of ‘Is this worthy of Nobel quality work? (de 
Soto 2005) 
  
Did Debreu finally face the dilemma? No. As he did not solve it in his young years, he never 
acquired the intellectual ethos to deal with it later in his life. His only reaction to the feeling of 
having made a mistake was to go back to the desk and check again whether it was rigorously 
rigorous. He never learned to deal with mistakes in any other way. But what could he find in 
his articles? The errors he may have found probably made things even more severe, while all 
the beautiful proofs only proved that he “has nothing to say”, either to The Pope, nor to 
anyone else – and increasingly less to his closest fellows. What a healing effect it would have 
had for Debreu, for the profession of economics, and for his family, if he had only refused the 
Prize!  
 
It was from that time onward that I saw my father withdraw from us. He was unwilling for any of us to 
see him as less than he had been judged in that brief shining moment in Stockholm. He could not live 
up to the myth that had been created around him. We deprived him and he deprived himself of his 
humanity, of his right to be flawed (de Soto 2005). 
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Implications 
 
 
 
 
After having marked some of the coordinates of the horizon from which the practice of 
economic science arises and in which it takes place, the reader may have the impression that 
the matter came close to a “theory of economics”. Some readers may wish to see this implicit 
theory conceptualized or even operationalized more rigorously than being applied in a 
haphazard socio-historical narrative. But this would miss the character of the text.  
Before coming to hastily wrap up the preceding material in a couple of lines, I thus would 
do well to recall one of the mottos of Husserl’s phenomenology: ‘World is not a being’. Or,  
phrased differently, ‘life-world cannot be reduced to world’. World is horizon. If there is a 
philosophy of phenomenology, it is this idea of the involvement and enmeshment of the reality 
of experience: that this reality affects and is always a step ahead of our epistemic efforts that try 
to calm the lived world in a claim or a judgement. With the notion of the life-world, I referred 
to precisely this: the inhering of intellectual life in what it comprehends.  
According to such philosophical intuition, to conclude is rather to show the implications 
than to sum up. The Phenomenology of Economics needs to be judged on what it discloses 
rather than on what it pins down. In order to do justice to this disclosing character, I must be 
able to turn the basic tone from critique to invitation, and from pessimism to optimism. 
Intellectual life according to this philosophical intuition is an ardent, devoted, constant, patient, 
and, yes, even a festive activity. Such pathos of intellectual life shimmers through all the 
limitations it suffers when subjected to the corset of authoritative claims – to science. It is thus 
now the time to turn over the critical tone to the optimism underlying my skepticism.  
What did I promise? The preceding exercise was meant to be prolegomena for a renewed 
sensibility in economic writings. How did I show the possibility of such renewal? I did not do 
so by means of a phenomenological theory of economics, but by addressing the necessity of 
economists as those who accomplish economics, and therefore address a sensibility that is 
“forgotten” as long as one is gagged by science (though not willingly – no one forgets on 
purpose). To “remember” that sensibility meant to disclose the horizon from which intellectual 
efforts in economics gain their forces. To do so, to use the philosophical jargon, is nothing but 
to carry out a phenomenological reduction on the transcendental constitution of economic 
science. Only when considering this character of my text can we arrive at the point at which we 
can appreciate the liberating aspect of my core critique – namely, that that the practice of 
economic science is possible only as the oblivion of the motives that gave rise to it.  
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There certainly could be other phenomenologies of economics with perhaps less emphasis 
on the difference between phenomenology and economics – here their attitudes have been 
diametrically opposed; another could be less historical and closer to the philosophy of science; 
another closer to the writings of this or that economist or phenomenologist. The one at hand 
was written for the economist and against science. Accordingly there are two concluding tones, a 
pessimistic tone about economic science and an optimistic tone about liberation from it. I first 
sum up why economic science is phenomenologically unbearable in order to then move to the 
optimism for a renewed sensibility for economic life – at least for the sake of social 
responsibility in economic talk.  
 
 
Pessimistically Speaking, Economic Science is Insignificant – Necessarily 
 
The most least explicit object of concern of the preceding exercise was economic talk. It 
provides the discursive and historical environment of economic science. What economic talk 
consists of is rendered rather blank throughout the text. I did not say more than that it is 
affected by a notion of economic life as characterized at the beginning of the second part.  
The main patent concern was rather the scientific attitude that economics demands: the 
distance one takes and the aloofness one adopts toward economic talk in order to claim 
epistemic authority. How do economists distance themselves from the rest of economic talk? 
How do they demand to be listened. What is their relationship to their audience, to their 
profession, to their discipline, and to their past? Such questions circled around the notion of 
the ethos of economists. With the notion of the life-world I have promised an inquiry into the 
transcendental constitution of this ethos. The ethos of economists, phenomenologically 
speaking, is the locus of intellectual responsivity and, moreover, the condition of the 
significance of economics. What then is the result? What describes the ethos of the economist?  
If I had to draw a conclusion on the implicit image I presented of the “average ethos” of 
economists – on the what-kind-of-people question – then it would be that economists tend to be 
something of “moderate reformers”. They are moderate because they do share, in some way or 
another, the discreetness of Debreu. One never could make a career by calling out for 
revolutions. Neither the red nor the black flag was ever hauled up in the institutions of 
economics (liberals were labeled anarchists in the 1920s). It was rather the white flag on which 
was written: Please Don’t Ask: Who am I – Arguing This! Economic science, for the most 
part, was a defensive project.  
But economists always maintained their reformative spirit since, contrary to Debreu, they 
never completely gave up the belief in the expressive possibilities of their science. They 
continue believing that the theoretical perception of “the economy” has a meaning – be it the 
production and consumption of wealth, efficient resource allocation, information processes of 
a complex society, or whatever goes through one’s economic mind. I would even presume 
when speaking to an outspoken neoliberal economist that he or she never entirely gave up the 
belief that the market is a political institution, and moreover that economic life is a concrete 
part of life and does not pervade all of it. How else could one maintain one’s self-perception as 
an economist?  
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While holding on to their belief in the expressiveness of economic science, economists 
also believe that they are entitled to provide some economic services that are meaningful in a 
specific social and historical context without being mere expressions of special interests. Most 
economists may agree with Martin Bronfenbrenner “that academic life can be more than a 
consolation prize for not ‘mattering’ in the Real World. But also, that racial, religious and 
ideological quotas made Ivory Towers difficult to climb” (in Szenberg, Lamrattan 2004: 97). 
Economists are fairly “moderate reformers”, who believe themselves to be somewhat aloof to 
the pragmatic and all the more moral naiveties of economic talk, and for this reason avoid 
being too literary in their writings.  
In the course of the preceding remarks, I did, of course, encounter some economists who 
indeed deliberately used scientific authority in order to justify special political interests. If such 
economists have a strong mission, however, they show it openly and do not hide behind 
scientific authority. In these cases, if there is anything to reveal, it is rather trivial. If you do not 
like the Cato economists, then launch your own think tank. The Catos of this world came here 
to argue, and they need to be argued against. In more general terms, as long as the world that 
informs a piece of economic theory is in some way associated with the world that it envisions, 
it is sufficiently vulnerable to other economic talk. It should count as intellectual honesty if 
these writers were to oppose science and promote a partisan scholarship. Friedrich Hayek and 
Deirdre McCloskey are friends in this respect. Both believe that “Smithean” scholarship was 
and still is possible – I had only wanted to intervene in the party when Hayek flirted with von 
Neumann, and equally had called back McCloskey when making theory admissions to Arrow 
(2000: 224). 
In the other case when science is indeed used as a tool to serve politics in one’s own interest 
or that of the politicians who pay, that is, in the case of social engineering, it is the task of the 
discursive environment to unravel these intentions. For this purpose the work of historians 
and science studies are important for the operation of democracy, at least to the extent that 
they pose the critical question: Who Are You – Arguing This? Here, also, economic discourse 
beyond scientific authority is possible. Google “von Neumann” and “Target Committee”, and 
every single layman should have something to say about the application of GET to the 
“efficient allocation of resources”. 
Be they moderate reformers, partisan scholars, or social engineers, the preceding exercise 
went further than asking what kind of people economists are. The point was not to determine 
the ethos of economists and their social significance, but to consider the diminishing role and 
contestability of any ethos. The degeneration I exposed referred to the increasing irresponsivity 
of the ethos of economists to both their discursive origins and effects. Whatever the motives 
of the economist, it is difficult to live them out; whatever are the discursive effects, it is difficult 
to take responsibility for them. The incontestability of the scientist overshadows economists’ 
social character. Simplistically stated, if a motive for gaining this or that ethos in economic talk 
is “to be on the good side” – whatever that side is – economic science will not be very helpful, 
since it does not reward such motives. For economic science does not reward any motive that 
stem from economic talk – necessarily. To the contrary, one will more likely become 
indifferent to the question of who is on the good side of economic talk. Why? 
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The notion that emerged as the key to this argument of the diminishing ethos was the 
economic suspicion. Science was operational for liberating economists from this suspicion. This is 
the great attraction of the elevation of science. Economic science developed as that discursive 
practice which was able to avoid and to divert from the economic suspicion by means of arriving 
at a level of reflection that is beyond the question: Who are You – Arguing This! The 
scientification of economics happened as a series of manoeuvres of diversions from this blame. For 
this reason I stated a tendency toward formalism, in particular but not limited to mathematics, 
as well as to structuralism, in particular but not only in GET. Formalism as the title of lowering 
one’s tone, and the invisible hand as the title of saying less both stand for the withdrawal from 
the culture of the economic suspicion.  
The definite result of my narrative was: Yes, economics was successful in these 
manoeuvres. Yes, economic science came to be. It is there, fully situated within the institutions 
of science. The devastating result was, however, that this achievement had its drawback. The 
economic suspicion was the motive for the formation of a discursive identity of economic 
scientists, but at the same time accounts for the degeneration of this identity. Economists 
overcame the imposition of economic motives, however, only with the reversal of being 
haunted by another suspicion, the suspicion of meaning – that claiming anything must be beyond 
scientific authority.  
This reversal I have traced along the genetic code of economists’ ethos: scientific modesty 
is instituted as an opportunity to gain attention in a world where there is nothing but moral 
clamor. This modesty turned into aloofness and further into discreetness rather than scholarly 
respect for matters of concern. This discreetness applied not only to the heated concerns of 
the others, but also to one’s own concerns, which, after all, made economists forget their own 
motives for engaging in science. As a result, irony and cynicism about the belief in the worth of 
one’s effort is systematically induced. In this sense, economic science is the liberation from the 
economic suspicion, and has its drawback in the liberation from the weight of meaning. For 
this reason, economics, after the formalist revolution, continuously evoked jeers of irrelevance. 
If the very fact of meaning – its weight, as I said – is experienced as a limit to science – which I 
indeed stated for the case of Gerard Debreu – then a “scientific claim” turns out to be an 
affective and existential acrobatic maneuver beyond phenomenological imagination.  
The case I made against science is clear: Economic claims cannot be made with scientific 
authority. Scientification required becoming insensible to all possible sources of meaning 
bestowal for economic theory. Economists have never managed to separate their (political) 
bias and their (political) relevance. Such a distinction is only possible by excluding all meaning 
from the structure of economic theory. This, however, constitutes such a rupture that it is 
impossible to maintain one’s self-understanding as an economist. In this sense, the 
scientification of economics is at the same time the degeneration of the economic claims 
possible in science. As a consequence, economics enters its discursive surrounding only as a 
result of “misunderstandings” for which no economist is responsible. The locus from which 
economists speak is always about to lose itself in either irrelevance or mere talk beyond science. 
The ‘seat of economic science in life’ is thus inherently fragile – has, as it were, only one foot – 
namely, the misunderstanding that saying less with a lower tone suffices as authority. A light 
shove, as I promised, is enough.  
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The rupture represented by economic science is not of a philosophical, but rather – though 
I have carefully avoided this term – of an existential kind. In their theories, economists cannot 
tell by any means about their motives for theorizing. Economists have to theorize at the edge 
of irrelevance, and so at the edge of not understanding oneself in ones practices. Like in the 
case of the petition of the French students, there is a clash between one’s economic interest 
and the demands imposed on its expression in the name of science. The interest of economists 
is the supplement of their pursuit of science. Economists are the blind spot of their own universe 
of discourse, the trace of their commitment to science. As long as these motives are that 
through which economics can possibly “refer back” to the life-world, my pessimist tone in its 
most propounded version is: the phenomenological conditions of the possibility of economic science are the 
condition of the impossibility of it significance.  
My pessimism cannot be stronger. When I reverse this argument, however, we gain a 
feeling for its constructive implications. If economics became insignificant by avoiding the 
economic suspicion, then the economic suspicion is that instance which makes economic talk 
significant: the economic suspicion is the condition of the possibility of intellectual responsivity in economic talk. 
An expressive intellectual practice is inconceivable without the ambiguity of (political) bias and 
(political) relevance – that is, only as long as one is vulnerable to the economic suspicion. If I 
said that the life-world is the world through which an intellectual interest is possible, the 
economic suspicion functions as this demand of meaning. The economic suspicion, in its threat 
for discursive identity, in its ability to bind all economic solutions, judgments, and claims back 
to their motives, denotes the very possibility for economic reflection – reflection as opposed to 
the abstraction from the economic suspicion. If reflection means for Husserl being able to ask 
at each point ‘What am I truly seeking?’ then this question in economic talk translates to ‘Who 
are You – Arguing This!’ 
Life-world, I said at the beginning, is the locus where the problems come from. The 
economic suspicion is constitutive of the “having” of a life-world when engaging in intellectual 
efforts invoked by economic life. To face the economic suspicion is to acknowledge a level of 
discourse that always remains to be considered and that never ceases to give us to think. It 
keeps an economic claim from being forgotten in the archives of truth. The life-world is not 
the world from which science abstracts and later comes back again. This is the empirical world. 
The life-world, as I announced at the beginning, is not the world that is left to be considered, 
but it is the world that demands to be considered. It is the experienced world of the scientist that 
lets him dither about the success of science, and makes him vulnerable to the question Who 
are You – Arguing This. It is there that sensibility in economic talk comes from. From this 
point on I can turn my pessimism into optimism.  
 
 
The Phenomenological End of Economics and the Diminishing Need  
for Economics Departments: The Waning Love of Economics and Science 
 
Let me dwell further on this reversal in order to appreciate its implicit optimism. First, which I 
suppose to be the greatest obstacle for any economist in order to appreciate my conclusion: in 
what sense did economic science come to an end?  
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What exactly came to an end? Economic theory? No. Innovations of its scientificity? No. 
Although my historical narrative was phrased along a seemingly methodological and theoretical 
issue (formalism and the invisible hand), neither issue could let me conclude on the end of 
economics. Formalism as well as structuralism are titles of the ethos of economists. Formalism 
was the title of the search for a level of reflection beyond special interests, while the invisible 
hand was the title of the cultivation of the theoretical perception of “the economy”. The 
problem of formalism and the invisible hand is not a matter of a feature of theory erroneously 
developed in the history of economic thought. Rather, I have discussed them as a matter of the 
very possibility of economists’ scientific ethos. In this sense, the formalist revolution of the 
1950s was not only a blunder that never happened before and will never happen again, but 
showed something of the constitution of economics as a science. 
In what sense, then, have I argued that economic science has passed the peak of its life 
cycle? What exactly came to an end? The time when economics made sense in its environment 
(the historicist point)? Or the time when economists were deceived on the contradiction of 
economics (the philosophical point)? Neither. For my notion of the oblivion of the life-world was a 
historiographical guide beyond the history and philosophy of science. But did I really avoid the 
ambiguity between history and philosophy?  
(a) Did I not present a historical argument in the sense that the life-world qua culture was 
moving ahead of the institutions of economic science? Perhaps once economic talk was 
arranged in such a way that there were plenty of opportunities to claim scientific authority, 
above all during the century of the battle of ideologies, but today increasingly less? Did I not 
argue that economic science, given our present times after 1945, is no longer an appropriate 
institution? Are economics departments remnants of modernity in an increasingly 
“postmodern” world beyond the triad of science, growth and technology? Did I not suggest 
that one no longer could believe, today, after 1945, after the fall of the wall, after the fall of the 
two towers, in the scientific engineering of freedom? The drawback of the belief in science, 
which I illustrated with Gerard Debreu’s life – is it not a symptom of the end of modernity as 
observed everywhere in Western culture? Is economics thus outdated because it can no longer 
be critical for the present culture? Was it appropriate perhaps one or two centuries ago, but not 
today? Time passed, and with it the time of economic science? 
(b) Or did I present a rather essentialist and teleological narrative that economic science 
was ill-founded since its beginnings? Did I not argue that the conflict between political 
relevance and political bias was already present at its beginning? Did I not show that at each 
point in the modern history of economic science (since the epistemic revolution in the 17th 
century down to the Bourbakian trauma of the 1950s) there is a latent conflict between the 
interest in an economic claim and the commitment to science? Did I not argue that already the 
Urstiftung of economics entailed the germ of an instability that could only be hidden as long as 
one diverted too-indiscreet questions? Did I not argue that Nicholas Barbon and Nicholas 
Bourbaki merely represent two sides of the same misunderstanding: the misunderstanding that 
referential truth-claims about “the economy” are possible? Did I not suggest that economic 
theory was doomed anyway to dissolve into the void of the axiomatic method? Was it not only 
history that blurred the contradictory reality “of” and of economics, which finally in the 
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formalist revolution could become evident? Was not everything already predetermined from 
the outset? 
These two arguments are neither plausible nor intended. The historiography of the 
oblivion of the life-world was designed in order to avoid the choice between these alternatives. 
Reducing the narrative to one or the other would miss the transcendental materialism of the 
oblivion of the life-world. It is true that I stated a steady history of a misunderstanding that 
began in the 18th century and later multiplied, reproduced, and developed a life of its own. It is 
true that I stated a, say, Serresian association between the 17th century cynicism of giving up the 
pretence to do all for the mere honor of the Kingdom, and the 20th century cynicism of letting 
all humanistic laments crash at the wall of formal analysis. Yes.  
But this does not impose an essence or undermine the historical reality of economics by 
any means. Stating a misunderstanding that made possible the contests over the epistemic 
character of economic talk of at least one century, if not three, is neither to reduce matter to 
philosophy nor to history. If there were an essence of economics, then these historical 
renewals of the practices that made it possible to hide the fragility of economics and thus to 
evolve in a rich history. The oblivion of the life-world accounts for this historical richness 
rather than subsuming it – which is the philosophical failure. And neither does it subsume this 
history under a specific historical a priori of meaning, after which there could be simply 
another phase of epistemic culture in economic talk – which is the historical failure.  
As long as I focused on the contests that constituted economics rather than the contest 
about the true essence of economics, my narrative thus presented both the rise of the 
appearance of an essence in economics as well as the rise of the difference between economics 
and the socio-historical realities that surround it. My narrative was thus transcendental in the 
sense that it asks for the conditions of the possibility of the identity of economics. But it was 
material in the sense that these conditions are rooted in nothing but the concrete practices of 
economists as the attempts to appropriate the socio-historical environment. Speaking of the 
end of modern economic thought means that these contests no longer trigger a deepening of 
the modernist belief in science. The basic tension between the reality “of” and of science is no 
longer productive, but, to the contrary, befalls and works against scientific optimism in 
economics.  
If my tone seemed radical, then it was because I did not argue against science in light of an 
idea of true science, as all modernist critiques did, including Husserl. I did not make a plea for a 
new economic science that could emerge after economists began to reflect. I ventured that 
such a reflection would be a move away from any image of true science – whatever epistemic 
principle. There is certainly a lot to say about the future of “technocratic empiricism”, of 
neuroeconomics, or about the future of heterodox economics. But there is no reason to 
believe that that these innovations of the scientificity of economics will strengthen the 
discursive identity of economic sciences. Rather, I would expect that they contribute to the 
loosening of it.  
I have suggested that there is no reason to expect another, third wave of scientific 
optimism in economics. Which political vision (in Heilbroner’s and Milberg’s sense) could 
nourish this scientific optimism? Commercial freedom, freedom from social miseries, and 
other forms of the modern liberation of man – who is willing to invest such visions into a 
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renewal of scientific optimism in economics? Recall Hayek, who in 1949 called for a new 
vision of liberal intellectualism:  
 
[W]e must be able to offer a new liberal program which appeals to the imagination. We must make the 
building of a free society once more an intellectual adventurer, a deed of courage. What we lack is a 
liberal Utopia, a program which seems neither a defense of things as they are nor a diluted socialism, 
but a truly liberal radicalism (1949: 384) 
 
In the last six decades since Hayek’s call, have there been any steps taken within academic 
economics toward such a renewed vision, be it a liberal or any other hope?  
As radical as this anti-scientism seems, it is not great news. Many of the political 
implications regarding the institutions of economics have been drawn more or less explicitly 
many times. Most economists share a general skepticism about science in the same sense as 
they know that being merely an economist does no good to their intellectual life. Is not not being 
merely an economist the new intellectual virtue after Debreu? Economists share the perception 
that economic theory never does the actual work of arriving at a claim, for which one rather 
needs intuitions called on to be “sociological” or “psychological” or any other 
“interdisciplinary” ally economists have taken since the 1970s. Among many others, 
Heilbroner and Milberg conclude similarly that economics should be a sub-discipline of other 
social sciences which “follows in the wake of sociology and politics rather than proudly leading 
the way for them” (1995: 126). Is this not, even if secretly, common sense among economists? 
If so, let us get serious about it. 
The commentary of economics agrees. Here, for example, is Colander on the teaching of 
“New Millenium Economics”:  
 
[The] increased specialization has been accompanied by a redefinition of boundaries of graduate 
economics programs within institutions. In the 1990s, firm institutional boundaries existed between 
public policy schools, arts and sciences schools, engineering schools, business schools, law schools, and 
medical schools. In 2050, these boundaries have broken down. Most of the existing specialities that 
comprise economics evolved of a combination of schools or programs within schools (…) In fact, one 
might say, that in 2050 there are no longer ‘economists’, but, instead, health economists, statistical 
specialists, simulations experts, who focus on economic issues, public finance specialists, and so on 
(Colander 2000: 124) 
 
Economists from economics departments, according to Colander, will lose their power in 
other departments, where economic scientists no longer teach the so-called “economic 
aspects” of social life. Economic scientists, anyway, never had authority over the meaning, let 
alone scope of the “economic aspects” of life. Economic theory will increasingly be replaced 
by the economics that stems from outside economics departments, and, peu à peu, the very 
notion of an epistemic economic domain vanishes. Weintraub agrees:  
 
In the major American research universities, economic statistics has migrated to departments of 
statistics, research and teaching in economic policy are now moving to departments and schools of 
public policy, political economy has moved to political science departments, and managing studies are 
migrating to departments of management and of sociology (2002: 12). 
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To which I should add philosophers of economics moving to the philosophy of science 
department, and historians of economics moving to the history of science department. Let the 
commentary of economics not be the backbone of the remnant skeleton of economics 
otherwise falling into itself – a blame to which the present exercise should be immune. 
Consider again what identifies economics departments today. Economics of (rational) 
choice, for example, can be and is indeed conducted just as well at the psychology or sociology 
department. If it comes to the market, the actual determinants of choice do not matter anyway 
(take the Bourbaki lesson!). The methods of economists too – be it game theory, experimental 
economics, or complexity studies – can be and are used by all social sciences. Notions other 
than choice that represent the research of economists simply do not warrant a noteworthy 
profile in economic talk – such as institutional change, emergent properties, information 
entropy, prospect theory, let alone oxytocin when speaking of trust. Who recognizes 
economists in such ideas? Who would want to maintain economics departments on the basis 
of such notions? The research done at economics departments could increasingly be done just 
as well at other departments. One could design – in order to arrive after all at a real hypothesis – 
an index of the materialism over which economists compete with other sciences. My hunch 
would be that there are diminishing sources on which economists exclusively rely.  
Or consider the notion of (dis)equilibrium, which is the homemade concept of economic 
theory of the 20th century. Has economic theory without equilibrium not been the desire of 
economists since 1954? But is not this desire only held secretly, because economists know that 
they would lose their discursive identity if they were to give up this notion entirely? Given the 
negative closure the rejection of equilibrium economics provides, is it not time to face up to 
the consequences of giving up the notion of equilibrium? Backhouse (2004) tried to rescue the 
notion of equilibrium in its opposition to history by arguing that “equilibrium is one of the 
many tools that can be used to understand history” (303). But what if (dis)equilibrium 
theorizing has the inherent tendency to make the economist forget about this “tool”-character, 
as I argued? Is not the lesson to be drawn that one should recognize that economic reason (for 
which the notion of equilibrium stands) cannot be anticipated by a theory, but needs the 
intellectual care that is only possible within history?  
Consider, conversely, economics departments from the outsider point of view. The 
concepts that identify economics are less and less reflected by the practices of economists. Are 
there any academic economists left who actually exert epistemic authority in favor of the 
(largely neoliberal) policies that are associated with economic theory? Did such economists not 
to a large extent move to think tanks? The time of the scientific engineering of liberty has 
passed. The notion of freedom becomes public good in all economic talk, and there are many 
signs that the liberal tradition in its neoliberal shape loses its discursive monopoly over it. Who, 
in Western countries, would still want to rely on scientific optimism when claiming authority 
on the meaning of freedom? Would that not be one of the most liberating moments for the 
modern history of economic discourses, let alone Western democracies, if “freedom” became 
contested rather than violently instrumentalized?  
The authority economists rely on, therefore, increasingly does not stem from their own 
science. Whatever one intends to argue for, whatever is one’s discursive interest in economic 
talk, one can do just the same without claming science. Scientific authority is no longer critical 
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for the economist. Even if the opportunities of science hang high, even if one can doubtless 
still attract attention, make politics or even business with scientific authority, there is simply a 
diminishing need for it. There is a diminishing need for economics departments. It is time to get 
serious about what most economists know anyhow, and tear down the discursive walls around 
economic science. My radicalism boils down to the simple claim that economics, as demanded 
by almost all economists in the form of a plea for more “interdisciplinarity”, will dissolve into 
other disciplines. What makes my argument seem more radical than the commonsense 
skepticism about economics is thus merely that economists have not yet drawn the 
consequences from their skepticism. Face up to it, there is no longer any reason for a further 
development that could reinforce or even renew the institutions of economics. What could be 
the next guarantee of its power? Who could enforce it? Of course, the triad of Chicago-MIT-
Stanford is Big. But it is not old.  
How could I better show how harmless the post-scientific world is than by showing that it 
no longer merely lies in the future? Economics departments are already about to close down. The 
actual divorce of economics and science, without economists having realized it, has factually 
already taken place. The peak of the efforts to unify economics analytically has already passed. 
Economics can disappear into the many economics of’s, thus merging into sub-disciplines with 
their own theoretical interests – which makes it less and less necessary to study economic 
theory. What remains in economic departments is this black hole of the analytic core of 
“economic theory”, which, as I have argued throughout, will collapse as soon as it loses its 
supporting flesh of those who continue interpreting it – the skeleton of “the economy”. 
The institutions representing scientific authority in economic talk – economics 
departments – are not in a sustainable situation. They are free to dissolve. The age of science in 
economic writings has passed. Economic science passed its peak, running downhill, fun but 
effortless; everything that could have been achieved has been achieved, everything that could 
be said, is said. 
Economists, to be more illustrative, relate to the authority of science like waning lovers in 
the days before they part. Afraid of losing the authority of science, one embraces it in a last 
attempt even stronger, but by doing so only stirs up the burden of the relationship that neither 
side can continue to bear. The only way out is to come to the point at which an anxiously 
awaited decision comes down to the simple recognition of a past: that the actual divorce has 
already taken place. Then relationships can fall in the twinkle of an eye – a light shove, I 
promised, no more. 
 
 
Yet the Optimism Lies in the Reversal:  
The Liberation from Science to a Renewed Intellectual Sensibility 
 
Implausibility remains, in particular in light of the many economists who crowed year after 
year at the ASSA meetings and put intellectual efforts into the worth of their profession of 
considerable affective density. This, granted, cannot be a misunderstanding. Affects cannot lie! 
And economics matters, yes! How can I then propitiate the economists’ minds? What is the 
good news?  
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The task of my critical exercise was to address the economist (rather than to provide a 
philosophical or social justification or explanation). Obviously this does not mean to address 
the economist in person – which could only be done formally (Dear, Mr. X). Addressing was 
meant in a strictly phenomenological sense of pointing to the subjective constitution of 
economics that is manifest in the ethos of economists. Certainly, I hardly address economists by 
stating that they lack any intellectual ethos, as long as addressing means always to address the 
other in his or her ethos. I hardly invite someone to a renewed reflection by undermining his or 
her discursive integrity. I can exploit the skepticism and the irony of economists to some 
extent, but as long as I support economists in their attempts to make sense of themselves, such 
critique risks even reinforcing the dilemma I charged.  
Yes, economists do try to show a positive attitude about the social world they live in. Most 
have found their place within their institutions somewhere between theory and politics, neither 
really here nor there. They can rely on a considerable biography of interest and care about 
particular problems that partially stem from general economic talk, mostly from the century of 
economics proper, and sometimes also from a theoretical sense. The usual talk among 
academic economists is to arrive at an economic claim with economic theory. These 
conversations work as long as one is able to maintain, to remember and also to share one’s 
intuitions about the world of economic life.  
In no line did I doubt it. Even some mathematical (no pause) economists manage to live a 
considerable expressive life in various political institutions. Read, for example, the astonishing 
biography of Graciela Chichilnisky, a student of Debreu and maker of the Kyoto protocol (in 
Szenberg, Ramrattan 2004: 108 ff.). Somewhat better known, Gary Becker, the personification 
of the insensibility of “the economic approach”, also showed strong emotions about his work: 
 
I began to lose interest in economics during my senior (third) year because it did not seem to deal with 
important social problems. I contemplated transferring to sociology, but found that subject too difficult. 
Fortunately, I decided to go to the University of Chicago for graduate work in economics. My first 
encounter in 1951 with Milton Friedman’s course on microeconomics renewed my excitement about 
economics. He emphasized that economic theory was not a game played by clever academicians, but 
was a powerful tool to analyze the real world. His course was filled with insights both into the structure 
of economic theory and its application to practical and significant questions. That course and 
subsequent contacts with Friedman had a profound effect on the direction taken by my research 
(Becker 1992: autobiography, nobelprize.org). 
 
If even Becker was able to believe in the relevance of his “economic approach”, why not those 
economists who engage in conversations on the basis of those theoretical innovations of the 
last two decades which tried to cope with the irrelevance associated with Becker’s work?  
Economists do engage in decent expressive activities. Many learned to associate economic 
life with “rationality” or lack of it – whatever that means, for most it does mean something! 
Economic theory may commit the economist to some caution, but does not withhold him or 
her from making actual claims that are identifiable as stemming from his or her expertise. In 
order to also propitiate the minds of those who believe in the theoretical innovations of the last 
decade: Yes, certainly, the expressive life of economists may flourish more likely in a world in 
which Cobb-Douglas functions and topology are no longer the gate-keepers of publishing. For 
some, emotions heat up when reading ‘neuroeconomics has shown that emotions matter for 
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decision making’, although it is not clear who has ever had doubts about that. Debreu would 
turn red if someone said he assumed so. And Becker would simply laugh.  
Now and then some economists may even come to the point of really being convinced 
about this or that social agenda or political reform. Then they draw from their intellectual 
experiences the forces to enter one of the countless battles in economic talk. Some know why 
they are liberals, why Marxism can no longer be updated, why the minimum wage ruins the 
state of the poor, why monetary institutions need to be more centralized, why foreign aid is 
better than trade agreements, why agricultural policies in the U.S. ruin developing countries, 
etc. Others perhaps enjoy arriving at the point of debating how economic anxieties nourish the 
political violence of the day. The discursive depths of the culture of the economic suspicion are 
wide. And everywhere the economist can run into those who have an opinion on why the talk 
of economic scientists is biased or irrelevant. There are plenty of opportunities to respond.  
In no single line have I deprived economists of such a factual ethos. It was not up to me to 
describe or in any sense scrutinize their factual ethos, let alone to show what exactly are the 
depths of economic talk. This the economist has to know! Precisely this ability and necessity of 
entering economic talk is the locus where a renewed reflection can take place. The punch-line 
of the preceding exercise is thus: I did not show that economists lack ethos, that there are no 
economic claims made in economics, that economists are not more than Bourbakians or 
Debreuvians, that economics is mere mathematics, that economists are like Taylor workers 
thoughtlessly cramming discovered interpretations into ready-made axioms, etc. I promised not 
to contribute to this choir of mourning for economics. Indeed, what I have shown instead is 
that there never has been any “economic scientist”, that there never was any “Bourbakian 
economist”, that no economic claim could ever be made because of the commitment to 
science, that no economist could ever truly avoid his or her political bias when making 
politically relevant claims. Impossibly. Otherwise, one cannot live up to an actual self-perception 
as an economist. My narrative, specifically the parable of Debreu, showed the necessity of a 
factual ethos of economists.  
What I have shown is that if there is any ethos of economists, it is not nourished by scientific authority. 
If economists make claims, then its authority is never guaranteed by science but by other 
sources. The necessity, with which I made this case, is of a transcendental kind. It concerns 
economists as those who “accomplish” and “achieve” economic theory. It concerns 
themselves. Hence, with transcendental discreetness, I avoided talking about the actual ethos of 
economists. My aim was not to show that there are no economists present in their economic 
theories, but that such presence is at risk in economic science. At stake was not what economic 
science, but its very possibility as an intellectual practice. The worth of The Phenomenology of 
Economics needs to be judged regarding how it disclosed this locus of criticism. 
Could I not have come to such a conclusion much more easily without the 
phenomenological roundabout of the theoretical experience? I could have simply shown that 
in each actual economic claim there are always irreducible economic intuitions at work that do 
not stem from, nor are justifiable in the context of, science – even in the case of Leon Walras, 
John von Neumann, Kenneth Arrow, Gary Becker, etc. There is always a hidden intuition of 
economic life that may give rise to scientific optimism in economics, but, when looking closely, 
actually works against it. Arguing so was a matter of a philosophy, rather than a 
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phenomenology, of economics. Only as long as the object of economists’ concern remains 
implicit – is “put into brackets” – this concern itself could be made an object of a history. Only 
then could economists’ involvement in economics be made the object of a narrative.  
Here, thus, is the reversal of my pessimism about the presence and future of economic 
science: Economists are free from its phenomenological contradiction if they experience their interest expressed or 
in any sense at stake when doing economics. Such a benchmark cannot serve as a criterion to delineate 
good, phenomenologically enlightened, significant theories from others. It needs to be 
answered by economists themselves! The Phenomenology of Economics results in this 
question, the urgency, not the answer of which, this text was dedicated to. Perhaps some 
economists can nod without hesitation. Then we could close this book with a deep sigh. Yet I 
have given sufficient reason to believe that not all do so. It is in this sense that I charge 
economists with being the accomplishing subjects of their intellectual lives. It is a call for the 
economist to reflect on the motives which give rise to an engagement in economic science. To 
do so remains the task of economists. And so the present exercise was indeed a truly 
phenomenological reduction to the accomplishing intellectual life of economists. 
 
 
Some Prospects of a Post-Scientific Culture of Economic Talk  
and the Further Task of a Genetic Phenomenology of Economic Life 
 
Can I say more about this promise for a new intellectual sensibility than that it is suppressed by 
science? Are there concrete prospects for a post-epistemic period of economic talk? It should be 
clear that the punch line I just formulated disappears if I now urge myself to propose a 
different, say, principle that is exploitable in just another “theory”. All I can do is to propose a 
different attitude than the scientific one.  
In order to appreciate the liberating effect of losing scientific authority, one may follow 
this guide to a new culture of economic talk. It is the reversal of what I called the genetic code 
of the oblivion of the life-world. Practicing economics, I argued, is the unlearning of how to 
mobilize the forces of meaning to such an extent that one become irresponsive to them. 
Science, by means of the separation of the reality “of” and of science, directs these forces into 
channels so that they are experienced as too weighty and thus appear repellent. Instead of 
mobilizing the weight of meaning as the pathos of intellectual life, meaning evokes the 
uneasiness of an inadequacy, if not an estrangement. The liberating insight is thus: Only in 
science, only under the necessity of exerting epistemic authority, is the weight of meaning experienced as a burden. 
In the words of my narrative, only as long as the economist is committed to theorize on a level 
where the economic suspicion is not at work do economic claims appear too big to be worth 
science. The pessimistic tone I largely adopted can thus be easily reversed into an optimistic 
tone – yes, an enthusiasm about the liberation from the burden of science. 
Whence I can depart with some stronger implications for a new post-epistemic culture. 
Rather than an invitation to an “everything goes” attitude, it invites us to look further into the 
phenomenological constituents of economic life, in that it affects the intellectual efforts of 
articulating it. The notion of the life-world implies that intellectual activity is experientially late. 
It needs to be affected. If it is true that all intellectual life is a response to…, then the economic 
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suspicion tells us something of economic lived experience. This would be the first question of a 
genetic phenomenology of economic life: to present a (transcendental) genesis of the economic 
suspicion.  
The open question is thus: whence the cultures of economic suspicion? And how do they 
constitute the weight of meaning in economic talk? How is economic life experienced that it 
serves as a seemingly infinite source for this suspicion? What of economic life makes it so 
brittle that it continuously gives rise to so much clamor – particularly but not exclusively in the 
last four or five centuries of capitalism? Such was the question of a phenomenological genealogy 
of economic life. “The generation of the economic suspicion” could be a historical guide 
through modern economic history, just as the “oblivion of the life-world” was for modern 
economic science. How do the experiences of needs and desires, acquiring means and having 
ends, private and political life – how do these experiences become contested within the various 
cultures of economic talk of today, after WWII, before the 19th century, in Britain of the 18th 
century, as well at the times when economic modernity settled down?  
Such a project could certainly not justify the existence of economic science. It could not be 
an inquiry that resulted in a claim to referential truth. It would rather arrive at an economic 
transcendental materialism in that intellectual life itself appears in colors for which modern 
science as such is blind. For did I not show that economic life cannot be matter of epistemic 
concern, since as soon as one does, one slides off into the structuralism of “the economy”? 
Economic life is a matter of the transcendental genealogy of intellectual life, not an object of 
inquiry. Economic life does not satisfy epistemic concerns, for it is constitutive of it – which I 
believe not even Marxists have ever fully internalized. With this final claim I have responded to 
Aristotle’s motto that stands at the beginning of this exercise: Regarding economic life a 
“proof” is not necessary. Thus, the end of epistemic authority of what is and what ought in economic life.  
That such a genealogy happens “below” any epistemic concern of science is clear when 
considering another substantial implication of my critique – namely, considering the status of 
“the economy”. Regarding the broadly-conceived narrative from the temporal order of the 
oikonomia to the structural order of “the economy”, there is a clear conclusion: to the contrary 
of what the formalist revolution supposedly has accomplished, “the economy” is not a generic 
object to be studied, but rather the correlate of the intellectual discreetness of economists. The 
structuralist turn in economic talk from the oikonomia to “the economy” has never been fully 
carried out. I thus propose strongly that we give up speaking about “the economy”. 
As long as no economic claims ever stem from the theoretical perception of “the 
economy”, economic talk can be liberated from it without restricting its expressive potential. 
To the contrary – reference to “the economy” hinders our ability to speak out concretely, 
frankly, and openly. Did my narrative not suggest that there is no such thing as an abstract, 
dissolved core of an analytic, scientific object, “the economy” in that it could satisfy an interest 
in its own right? Do we not have to give up the belief that one could talk about “the economy” 
as a way of talking about economic life? The renewal of intellectual sensibility requires such 
“bracketing” of “the economy”. As a new phenomenological imperative for economic talk: 
Never speak about “the economy”!  
Economic talk “after science” will be organized less by the authority of claims than by the 
various cultures of the economic suspicion. Recall what I have said about the nature of 
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economic talk before there was economic science. Economic talk did not have a distinct 
discursive identity. People appealed to various authorities and therefore participated in 
different discourses. This is what economic talk in a post-scientific world could return to. The 
unity of economic discourses depends on the presence of scientific authority – that is, on the 
presence of those believing that “the economy” is indeed an object rather than a rhetorical 
strategy of diverting attention from something else. Economic talk is not unified because of its 
object, but because of a particularly nagging suspicion that can potentially show up at any 
moment. Economic talk is inherently plural – or better: there is no economic talk, but only the 
nagging of a suspicion.  
Having said that, I do not have much to say in reply to those philosophers with 
deconstructive inclinations who suspect me as having hidden a dichotomy of life and structure, 
as Derrida once suspected Husserl (1980). Did I work with an operational opposition of life 
and structure, of materialism and formalism, or even of science and philosophy that I have not 
argued for because it allowed me to argue? To the extent that the preceding exercise had a 
disclosing character – rather showing and asking than proving and persuading – I did at last 
rely on that opposition, yes. But there was nothing to hide, for nothing remained a promise. 
The promised sensibility was at work in the preceding exercise, even if not made an object of 
inquiry. In this way this text has been, as noted above, a prolegomena to another sensibility – no 
more.  
 
 
Economists of the World: Leave Science –  
at least for the Sake of Social Responsibility 
 
Just like the first words, so are the last reserved for indulging in pamphleteerism. I argued 
against scientism on the background of a clear political vision. What may seem like epistemic 
nihilism is actually an urgent political agenda. Whether one argues in light of an idea of real 
science or not is not a matter of how “post-modern” we are in our epistemology, but is a 
matter of a political conviction underlying The Phenomenology of Economics: that economic 
science does not deserve the institutional power it exerts today, be it in the university or in 
non-academic political and social discourses, or on whatever level of economic talk. Arguing 
against science was a way to argue against discursive power and violence. Even for those 
economists who did not learn a thing about their intellectual sensibilities, I hope the preceding 
exercise was suggestive enough for them to seriously reconsider the epistemic authority they 
claim – not for themselves, but for others. Claiming authority happens after all against others. In 
their name, I would like to conclude. 
The intellectual responsibility in science, which represents the moral horizon of the 
preceding contemplations, is the capacity to give a response to the experiences that make 
science interesting. Social responsibility of science requires being able to respond to the 
motives of others who are subjected to epistemic authority. Reflection on the motives that give 
rise to an intellectual life is a condition of becoming socially responsible for one’s claim. In this 
sense economic science must fall for the sake of social responsibility.  
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The reasoning is clear: After the discursive gaps that I described in the first part, after the 
history of the diversion of the economic suspicion presented in the second part, and after the 
scandal of Debreu’s biography covered in the third part, I concluded that scientific authority is 
achieved by means of ignoring one’s own motives. Economic science is constituted in such a 
way that the motives for “doing” it and “using” it exclude one other. Economics is therefore 
necessarily socially irresponsible. It excludes as such a reflection on its social use. A change of 
the connotations of an economic concept can change the world without economists even 
noticing. The problem of social irresponsibility, therefore, cannot be solved within economic 
science. If it is inherent to scientific authority to be irresponsive to the motives that give rise to 
it, but this authority nevertheless finds its bypass into economic talk, then economists cannot 
be charged for the consequences of their work. Being intellectually irresponsive for the sake of 
science, economists avoid all responsibility for the social effects of their scientific authority. 
To avoid the economic suspicion is thus not problematic in that it makes economics 
politically irrelevant. Economics always finds its way into its discursive surrounding where 
there are people who (unknowingly or secretly) find associations with a political position. And 
if the very phenomenological constitution of economic science requires that it not be blamed 
for being the delinquents of ideologies, economists have to be charged with this responsibility. 
Economic science must fall for the sake of moral integrity in economic talk. 
Should it not be at the heart of the discussion of economic theory how it enters the public 
debate? Should economists not direct all their energy to the uses and misuses of their theories? 
Should it not be the first historical concern of economists how they contributed to the project 
of modernity, insofar as it ended up with a tombstone reading “1945”? Should it not be the 
first question of every history class which possible violence the project of a science of wealth 
did to the moral architecture of the household? Should it not be a primary concern whether the 
economic suspicion comes from or is the result of the many political diasporas of the last 
centuries? Should it not be a nagging question in economists’ political awareness how liberty in 
markets was supposed to free us from those who lead, but took alliance with the greatest 
violence of the last decades? Should not the first question in an introductory course be what 
epistemic authority could possibly amount to in a world that has seemingly left behind the 
opposition of socialism and capitalism? Should not the first question of every new generation 
of economists be: What are the burning questions of today? Should not be the first and 
permanent task of economists be to be responsible for how their own reality affects the reality 
they claim? Should economists not finally face the economic suspicion instead of evading it? 
Reverse this argument: Not claiming authority, not being certain, not attempting to 
persuade are the acts of social responsibility. Economic talk draws its intellectual force from its 
vulnerability. Exposing oneself to the question of Who Are You – Arguing This! is to show such 
vulnerability. Economists are most capable of taking social responsibility when they do not rely 
on the authority of science – when they expose their own skin. 
The walls around economic science have to fall for the sake of social responsibility! As soon as 
one claims scientific authority, one risks being incapable of taking responsibility for what 
others will do with this authority. To take social responsibility requires one to be within, not 
beyond economic talk. Members of the AEA and all their friends: Resign! 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
 
 
Aan de hand van de fenomenologische notie van ‘de levenswereld’ formuleer ik in deze 
dissertatie een kritiek op de economische wetenschap. Deze kritiek werk ik in drie delen op 
drie verschillende manieren uit. Het eerste deel (Discours) beschrijft de discursieve situering van 
hedendaagse economen met betrekking tot hun openbare, professionele en pedagogische 
ethos. Het tweede deel (Geschiedenis) reconstrueert de sociale geschiedenis van de 
verwetenschappelijking van de economie. Betoogd wordt dat verwetenschappelijking 
plaatsvond door het vermijden van economische claims en dat de formalistische revolutie van 
de jaren 1950 het einde is van deze geschiedenis. Deel drie (Biografie) beschrijft de 
levensgeschiedenis van Gerard Debreu als de centrale figuur in deze formalistische revolutie. 
Het schandaal van zijn biografie is dat hij ondanks het feit dat hij zich nooit als een econoom 
zag, in 1983 de Nobelprijs voor de economie ontving.  
Op deze drie manieren toon ik aan dat de economische wetenschap wordt geconstitueerd 
door een vergeten van de levenswereld. Nauwkeuriger gezegd, economen kunnen alleen dan 
aansprak maken op wetenschappelijke autoriteit wanneer zij de motivaties die hen tot het 
bedrijven van deze wetenschap drijven, vergeten. Op wetenschappelijke autoriteit aansprak te 
maken betekent dan tegelijkertijd een conflict in het intellectuele leven van de econoom. 
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